

THRACE AND THE ATHENIAN ELITE, CA. 550-338 BCE

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# THRACE AND THE ATHENIAN ELITE, CA. 550-338 BCE

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This dissertation examines the personal ties between elite Athenians and Thrace from the mid sixth century to the mid fourth century BCE in four case studies – the Philaids and the Thracian Chersonese, Dieitrephes and the massacre at Mycalessus, the northern campaigns of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, and the fourth century mercenary general Iphicrates. In order to highlight further the particular qualities of those elites who were drawn to Thrace, the final chapter examines figures that shared several traits with Athenian Thracophiles but did not make extensive use of Thracian ties. The relationship between Athens and Thrace is explored in terms of three broad categories – political, military, and cultural.

Given that there continued to be ambitious elites in Athens even after Solon's reforms and the subsequent climate of increasing political equality between male citizens, Thrace served as a political safety valve. Thrace was a place to which elites could remove themselves should they be unwilling or unable to engage in the prevailing ideological system and should mechanisms like ostracism fail to achieve the desired result, such as the removal of their more powerful competition.

Experience with Thracians was often the catalyst for military innovation. Several Athenians were pioneers in adopting Thracian methods of warfare. Thrace was a forum for experimentation as it was a long way from the pitched hoplite battles

that were the norm between mainland Greek *poleis*, and Thracophiles were frequently the sorts of leaders that were unconstrained by the hoplite ethos.

Finally, some elements of Thracian culture and society were powerfully attractive for ambitious Athenians. In the Athenian imagination Thrace was a throwback to the primitive societies of the Greeks' own past, specifically the world of epic. For the Athenians, Thracian culture and society were defined by *aselgeia* (licentiousness) and *poluteleia* (extravagance). While these traits were disdained by many, they proved enticing to others, those whom Aristophanes would dub *Thraikophoitai*, or Thrace-haunters.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Matthew Alan Sears was born in Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada, on September 25, 1982. After graduating from Fredericton High School in June 2000, he enrolled at the University of New Brunswick, where he completed his honors BA in Classics, with a minor in History, in May 2004.

In August 2004 he entered the Ph. D. program in Classics at Cornell University, in Ithaca, New York, where he completed his “Q” language examinations in Classical Philology in May 2006 and his comprehensive “A” examinations for Ph. D. candidacy in July 2007. From September 2007 until June 2008 he was a regular member and Thomas Day Seymour fellow at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. In July 2010 he successfully defended his doctoral dissertation at Cornell University.

For Jenny

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Biographical Sketch .....	iii
Acknowledgements .....	v
List of Abbreviations .....	ix
Map 1: Greece and the Aegean .....	x
Map 2: Thrace .....	xi
 Chapter 1: Thrace-Haunters .....	 1
<i>Ambitious Elites in an Egalitarian State: Political Considerations</i> .....	3
<i>Inspiration from Abroad: The Military Impact of the Thracian Connection</i> ...	10
<i>The Greek Discourse of Thrace: Cultural Attractions</i> .....	16
<i>Thracians at Athens</i> .....	31
<i>Defining “Thrace”</i> .....	38
<i>A Note on Sources</i> .....	42
<i>Case Studies</i> .....	68
 Chapter 2: Pisistratus and the Philaids .....	 74
<i>Pisistratus and Thrace</i> .....	78
<i>Regal Power and Royal Connections</i> .....	84
<i>Miltiades Kalos</i> .....	95
<i>Competition and Olympic Victors</i> .....	103
<i>Heroic Honors</i> .....	108
<i>Military Influences</i> .....	116
<i>Cimon: Continuing the Family Legacy</i> .....	126
<i>Conclusions</i> .....	132
 Chapter 3: Dietrephes and the Mycalessus Massacre .....	 135
<i>The Attack</i> .....	137
<i>Dietrephes: The Man and his Family</i> .....	141
<i>Dietrephes’ Thracians</i> .....	149
<i>Precedents for Working with the Dioi</i> .....	156
<i>The Athenian Perception of Dietrephes</i> .....	172
<i>Conclusions</i> .....	175
 Chapter 4: Alcibiades and Thrasybulus .....	 178
<i>The Necessity of Thrace following the Sicilian Disaster</i> .....	181
<i>Thracians at Athens, 404-403</i> .....	191
<i>Political and Family Connections</i> .....	201
<i>Ambition and a Place of Refuge</i> .....	212
<i>Conclusions</i> .....	219
 Chapter 5: Iphicrates and the Odrysian Court .....	 222
<i>Iphicrates’ Involvement with the Thracians: An Outline</i> .....	226
<i>At the Court of Cotys</i> .....	239

<i>Ambition and Anti-Democratic Tendencies</i> .....	252
<i>Iphicrates' Style of Warfare</i> .....	262
<i>Iphicrates' Successors in Thrace</i> .....	271
<i>Conclusions</i> .....	277
Chapter 6: Why Thrace? Control Cases .....	280
<i>Hippias and Themistocles</i> .....	282
<i>Xenophon</i> .....	291
<i>Conon and Timotheus</i> .....	300
<i>Chabrias</i> .....	308
<i>Thrace versus Persia: The Case of Alcibiades</i> .....	314
<i>Conclusions</i> .....	320
Chapter 7: Conclusions .....	323
<i>Political</i> .....	323
<i>Military</i> .....	329
<i>Cultural</i> .....	336
Bibliography .....	340

## LIST OF ABBEVIATIONS


ARV<sup>2</sup> = Beazely, J. D. 1963. *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Oxford.

FGrHist = Jacoby, F. ed. 1923-1958. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Berlin.

IG = 1873-. *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin.


K-A = Kassel, R. and C. Austin. 1983. *Poetae comici graeci*. Berlin.

LSJ = Liddell, H. G., R. Scott, H. S. Jones, R. McKenzie, P. G. W. Glare, and A. A. Thompson. 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9<sup>th</sup> edition with revised supplement. Oxford.



Map 1. Greece and the Aegean

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Map 2. Thrace

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## CHAPTER 1

### THRACE-HAUNTERS

#### *Introduction*

In the first half of the fourth century, Iphicrates of Athens, a talented and justly famous military leader, forged a connection with Cotys, ruler of the Odrysian kingdom of Thrace.<sup>1</sup> Though he had risen to prominence at the head of Athenian expeditions – achieving a stunning victory with mercenary peltasts over Spartan hoplites near Corinth in 390 – Iphicrates took up service with his Thracian patron. Not only did Iphicrates take Cotys’ daughter as his wife, he even fought a naval action on behalf of his father-in-law against the forces of Athens itself. Though Iphicrates’ career with its focus on Thrace has been treated as a unique curiosity in the history of Greek warfare, his actions were prefigured by a continuous line of illustrious Athenians stretching back nearly two centuries to Pisistratus.

Thrace featured prominently in Athenian history from the late Archaic and throughout the Classical periods. Its place in the overseas ventures and the strategic considerations of Athens as a *polis* has been widely acknowledged. But Thrace played an essential role in the careers of individual Athenians as well. In this capacity it was of great importance as a destination for political and military leaders frustrated by a lack of success and opportunity at home. This phenomenon was so pronounced that Aristophanes coined a unique term for the individuals involved: *θηρακοφοῖται*, or Thrace-haunters (F 156 K-A). Starting well before Iphicrates, the connection between

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<sup>1</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all dates are BCE.

Athens and Thrace also had an underappreciated importance in the introduction and adoption of novel, non-hoplite military tactics throughout Greece.

While Athens and individual Athenians had ties with various foreign peoples, Thrace was uniquely important in several ways. To a greater degree than other locales, Thrace was attractive because of the richness of its resources in terms of metals, timber, arable land, and access to grain-producing areas further afield; its geographic proximity to seafaring Athens; the relative power vacuum throughout its vast territory; and various cultural and social elements that appealed to members of an elite stifled by the political system of post-Solonian Athens. As Athens became ever more egalitarian, certain of its citizens still aimed at political dominance. Though this sometimes led to civil strife and violent attacks against democratic institutions, Thrace provided sufficient opportunities for disaffected elites so as to spare Athens from considerable political turmoil. It also served as a means for ambitious figures to consolidate their power within the system at home. Beyond politics, some Athenians might have found in Thrace an environment more conducive to aristocratic cultural affinities, from ostentatious display to heroic feasting. The elites who turned to Thrace tended to be open to military innovation just as they were ready to employ unorthodox measures in circumventing regular Athenian politics. Thus, these Thrace-haunters combined experience with Thracian tactics with a willingness to use them.

This study will examine how the relationship between Thrace and the Athenian elite was manifested in terms of three broad categories: *Political* – that is, the ways in which Thrace factored into politics at Athens by advancing Athenians at home and providing a political outlet and refuge abroad; *Military* – the impact the special

relationship between Athens and Thrace had on Greek military practices and the central role played by Thrace-haunters; and *Cultural* – the “soft,” or non-political and non-material ways in which Thrace might have appealed to certain Athenians.<sup>2</sup>

### ***Ambitious Elites in an Egalitarian State: Political Considerations***

In the fourth century many Athenian generals abandoned Athens in favor of their own private operations abroad, which Demosthenes attempts to explain in the *Second Olynthiac*, delivered in 349:

If I am to say something factual about the generals, then why do you think, men of Athens, all the generals you send out flee this war only to pursue their own private wars? Because this war is fought for prizes that are yours collectively (for if Amphipolis were taken, you would be immediately advantaged), but the commanders bear the danger themselves and yet receive no pay. In private wars, the danger is small and the rewards go to the commanders and the soldiers – Lampsacus, Sigeum, and the things plundered from ships, for example. Therefore each one turns to that which pays best (2.28).<sup>3</sup>

In urging the Athenians to commit the requisite resources to check Philip’s growing power, Demosthenes gives a straightforward, sensible reason why commanders have taken to pursuing their own “private wars.” Fighting on behalf of Athens carried great

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<sup>2</sup> I use the expression “soft” in the sense championed by Joseph Nye, Jr. in his 1990 book *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, and more recently in 2004’s *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Nye employs the idea of “soft power” in the sphere of international relations, whereby one nation affects the behavior of another by means of attraction – employing things such as culture, values and institutions – rather than coercion – achieved through more traditional military and economic means. Various regions of Thrace had definite “hard” advantages, such as strategic location and economic opportunity, but it also had less tangible cultural and social attractions.

<sup>3</sup> “τίνος γὰρ εἶνεκ’, ὧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, νομίζετε τοῦτον μὲν φεύγειν τὸν πόλεμον πάντας ὅσους ἂν ἐκπέμψητε στρατηγούς, ἰδίους δ’ εὐρίσκειν πολέμους, εἰ δέ τι τῶν ὄντων καὶ περὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν εἰπεῖν; ὅτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ θάλ’ ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐστὶν ὁ πόλεμος ὑμέτερον (Ἀμφίπολις γ’ ἂν ληφθῇ, παραχωρήμ’ ὑμεῖς κομεισθε), οἱ δὲ κίνδυνοι τῶν ἐφεσθηκότων ἴδιοι, μισθὸς δ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἐκεῖ δὲ κίνδυνοι μὲν ἐλάττους, τὰ δὲ λήμματα τῶν ἐφεσθηκότων καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, Λάμψακος, Σίγειον, τὰ πλοῖ’ ἃ συλῶσιν. ἐπ’ οὖν τὸ λυσιτελοῦν αὐτοῖς ἕκαστοι χωροῦσιν.” Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are my own.



risk for a commander in the case of defeat, and very little reward in the case of victory.<sup>4</sup> Demosthenes was addressing the situation in his own day, but the Athenian generalship had always been a hazardous occupation. Capable of bringing great glory to a victor, such as for Miltiades after the Battle of Marathon, it virtually guaranteed harsh and immediate consequences after defeat, as for the very same Miltiades following his failure at Paros. Such were the consequences of popular control over the state's leaders.

In his 352/1 speech *Against Aristocrates*, Demosthenes characterizes those generals who were attracted to Thrace as desirous of *exousia*, or license and authority (23.57).<sup>5</sup> Throughout the speech Demosthenes deals with Charidemus of Oreus, one of the more notorious military leaders of the mid fourth century. Charidemus was originally from Euboea, but as a mercenary light-infantryman in the 360's he served under Iphicrates and accompanied him on a mission to Amphipolis. When Iphicrates failed to take the city and decided to remain in Thrace, Charidemus did likewise and would spend the rest of his career oscillating between service to the Athenians and to Thracian kings. To Demosthenes' mind, Charidemus was loyal only to his own advancement. Demosthenes carefully contrasts the civilizing and constraining laws of

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<sup>4</sup> While many scholars have followed the scholiast to this speech in suggesting that Demosthenes means to single out Chares in particular as the general who pursued his own interests instead of bringing aid to Olynthus, I agree with Ellis (1967: 109) who argues that Demosthenes is alluding to all Athenian generals.

<sup>5</sup> “ἀπαλλαγῇ μὲν ἐκ Θράκης, ἐλθὼν δ’ εἰς πόλιν οἰκῇ που, τῆς μὲν ἐξουσίας μηκέτι κύριος ὦν δι’ ἧς πολλὰ ποιεῖ τῶν ἀπειρημένων ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων...” (Suppose [Charidemus] should leave Thrace, coming to live in some civilized city, no longer enjoying the license through which he now commits innumerable violations of the law...)” Demosthenes supplements the sections of historical narrative in this speech with many pieces of documentary evidence. As Sealey (1993: 131) notes, Demosthenes acquired the copious knowledge of Thrace demonstrated in the speech from his service as a trierarch in the region in 360/59. Sealey also suggests that, though a Hellenistic scholar listed Euthycles as the actual litigant who delivered the speech, perhaps Demosthenes prosecuted Aristocrates himself.

the Athenian *polis* – particularly the legal safeguards and recourse available to aggrieved citizens against the more powerful – with the *exousia* available in Thrace to the unscrupulous. Like his protégé, Iphicrates seems to have been attracted to the *exousia* of Thrace when denied what he deemed to be suitable power in Athens.

For a long time scholars maintained that the generals in the fourth century were tied less and less to the *demos* and behaved largely as *condottieri*, the mercenary generals of late medieval and Renaissance Italian city-states. Some have likened them as well to the professional generals of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who rose to prominence in the armies of foreign powers.<sup>6</sup> Also, mercenary soldiers came increasingly to replace the traditional citizen hoplite as the mainstay of Greek armies, or so was the *communis opinio*.<sup>7</sup> Iphicrates, with his storied leadership of Thracian mercenaries and perfidious actions in the service of Thracian kings, would appear to be the very paradigm of these trends in Greek warfare. But, the observations of Demosthenes are also apt with respect to many prominent Athenians in the fifth and even the sixth century. In the context of post-Solonian Athens, Thrace had long beckoned leading political and military figures with the promise of ever greater *exousia*.

It is a truism that there will always be elites in any given society, regardless of the particular political, social, and cultural framework by which the society is defined. In the case of ancient Athens, though by the end of the sixth century a new form of

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<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of the problems with labels such as *condottieri*, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-116. Pritchett argues that these generals remained loyal in the service of their polis. He seems to overstate his case at certain points, however, as many of the Athenian leaders did at times forsake Athens in favor of their own campaigns.

<sup>7</sup> For a study of this phenomenon, see Burckhardt 1996: 76-153. Pritchett (1974-1991: vol. 2, 104) thinks the sources, especially Demosthenes and Isocrates, exaggerate the dependence on mercenaries.

government took hold which in theory afforded ever greater numbers of adult male citizens a full share in the running of the state and the benefits derived therefrom, there remained individuals who strove for a disproportionately great share of power. While sometimes these figures were able to achieve such power, often they were left disappointed. Scholars have long wrestled with how democratic Athens reconciled the opposing interests of mass and elite, as well as the fierce competition within the elite itself.

Ober argues in his seminal *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* that the elite communicated with the masses in the public sphere by means of a complex set of symbols. The meaning and ideology behind these symbols were assigned by the masses themselves, thereby constraining the elite.<sup>8</sup> More recently, he has explored further the ways in which the Athenian democracy met the challenges posed by what was in reality a socially diverse citizen body. He calls democracy “diversity management,” and acknowledges that such a system inevitably left some disappointed. Ideally, though, the political and social “ledger” would be balanced over time.<sup>9</sup>

In an important study, Forsdyke maintains that through the institution of ostracism the democracy took ownership of the “weapon of exile.” Prior to democracy, members of the elite throughout Greece had employed exile as a means of removing their competitors. This rendered the political situation in many *poleis* inherently violent and unstable. Ostracism, with its ten-year limit, was an ingeniously mild form of exile which showcased the democracy’s restraint while still preventing dangerously ambitious and influential individuals from posing a threat to the balance

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<sup>8</sup> See Ober 1989, esp. 339.

<sup>9</sup> Ober 2005: 1-26.

of power.<sup>10</sup>

Recently, Moreno has argued that, by contrast to the system outlined by Ober, the elite were in fact able to maintain power over the masses in Athens. This was achieved principally through control of the grain trade. For Moreno, foreign connections with the Aegean clerouchies and allies in the fifth century and with the kingdoms in the grain-producing Crimea in the fourth were crucial to elite control of Athens. These elites were cynical enough to call themselves democrats while fostering despotic rule in the northern Black Sea in order to cement their position within the democracy.<sup>11</sup>

To add to the models advanced by Ober and Forsdyke, Thrace was a place to which the elite could remove *themselves* should they be unwilling or unable to engage in the prevailing ideological system and should ostracism fail to achieve for them the desired result, such as the removal of their more powerful competition. Not every ambitious Athenian was willing to suffer political and social disappointment in the hopes that the situation would even out in the end. In this way, removal of oneself to Thrace served as a type of voluntary ostracism. Furthermore, it would seem that Athens was not always as susceptible to elite capture as Moreno contends. Even if it were, not a few notable Athenians would still be largely excluded from power. Instead of using foreign ties to maintain their influence at Athens, many elites turned abroad when the desired level of influence proved unattainable, either because the democracy would not countenance elite capture, or because rival elites held the reins of power. For this reason, Thrace proved a vital alternative to Athens, providing a

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<sup>10</sup> See S. Forsdyke 2005, esp. 1-3.

<sup>11</sup> See Moreno 2007, esp. 204, 322-323.

power base and an outlet for elites unable to achieve their goals at home. The ambitions of the elder Miltiades, for example, were stifled because of Pisistratus' firm grip on power in the second half of the sixth century, so he turned to the Thracian Chersonese. Connections to Thrace also frequently allowed elites to achieve greater influence at Athens itself. Pisistratus overcame rival aristocrats once and for all and was established as tyrant largely because of the mercenaries and money he was able to amass from the region around Mt. Pangaeum in the northern Aegean.

The extent and nature of the role Thrace played in the contest for political power among Athens' elites has gone unnoticed by modern scholarship. More than three and a half decades ago, Pritchett, in discussing Iphicrates, commented that "we are in need of a study of nuptial ties of mercenary chieftains with Macedonian and Thracian princesses."<sup>12</sup> Little has been done to remedy this situation. As this study will show, for Athens such ties went far beyond the nuptial and involved many more leading figures than those traditionally seen as mercenary chieftains. In his invaluable reference work for Aegean Thrace, Isaac identifies some of the personal ties established between Athenians and Thrace. For instance, in discussing the ties of Thucydides and the Philaids to the region opposite Thasos, Isaac stresses the longstanding relationship forged by one of Athens' most elite families with Thrace, based largely on cooperation rather than enmity with local Thracians.<sup>13</sup> But Isaac is interested in such connections only insofar as they pertain to the local history of certain sites. Only a very cursory account is therefore provided.

Archibald's 1998 *The Odysian Kingdom of Thrace: Orpheus Unmasked*

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<sup>12</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 66, n. 33.

<sup>13</sup> Isaac 1986: 34.

provides the most comprehensive survey to date of the region of Thrace most directly connected to the Athenians. In discussing Athenian activities in Thrace during the Pentacontaetia, she says that “the relationship between official civil and military activities and unofficial, private ones is occasionally perceptible in our sources but is otherwise an unexplored dimension of these developments.” While Archibald does recognize that the personal interests of elite Athenians were central to Athens’ foothold in Thrace, she stresses that Athens’ principal aims in the north were economic and strategic.<sup>14</sup> There is no in depth exploration of how pervasive these personal ties actually were, nor the full range of factors which led to elite Athenian interest in Thrace irrespective of the wider aims of the *polis*. Also, Archibald distinguishes between the personal ties made by Pisistratus and the Philaids, especially Cimon, with what appear to have been official “civic” ventures from the mid fifth century on.<sup>15</sup> Even in the later fifth century, though, the personal connections of the elite continued to play a pivotal role, and there was not so much of a shift in Athenian diplomatic machinery as scholars such as Archibald contend.

For the Greeks, the Persian Empire too was often perceived as a source of personal enrichment and prestige, and a channel to greater political power. The main difference, though, between Thrace and the other lands to which an Athenian might turn was the potential for acquiring autonomous power and territory. Whereas the nations ruled by the Persians were under the thumb of the Great King, and any Greek who was given influence over a territory served at the pleasure of his Persian masters, Thrace was under no such central control. In describing Thrace, Herodotus evokes a

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<sup>14</sup> Archibald 1998: 115-116.

<sup>15</sup> Archibald 1998: 112.

land of limitless but unrealized potential. He says that the population of Thrace is second only to that of India, and that if all the Thracian tribes united under a single leader and common goal, no nation on earth could defeat them. Herodotus then adds, however, that such a unification could never happen, so the Thracians remain weak and divided (5.3). The Odrysian kingdom provides the only exception to a Thrace that was fragmented, and even under the Odrysians enterprising Greeks could enjoy a great degree of individual power and autonomy. While Herodotus himself lived to see the rise of the Odrysian kingdom and knew of the powerful king Sitalces (Hdt. 4.80, 7.137), he maintained his conception of Thrace as largely ungoverned. It was in this expansive territory in the northern Aegean that ambitious men could establish hereditary dynasties, secure wealth and resources, and acquire private armies of mercenary soldiers. In short, Thrace-haunters could obtain the *exousia* they desired.

### ***Inspiration from Abroad: The Military Impact of the Thracian Connection***

Many scholars have recognized that Thracian soldiers were instrumental to Greek military developments. The indispensable volume is Best's dissertation, published in 1969 as *Thracian Peltasts and Their Influence on Greek Warfare*.<sup>16</sup> Best emphasizes that peltasts – the light-armed Thracian soldier characterized by his small crescent-shaped shield, the *pelte* – played a role in Greek armies far earlier than most previous scholars had assumed. He also argues that the famous fourth century reforms of Iphicrates as related by Diodorus and Nepos, by which peltasts were supposedly regularized and integrated into Greek armies, never actually took place. Best

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<sup>16</sup> Best 1969.

concludes that any major changes to Greek warfare were essentially effected by the end of the fifth century and that in the fourth, that era of supposedly revolutionary developments in Greek infantry tactics, “the situation in the army remained exactly as before. The hoplites formed the core of both the Greek citizen and mercenary armies; peltasts played a secondary role, albeit one of considerable importance.”<sup>17</sup> Best goes a little too far. Nepos and Diodorus might have misconstrued some of the details transmitted by their sources, but Iphicrates was a capable innovator. Greek *poleis* might have failed to incorporate Iphicrates’ innovations effectively, but it does not follow that he made no such innovations or that they did not have an impact on military practice.

Best and others largely neglect the special connection between Athens and Thrace, which was a central element in the introduction and integration of Thracian tactics. Iphicrates was clearly working within an already established military paradigm for the use of light-armed auxiliaries. But beyond this, by turning to Thrace, he behaved much as previous generations of elite Athenians had in the political sphere as well. He was a cunning tactician who made good use of Thracian-style mercenary soldiers due mainly to the extended periods of time he spent with them. Those inhabiting the Greek settlements in the Thraceward region were among the first to recognize the effectiveness of Thracian styles of warfare and adopt Thracian tactics themselves, perhaps the inevitable result of proximity to the Thracians. In the same way, Athens played a decisive role in pioneering the use of Thracian soldiers precisely because so many elite Athenians had personal ties with Thrace. Athens itself was also

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<sup>17</sup> Best 1969: 139.



a geographic neighbor to the Thracians if we consider the Thracian Chersonese to be Athenian territory. It was at any rate controlled and inhabited by Athenians through much of the period covered by this study. Places in the north Aegean such as Thasos were under Athenian suzerainty at various times as well. This connection was important for the introduction to mainland Greece of the peltast and possibly several other military practices that have gone unnoticed by previous scholars.

It is unlikely that proximity to and experience with Thracians was the only factor that led to such significant military change. The peltast was an important new technology for the Greeks, but scholars debate to what extent new technologies provide an impetus for reform. Politics, society, and culture clearly play important roles too, both in the adoption of new ways of fighting and the retention of old. Many Athenian Thrace-haunters were innovators that were unconstrained by traditional military norms. In their hands, the new technology learned from the Thracians could be put to optimum use. This vital characteristic of those who spearheaded key Greek military developments has received insufficient scholarly comment.

Many scholars, though, have addressed non-technological aspects of Greek warfare, especially how Greek tactics were intertwined with the nature of the *polis*. In an influential article, Vidal-Naquet insisted that the Classical hoplite phalanx, especially that of Athens, was an artificial reflection of the *polis* itself. Even the organizational structure of the Athenian phalanx was based on the political division of Attica wrought by Cleisthenes' reforms.<sup>18</sup> More recently, Hanson has shown that citizen hoplites, who were primarily middling farmers, dictated the predominance of

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<sup>18</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1999 [1968].

the decisive phalanx battle until at least the Peloponnesian War. For Hanson, it was in the interest of the land-owning hoplites to settle disputes as quickly as possible in order both to defend their property and to ensure that lengthy campaigns did not keep them from their crops. Once military power was in the hands of these middling farmers, they demanded their fair share of political power, which led to the community of citizens that was the Classical *polis*.<sup>19</sup> Strauss has provided similar analyses with respect to the Athenian navy, the predominance of which in the fifth century led to a more broadly-based democracy with full participation of the thetic class of rowers.<sup>20</sup> As Strauss succinctly states, “military tactics are rarely simply a matter of military efficiency; they reflect politics, society, and culture.”<sup>21</sup>

Recently, Lendon has focused on the cultural dimension of ancient military practices, arguing that both the Greeks and Romans found military inspiration in looking to the past, especially the mythological and epic past.<sup>22</sup> The Greeks were most of all concerned with emulating Homeric precedent and tailored their infantry tactics accordingly. Lendon suggests that the increasing presence of the peltast in the fourth century, along with Iphicrates’ reforms, was made possible not so much because the peltast mode of fighting – by charging out and hurling javelins – was tactically effective, but because it resembled Homeric warfare more than did the hoplite phalanx.<sup>23</sup> In the end, Iphicrates probably did not care whether his troops had

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<sup>19</sup> Hanson 1995; 1998; 2000. Hanson (1996) argues as well that hoplite ideology was embraced by the Athenian democracy of the Classical period as a means of enforcing solidarity among the mass of citizens. Athenian hoplites in turn embraced the democracy. For more on the ideology of the hoplite, see also Osborne 1987b: 137-164.

<sup>20</sup> Strauss 1996; 2000.

<sup>21</sup> Strauss 2000: 316.

<sup>22</sup> Lendon 2005.

<sup>23</sup> Lendon 2005: 93-98.

epic legitimacy, and the peltast still did not replace the hoplite as the primary element of Greek armies. But Lendon's suggestion that culture plays an important part in tactics is a good one. Certainly something had to overcome the cultural and social stigma attached to non-hoplite troops.

Ferrill addresses this issue in his general survey of ancient warfare. He argues that there were two distinct strains of military development in antiquity, that of the Greeks, and that of the Near East.<sup>24</sup> By Ferrill's model, change gradually came about in Greece because large numbers of Greek mercenaries served in the east in the late fifth and throughout the fourth centuries and brought back their experience with light-armed troops and other supposedly eastern elements. The Greek ideological commitment to hoplite battle, however, ensured a slow rate of change. Since the Macedonians had never been fully part of the hoplite culture, Philip was finally able to merge the two strains of development in creating his invincible war machine. As a Macedonian, Philip enjoyed a relatively free hand to innovate.<sup>25</sup> Ferrill pays too little attention to the importance of cavalry in the Macedonian army, and he overstates his case in insisting that virtually all Greek military innovation was due to Persian influence.<sup>26</sup> He rightly, though, emphasizes the conservatism of the Greek hoplite as compared to the innovative genius of Philip.

Like Philip, Thrace-haunters seem to have been less tied to the hoplite ethos. They were thus open to military experimentation inspired by their contact with Thracians. Figures such as Diitrephes and Iphicrates were all too happy to work

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<sup>24</sup> Ferrill 1997: 149-186.

<sup>25</sup> Ferrill 1997: 150.

<sup>26</sup> Ferrill 1997: 180.

beyond the bounds of the phalanx. They were placed in charge of foreign and irregular troops and received their commands by special appointment, circumventing the regular channels such as popular election to the *strategia*. They were uninterested in the supposedly ritualized conventions of hoplite warfare, and were instead willing to employ any and every device to achieve victory, to the point of unleashing bands of soldiers on defenseless towns. Xenophon, by contrast, was unimpressed with the Thracian Seuthes' willingness to slaughter and plunder even his defeated enemies in order to teach them a lesson. Many of those attracted to Thrace were also wealthy aristocrats, expert horsemen who probably felt little loyalty to the hoplite phalanx in either an ethical or political sense. The Philaids, for example, were famous horse-breeders in Attica, and many members of the family, including the elder and younger Miltiades, were victors in the Olympic chariot race. Why should wealthy, talented, and ambitious descendants of the *eupatridae* adhere to the phalanx and its attendant values of military and political equality? This freedom to experiment beyond the regular forms of warfare was a major factor in effecting military change in Greece.

A central theme in the various modern histories of Greek warfare is the increasing dependence of *poleis* on mercenary troops in the fourth century and the growing professionalization of the military concomitant with a separation between political and military leadership.<sup>27</sup> The ties between Athens and Thrace have largely been ignored in such analysis. Common scholarly opinion is well encapsulated by Lengauer. He argues that starting in the last decades of the fifth century, and increasingly in the first half of the fourth, military commanders, who had once been

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<sup>27</sup> See, for example, L. Burckhardt 1996.

conceived of as citizens leading groups of citizens in military activities at the behest of the *polis*, grew to become military commanders-in-chief. In many cases, Military strength came to be the prime determiner of political power.<sup>28</sup> As Lengauer contends, this trend was made possible by the growing professionalization of generals, of which Iphicrates was a prime example. Such commanders were first and foremost military men whose success depended solely on military skill. Their ties to any *polis* were largely immaterial, hence Iphicrates' service for Cotys in Thrace.<sup>29</sup> But as this study will show, the phenomenon of the military leader more concerned with his own advantage than with the aims of the *polis* was nothing new in the late fifth and early fourth centuries. It was to Thrace that many such figures turned as early as the mid sixth century.

### ***The Greek Discourse of Thrace: Cultural Attractions***

The historian Theopompus of Chios, writing in the fourth century, offers his own take on the reasons behind prominent Athenians turning abroad. As he alleges concerning Chabrias and others:

[Chabrias] was unable to live in Athens, partly because of his profligacy (*aselgeia*) and extravagant way of life (*poluteleia*), and partly because of the Athenians. As the Athenians are difficult for all prosperous men to bear, virtually all of the most renowned figures elect to live abroad: Iphicrates in Thrace, Conon in Cyprus, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares in Sigeum, and Chabrias himself in Egypt (FGrHist 115 F 105).<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Lengauer 1979.

<sup>29</sup> Lengauer 1979: 110-114.

<sup>30</sup> “οὐ δυνάμενος δὲ ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ μὲν διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοὺς Αθηναίους· ἅπασιν γὰρ εἰσι χαλεποὶ τοῖς εὐδοκίμοισιν. διὸ καὶ εἴλοντο αὐτῶν οἱ ἑνδοξοὶ σχεδὸν πάντες ἔξω τῆς πόλεως καταβιοῦν, Ἰφικράτης μὲν ἐν Θράκῃ, Κόνων δ' ἐν Κύπρῳ, Τιμόθεος δ' ἐν Λέσβῳ, Χάρης δ' ἐν Σιγείῳ, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Χαβρίας ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ.” It should be noted that Chares' choice of

As is implied, the great men of Athens almost invariably left the city because their very *lifestyle* was out of keeping with the Athenian democracy. Chabrias was too prone to *aselgeia* and *poluteleia* to live in Athens, where such traits were discouraged and even reviled. As Flower argues, Theopompus does have a tendency to over-moralize, and he is not always consistent. While he is aghast at the apparent moral depravity exhibited by individuals in his day, he is also harshly critical of the Athenian democracy, which he sees as itself decadent and morally bankrupt.<sup>31</sup> Lamentation over moral decay was a common theme for elite writers, especially in the fourth century. A general's extravagance, then, is ultimately insufficient as an explanation for the choice to leave Athens and take up with foreign powers, but it cannot be utterly discounted as a factor.

Throughout the two centuries of Atheno-Thracian relations, *aselgeia* and *poluteleia* were central ideas along with a desire for *exousia*. These concepts informed the Athenian discourse of Thrace and characterized the Athenians who cemented ties in the region – from the tyrant Pisistratus in the 550's to Iphicrates and his successors in the mid fourth century. Many if not all of these figures at one point or another embraced certain Thracian cultural practices. They seem to have been more prone to *aselgeia* and *poluteleia* than was acceptable at home.

To determine what attraction, if any, Thrace held for such Athenians, we must

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Sigeum, a city in the Troad, was usually considered part of Thrace as well, along with the other cities in the region such as Abydos and Lampsacus. Chares had led many campaigns in the vicinity of the Hellespont, so he too should be considered a Thrace-haunter.

<sup>31</sup> On this passage, see Flower (1994: 151-152), who argues that Theopompus presents the extravagance of Charidemus as completely unrelated to the Athenians' harshness towards him. Athens as a whole could be just as extravagant as Chabrias in his personal life. See also Flower's comments on FGGrHist 115 F 62 in which Theopompus renders a damning indictment of the decadence of fourth century democracy (78-79).

examine in some detail how the Greeks conceived of the Thracians. The evidence indicates that some saw in Thrace not only a political, but also a *cultural* alternative to Athens that suited their particular tastes. Davies outlines some of the problems faced by the traditional elite under the democracy:

A traditional society could be governed by people whose claim on public recognition lay in their wealth, or athletic prowess, or descent from a god or hero. A complicated, Assembly-based, political society such as Athens had rapidly become needed men to run it who could compile a set of accounts and check that they were right, who had enough sense of logic to put a case persuasively, and who could cope on their feet with malicious opponents and a bloody-minded Assembly.<sup>32</sup>

A democratic system rendered much of conventional aristocratic training and talent obsolete. Davies continues by quoting a passage from Plato's *Laches* (179c-d) in which the speaker addresses the inappropriateness of elite education – that is, training in horsemanship, wrestling, gymnastics and the like – for achieving power in the Athenian democracy.<sup>33</sup> Prior to the reforms of Cleisthenes, the tyranny of Pisistratus also placed a check on the ambitions of rival aristocrats. In the Athenian imagination, Thrace represented the type of traditional society in which aristocratic skills still carried the appropriate weight.

To be sure, many elite writers of the Classical period portray Thrace and the Thracians in a negative light. Euripides' *Hecuba* renders perhaps the most vivid image of Thracian savagery, greed, and perfidy. We are told at the beginning of the play that Polymestor, king of the horse-loving Thracians in the Chersonese, was given Priam's son Polydorus to safeguard during the course of the Trojan War. In short order, Polymestor killed the son of his ally and guest-friend (ξένοϛ) in order to steal

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<sup>32</sup> Davies 1993: 99.

<sup>33</sup> Davies 1993: 100.

his gold, thus violating every rule of guest-friendship (ξενία). Later, he maltreats Polydorus' mother Hecuba, and the daughter of Priam and Hecuba, Polyxena, is sacrificed by the Greeks on a Thracian altar. In the end, Hecuba blinds Polymestor, who in turn seethes with rage and wants to tear Hecuba limb from limb and devour her: "Where can I spring on them and devour their flesh and bones, making for myself a savage beast's meal, inflicting mutilation in payback for their outrage against me?"<sup>34</sup> There are few characters so evil in all of Greek literature as this Thracian king who violates every diplomatic convention, lusts insatiably after treasure, and raves about his desire to butcher and consume his enemy.

As scholars have remarked, there might be a warning inherent in the play. In the early years of the Peloponnesian War, when the *Hecuba* was first produced, Athens was entering into close diplomatic relations with the Thracians, especially the Odrysian king Sitalces. As a gesture of goodwill, the Athenians had even made Sitalces' son an Athenian citizen (Thuc. 2.29). Euripides might have intended this play as an admonition against relying on a Thracian as an ally in the war, as the Thracians were proverbially greedy and untrustworthy. Like Polymestor who had agreed to protect Priam's son during a war only to murder him for material gain, Sitalces could be expected to pursue his own interests regardless of any perks offered

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<sup>34</sup> "...παῖ πόδ' ἐπάϊξας  
σαρκῶν ὀστέων τ' ἐμπλησθῶ,  
θοῖναν ἀγρίων τιθέμενος θηρῶν,  
ἀρνύμενος λῶβας λύμας τ' ἀντίποιν'  
ἐμᾶς, ὦ τάλας; (1070-1074)."



by the Athenians.<sup>35</sup> Polyxena, whose very name means “many guest-friends,” seems to represent, by her sacrifice at the hands of the Greeks in Thrace, the terrible consequences of entering into alliances with Thracian dynasts. As Hecuba declares: “The barbarian race has never been a friend to the Greeks, nor could it be (οὐποτ’ ἄν φίλον / τὸ βάρβαρον γένοιτ’ ἄν Ἑλλήσιν γένος / οὐδ’ ἄν δύναίτο, 1199-1201).”

Another Thracian character of stereotypical brutality is Tereus, popularized by his depiction in Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*. The earliest versions of the Tereus myth can be traced back to Homer (Od. 19.518-23), Hesiod (F 312 M-W) and Pherecydes (FGrHist 3 F 124). Sophocles wrote a tragedy called the *Tereus* sometime before 414, which now survives only in fragments. It has been argued that Sophocles’ version of the story probably had a great deal of influence on Ovid’s.<sup>36</sup> The essence of the story is that the Athenian king Pandion married his daughter Procne to his military ally, the Thracian king Tereus. In due course, Tereus fell in love with Procne’s sister Philomela and so kidnapped her, raped her, and cut out her tongue to prevent her from revealing his crime. Once Procne learned of her husband’s deeds, she conspired with her sister to kill her own son by Tereus, and serve his remains to Tereus as a meal. When the awful truth was revealed, Tereus was transformed into a hoopoe in full armor, Procne into a nightingale, and Philomela into a swallow. While the myth existed before Sophocles’ play, it seems that Sophocles innovated by setting the action

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<sup>35</sup> See Delebecque (1951: 147-164) for a detailed study of Polymestor’s character and the assertion that Euripides intended to warn the Athenians against aligning too closely with Thracians.

<sup>36</sup> Fitzpatrick 2001: 91-92.

in Thrace.<sup>37</sup> It is likely, though, that Sophocles made use of a pre-existing tradition in which Thrace had rendered military aid to Athens at some point in the epic past.<sup>38</sup>

The myth of Tereus was popular in Athens during the time of the Peloponnesian War. Tereus is a central character in Aristophanes' *Birds*. He is also mentioned by Thucydides in connection to the Athenians' Thracian ally Sitalces (2.29). Sitalces' father was a man named Teres, and clearly some Athenians had connected Teres with the mythological Tereus, a notion which Thucydides attempts to disprove. In the early fourth century, the Thracian dynast Seuthes II appears to make use of the same mythological kinship in dealing with Xenophon, as recounted in the *Anabasis* (7.2.31, 3.39).<sup>39</sup> While the Thracians tried to use the myth to their advantage by highlighting a history of military alliance between Athens and Thrace, writers such as Sophocles possibly employed the myth as a cautionary tale. Like Polymestor, Tereus was a cruel and untrustworthy ally. Thus, Athens should think twice before working with his descendants.<sup>40</sup>

The Thracians were noted for their propensity for warfare. Euripides describes the fearsome god of war, Ares, as the lord of Thrace of the golden *pelte*, that is, the crescent shield wielded by peltasts (Ἄρεος, ζαχρούσου Θρηκίας πέλτης ἄναξ, *Alc.* 498). Herodotus claims that Ares, along with Dionysus and Artemis, was one of the only gods worshipped by the Thracians (5.7). Herodotus also says that the Thracians considered a life of working the land the least worthy of honor

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<sup>37</sup> Fitzpatrick (2001) presents an in depth look at Sophocles' fragments and attempts to determine the plot of the *Tereus*, including the elements Sophocles inherited and those he invented.

<sup>38</sup> E. Hall 1989: 137.

<sup>39</sup> See Stronk 1995: 52-53.

<sup>40</sup> Stronk (1995: 53) argues that Sophocles' play was meant to flatter Sitalces. Given the nature of the plot, this hardly seems likely.

(ἀτιμότατον), but reckoned that warfare and plunder provided the finest mode of living (τὸ ζῆν . . . κάλλιστον, 5.6). Herodotus rounds out his description of Thracian bellicosity by stating that the most valuable prizes in Thracian athletic competitions were awarded to the victors in single combat (μονομαχία, 5.8). Thucydides paints a terrifying picture of Thracian mercenaries setting upon the unwallled Boeotian town of Mycalessus, which they utterly destroyed before turning to plunder. These Thracians were so intent on despoiling the town (ἄρπαγή) that many of them were killed by the Theban cavalry while still in the act of gathering up booty (7.29-30). In the fourth century, Isocrates equated sea-borne pirates (καταποντισταί) with peltasts (4.115). Even into the Roman period the Thracians continued to be famous for fighting. Vergil calls Thrace the land of Mars (*Mavortia Terra*, *Aen.* 3.13), and Horace describes it as a country mad with war (*bello furiosa Thrace*, *Carm.* 2.16.5).

Thracians, as other barbarians, were purported to be drunkards. Aristophanes, in his *Acharnians*, ridicules the Athenian envoys to Sitalces by suggesting that they were held up so long in Thrace by continuous drinking parties (141). While the Persians are similarly mocked in the play (73-78), the Thracians seem to have had more of a flair for rowdy drunkenness. Plato lists the Thracians along with the Scythians as the quintessential drinkers, taking their wine neat and letting it crudely drip all over their clothes. Even the women partake in such activities. In this way, the Thracians and Scythians reckon that they are following a noble and prestigious custom (καλὸν καὶ εὐδαιμον ἐπιτήδευμα). While the Persians also drink great quantities,

they do so with considerably more decorum (ἐν τάξει δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων, *Leg.*

1.637d-e). Xenophon describes Seuthes II as able to drink several horns of neat wine and then carry on as if the alcohol had not the slightest effect (*An.* 7.3.35). The fourth century king Cotys is reviled by Demosthenes as directing a drunken rage (μεθύων ἐπαρώνει) against his foes, Athens included (23.114). In a private legal speech of Demosthenes, a group of rowdy, drunken, and utterly sacrilegious Athenian youths is described. This group dubbed itself the Triballoi after a famously uncouth Thracian tribe (54.39).

As is evident, in much of Greek, and specifically Athenian, discourse Thrace was reviled, mocked, and even feared as a primitive and backward society of fierce fighters. Belligerence was matched only by rapacity, perfidy, and drunkenness. What could possibly recommend such a society to members of the Athenian elite?

Some Greeks might have thought of the Thracians not only as barbaric and savage, but also as quaintly old-fashioned. In the second book of the *Politics*, Aristotle discusses how and when changes should be introduced into the laws of any given state. While this task should never be undertaken lightly, sometimes it is important to bring in modifications and improvements to a body of law. As an example of why such measures might be necessary, Aristotle says that the customs of old are exceedingly simple and barbaric (τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς). For instance, the Greeks used to carry arms at all times and purchase their wives (ἐσιδηροφοροῦντό τε γὰρ οἱ Ἕλληνες, καὶ τὰς γυναικας ἐωνοῦντο παρ' ἀλλήλων, 1268b39-41). The Thracians were famous

for purchasing their wives at great expense, as Herodotus relates (5.6), and there are references to Thracians carrying weapons in a way that was no longer fashionable among the Greeks (Hdt. 6.36; Thuc. 1.5.3-6.2).<sup>41</sup> Some Greeks, then, might not have considered the customs of the Thracians, even the most savage ones, to be utterly alien and divorced from “Greekness.” Instead, the Thracians lived as the Greeks themselves once had.

Near the beginning of his *Archaeology*, Thucydides says that in former times Greeks and barbarians alike routinely engaged in piracy (ληστεία), in particular descending upon weak and unprotected settlements in sea-borne raids in order to seize plunder. More than that, they considered this lifestyle to be perfectly honorable (τι καὶ δόξης). In those days of banditry, everyone carried weapons at all times, which the more primitive Greeks continued to do. Thucydides then discusses the way in which many Greek states turned to a more luxurious and relaxed way of life, as is also common among certain barbarous peoples, and it was the Athenians themselves who led the charge. He ends the passage by remarking that the former mores of the Greek world are very much the same as those of the barbarians of his own day (τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῷ νῦν βαρβαρικῷ διαιτώμενον, 1.5-6). We see some evidence of this in epic poetry. For example, the first act of Odysseus and his men after leaving Troy was to attack the Thracian city of Ismarus and kill all of the male Cicones who dwelt there. The women of the settlement were taken along with the rest

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<sup>41</sup> For the display and carrying of weapons in Dark Age and Archaic Greece, see van Wees 1998. He argues that carrying weapons fell out of fashion in Greek *poleis* with the relative increase in the importance of wealth and leisure as opposed to martial prowess in determining social status.

of the plunder. To his Phaeacian hosts Odysseus freely admits his role in this merciless act of killing and pillaging (Hom. *Od.* 9.39-42).<sup>42</sup>

Unlike the hoplite-dominated Athens of the late Archaic and Classical periods, Thrace was a land of skilled horsemen.<sup>43</sup> Even in the *Iliad*, The Thracian king Rhesus is noteworthy for his resplendent chariot and team of brilliant white horses (10.435-440). Elsewhere, Homer describes the Thracians as horse-herders and horse-warriors (*Il.* 13.4; 14.227; 16.287). During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides says that the Thracian king Sitalces had at his disposal around 50 000 cavalry (2.98.3). Regardless of any exaggeration on the part of the historian, Thrace certainly had vast numbers of horsemen. Arrian attributes the origin of the wedge formation so effectively utilized by Alexander's cavalry to the Scythians and Thracians (*Tact.* 16.6). The image of the Thracians as able riders was so prevalent in art and literature that members of the Athens' own cavalry were often depicted in Thracian apparel.<sup>44</sup> Skill in mounted warfare was matched by a fondness for horse-racing and chariot-racing (Hdt. 6.38; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.5), a fondness shared by Athenian aristocrats.

The literary accounts of Thrace indicate a society that enjoyed more than its fair share of wealth and royal pomp, not unlike the Persian Empire. Xenophon's firsthand description in the *Anabasis* of life at the court of a Thracian ruler recalls lavish banquets, ornate furniture and treasures, the exchange of valuable gifts, and all the pomp and circumstance of the best royal entourages (7.3.26-35). This picture is corroborated in several other sources, and the material finds from Thracian lands lend

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<sup>42</sup> For more on the Greeks' evolutionary view of history and its appropriation in later historiography, see Nippel 1990.

<sup>43</sup> For the sources detailing Thracian horsemen, see Archibald 2000: 212.

<sup>44</sup> See Lissarrague 1990a: 191-231.

further credibility to Xenophon's witness.<sup>45</sup> The wedding banquet of Iphicrates in Thrace is parodied in middle comedy as the very picture of excess (Anaxandrides, F 42 K-A). Even Homer's accounts of Thracians are colored by images of incredible wealth and fabulous objects, such as the elaborate cup given to Priam when he was an ambassador to Thracians (*Il.* 24.234-235).<sup>46</sup> Such wealthy figures could give valuable gifts to their friends. While women were often exchanged, fortresses and large tracts of territory were also bestowed upon foreign allies. Xenophon was offered several properties in addition to Seuthes' daughter in marriage, and two of these properties had previously been given to Alcibiades, another Athenian friend of the Thracians (Xen. *An.* 7.2.38; 5.8).

Post-Solonian Athens was no longer a place in which aristocrats could hope to obtain power solely by virtue of their lineage, nor even their wealth and athletic and equestrian prowess. As the democracy evolved and became ever more broadly based, a new skill set became necessary for swaying the assembly and obtaining political influence, and certain aspects of aristocratic culture became suspect to the *demos*. A typical note of resentment is sounded by the chorus of aristocratic horsemen in Aristophanes' *Knights*, performed in 424. Bemoaning the lack of innate courage in the mass of Athenians, as well as the public subsidies offered to the people by demagogues, the horsemen insist that they only wish to fight nobly for the city and its gods, and should peace ever be restored, to be allowed the luxury of their long hair

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<sup>45</sup> For a full discussion, see below, ch. 5.

<sup>46</sup> For Homer's Thracians, see Archibald 1998: 94.

and personal adornment (565-580).<sup>47</sup>

Throughout the period of the democracy other signs of elite disdain for the *demos* can be found. The Dexileos monument, a relief from the Ceramicus depicting a young aristocratic horseman killed in 394-393 during the Corinthian War, is perhaps one example.<sup>48</sup> As Ober points out in his stimulating discussion of the piece, the iconography suggests that the mounted Dexileos is delivering the death blow to a hoplite lying on the ground who assumes the distinctive posture of the Tyrannicides. That a vase depicting the Tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogiton was found in the same burial plot suggests that those who commissioned the monument were well aware of Tyrannicide iconography, specifically the image of a nude warrior raising a sword above his head with his arm bent at a right angle. Dexileos, therefore, a noble cavalryman, is portrayed as vanquishing a hoplite representative not only of the democracy, but even of the very champions of democracy.<sup>49</sup> On a more fundamental level, the size and splendor of the relief suggest that Dexileos' family was not satisfied with honoring their dead simply as another democratic citizen killed in battle, equal

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<sup>47</sup> Dover (1978: 78-79) argues that this passage is representative of the aristocracy's penchant for maintaining a particularly upper class appearance and dress. The verb κομᾶν, literally "to wear one's hair long," came to mean "to put on airs." Morris (1996; 2000: 156-187) offers a stimulating discussion of the conflict between elite and "middling" ideologies in the Archaic period. The thrust of middling ideology was that all citizens of the *polis* were essentially in the "middle" and therefore good, with non-citizens and hubristic aristocrats on the extremes. While Morris argues that elite ideology largely collapsed and made the development of democracy possible, he acknowledges that there were still elite holdouts, evinced in rituals such as the symposium.

<sup>48</sup> For the monument and its situation, see Knigge 1991: 111-113.

<sup>49</sup> Ober 2005: 237-247. As Ober argues (245-246), the iconography of the monument, set up in a very public place, was far from straightforward. The suggestive imagery of an aristocrat slaying a democratic hoplite is tempered by the unusual inclusion of Dexileos' birth date in the inscription, probably to indicate that he did not participate in military forces of the Thirty Tyrants as he would have been too young. Ober suggests an "amphibolic" reading of the monument, capable of symbolizing different things depending on the ideological perspective of the viewer.



and indistinct from the others who were honored by the *demos* collectively.<sup>50</sup>

Pleas to be allowed certain elements of aristocratic pretention, along with the commissioning of subversive monuments, were some of the ways in which the elite could assert their superiority in Athens. But in the end, the *polis* was still a constraining environment for those eager for more pomp and power. In Thrace, it seems as though the ruler was expected to be ostentatious, to lavish presents on his allies as he received status gifts from his subjects. Thracian dynasts lived a life that was vaguely reminiscent of epic heroes – racing horses, entertaining guests with feasts, and leading raiding parties of hardy warriors. If Athenian elites could no longer live this way in Athens, at least not without censure, then perhaps they could in Thrace.

Clever political actors are aware of the very practical importance of employing the customs of the people they hope to influence. White, in the context of the relations between Europeans and Native Americans in the Great Lakes region from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, stresses what he dubs the “middle ground,” that is, the mutually comprehensible region created by disparate cultures that perceive each other as alien:

On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences through what amounts to a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings. People try to persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what they perceive to be the values and the practices of those they deal with, but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them new

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<sup>50</sup> For the public inscription honoring the war dead of this year, see Tod 1950: vol. 2, no. 104; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: no. 7A. In the fourth century there was a trend towards ever more lavish funerary monuments to honor aristocrats. See Morris 1992: 128-144. Solon was reputed to have introduced measures to limit aristocratic extravagance, including excessive mourning and funerary ritual (Plut. *Sol.* 21). See Seaford (1994: 74-86) for Solon’s sumptuary laws as aimed at curbing the aristocracy.

practices – the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground.<sup>51</sup>

By such a model, the Greeks operating among the Thracians would have attempted to employ Thracian cultural practices to appeal to Thracian sensibilities and achieve their practical aims. Quite likely the Greeks misread various Thracian cultural practices with the result that new meanings and practices emerged. In any case, a major goal of adopting Thracian practices seems clear: to solidify one's position among a foreign people and secure every possible material and political advantage. But this does not preclude that some Greeks also had an affinity for the cultural forms they took on in Thrace.

T. E. Lawrence, immortalized by his own writings and by Peter O'Toole's performance in the 1962 film *Lawrence of Arabia*, is the most famous example of a Western European who fell in love with a foreign people and culture. In his autobiographical *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, Lawrence details his experiences as a British officer aiding the Arab revolt from the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. He also offers a portrait of Arab culture and the steps he took to assimilate to it. Lawrence had spent a great deal of time in the Middle East on archaeological digs and other projects, was fluent in Arabic, and was as well placed as any Briton could be to blend in with the Arabs. While living with and fighting alongside the Arabs, Lawrence himself admits that he kept a cool paternalistic distance from them while at the same time striving to blend in culturally. Throughout *Seven Pillars*, he presents the Arabs as strange and foreign, prone to base physical excesses yet possessing an innate nobility of mind and character. The many portraits and photographs of

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<sup>51</sup> White 1991: x.

Lawrence in full Arab dress are the perfect caricature of the strange oriental, down to the ornate curved dagger. Whatever degree of reality is represented by Lawrence's literary and artistic portrayals of himself, he wished to convince others that he truly lived and appeared as an Arab. He himself also seems to have believed that he "could see things through the veils at once of two customs, two educations, two environments."<sup>52</sup>

As the enduring picture of a modern cross-cultural actor, Lawrence might shed light on the Athenians who were able to thrive in Thrace. He was an agent of the British Empire in a strategically important yet peripheral part of the world. He worked to advance the interests of Britain by embroiling a key ally of the Axis in a theatre far from the European fronts of the Great War and also, it would turn out, by establishing a foothold in a resource-rich corner of the globe. At the same time, there was a deeply personal element in Lawrence's activities in Arabia. He cemented his own ties with key Arab leaders, attempted to live as an Arab himself, and felt saddened and betrayed by the cynical exploitation of the region by the British in their own national interests and the failure to grant the Arabs full sovereignty after the War.<sup>53</sup> Not only was Lawrence able to achieve remarkable fame and influence by his activities in Arabia, he was also either genuinely attracted to the area's cultural and social milieu or he appreciated the usefulness of adopting Arab customs while in the Middle East. The promise of a life of adventure also played its part. In Lawrence's own words: "We were fond together, because of the sweep of open places, the taste of wide winds, the

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<sup>52</sup> Lawrence 1991 [1926]: 32.

<sup>53</sup> See Lawrence (1991 [1926]: 25) for a clear statement of his disillusionment with post-War British policy in Arabia.

sunlight, and the hopes in which we worked. The morning freshness of the world-to-be intoxicated us. We were wrought up with ideas inexpressible and vaporous, but to be fought for.”<sup>54</sup> This combination of real political and material advantages, compelling cultural and social draws, and the prospect of unencumbered adventure could have been just as potent in ancient Athens as it was for Lawrence in the early twentieth century.

We can only speculate as to the importance of these cultural factors in drawing Athenian elites to Thrace. In Thrace ambitious individuals were able to grow rich and powerful – to obtain a great level of *exousia* – beyond what they could hope for at home. It just so happens that the very traits which characterized the old aristocracy at Athens, those outlined by Davies as out of place within a democratic society, were exhibited by Thracian dynasts and many of those Athenians who turned to Thrace and obtained the power of dynasts in their own right.

### ***Thracians at Athens***

An examination of the situation of the Thracians living in Athens itself provides a useful illustration of the ways in which political, military, and cultural considerations coalesced in the Athenian connection to Thrace. Thracians living in the *polis* held an ambiguous place, just as they did in the Athenian imagination. While they were denied full participation in the *polis* and subject to certain humiliations such as slavery, in many respects they enjoyed a privileged status, especially in the sphere of religion.

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<sup>54</sup> Lawrence 1991 [1926]: 24.

In the second half of the fifth century, worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis was instituted in Attica.<sup>55</sup> At some point before 429/8, the Thracians, alone of all peoples, were granted the right of owning property (*enktesis*) in Attica and constructing a shrine to this goddess (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1283, 4-7). Closely linked with the huntress Artemis, Bendis is usually depicted as a young woman clad in the apparel of light-armed Thracian fighters – with a throwing spear; special boots, or *embades*; the cloak known as the *zeira*; and the distinctive fox-skin cap – and sometimes accompanied by a hunting dog. The center of her worship was in the Piraeus, specifically in the vicinity of the Munichia hill, perhaps due to the presence there of a shrine to Artemis Munichia. More importantly, the Piraeus, as a port and *emporion*, was a center for foreign residents of Athens, including Thracians, making it the natural place in which to found a cult of a Thracian deity.<sup>56</sup>

While the worship of Bendis in Attica on the part of the Thracians living in the Piraeus probably stretched back to the 430's or earlier, The Athenians as a whole eventually celebrated a lavish public Bendideia. The date of the inauguration of this festival is variously given between 431-411, but the earlier date seems more likely.<sup>57</sup> The opening lines of Plato's *Republic* give us the fullest description of what this festival entailed, including separate processions of Thracians and Athenians, a

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<sup>55</sup> For Bendis in Attica, see Peek 1941; Nilsson 1942; Ferguson 1944; 1949; Simms 1988; Garland 1992; Planaux 2000.

<sup>56</sup> For the demography of the Piraeus, see Garland 2001: 58-72. See also 105-109 for the large number of foreign cults in general in the Piraeus. But, see Roy (1998: 196-197) who argues that the proportion of metics in the Piraeus might not have been much different than that in the *asty*. At the risk of employing circular reasoning, it seems reasonable to extrapolate from the prominence of Bendis worship in the Piraeus that many Thracians lived there. Later in the fourth century, private shrines of Bendis were set up in places such as Laurion, presumably to serve the large population of Thracian slaves in those locales (Garland 1992: 112).

<sup>57</sup> For the date, see Planaux 2000.

horseback torch-race, and an all night celebration (327a-328a). Inscriptional evidence tells us that there was also a massive sacrifice, probably a hecatomb, on the part of the state (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1496).<sup>58</sup>

In addition to grants of *enktesis* and the right to construct a shrine, the Thracian worshippers of Bendis were allowed to form their own groups of *orgeones*.<sup>59</sup> While it is difficult to translate this word directly, the closest we can get is something along the lines of “sacrificing associates.” *Orgeones* were an important element in the civic structure of Athens, along with phratries and *gene*, having an elevated status with a great deal of economic and political autonomy. Prior to the privileges given to Thracians, only Athenian citizens could be *orgeones*. An early, most likely Solonian law states that the phratries must admit *orgeones* as well as *gennetai*. Ferguson takes this to mean that in Solon’s time *orgeones* were Athenians of the middle classes, now to be admitted to a central institution of the citizenship as Athens transitioned from an aristocracy of birth to a timocracy.<sup>60</sup> More recently, Ustinova has suggested that the private cultic associations of *orgeones* were incorporated into civic life in order to include a greater number of Attic residents in civic affairs, fostering the growth of common consent, or *homonoia*.<sup>61</sup> In any case, for Thracian foreigners to be called *orgeones* and to acquire all the rights inherent – barring citizenship – is noteworthy. We know of no other corporate bodies of non-citizens that were allowed to be *orgeones*. We must ask why the Athenians granted the Thracians these very special privileges, and also why the Athenian state held such a prominent and expensive

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<sup>58</sup> See Ferguson 1944: 101-102.

<sup>59</sup> See Ferguson 1944; 1949; Planeaux 2000: 186-189.

<sup>60</sup> Ferguson 1944: 65-69.

<sup>61</sup> Ustinova 1996.

festival for a foreign deity.

Some scholars argue that the Athenians were eager to secure the alliance of the Odrysian king Sitalces as war with Sparta loomed on the horizon.<sup>62</sup> Sitalces was granted sundry honors at Athens in order to secure his cooperation. A public festival to his native goddess would have sweetened the deal. As Garland says, “the incorporation of a foreign deity into another state's pantheon was, in effect, the ultimate diplomatic compliment one state could pay to another.”<sup>63</sup> Others take this line further. In addition to gaining a powerful ally in the north Aegean, the Athenians wished to ensure the loyalty of those many Thracians already living in Athens, to protect against any possible unrest in the city and also to make use of the foreigners on campaign. In 431, Athens made the first of many invasions into the Megarid. Thucydides tells us that in addition to the many thousands of citizen hoplites, the Athenians also had with them not less than 3000 metic hoplites and a sizeable mob of light-armed fighters (ὄμιλος ψιλῶν, 2.31). A large number of these metics, especially the light-armed troops – a specialty of the Thracians – were probably Thracians from the Piraeus, as argued by Simms and Peek.<sup>64</sup> Ferguson suggests that the army (*stratos*) of the Piraeus, which would eventually be an official unit of the Athenian military, had a key role to play in the public Bendideia.<sup>65</sup> Thracian metics, therefore, could have been a strong presence in this force.

Some attribute the inauguration of the Bendideia to what they call “plague

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<sup>62</sup> See especially Nilsson 1942.

<sup>63</sup> Garland 1992: 113.

<sup>64</sup> Peek 1941: 215; Simms 1988: 64.

<sup>65</sup> Ferguson 1949: 151.

psychology.”<sup>66</sup> In light of the destruction wrought by the Plague in the first years of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians desperately sought divine help. It is perhaps then that they received instructions from the oracle at Dodona, mentioned in IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1283, to honor the goddess Bendis. Furthermore, Bendis is linked to the Thracian hero Deloptes (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1324) who may have been a Thracian Asclepius. The propitiation of this healing figure by means of a public festival in his honor and that of his associate Bendis would make sense.<sup>67</sup>

A combination of these factors most likely explains why the Athenians paid special attention to a Thracian goddess. The Thracians were important allies abroad and probably also in the *polis* itself. The Athenians could have given the Thracians special privileges in order to secure their loyalty and their foreign alliance, and the public worship of Bendis would have provided the perfect forum for the Athenians to “liaise” with their Thracian neighbors, as Garland has argued.<sup>68</sup> Also, the effect of the Plague on the Athenians cannot be overestimated, and the probable timing of the introduction of the Bendideia suggests that the Plague may have played a role. Finally, the Athenians seemed uniquely fascinated by Thracian, or what was perceived to be Thracian, religion. In addition to Bendis, cults of Sabazius, a Thraco-Phrygian god, and Cotytto, a Thracian mother-goddess, were introduced at some point into Attica.<sup>69</sup> Even Dionysus and Orpheus, with their stereotypically wild and barbaric worship, were conceived of as Thracian figures.

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<sup>66</sup> Ferguson 1949: 160-161; Planeaux 2000: 180-181.

<sup>67</sup> Popov 1977; Simms 1988: 67; Planeaux 2000: 181.

<sup>68</sup> Garland 2001: 109.

<sup>69</sup> For Sabazios, introduced by the late fifth century, see Garland 2001: 132-133; for Cotytto, an Edonian goddess, see Strab. 10.3.16, who says that Cotytto was mentioned as early as the plays of Aeschylus.



For the Thracians to have been granted special privileges, including *enktesis*, an official decree had to be passed by the Athenians. Garland regrets that we know nothing of those who championed the cause of Bendis in the *boule* and *ecclesia*, but he suggests that foreign policy weighed heavily on the decision and would have been employed in the arguments in favor of the cult.<sup>70</sup> Gauthier points out that only extremely rarely were grants of *enktesis* made for Athenians abroad before the Hellenistic period.<sup>71</sup> Some Athenians in the fifth century, though, notably Alcibiades and his associates, clearly had these rights in the Thraceward region.<sup>72</sup> As the Thracians alone of all foreigners were given such privileges in Athens, it is plausible that Athenians with interests in Thrace proposed such a decree, probably to cement their own claims to property abroad. Thus, the interests of individual Athenian Thrace-haunters might have been partly behind the embracing of Bendis' cult.

The Thracians were not always so well off in Athens. Rosivach argues that they were the first true chattel slaves in Athens, beginning in the sixth century when Pisistratus, the Philaids, and others became active in the north Aegean. Thracians continued to be the predominant group of slaves at Athens and came to represent in drama the very stereotype of the foreign slave.<sup>73</sup> Even on those rare occasions when Greeks were actually taken as slaves, it was usually from places on the periphery of

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<sup>70</sup> Garland 1992: 112.

<sup>71</sup> Gauthier 1973: 172.

<sup>72</sup> See below, ch. 4.

<sup>73</sup> Rosivach 1999: 155-156. There are many pieces of evidence for the preponderance of Thracians among Attic slaves. For example, of the twenty-eight slaves mentioned in the Attic Stelai as confiscated from the *hermokopidai*, nine are Thracian, the largest single ethnic group represented. See Pritchett and Pippin 1956: 278. The scholiast to Plat. *Lach.* 187b remarks on the Greek habit of enslaving Thracians and Carians. See Osborne and Byrne (1996: 106-110) for a listing of all known Thracians at Athens, many of whom were slaves. Incidentally, the greatest proportion of the Thracian names we do know from Athens belong to a list of mercenary soldiers from about 300 (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1956).

the Greek world, overwhelmingly in Thrace.<sup>74</sup> The situation is made more complicated by a comment made by Xenophon in his *Poroi*. He tells us that the general Nicias leased 1000 of his mine-working slaves at Laurium to a Thracian *epistates* named Sosias (*Por.* 4.14).<sup>75</sup> Scholars have surmised that Sosias was chosen because of his familiarity with mining, perhaps because he came from the region of Mt. Pangaeum.<sup>76</sup> Throughout this passage Xenophon argues that business deals involving metics, Thracians included, for the exploitation of Attica's mines would benefit the state immeasurably. For his part, Sosias could have grown very wealthy by this deal, if the mines were sufficiently productive, and the control of 1000 slaves, many of whom were probably Thracians themselves, evinces no small amount of power.

The paradox of the Thracians in Athens is apparent. At one moment they were slaves working the mines, hardly an enviable position. At another they were involved in important and lucrative business arrangements with prominent Athenians. And, while throughout Greek literature Thracians are stereotyped as backward and savage, the worship of their goddess was embraced at Athens and celebrated at public expense. In her survey of Thracian imagery, Tsiafakis concludes that while they were frequently reviled and despised by the Athenians, the Thracians still had a powerful allure. They were not necessarily enemies to be feared, but simply "others" that were fascinating to the Athenians.<sup>77</sup> An aesthetic interest in foreign cults, practices, and

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<sup>74</sup> As noted by Rosivach (1999: 131-135) who provides a useful table of the instances in which Greek slaves seem to have been taken, particularly in war.

<sup>75</sup> We learn from Xenophon that Sosias was an *epistates* of Nicias in *Mem.* 2.5.2.

<sup>76</sup> See Gauthier 1976: 138-142.

<sup>77</sup> Tsiafakis 2000.

imagery, though, is not the whole picture. As the *polis* profited from slave labor and benefitted civically and militarily by keeping the Thracian metics happy, many elites derived real advantages abroad by championing the Thracian cause at Athens.

### ***Defining “Thrace”***

Before turning to the careers of several Athenian Thrace-haunters, the geographic and ethnic parameters of this study should be outlined. Thrace, that is, the territory inhabited in the main by “Thracians,” represents a very broad category.<sup>78</sup> The geographical boundaries of what the Greeks and Romans called Thrace varied over time. The Danube might be considered its northern extent, but from antiquity on, many have conceived of territory far to the north of this line as Thracian.<sup>79</sup> To the southwest, prior to the Persian Wars the area west of the Axios River surrounding the Thermaic gulf was inhabited by Thracians, though this region came increasingly under the Macedonian sphere of interest after Xerxes’ invasion in 480-479.<sup>80</sup> Virtually all the northern Aegean coast was inhabited by Thracians at some point, including islands such as Thasos, though over time Greek settlements were found increasingly throughout the area.<sup>81</sup> The edge of the Black Sea formed the eastern border, but there were Thracian elements in the Spartocid dynasty as far east as the Crimea in the fourth

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<sup>78</sup> For the most comprehensive modern treatments of Thrace and the Thracians available in Western European languages, see Danov 1976; Fol 1977; Hodinott 1981; Archibald 1998; Theodossiev 2000. See also the collection of papers in Poulter 1983. For more specific treatments of Aegean Thrace, see Isaac 1986; Parissaki 2007; and the collection of papers in Fol 2002.

<sup>79</sup> See, for example, the map provided by Hodinott (1981: 11-13).

<sup>80</sup> Hammond et al. 1972-1988: vol. 1, 435-440; Baba 1990: 16-17. Buck (1978: 78-81) examines the ancient sources indicating that Thracians at one point lived as far south as Boeotia.

<sup>81</sup> Isaac (1986) provides an account of the Greek settlements in this region, and also eastward to the Hellespont and Propontis. He looks in depth at the level of blending that occurred between the Greek and Thracian populations. For the issue of the ethnic makeup of the population, see also Parissaki (2007) who studies the prosopography of the area. For Thasos, see Owen 2000.

century.<sup>82</sup> To the southeast, Thracians inhabited the Chersonese – the modern Gallipoli Peninsula – and the northern shore of the Propontis, today’s Sea of Marmara. The Greeks considered the lands immediately south of the Hellespont – the strait now called the Dardanelles – and Propontis, including the Troad, to be part of Thrace. Herodotus tells us that the Thracians who had migrated to Asia, namely to the southern shore of the Black Sea, continued to live exactly as their European brethren, becoming known as Bithynians (7.75). Other writers, including Xenophon, call the Thracians in Asia simply Bithynian Thracians (*Hell.* 1.3.2).<sup>83</sup>

What will be considered Thrace, or at least a “Thracian context” for the purposes of this study, includes the following: all of modern Bulgaria, especially the Haeumus – the modern Balkan – and Rhodope mountain ranges and the plain lying in between, known as the “Thracian Plain”; northeastern Greece east of the Axios, including the Chalcidice and all of the northern Aegean coastline; all of European Turkey; a sizeable section of northwestern Anatolia, including the northern Troad, the territory abutting the Propontis, and the southwestern shore of the Black Sea; and the northern Aegean islands lying between the Athos peninsula and the Chersonese. It should be noted that many cities in Asia, such as Lampsacus, Cyzicus, and Sigium, which today are not normally considered to be part of Thrace, were considered so by the ancients and will be treated as such in the following analysis.

In discussing groups of Thracians, the word “tribe” is used for the sake of consistency. Those scholars such as Archibald and Theodossiev who write about

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<sup>82</sup> Moreno 2007: 168.

<sup>83</sup> See further Stronk (1995: 59-60; 283), who correctly argues that the entire Propontis region should be conceived of as one “coherent historico-geographical complex,” and stresses the historical presence of Thracian tribes in the Troad as well.

Thrace all use “tribe” to refer to the different groups living in Thrace. Greek writers such as Herodotus and Thucydides variously refer to different divisions of Thracians by ἔθνος and γένος, and even the Thracians as a whole are labeled an ἔθνος. It seems that γένος usually denotes a subgroup within an ἔθνος, but the ancient writers show little consistency in the use of these terms in relation to the Thracians.<sup>84</sup> “Tribe” is used to refer various non-state groups as opposed to, say, the Odrysian kingdom which incorporated many tribes into a larger federation led by a king.<sup>85</sup> It is uncertain what exactly differentiated Thracian tribes, whether territory, language, origins, or the like. It surely varied from case to case.<sup>86</sup>

It is unclear how many distinct tribes comprised Thrace. Strabo, for one, counts twenty-two in the comprehensive treatment of Thrace in his seventh book (7a.48), whereas the elder Pliny describes Thrace as divided into fifty *strategiae*, a Roman administrative unit that might reflect some sort of ethnic or tribal division (*Nat. Hist.* 4.11.40). The problem is compounded by our inability to ascertain to which chronological period each tribe mentioned in the sources belongs, as Strabo and Pliny wrote centuries after Iphicrates and the other Athenian Thrace-haunters. Some tribes were larger and more powerful than others, and are consequently better known to us, such as the Triballoi and Getai in northwestern and northeastern Bulgaria

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<sup>84</sup> See J. Hall (1997: 34-36) for the Greek use of these terms, especially in Herodotus.

<sup>85</sup> Archibald (1998: 5) calls the Odrysian kingdom a “supra-tribal polity.”

<sup>86</sup> J. Hall (1997) provides the most useful discussion of the concept of ethnicity among the ancient Greeks. For Hall, the Greeks constructed their identity through written or spoken discourse. Genetic traits, language, religion, and even common cultural forms are merely symbols of this socially constructed ethnic identity (2). For the Thracians, of course, we have no recourse to such written texts that might shed light on how they viewed their own identity. Archaeology, though, as Hall (111-142) argues, can help identify ethnic groups by illuminating different dietary preferences, the different types of ceramics used, and so forth. For Greek ethnic terminology, see also Fraser 2009.

respectively, and the Odrysai who for a period in the fifth and fourth centuries controlled a federation of tribes spread over most of southeastern Bulgaria and European Turkey.<sup>87</sup> There were numerous smaller tribes that were at different points incorporated into larger units such as the Odrysian kingdom, while others seem to have remained independent. For his part, Herodotus judged who should be considered Thracian by a set of criteria including physical appearance, dress, customs, and common origin traditions. He was probably influenced by the definition of Thracian then current at Athens.<sup>88</sup> While we do not have to accept Greek or Roman notions of tribal and ethnic groups, as with so much of Classical Antiquity we are at the mercy of their terminology. Thracian tribes are thus referred to by the names given to them by Greek literary sources.

The Athenians – like most Greek powers – dealt primarily with the Thracians inhabiting the Aegean littoral. That being said, some of the tribes with whom the Athenians interacted were from regions further inland, such as the Dioi who inhabited the Rhodope Mountains. Also, Sitalces, the Odrysian king that was an Athenian ally in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, ruled tribes quite distant from the Aegean, as did some of his successors. The Odrysian kingdom, however, even at its greatest extent was confined to the southeast corner of Thrace. It should be borne in mind that an Athenian Thrace-haunter usually had a relationship with only one of the many Thracian tribes, centered on a specific region. Diitrephes, for instance, seems to have had ties to the Dioi. Likewise, the elder Miltiades was invited to the

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<sup>87</sup> Archibald (1998) offers a useful study of the Odrysian kingdom, and provides a map showing the location of the Bulgarian Thracian tribes (108).

<sup>88</sup> Asheri 1990: 167.

Chersonese by the tribe of the Dolonci with the express purpose of defending them from the Apsinthii, a rival group of Thracians. At the same time, because of his connections Diitrephes was given a special command by the oligarchy of 411 over the entire Thraceward region, and the elder Miltiades married the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king most likely from the area opposite Thasos. Thus, while we should not assume that an individual's connections to Thrace entailed a special position among all Thracians in all regions, Thrace was often conceived of as a unit by the Athenians. Where possible, the specific Thracians involved in a given case will be defined.

### *A Note on Sources*

A study of the more than two centuries of connection between Athens and Thrace incorporates a wide array of sources. The nature of the surviving evidence necessitates an Atheno-centric approach as the Thracians left us no writing of their own by which we might discern their motives and views concerning the Athenians. An acute problem for modern scholars is in separating the reality of Thrace from the often ideological perception of Thrace found in literary sources. Several recent archaeologically based studies have made strides towards illuminating Thracian society on its own terms.<sup>89</sup> For their part, the Greeks had much to say about the Thracians which, though biased and skewed by the incomplete perspective of the foreign observer, can at the very least reveal how the Greeks thought about the Thracians. In addition to literary accounts, epigraphic and artistic evidence are used

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<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Archibald's comments on her methodology (1998: 5-6). She advocates moving beyond the traditional categories of investigation derived from the literary sources, such as theories of Thracian kingship and the personalities of individual rulers.

where appropriate. Due attention is also given to the material from archaeological excavation. What follows is a survey of the sources most frequently used and the methods employed in approaching them.

### *Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon*

Herodotus is our most important and often only source for the late sixth and early fifth century. Born in Halicarnassus in Caria around 485-480 BCE – a city with a mixed population of Greeks and non-Greeks – it is generally accepted that he travelled widely in the process of compiling material for his history. The bibliography on Herodotus as a historian, especially his reliability and use of knowledgeable sources, is vast.<sup>90</sup> The extremes of opinion are best exemplified by Fehling and Pritchett. Fehling argued in his 1989 *Herodotus and his Sources: Citation, Invention and Narrative Art* that Herodotus employed the principle of citing the most obvious source when addressing a given topic. For example, in dealing with Egyptian matters, Herodotus cites “the Egyptians” as his source, and so on. For Fehling, Herodotus largely invents such sources as part of his literary program, and his historical veracity is accordingly impugned.<sup>91</sup> Pritchett, in his 1993 *The Liar School of Herodotos*, vigorously refutes Fehling and others, arguing that Herodotus, a faithful recorder of his sources, should be trusted. A vast array of evidence is brought to bear to demonstrate that even the most implausible of Herodotus’ stories could have happened

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<sup>90</sup> For a brief survey, see Harrison 2000: 1-11. See also the introduction to Scott’s commentary of Herodotus’ sixth book (2005: 1-37). Romm (1998) offers a good general treatment of Herodotus, as does the useful and relatively recent *Cambridge Companion to Herodotus*, edited by Dewald and Marincola (2006).

<sup>91</sup> Fehling 1989. See also the influential article by Armayor (1978) which calls into question the extent of Herodotus’ travels.



just as he narrates them.<sup>92</sup> Scott seems to be correct in insisting that the real issue is not whether we can trust Herodotus when he names a certain source, but how reliable each source is and whether Herodotus was willing or able to check his sources' information. For Scott, Herodotus is essentially honest, arguing that "for the later books, including book 6, there is no reason to see him as other than a conscientious enquirer, within the limits of his world, and then writing up the results."<sup>93</sup> Because Herodotus wrote about events that occurred over a huge expanse of the ancient world usually a generation or more prior to his own researches, we should approach his material with a critical eye, evaluating how he could have learned about a particular event and whether the event as he describes it is plausible and fits in with what other evidence we have.

Herodotus famously was as much an ethnographer as historian. The Thracians are treated in an excursus at the beginning of his fifth book. As Asheri argues, we are given a valuable yet selective and incomplete portrait of the Thracians which is centered on *θαῦματα*, or marvelous things.<sup>94</sup> Thus, we should bear in mind that the aspects of the Thracians Herodotus chooses to present are those most alien to the Greeks.<sup>95</sup> Many scholars have dealt with Herodotus' treatment of non-Greeks.<sup>96</sup> In 1980, Hartog in *Le miroir d'Hérodote: essai sur la représentation de l'autre* studied in

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<sup>92</sup> Pritchett 1993.

<sup>93</sup> Scott 2005: 6, n. 17; 26.

<sup>94</sup> Asheri 1990: 162. Marvelous things, along with great works and customs, were central concerns for Herodotus' ethnographic excurses. He sought to present foreign peoples to the Greeks by highlighting non-Greek aspects. See Rood 2006: 291.

<sup>95</sup> Irwin (2007: 65-77) argues that by contrast authors such as Thucydides and Aristophanes attempted to downplay the differences between the Greeks and Thracians, showing that the Thracians would be fitting allies for the Athenians.

<sup>96</sup> See the collection of essays in Burkert and Nenci, et al. (1990); see also Thomas (2000) who argues that Herodotus employed the new methods of 5<sup>th</sup> century scientific inquiry in his examination of foreign peoples.

depth the excursus on the Scythians in book 4, concluding that Herodotus employed the Scythians – a people representative of the “other,” or non-Greeks – as a means of revealing and exploring Greek customs. The strange customs of the Scythians were used by Herodotus to convey a wealth of information about the Greeks themselves.<sup>97</sup> This would apply as well to his treatment of the Thracians. Herodotus, though, does not necessarily imply the *inferiority* of non-Greeks by emphasizing their differences. Rather, he seems to admire many non-Greek practices while at the same time showing that the boundary between Greek and non-Greek is often permeable.<sup>98</sup>

For Thracian affairs, especially those pertaining to the Aegean coastline and the Chersonese, Herodotus seems to rely on Athenian sources. While in Athens, he could have consulted members of the large population of ethnic Thracians living in the city. He also visited a number of sites in the north Aegean, including Thasos and the Hellespont, where he would have encountered both Greeks and Thracians privy to happenings in Thrace and knowledgeable about Thracian *nomoi*.<sup>99</sup> Scott, however, urges caution with respect to Herodotus’ Athenian sources. For example, while there would have been many Athenians who remembered hearing of the exploits of the Philaids in Thrace, the tradition might have been tainted by the arguments made in Miltiades’ tyranny trial of 493. The prosecution would have emphasized the tyrannical bent of Miltiades, including his association with the hated Pisistratids. The defense, on the other hand, would have denied such a connection and stressed his

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<sup>97</sup> Hartog 1980; the work was translated into English in 1988. More recently, Munson (2001: 172) explores many of the same issues, concluding that Herodotus engages in an “ongoing polemic against cultural chauvinism, cultural imperialism, and racism” by means of his ethnographic passages.

<sup>98</sup> Rood 2006: 301-303. More generally, see Bichler 2004.

<sup>99</sup> As pointed out by Asheri (1990: 132-133).

democratic credentials. Both strains subsequently entered the tradition. Thus, when Herodotus narrates the departure of the elder Miltiades for Thrace, he makes use of a pro-Philaid source which removes all mention of Pisistratus' involvement. Later, the departure of the younger Miltiades is depicted as at the behest of the Pisistratids, which indicates an anti-Philaid source.<sup>100</sup> Despite Scott's arguments, it is odd that at one part of the Philaid account Herodotus accepts what amounts to pro-Philaid propaganda, while at another he repeats the accusations of the Philaids' political enemies. Why would the historian have been so inconsistent? All told, Herodotus had access to a wealth of reasonably informed sources on Thrace. We should hesitate before challenging the accuracy of his account of Thracian *nomoi* and Thracian events, including the experience of the controversial Philaids.

Thucydides is a crucial source for this study not only due to his incomparable history of the Peloponnesian War and much of the fifth century, but because he was tied to Thrace in his own right. He tells us that he had many connections in Thrace, due largely to his control of gold mines on the mainland opposite Thasos (4.105.1). The biographical tradition of Thucydides, attributed largely to one Marcellinus, adds that the historian also owned estates in the region (Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 14).<sup>101</sup> Plutarch says that Thucydides inherited these mines from Cimon, who was probably a kinsman, and from his own father Olorus (*Cim.* 4). It is nearly certain that Thucydides was related to Cimon and the Philaid family. There is ancient testimony of a monument or tomb of Thucydides at Athens located among those of the other members of the Philaid family, though scholars are divided as to the historicity and nature of the

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<sup>100</sup> Scott 2005: 19, 163, 169-170, 178-179, 366-367, 526-527, 531, 643.

<sup>101</sup> For Thucydides' biographical tradition, see Maitland 1996.

monument.<sup>102</sup> That aside, Thucydides' father was a man named Olorus, which was the name of the Thracian king who married his daughter Hegesipyle to the younger Miltiades. Some sources attribute the name Hegesipyle also to Thucydides' mother. It is possible, then, that Thucydides was a grandson of the elder Miltiades. At any rate, there existed some sort of familial relationship.<sup>103</sup>

Because of his ties in the north, Thucydides was one of the Athenian generals specially charged with affairs in Thrace (στρατηγὸς ἐπὶ Θράκης) for 424/3 (Thuc. 4.104.4). Other figures in this study, namely Dieitrephes and probably Thrasybulus, were given similar postings during the Peloponnesian War. Following the loss of Amphipolis to Brasidas – due in part to Thucydides' failure to arrive from Thasos in time to prevent the city from defecting – Thucydides withdrew to his possessions in Thrace, at Skaptesyle across from Thasos. According to both Plutarch and Marcellinus, there he completed the writing of his history (Plut. *Cim.* 4; *Mor.* 205c; Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 46-47). Marcellinus adds that Thucydides married a woman from Skaptesyle and remained very rich and in possession of mines (19). In light of his role in the loss of Amphipolis, which was psychologically devastating for the Athenians, it seems as though Thucydides opted for voluntary exile.<sup>104</sup> He resembles many of the

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<sup>102</sup> Marcellinus *Vit. Thuc.* 17. For a discussion of the problems relating to the monument, and for Thucydides' biography in general, see Canfora 2006.

<sup>103</sup> It has also been argued that Thucydides the historian was related to Thucydides son of Melesias, also a kinsman of Cimon. For a proposed stemma of the family, see Wade-Gery 1932: 210-211. See also Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3: 578; Davies 1971: 233-234.

<sup>104</sup> Canfora (2006: 16-17) argues that Thucydides' exile was voluntary, and that he may have returned to Athens for a brief period after the exiles were recalled in 413; after 411, he left Athens again, perhaps due to his connections with the oligarchy of that year. Canfora's arguments, however, are not without critics. In Thucydides' own account we are told that he was an exile for a period of twenty years after Amphipolis, though the language is ambiguous as to whether voluntary or forced exile is meant (5.26.5). This passage is a vexed one. Canfora has argued that it was in fact penned by Xenophon, and others have suggested various emendations. Dover, though, accepts the text as it appears (Gomme et

figures examined in this study: he gained a prestigious command because of his ties to Thrace, and once out of favor in Athens he relied on those same connections to provide refuge.

It is difficult to assess how Thucydides' personal ties affect the presentation of Thrace in his history. He demonstrates a deep knowledge of the region and allows himself a handful of lengthy digressions on Thrace, especially on the Odrysian kingdom of Sitalces (2.95-101).<sup>105</sup> As opposed to Herodotus, Thucydides' work contains few such excurses. His aside in 2.29 in which he censures the common association between Sitalces' father Teres and the mythical Tereus is curious. The historian is vehement in his systematic refutation of any connection between the Odrysians and the savage Tereus who is most famous in mythology for raping and mutilating the daughter of an Athenian king. Is Thucydides here defending the reputation of the Thracians who were his associates if not his kinsman? Or is he pedantically drawing upon his knowledge of the region to correct a common misconception at Athens? It is a strange and nearly unique insertion into his otherwise detached narrative.<sup>106</sup> At 7.29.4, while describing the sack of Mycalessus at the hands of Thracian mercenaries in the service Athens – one of the most chilling episodes in the war – Thucydides says that the Thracians, like other barbarians, are most

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al., 1945-1981: vol. 5, 431-432). Hornblower (1991-2008: vol. 3, 50-53), who insists that this passage is authentic and sound, thinks Thucydides returned to Athens after the war, in 404.

<sup>105</sup> For these digressions, see Rusten 1989: 2-3, 132-134, 239-245.

<sup>106</sup> Gomme (1945-1981: vol. 2, 90) thinks that Thucydides is merely offering an "enlightened" interpretation of the Teres-Tereus connection to correct common misconceptions at Athens. Another example of a Thucydidean digression is that concerning the tyrannicides at 6.54-59. Thucydides appears to use the opportunity to correct misconceptions about Harmodious and Aristogiton to make a political statement against the excesses of democracy. See Diesner 1959.

bloodthirsty when confident.<sup>107</sup> While this appears to be a condemnation of the Thracians, Kallet thinks Thucydides is employing a gnomic statement rather than giving his own opinion. She argues that the Mycalessus episode is intended more to demonstrate the depravity to which the Athenians had descended because of the financial ruin wrought by the Spartan presence at Decelea.<sup>108</sup> In the end, there is no mistaking the pity Thucydides felt for the people of Mycalessus. It seems he had a complex range of opinions regarding the Thracians.

Gomme sensibly argues that when Thucydides is contradicted in a later source such as Ephorus or Diodorus, we are to prefer Thucydides unless some new evidence appears in support of the latter.<sup>109</sup> I might add that regarding actual events, as opposed to attestations of motive and the like, Thucydides appears quite reliable.<sup>110</sup> In Thucydides we are fortunate to have a well informed source regarding many things, but especially in the case of Thrace. And as a figure connected to Thrace himself, he might offer special insight into the characters of other such men, though perhaps with a level of bias of which we should be wary. His feelings for the post-Periclean democracy at Athens, for instance, are fairly negative and might bear on his presentation of the democracy's treatment of the elite.<sup>111</sup>

Like Thucydides, Xenophon was a historian as well as an actor in some of the most significant events he records. Also, like Thucydides, he had extensive

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<sup>107</sup> “τὸ γὰρ γένος τὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ὁμοῖα τοῖς μάλιστα τοῦ βαρβαρικοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσύνῃ, φονικώτατόν ἐστιν.” For the Thracians at Mycalessus see below, ch. 3.

<sup>108</sup> See Kallet 1999, esp. 240, n. 49.

<sup>109</sup> See Gomme's (1945-1981: vol. 1, 84-87) principles of historical criticism.

<sup>110</sup> For possible problems concerning the attestation of motives, see Sears (forthcoming) concerning the problems surrounding Thucydides' description of the campaign at Pylos in 425.

<sup>111</sup> See for example his comments regarding Alcibiades at 6:15. Though Alcibiades was an arrogant and flamboyant aristocrat, Thucydides argues that because the Athenians turned against him due to their populist paranoia, they brought ruin upon themselves. See Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 4, 242-245.

experience in Thrace. The last two books of his *Anabasis*, an account of the journey in 401-399 of the Ten Thousand Greeks commissioned by the Persian pretender Cyrus, give a firsthand account of Xenophon's experiences in Thrace at the head of his troops.<sup>112</sup> The remnants of the Ten Thousand took up service with the Odrysian dynast Seuthes II and campaigned on his behalf through much of southeastern Thrace. Xenophon also recounts his personal dealings with Seuthes, including a banquet attended by all the Thracian nobles in the region. The *Anabasis*, completed after 362/1, offers one of the fullest accounts we have of the military interaction between Greek hoplites and Thracian peltasts, and of the life and ritual at a Thracian court. Xenophon's *Hellenica* too, an account written in the mid 350's of Greek history from 411 to the Battle of Mantinea in 362, tells us much about Thracian affairs, especially those Greeks involved in the north.<sup>113</sup>

Prior to his campaigns in Thrace at the head of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon was familiar with Thracians, especially their fighting methods. He gives a vivid account of Thrasybulus' use of light-armed troops in the Battle of Munichia against the Thirty Tyrants in 403 – a battle in which Xenophon himself might have participated.<sup>114</sup> Thrasybulus' troops likely consisted largely of Thracians, both mercenaries and those dwelling in the Piraeus.<sup>115</sup> As a young man, not much more than eighteen years of age, Xenophon seems to have taken part in Thrasyllus'

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<sup>112</sup> For a useful commentary on the Thracian portions of the *Anabasis*, see Stronk 1995.

<sup>113</sup> For the dates of composition for the *Anabasis* and *Hellenica*, which are still contested somewhat, see Badian 2004: 46.

<sup>114</sup> This was first proposed by Schwartz 1889, who sees Xenophon's account of the battles between Thrasybulus and the oligarchs in 404-403 as bearing the marks of an eyewitness. Xenophon seems to have been an admirer of Theramenes and his more moderate oligarchic tendencies, and has fairly high praise for the democratic champion Thrasybulus. Anderson (1974: 47-48) argues that Xenophon was a rather reluctant supporter of the Thirty.

<sup>115</sup> See Middleton 1982; and below, ch. 4.

expedition to the Aegean coast of Asia Minor in 409.<sup>116</sup> Thrasyllus eventually wound up on the Hellespont where he joined his forces with those of Alcibiades as they raided the territory of Pharnabazus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.13). Xenophon tells us that Thrasyllus equipped 5000 of his sailors as peltasts before he set out from Athens, and other mercenary peltasts seem to have been part of this force as well (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.1).<sup>117</sup> Thracian mercenaries were also part of Cyrus' expedition of 401, fighting in the battle of Cunaxa (Xen. *An.* 1.10.6).

While undoubtedly a well informed source, Xenophon had clear biases from which his history seems to suffer at certain points. In a seminal introduction to the *Hellenica*, Cawkwell renders a damning verdict of Xenophon as a historian, highlighting many inexplicable omissions and apparent distortions in his history.<sup>118</sup> Because Xenophon was exiled from Athens and took up service and residence with the Spartans, he has also been accused of harboring an elitist prejudice against Athenian democracy.<sup>119</sup> Likewise, his portrayal of the Thracians, especially Seuthes, appears to

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<sup>116</sup> The account of this campaign seems to be given from an eyewitness perspective. See Stronk 1995: 4.

<sup>117</sup> The *OCT* text of this passage shows that one editor has deleted the next line, “ὥς ἄμα καὶ πελτασταῖς ἐσομένοις,” which implies that these peltast-sailors would serve together with the peltast troops that were already to be part of the expedition. Presumably, the editor felt this line to be redundant, though I would argue it implies there were Thracian mercenary peltasts along with the newly equipped sailors. At 1.2.2-3, Xenophon seems to distinguish between the Athenian light troops – *ψιλοί*, a term Xenophon often uses interchangeably with peltasts – and other peltasts. In my opinion, the former designates the improvised peltast-sailors, while the latter denotes Thracian mercenaries.

<sup>118</sup> Cawkwell and Warner 1978: 7-46.

<sup>119</sup> The date and cause of the exile is one of the most contentious issues in the life of Xenophon, with even our ancient sources varying in explanation from participation with the Cyreans to philo-Laonism. To my mind, Rahn (1981) offers the most convincing arguments, proposing that Xenophon was exiled in 394 after anti-Spartan sentiment became more openly expressed in Athens. For his anti-Athenian bias, see, however, Badian (2004), who argues that Xenophon remained a loyal Athenian all his life, even as an exile. Whether his anti-Athenian feelings, like his pro-Spartan ones, were as extreme as many scholars have contended, Xenophon certainly harbored some negative sentiment toward his native city for a considerable span of time. After all, there were good reasons for the works of the so-called Old Oligarch to be attributed to Xenophon, however incorrectly. The democracy that had executed



be a hostile one. Xenophon was offered considerable rewards by Seuthes, but he chose to leave Thrace and join the Spartans in Asia Minor. What he tells about Seuthes' court, however, is in line with other sources concerning the Thracian nobility, including material remains. Because he was in a position to become a Thrace-haunter should he have wished yet opted instead for Sparta, he is especially valuable for this study as a counter to Athenian Thracophiles.<sup>120</sup> For the period covered by Xenophon we have recourse to other contemporary accounts, in various states of preservation, which can offer useful corroboration or corrective as the case may be. Biases and flaws aside, Xenophon tells us many useful things about Thrace and Thrace-haunters, often from a firsthand perspective.<sup>121</sup>

### *Drama*

A great portion of fifth century Attic literature is represented by drama, both tragedy and comedy. Many of the plays of the great tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, though ostensibly dealing with mythological themes, comment on current events.<sup>122</sup> For instance, Euripides' *Hecuba*, staged in 425, is set in the aftermath of the Trojan War, but the villainy of the Thracian character Polymestor was possibly meant as a warning to the Athenians against allying with the Thracians.<sup>123</sup> Likewise, Sophocles' *Tereus*, surviving only in fragments, told in gruesome detail of

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Socrates would not have overly pleased one of the great philosopher's most famous admirers.

<sup>120</sup> See below, ch. 6.

<sup>121</sup> Two volumes of Xenophon studies have appeared recently which offer updated scholarly views on a range of issues. See Tuplin and Azoulay 2004; Lane Fox 2004.

<sup>122</sup> A major exception would be Aeschylus' *Persae* which dramatizes the Battle of Salamis and its aftermath.

<sup>123</sup> For a study of Polymestor's character and the allusion to the Thracians, particularly Sitalces, see Delebecque 1951: 147-164.

the rape and mutilation committed by the Thracian king Tereus against Philomela, a daughter of a king of Athens. This, too, might have been meant as a comment on the Thracian allies of Athens.<sup>124</sup> While tragedy offers little by way of factual detail, the attitude of the playwrights towards the relationship between Athens and Thrace was probably shared by at least some other Athenians. By extension, that such comments were made concerning the Thracians implies that the playwrights believed a significant segment of Athens needed to be corrected in their opinion. Obviously we should be cautious in using tragedy as evidence, as the writers were pursuing a dramatic rather than historiographical agenda. In her influential 1989 book, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*, E. Hall explores how the Athenians sought to understand themselves in comparison to a barbarian other as represented in Attic tragedy. Plays such as Aeschylus' *Persae* served to paint a portrait of the barbarian which acted as a foil in developing the audience's conception of what it meant to be Greek. Such works, therefore, are invaluable in helping us determine how the Greeks conceived of barbarians, including Thracians.<sup>125</sup>

Comedy has often been used as a mine for historians of Athenian political history. The plays of Old Comedy in particular dealt overtly with contemporary events and personalities, especially leading politicians such as Cleon. As Rusten argues, Old Comic plays survived throughout antiquity, despite their arcane references that would hardly have resonated with later audiences, because the ancients used the

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<sup>124</sup> For a study of the play's fragments, see Fitzpatrick 2001.

<sup>125</sup> E. Hall 1989. J. Hall (2005: 259-263), however, has recently challenged the notion that the Greeks and barbarians were diametrically opposed. It seems that in reality the Greeks conceived of themselves and barbarians as occupying opposite ends of a cultural continuum, with infinite number of blended identities lying in between.

plays as sources for Athenian history.<sup>126</sup> The Thracians and Athens' ties to Thrace are mentioned in many places, especially Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. But, as with tragedy, we must be cautious in using comedy as evidence. Facts were routinely twisted and exaggerated to fit comic plots. Also, it is not always clear what the relationship was between the respective attitudes of comic playwright and audience. Sommerstein argues that the playwrights were a "conservative" lot, as were the majority of those who attended the plays. Thus, the treatment of "radical democrats" was disproportionately harsh.<sup>127</sup> Carey, on the other hand, insists that the lampooning of leading politicians was a means for the mass of citizens to assert authority over their leaders through ridicule. In this way, the comic playwright voiced concerns and attitudes held by the population at large.<sup>128</sup> Henderson calls the Old Comic poets the "constituent intellectuals of the *demos*" whose role in influencing and shaping the city's ideology was "an organic feature of the sovereignty of the *demos*." It was no coincidence that the heyday of Old Comedy was exactly the period of greatest popular sovereignty, between Ephialtes' reforms of 462/1 and the reforms enacted after 404/3.<sup>129</sup> Like tragedy, comedy can inform us of various Athenian stereotypes of foreigners such as the Thracians, though perhaps distorted to an even greater extent.<sup>130</sup>

In the end, as playwrights were concerned with taking the first prize in dramatic competitions, they would have written plays that pleased the audience, or at least the judges. If a joke was made concerning the Thracians or an Athenian Thrace-haunter,

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<sup>126</sup> Rusten 2006: 556.

<sup>127</sup> Sommerstein 1996: 334-337.

<sup>128</sup> Carey 1994.

<sup>129</sup> Henderson 1990: 272.

<sup>130</sup> For comic representations of barbarians, see Long 1986.

it probably resonated with the audience.<sup>131</sup>

### *Other Fourth Century Literature*

Theopompus of Chios, likely born in the first quarter of the fourth century, wrote two major histories, a twelve book *Hellenica* detailing events from 411-394, and the fifty-eight book *Philippica* which covered not only the career of Philip II of Macedon but also much of the fourth century through lengthy digressions. His work survives only in fragments, marking a great loss for scholars of late Classical Greece.<sup>132</sup> From what we can gather from ancient testimony and the contents of the fragments themselves, Theopompus was widely traveled and acquainted with many of the leading figures of his day, including Philip of Macedon at whose court he spent some time. He also seems to have participated in politics on his native Chios late in his career. Though scholars have differed in their assessments of Theopompus' political and moral leanings, as well his reliability as a historian, the evidence suggests that he was an honest writer who perhaps focused too much and too uncritically on questions of morality and motivation. Above all, he seems to have been preoccupied with the moral failings of his time, primarily licentiousness and extravagance. The rise of Philip, according to Theopompus, can best be explained by the vices of his opponents. Theopompus' evidence, though, should be given serious consideration given that he was a contemporary with many of the events he narrates and that he had

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<sup>131</sup> For the role of tragedy and comedy in instructing the audience in moral and ethical matters, see Taplin 1983. Taplin argues that the ancient dramatists did conceive of themselves as playing a didactic role in the *polis*, though perhaps not to the extent claimed by 19<sup>th</sup> century scholars.

<sup>132</sup> The 51 *testimonia* and 411 surviving fragments of Theopompus are collected under historian 115 in Jacoby's FGrHist.

so much contact with important political actors. And, as Flower stresses, Theopompus' obsession with moral failings may be exaggerated because he is quoted, chiefly by Athenaeus, in order to provide anecdotes of extravagance and the unusual.<sup>133</sup> Theopompus provides an important contemporary perspective on the times in which Iphicrates, Chabrias, Charidemus and others operated, and in several passages he comments directly on such figures.

Another important but no longer extant historian of the fourth century is Ephorus of Cumae, who lived around 400-330 and wrote a universal history in twenty-nine books. The first century BCE epitomator Diodorus Siculus remains our best means of accessing Ephorus' writings, as Diodorus relied heavily on Ephorus in his treatment of the fourth century in his own universal history. Unfortunately, Diodorus is a problematic source since it is generally acknowledged that he was a compiler of second-rate skill who accepted his sources uncritically and often represented them inaccurately.<sup>134</sup> That being said, Ephorus provided a fuller picture of the Greek world of the fourth century than did Xenophon, and were it not for Diodorus, we would be in the dark about many important issues such as the Second Athenian Confederacy.<sup>135</sup> Ephorus seems particularly well informed concerning the campaigns of Greek mercenaries abroad, perhaps hearing from the mercenaries themselves in Athens. His account of Iphicrates' activities in Egypt in 374/3, for example, is given from the

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<sup>133</sup> Flower (1994) provides the best modern treatment of Theopompus. See especially 66-71 on Theopompus' aversion to luxurious living; and 184-210 for the effect of his moral judgments and concern with motivations on his historical accuracy.

<sup>134</sup> See the treatment of Diodorus' methods in Stylianou (1998: 132-139). But see also Sacks (1990) who attempts a rehabilitation of Diodorus by demonstrating that there is more original thought in his writings than has been acknowledged. In the case of the Ephoran books in particular (11-15), Diodorus seems to have added his own proems, or at least embellished those of Ephorus.

<sup>135</sup> Stylianou 1998: 127-128.

perspective of Iphicrates who may have been Ephorus' source either directly or indirectly.<sup>136</sup> But, in examining the foreign exploits of various Athenians in Thrace and elsewhere, we must keep in mind that Ephorus seems to disparage barbarians unfairly and implies in many passages that they were helpless without the guidance of Greek mercenaries.<sup>137</sup>

Early in the twentieth century, a papyrus was discovered in Oxyrhynchus containing part of a history of Greece from 411-394, with the early years of the fourth century best represented in the surviving fragments. Various candidates have been suggested for the authorship of this *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, including Ephorus, Theopompus, and one Cratippus of Athens, but no clear solution to the problems of identification has been found.<sup>138</sup> The Oxyrhynchus historian, writing likely in the early to mid fourth century, a source for Ephorus and indirectly for Diodorus, provides an important alternative account to Xenophon at many points. It is unclear whether Xenophon or the Oxyrhynchus historian should be preferred in cases of disagreement. Each case should be judged on its merits.<sup>139</sup> The Oxyrhynchus historian is useful for deciphering the political situation in Athens following the Peloponnesian War, particularly the climate in which important Thracophiles such as Thrasybulus operated. Also, since this historian is widely acknowledged to have been a serious practitioner of history, the account preserved in Diodorus of the years 411-394 should be given due consideration alongside Xenophon.

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<sup>136</sup> Stylianou 1998: 104-109.

<sup>137</sup> Stylianou 1998: 114-115.

<sup>138</sup> See McKechnie and Kern 1988: 9-14. Flower (1994: 27-28) argues persuasively that Theopompus is not the author.

<sup>139</sup> McKechnie and Kern 1988: 14-16.

For the end of the fifth and much of the fourth century, the Attic orators – principally Lysias, Aeschines and Demosthenes – are often the richest sources we have for Athenian history. This is in many ways unfortunate, not least because the nature of their works necessitates extreme caution on the part of the modern historian. Speeches were composed to persuade the audience, whether in the political arena or in the law courts, and the stakes were enormous. As E. Harris points out, “nothing aside from the knowledge of the men sitting in judgment and the limits of plausibility restrained the litigant from inventing falsehoods and distorting the truth.”<sup>140</sup> A further wrinkle is added by the often substantial revision of speeches after their oral delivery.<sup>141</sup> Can we then trust oratorical evidence at all? In some instances, the claims made by an orator can be substantiated at least in part by other evidence. For example, Aeschines mentions a decree proposed by Archinus of Coele, part of which has been found in an inscription.<sup>142</sup> In this case, the two independent pieces of evidence can be used in conjunction to flesh out the particulars of the decree in detail greater than would have been afforded by just one or the other. Harris argues that references to public events, particularly recent ones, can more or less be trusted given that the audience would not have accepted blatant falsehoods concerning matters of common knowledge.<sup>143</sup> Statements about matters of a less public nature should be

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<sup>140</sup> E. Harris 1995: 8. Golden (2000), however, cautions against an appeal to plausibility as an indicator of truthfulness. See also Todd (1990) for a survey of the ways in which oratory has been used by historians.

<sup>141</sup> On this issue, see Worthington 1991.

<sup>142</sup> See below, ch. 4.

<sup>143</sup> See for example E. Harris (1989: 268) where he argues that Demosthenes could not have simply fabricated the naval battle which Iphicrates fought against Athens, given that all Athenians would have known about such a remarkable event.

accepted only if reasonable supporting evidence is produced by the speaker.<sup>144</sup>

Even if facts and events are unsure, oratory can help us discern Athenian attitudes and conceptions if used cautiously and with an appreciation of context. For instance, Lysias might be engaged in wholesale fabrication by alleging that Thrasybulus contemplated defecting from Athens in order to establish his own power base in Thrace (28.5-6). Such an allegation, however, implies that the Athenians would have appreciated the plausibility of this sort of defection. Ober stresses the importance of oratorical evidence for our understanding of Athenian mass ideology. Though the orators themselves were members of the elite, they composed speeches designed to sway the opinions of jurors or voters. Thus, they were compelled to speak well of what the audience thought was good, and ill of what the audience thought was evil. In this respect, oratory is virtually unique. Other elite writers, by contrast, wrote for elite readers.<sup>145</sup>

The use made by orators of historical material, involving both the distant and recent past, is a complex issue.<sup>146</sup> At the very least, a speaker would be discriminating and even misleading in the selection, exclusion, and interpretation of historical events. Concerning recent events, orators usually proceeded with the assumption that their

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<sup>144</sup> For Harris' complete list of criteria for judging the veracity of oratorical statements, see 1995: 15-16.

<sup>145</sup> Ober 1989: 43-49. Ober also argues that there was a sort of agreement between speaker and audience that the facts could be distorted for rhetorical purposes. For example, an orator could cast himself in the same socio-economic light as the members of his audience even though he might well have been far richer and more socially elite than a majority of his hearers. Still, even through such distortions we can come to understand the sorts of symbols and *topoi* that appealed to a majority of Athenians.

<sup>146</sup> See the treatments of Pearson 1941. See also Nouhaud (1982) who is concerned primarily with the orators' use of material preceding a given speech by at least twenty years. He concludes (357-364) that Lysias and Demosthenes were willing to distort and even falsify historical material to suit their purposes, and Aeschines was often mistaken or misinformed in his use of historical examples. That said, Nouhaud concedes that references to contemporary events, especially by Lysias, might be more trustworthy and useful to the modern historian.



audience knew the details, though it is difficult to determine to what extent this was actually true. It is reasonable to assume that recent history could not be treated too cavalierly.<sup>147</sup> As a relevant note on the treatment of historical events in Thrace, Aeschines chides Demosthenes for wearying the Athenians with excessive detail about obscure Thracian matters and places, but he does not impugn the accuracy of these statements.<sup>148</sup> In using oratorical evidence, the context and the intention of the speaker should always be borne in mind; statements about private matters without corroborating evidence should not be trusted; and the speaker's interpretation of even securely attested matters should never be taken at face value, though the speaker's arguments can shed light on what the audience might have been expected to believe.

The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, rediscovered on papyri in the late nineteenth century, was written probably in the late 330's and revised in the 320's while Aristotle was in Athens. It is disputed whether Aristotle himself wrote the treatise, or whether it was compiled by members of his school. In any case, we do know that Aristotle and his pupils compiled a corpus of "constitutions" of numerous Greek states, on which the *Politics* was based.<sup>149</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* consists of two sections, the first being a history of the development of the Athenian constitution from its beginnings to the supposedly final reforms of 403. The second gives a detailed account of the workings of the fourth century Athenian democracy. This study primarily makes use of the first half, as the author in narrating the history of

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<sup>147</sup> See Pearson 1941: 228: "Many such events [after the Peloponnesian War] would have taken place within the lifetime of the audience or might be known to them through older members of their families. In making such allusions the orator would have to be careful not to conflict with private information that some of his listeners might have acquired from their elders."

<sup>148</sup> See Aeschines' comments at 3.82, where he appears to pun on the Thracian place names. For Demosthenes' reply, see 18.27.

<sup>149</sup> For a discussion of the dating and authorship of the *Athenaion Politeia*, see Rhodes 1981: 51-63.

figures such as Pisistratus and events such as the struggle against the Thirty Tyrants make use of traditions different than those used by Herodotus and Xenophon. While it is not always clear which tradition the modern historian should prefer, and while many principles of fourth century political theory are applied anachronistically to earlier periods, each case will be judged on its merits.<sup>150</sup>

Other fourth century writers provide important details, from scattered references to historical events to an elaboration of various political views that bear on the Thrace-haunter phenomenon. The works of Isocrates, Plato, Aristotle and his school, and others will be used throughout with an attempt to maintain an appropriately critical approach and an appreciation for context.

### *Later Literature*

Cornelius Nepos, a Latin writer of the first century BCE, penned a collection of brief biographies of famous men, the *De viris illustribus*, which included a section on Greek generals. Though much maligned by modern scholars for his apparent lack of original research and his hackneyed prose, he does have his defenders.<sup>151</sup> It seems as though Nepos consulted primary sources more than previously thought, and the nature of his work, that is biography, means that he preserves many details left out of historiography.<sup>152</sup> As a repository of anecdotal material, such as certain traits of character and the attitudes held by the contemporaries of important figures, Nepos is often the only source we have. When we can compare his work with other sources, it

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<sup>150</sup> Rhodes's 1981 commentary remains the indispensable scholarly aid for the *Athenaion Politeia*.

<sup>151</sup> For a disparaging portrait of Nepos, see especially Horsfall's scathing comments in the *Cambridge History of Classical Literature* (1982).

<sup>152</sup> For a reassessment of Nepos, see Titchener 2003.

becomes clear that he often represents various traditions faithfully. He does present some factual inaccuracies, however, such as a conflation of the elder and younger Miltiades. This particular error might stem from a popular strain of thought in fifth century Athens that was followed by Ephorus, implying that Nepos accurately preserved the historical tradition rather than blundered through carelessness.<sup>153</sup>

Plutarch of Chaeronea wrote his famous series of parallel biographies of Greek and Roman figures between 96-120 CE. Like Nepos, by whom he was influenced, Plutarch's reputation has suffered at the hands of scholars.<sup>154</sup> During the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth, Plutarch was primarily used as a mine for historical information. It was assumed that he used only a single source for each of his biographies, and that this source was often an earlier Hellenistic biography. Plutarch's only direct contact with primary sources, so it was thought, was via this earlier biographical material. Accordingly, as good practitioners of *Quellenforschung*, scholars were at pains to identify the various lost primary sources that were indirectly, and uncritically, preserved by Plutarch. Recently, however, Plutarch has been rehabilitated as not only a critical user of primary material, but also an important literary figure in his own right.<sup>155</sup>

As for Plutarch's historical accuracy and access to reliable source material, Frost presents a convincing image of the biographer able to consult seminal works while being steeped in an intangible yet vital intellectual and cultural milieu that we

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<sup>153</sup> As argued by Scott (2005: 164). Herodotus is careful to distinguish between the elder and younger Miltiades by including the names of the elder's father and grandfather.

<sup>154</sup> For the influence of Nepos on Plutarch, see Geiger 1988; Ramón Palerm 1992.

<sup>155</sup> Duff (1999: 5-9) gives a brief and useful survey of Plutarch's fortunes at the hands of scholars. For Plutarch as an important literary figure, as well as a discussion of his historiographical methods, see the collection of essays in Pelling 2002.

moderns can scarcely hope to appreciate. Though Plutarch's prodigious memory might slip from time to time, he demonstrates a vast learning and familiarity with the Greek past.<sup>156</sup> This study does tend to use Plutarch primarily as a source of historical material otherwise lost to us; but the context and purpose of his writing is taken into account. As a biographer, Plutarch was a dedicated moralist. He records the deeds of his subjects, both major public actions and intimate private utterances, in order to present a comprehensive portrait of their respective characters.<sup>157</sup> In so doing, Plutarch hoped to edify his readers. This particular ethic of biographical writing ensures that Plutarch, like Nepos, records many things overlooked or downplayed by historiographical sources. For the careers – and personal traits – of Cimon, Alcibiades, and others, he is invaluable. If the motives he assigns to his subjects are incorrect or inferred from dubious evidence, we can at least gain insight into the reputation and reception of these characters as preserved in the traditions used by Plutarch.

### *Inscriptions*

The so-called Greek “epigraphic habit,” whereby all manner of decrees, laws, dedications, and economic transactions were recorded for posterity on stone, has provided ancient historians with a massive corpus of evidence. The Athenians were especially fond of inscriptions. In addition to filling in the gaps left in literature concerning political history, inscriptions are invaluable for legal and social history. They provide often the only source for local history outside of the main foci of ancient

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<sup>156</sup> Frost 1998: 36-53.

<sup>157</sup> For his moralizing program, see Duff 1999: 13-98.

literary sources.<sup>158</sup> In many cases, inscriptions are the soundest pieces of contemporary evidence we have. First of all, they were often inscribed very shortly after the event or decision they record. Also, they have not been subjected to the manuscript tradition which at certain points might have led to distortions in literary texts. Ideally, the inscription as we have it today is exactly as it was when it was first inscribed. Finally, inscriptions have often corroborated and elaborated upon the version of events preserved in literature. For instance, Plutarch tells us that Alcibiades managed to capture the rebellious city of Selymbria largely through treachery and bring it back into alliance with Athens (*Alc.* 30). The inscription preserved as IG i<sup>3</sup> 118 details the exact arrangements made between Selymbria and the Athenian generals, and Alcibiades himself is listed as the proposer for honors to be granted to Apollodorus, a Selymbrian citizen and probable associate of Alcibiades. We thus have a much fuller picture of events than Plutarch alone provides, including a glimpse into the personal arrangements that were behind Alcibiades' successful campaigns in the north.

Inscriptions, though, are often poorly preserved, missing large sections of the text and having other sections damaged by erosion and other factors. While the formulaic language and *stoichidon* lettering of many inscriptions allows epigraphers to make educated restorations to missing lines, Badian has urged caution in reconstructing ancient history from "square brackets."<sup>159</sup> Inscriptions can also be very difficult to date and situate in their proper context. Often a clear date presents itself, such as the preservation of an archon's name. In other cases, epigraphers apply

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<sup>158</sup> Cooper 2008: 10.

<sup>159</sup> Badian 1989.

various criteria, from letter forms to grammatical idiom and spelling conventions. But, these criteria are necessarily subjective and open to various interpretations. Letter forms especially have proven notoriously unreliable for dating purposes.<sup>160</sup> A base for a statue of a certain Dieitrephes, one the Thrace-haunters covered in this study, has been preserved on the Acropolis. The lettering had originally been used to date the inscription to the 440's, which would be too early for our Dieitrephes, but more recently a date closer to the end of the century has been plausibly suggested.<sup>161</sup> Certainty in this case is elusive. We should always remember that the inscriptions we do have form far from a complete record and only survive by chance. More than that, there is no guarantee that what is preserved on inscriptions is accurate. Even in the fourth century, Theopompus accused the Athenians of exaggerating their role at Plataea in the inscription supposedly preserving the oath made before the battle.<sup>162</sup> And finally, the physical placement of the inscription, often on a large and elaborately decorated stele, carried meaning far beyond the written text itself.<sup>163</sup> This meaning is often lost to us, in no small part because the original situation of the inscription cannot be ascertained.

### *Material and Artistic Evidence*

The Thracians left no written sources in any quantity by which we might hope to gauge their own views of themselves and also of the Greeks, but we are fortunate enough to have recourse to a substantial body of archaeological and material evidence

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<sup>160</sup> See, for example, Meiggs 1966; Mattingly 1971.

<sup>161</sup> Keesling 2004.

<sup>162</sup> Theopompus' epigraphical criticism is explored by Pownall 2008.

<sup>163</sup> See Thomas 1992: 78-88.

from Thracian lands. The first major comprehensive work to deal with Thracian material culture was Danov's 1976 *Altthrakien*, based largely on an earlier work published in Bulgarian in 1968. Danov follows a survey of scholarship on Thrace and an account of the relevant literary sources with a look at what he calls "primary sources," that is, inscriptions, numismatics, and other material and archaeological evidence.<sup>164</sup> Archibald takes into account the massive amount of archaeological material from Bulgaria in the decades following Danov's work and offers a rich and full survey of a specific area of Thrace from the Early Iron Age to the early Hellenistic period.<sup>165</sup> Archibald urges scholars to move beyond the skewed accounts of Thrace offered in Greek literature, and instead to investigate the Odrysians on their own terms. Utilizing material remains, she traces changes in such areas as the symbols used to express wealth and social stratification. From a material perspective, she also explores the interaction between the Odrysians and their neighbors, especially Greeks and Persians.

While a scholar must treat with caution material finds that have no native literary context with which they might be interpreted, such finds can be used to corroborate what the Greeks wrote about the Thracians. For example, it is difficult to determine what meaning the ornate drinking vessels found among the Rogozen and Panagyurishte treasures had for the Thracians who possessed them.<sup>166</sup> But we can understand how a Greek such as Xenophon or Iphicrates would have seen in the use of these objects the type of ritualized ostentation of epic heroes. Likewise, we do not

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<sup>164</sup> Danov 1976: 52-89.

<sup>165</sup> Archibald 1998.

<sup>166</sup> See Fol 1989 and Venedikov 1961 respectively.

know exactly what significance horse-burials, for which we have many surviving examples, had for the inhabitants of Thracian lands; but for the Greeks they might have reaffirmed their view of Thrace as a land of heroic horsemen.<sup>167</sup> By careful use of material evidence, the tension between Greek imagery and Thracian reality can be addressed.<sup>168</sup>

Art objects represent a complex and difficult category of evidence for the historian. Though we have a large body of vase-painting and sculpture, particularly of Attic origin, that depicts Thracians and figures with Thracian attributes, the precise intent and meaning behind such imagery can be elusive. In employing this evidence, the proper context for each object – usually sympotic in the case of vase-painting – must be kept in mind, along with the careful work of art historians. As this study is concerned with Athenian attitudes toward Thrace and the Thracians, artistic material cannot be overlooked. Though images of, say, Thracian peltasts might represent their subjects inaccurately, that they were depicted at all says something about those who consumed such material. There appears to be an acute fascination on the part of the Athenian elite, the primary consumers of art objects, with foreigners in general and Thracians in particular. In many cases, elite Athenians are themselves represented with Thracian attributes such as distinctive clothing and equipment.<sup>169</sup> In corroboration with literary and other forms of evidence, artistic material can flesh out our understanding of Athens' relationship with Thrace.

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<sup>167</sup> For horse-burials, see Archibald 1998:69; Kouzmanov 2005

<sup>168</sup> Archibald (1998) offers the most comprehensive treatment of Thracian material evidence, with a focus on the Odrysian kingdom. Archibald's stated aim (5) is to approach the subject from outside the lens of Greek literary sources and examine broader Thracian society.

<sup>169</sup> For foreigners in Attic art see Vos 1963; Lissarrague 1990a. For a general overview of Thracian imagery, see Tsiafakis 2000.



### *Case Studies*

The following chapters consist of case studies examining the careers of many whom Aristophanes would have called Thrace-haunters. As will become evident, there was a range of factors that led to the exploitation of the “Thracian option,” as there was a range of outcomes that resulted.

The study begins in chapter 2 with the careers of Pisistratus and the Philaids from the mid sixth century to the early fifth. After two initial attempts at tyranny which proved short-lived due to the efforts of his aristocratic rivals, Pisistratus found wealth and soldiers in the region of Mt. Pangaeum in Thrace. These new resources tipped the balance decisively in his favor, and he and his family were able to rule Athens unchallenged for decades. Faced with Pisistratus’ firm grip on power, the ambitious Miltiades son of Cypselus left Athens to lead a group of Athenians to the Thracian Chersonese. Driven from Athens by the lack of political opportunity, in Thrace he became a tyrant in his own right, and he passed on his authority to several succeeding generations of the Philaid family. For Pisistratus, Thrace proved to be a kingmaker in Athens. The Philaids were able to achieve royal authority abroad, being in effect exiles living as tyrants. Once back in Athens, later generations of the Philaids, from the younger Miltiades to his son Cimon, would use the resources and prestige they acquired in Thrace to gain positions of influence within the Athenian democracy.

During the Peloponnesian War the Athenians made extensive use of Thracian mercenaries, especially light-armed peltasts. The victory of Demosthenes and Cleon

at Sphacteria in 425 was achieved largely through this type of soldier and set the stage for increasing use of peltasts by Greek states from the end of the fifth and throughout the fourth century. While Demosthenes learned the utility of light-armed fighters in large part because he had suffered a crushing defeat at their hands in Aetolia, several Athenians before him learned this lesson in Thrace. Most notable of these was Hagnon, who founded Amphipolis in 437 and had led the armies of the Thracian Sitalces in 429/8. In 413, a group of 1300 Thracian mercenaries arrived in Athens to serve with Demosthenes in Sicily. These soldiers arrived too late and were too expensive for a beleaguered Athens to maintain, so they were sent home under the command of an Athenian named Dieitrephes, the subject of chapter 3. En route, this force massacred the entire population of Mycalessus, a defenseless Boeotian town. It turns out that Dieitrephes had a pre-existing family connection to Thrace, which explains his appointment to this command. In 411 he was commissioned by the Athenian oligarchs to be the overall commander in the Thraceward region, achieving yet another post through his Thracian connections. The career of Dieitrephes highlights some of the tensions in the Atheno-Thracian relationship. He exploited his ties to Thrace, even to a group of particularly murderous and unsavory mercenaries, to gain advancement in Athens. There is evidence that many Athenians did not approve of the use of such soldiers, nor Dieitrephes' command over them.

Chapter 4 explores the careers of two other Thrace-haunters active during the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus. After falling out with the Athenians due to his arrogance, fleeing Sparta because of an alleged affair with the Spartan Queen, and being arrested by the Persians, Alcibiades resorted to Thrace. The relative

power vacuum in Thrace allowed Alcibiades to carve out his own niche, complete with a private army of Thracian soldiers with which he conducted lucrative campaigns and rendered valuable services to several Thracian dynasts. His associate Thrasybulus made his own connections in the north in 411-407. These connections proved invaluable in 404-403 when he overthrew the Thirty Tyrants and restored democracy largely through the use of Thracian soldiers. Thrasybulus thus became the hero of Athenian democracy and enjoyed unparalleled prestige, at least for a while. In 390/89, he returned to Thrace and secured the alliance of two Thracian rulers whom he managed to reconcile to one another. His career was so intertwined with Thrace that his political rivals accused him of planning to abandon Athens and take up with the Thracians, after marrying a Thracian princess of course. For Alcibiades, Thrace proved the one and only suitable place of refuge, where he could freely exercise his ambitions. Thrasybulus owed much of his political success at Athens to his Thracian ties, and at the end of his career, some worried that he would follow in Alcibiades' footsteps.

Iphicrates, the brilliant leader of the mercenary peltasts that humbled Spartan hoplites at Corinth in 390, is studied in chapter 5. In the 380's, after losing control of the Hellespont to the Spartans, Iphicrates found refuge at the court of the Odrysian Cotys where he served as a guarantor of Cotys' throne and an advisor on military matters. He married Cotys' daughter, who bore him a son, and was adopted by Amyntas, king of Macedon. After returning to Athens for a time and serving as a mercenary leader in Egypt, Iphicrates again fled to Thrace in the 360's, having failed in his campaign to take Amphipolis. During this period he fought a naval action

against the Athenians on Cotys' behalf. Only the exigencies of the Social War led Athens once again to call on Iphicrates to serve as a general, indispensable commander that he was. Though Iphicrates has usually been seen as the harbinger of a new type of military leader for the fourth century, a mercenary general loyal more to his own gain than to his *polis*, he acted perfectly in line with previous generations of Thrace-haunters. He used his command of Thracian troops to gain prestige in Athens, and he turned to Thrace as a refuge when prosecution and loss of influence loomed at home. And, like other Athenians who turned to Thrace, Iphicrates seemed to enjoy the cultural and social milieu of the north, being treated to lavish feasts and rewarded with valuable gifts.

Athens' ties to Thrace did not long survive Iphicrates. Philip began to extend Macedonian control over the region in 357 when he took Amphipolis, succeeding where the Athenians had failed so many times. This was followed soon after by most of western Thrace between the Strymon and Nestus rivers. By 340, after a series of campaigns, Philip controlled all of Thrace, the native kings being reduced to subject rulers. Athens, though, did have its agents in the north. Charidemus of Oreus (in Euboea), who had served with Iphicrates at Amphipolis and followed him to Thrace, worked as a general for Cotys and then his son Cersobleptes. Thanks to Demosthenes, Charidemus' reputation is one of a greedy mercenary exploiting the fragmented power structure of Thrace for his own advantage. Despite this, he did render valuable service to Athens and was awarded Athenian citizenship and made a general several times. Another commander active in the north in the mid fourth century, especially against Philip in the Chersonese, was Chares. He too had the reputation, perhaps

unwarranted, of an unscrupulous bandit who looted and pillaged in order to keep his troops well-paid. In the end, regardless of the negative portrayal given by our sources, both Charidemus and Chares acted well within the paradigm established by previous Athenian generals who campaigned in Thrace. Despite Athens' best efforts, control of the Chersonese, the last remaining foothold in Thrace, was lost to Philip. After Chaeronea in 338, there was little hope it would ever be regained.<sup>170</sup>

As there were other places to which Athenians could and did turn, chapter 6 examines several individuals who did not find their outlet or secure a power base in Thrace. Though his family had ties to Thrace, Pisistratus' son Hippias trusted in Persia to return him to power in Athens. Considering that Persia at the time sponsored many Greek tyrants in Ionia, this was a reasonable goal. After the Persian Wars, and the stigma that became attached to "Medism," Hippias' attempt was never repeated. Themistocles famously found a refuge in Persia, but he did so only as a last resort when Athenian naval power prevented him from settling in any place within reach of Athens' ships. Xenophon was offered a Thracian bride, valuable estates, and a position of influence by the dynast Seuthes II, but he had no love for the Thracians. He opted instead to serve with the Spartans and his personal friend Agesilaus, who duly rewarded him with an estate at Scillus. After fleeing the Battle of Aegospotami, Conon took refuge on Cyprus at the court of Evagoras, and eventually came to lead Persia's fleet against Sparta. Immediately following the Peloponnesian War, Spartan control of the Aegean, especially the Hellespont and Chersonese, ensured that Thrace

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<sup>170</sup> Nilsson (1942: 180-181) suggests that Thracian cults were once again given prominence in Athens in the late fourth century as part of Lycurgus' plan to court the Thracians as potential allies against Philip and Alexander.

was not an option for Conon. While his son Timotheus served the Persians abroad for a time, he was above all dedicated to Athens and its fourth century maritime league. The general Chabrias found service with the Egyptians. It seems that he and Iphicrates were rivals, and while the latter was influential with Cotys in Thrace, Chabrias was shut out of the region. Finally, Alcibiades is once again examined to contrast his experiences in Persia and Thrace.

In the end, Thrace offered limitless resources coupled with a lack of a central governing authority that few other regions could match. Thus, for the Athenians Thrace held a unique place. Throughout much of Athenian history, Thrace was vital to the needs of the Athenian *polis* and instrumental in the careers of its elite. By turns, ties to Thrace led to power and influence at Athens – even within the democracy – and a source of refuge and authority abroad. This special relationship also had a great impact on Greek military developments. By winning influence and renown at Athens through novel tactics employed at the head of Thracian troops, and by turning to the court of a Thracian king when his fortunes at Athens were on the wane, Iphicrates acted just as a long line of Athenians had before him.

## CHAPTER 2

### PISISTRATUS AND THE PHILAIDS

#### *Introduction*

The paradigm for Athenian involvement in Thrace was established by Pisistratus and the Philaid family from the mid sixth to the early fifth century. Pisistratus discovered that the resources of Thrace could be harnessed by an ambitious and unscrupulous politician to furnish a decisive advantage over aristocratic rivals. For Pisistratus Thrace served as a kingmaker in Athens which, for a period, ended the volatile shifting of power between competing aristocratic factions. Once Pisistratus was firmly entrenched as tyrant, the Philaids, starting with the elder Miltiades, found in the Thracian Chersonese a political refuge and a place where they could exercise tyrannical authority abroad. They deftly exploited the conflicts endemic among the Thracian tribes to establish their own power base in a land lying just across the Aegean. Aside from political and material advantage, there are also several indications that the Philaids found much that was attractive in Thracian culture. In this period, Thracian military practices were introduced to the Athenians, through the mercenaries hired by Pisistratus and by the experiences of the Philaids in dealing with threats to their territory in the Chersonese. The Philaids developed various military techniques that would influence Greek fortification and perhaps even the outcome of the Battle of Marathon. They were but the first of many Athenians who would derive tactical inspiration from the Thracians, outside the bounds of the traditional Athenian military ethos.

To begin with, however, we should turn first to an episode of the late seventh century. A group of Athenians set out from home and captured the site of Sigeum in the Troad from the Mytileneans, thereby gaining a foothold on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont.<sup>1</sup> The leader of this early Athenian expedition was a man named Phrynon, an Olympic victor in the *pankration* described as a massive man of great strength (Plut. *Mor.* 858b).<sup>2</sup> Phrynon the pankratiast, skilled at hand-to-hand combat, relished any chance to engage in a duel of champions (μονομαχῆσαι) and win glory for himself. Accordingly, in a subsequent dispute with Mytilene over control of the territory, he issued a challenge to anyone willing to fight him. In spite of the Athenian's intimidating stature and renowned proficiency, a famous figure by the name of Pittacus, one of the so-called seven sages of Greece, rose to the challenge. During the duel, Pittacus ensnared Phrynon with a net he had concealed under his shield and ran him through. Thus killing his opponent, Pittacus took back control of Sigeum for Mytilene (Plut. *Mor.* 858a-b; Diod. 9.12.1; Diog. Laert. 1.74). In recognition of this feat he became sole ruler (αἰσυμνήτης) of the Mytileneans (Diog. Laert. 1.74-81).<sup>3</sup>

Diogenes tells us that Pittacus' father was a Thracian (1.74), and indeed the name is shared by a king of the Edonian Thracians mentioned by Thucydides (Thuc.

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<sup>1</sup> See Hdt 5.94-95 for the ongoing disputes between Athens and Mytilene over possession of this site. See also the attendant commentary in How and Wells (1912: vol. 2, 56) for the chronological problems in Herodotus' account. For the history of settlement of Sigeum, see Diog. Laert. 1.74; Str. 13.1.38. Isaac (1986: 162-166) offers a comprehensive account of Athenian activities in the region. For Sigeum as part of Thrace, see above, ch. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Eusebius' list of Olympic victors places Phrynon in 636/5 (1.199).

<sup>3</sup> Though Herodotus makes no mention of this story, it had a strong tradition in antiquity. For the ancient sources, see Isaac 1986: 162. See Bowen (1992: 112-113) for a discussion of Plutarch's treatment of the story. As Bowen argues, Plutarch probably visited Sigeum himself, and he may have used Hellanicus of Lesbos as his source. For Diogenes Laertius' use of earlier sources, see Mejer (1978: 7-59), who aims to show that, however flawed, Diogenes was an honest compiler of material (14).



4.107).<sup>4</sup> As Herodotus says in his ethnological account of the Thracians at the beginning of his fifth book, the Thracians considered warfare to be the most honorable way of life, and in the lavish funeral games which they held for their dead, they awarded the highest prize to the victor in single-combat (κατὰ λόγον μονομαχίης, 5.8). Even in the Late Roman Republic, the Thracian was a type of gladiator (μονομάχος in Greek), and the most famous gladiator of all, Spartacus, was from Thrace.<sup>5</sup> Indicative of the popular Greek perception of the inhabitants of Thrace, the most notorious fighter in Greek mythology, Amycus, was the king of the Bebrycians who dwelt on the southern shore of the Black Sea and in the northern parts of the Troad, not far from Sigeum.<sup>6</sup> As told by Apollonius of Rhodes and Theocritus, the towering and arrogant Amycus demanded that every foreigner who came to his land fight him in hand-to-hand combat. Polydeuces finally silenced this bully by defeating him in a vicious boxing match (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 2.1-98; Theoc. *Id.* 22). Among such a people, Phrynon, who had received the highest known accolade among the Greeks in the sport of no-holds-barred fighting, would have felt right at home. That Pittacus was himself of Thracian stock and that he was able to defeat Phrynon with a cunning trick implies that he too was experienced in such combat.

A half century after the Athenians first took Sigeum, the elder Miltiades led an expedition to the opposite shore of the Hellespont. The Thracian Chersonese – the modern Gallipoli peninsula – abounded in fertile land for crops and pasturage, a thing

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<sup>4</sup> For the name, see Dechev 1957: 371. The Edonians lived mainly in the Strymon valley.

<sup>5</sup> See Strauss 2009: 13-28. Spartacus, though, was a *murmillio*-type gladiator.

<sup>6</sup> The scholiast for Apollonius (2.2) places the Bebrycians specifically near Lampsacus on the southern shore of the Hellespont.

decidedly lacking in Attica. Also, the straits provided access to Black Sea trade. It would have been in any state's interest to control important ports along this trade route in order to impose duties and attract the business of traveling mariners. The Black Sea eventually became crucially important as a source of imported grain, though likely not before the late fifth century.<sup>7</sup> Miltiades had been invited there by the local inhabitants, the Thracian Dolonci, in order to offer protection against a rival group of Thracians, the Apsinthii. Having been established as tyrant, he came to possess a swathe of territory that his family would control for several generations.

In deciding to leave Athens, the elder Miltiades seized an opportunity to carve out a niche in greener pastures. As it turned out, the fringes of the Greek world proved just the place for the horse-loving Philaids, as it might have for the ill-fated Phrynon. The extent to which sheer necessity lay behind such overseas ventures and colonization efforts is hotly debated by scholars. A consensus is emerging that emphasizes adventurism over pragmatism.<sup>8</sup> Moreno calls the younger Miltiades an "aristocratic buccaneer."<sup>9</sup> Beyond this, Thrace served as a social safety valve whereby elite Athenians could achieve their full aristocratic potential without the constraints of Athens' political system, be it democracy or Pisistratid tyranny. Moreno contends that

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<sup>7</sup> For the vigorous scholarly debate surrounding the settlement of this region, see Isaac 1986: 159-166. For the grain supply, see Moreno 2007.

<sup>8</sup> De Angelis (1994) argues that problems of overpopulation and other traditional explanations for colonization played less of a role in the settlement of Selinous in Sicily than did the thrill of new opportunities. The role of the Hellespont in the Athenian grain trade is disputed. Garnsey (1985; 1988) argued that Athens was more self-sufficient in terms of grain than previously thought, so the colonization of the Hellespont was driven by adventurism. Keen (2000), conversely, attempts to show that Athens did use Black Sea grain before the Peloponnesian War. More recently, Moreno (2007: 140-143) has shown that Athens used Aegean clerouchies to provide the city with grain throughout most of the fifth century, and did not turn to the Black Sea until the fourth. In his model, the missions of Phrynon, the Philaids, and others were aimed at securing land for the elite.

<sup>9</sup> Moreno 2007: 142.

achieving power in Athens was always the ultimate goal of the Philaids and those like them.<sup>10</sup> The elder Miltiades, though, accepted that the door to advancement in Athens was closed. He was not simply an old fashioned aristocrat opposed to a populist tyrant. As we shall see, there is good evidence that *he* wanted to be a tyrant.

Later generations of Philaids would distill an additional advantage from their Thracian power base, namely the ability to court the Athenian populace and bolster their position within the new democracy. But, even for talented leaders enjoying privileged access to the resources of Thrace, the politics of the democracy proved too volatile. While Pisistratus had largely kept rivals to his power at bay, the Philaids struggled with maintaining lasting influence once back in Athens.

### ***Pisistratus and Thrace***

Sometime in the mid sixth century, Pisistratus seized power in Athens. Taking advantage of the factional strife that plagued the post-Solonian *polis* – namely that between the people of the coast led by the Alcmeonid Megacles and the people of the plain under Lycurgus – he championed the cause of a new third faction, the people of the hills.<sup>11</sup> Shrewdly drawing upon the fame he acquired in a war against Megara, and

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<sup>10</sup> Moreno 2007: 140-141.

<sup>11</sup> The fullest accounts of Pisistratus' tyranny are given by Herodotus (1.59-64) and the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* (14-19). For the chronological problems involved, see Rhodes 1981: 191-199. How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 81) see these factions as the natural consequence of Solon's reforms, which eroded the traditional rule of the *eupatridae*. They argue that the real division was between the old landed aristocracy and the rising mercantile class. For recent scholarly treatments of Solon's reforms and the political situation in Athens at the time, see the collection of essays in Block and Lardinois 2006, especially the offerings of Raaflaub and van Wees. Raaflaub argues that there were basically two, rather than four, classes in Solon's time, the cavalry leaders (*hippeis*) and hoplite followers (*zeugitai*); whereas van Wees posits that Solon merely reinforced the pre-existing agrarian class divisions. See also Rhodes 1981: 183-187. For the general importance of intra-elite conflict in this period, see Stahl 1987: 60-105; Forsdyke 2005: 103-107.

addressing the grievances of a large underprivileged segment of the Athenian population, Pisistratus managed to be voted a bodyguard with which he occupied the Acropolis and became master of the *polis* (Hdt. 1.59; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 14.1-4).<sup>12</sup> Soon, however, his aristocratic rivals joined forces and drove him from Athens. How was Pisistratus to overcome the traditional elite weapon of exile?<sup>13</sup>

In order regain the tyranny, Pisistratus devised a scheme in conjunction with his former rival Megacles whereby he was escorted into Athens by an exceptionally tall woman in full panoply on a chariot. The Athenians were told that this was Athena herself brining Pisistratus home. The ruse worked (Hdt.60.4).<sup>14</sup> The fourth century Athenian Atthidographer Clidemus says that this woman, named Phye the daughter of Socrates, became Hipparchus' wife (FGrHist 323 F 15). In the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* we are told of a tradition that this woman was a Thracian flowergirl (σετφανόπωλις), or *hetaira*, living in the deme Collytus (14.4). In introducing the passage from Clidemus, Athenaeus preserves her designation as a flowergirl, which was unknown to Herodotus and Clidemus. Jacoby thinks that her label as a Thracian was an insertion, perhaps originally a marginal note on the *Athenaion Politeia*. As he argues, it would not be surprising for a tradition to take root that made Hipparchus' wife a nameless Thracian, as appears to have happened in the case of Themistocles'

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<sup>12</sup> The *Athenaion Politeia* labels Pisistratus as δημοτικώτατος, as opposed to Megacles and Lycurgus. Rhodes (1981: 186) thinks that this account of the rivalries between aristocrats is broadly correct.

<sup>13</sup> See Forsdyke (2005: 101-133) for a study of the role of exile during the Pisistratid period.

<sup>14</sup> How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 83) believe this story. The sons and grandsons of those who had seen this peculiar procession would still have been alive at Athens.

mother (Plut. *Them.* 1.1-2).<sup>15</sup> It seems that this was a stock slander in Athenian political history.

For Themistocles, however, there is strong evidence that his mother actually was a Thracian woman from the Chersonese, or at the very least a Greek living in this Thracian territory.<sup>16</sup> The Pisistratids hedged their bets with far-flung alliances. Clidemus says that Pisistratus chose for his son Hippas the daughter of the polemarch Charmus, which would have secured the loyalty of a powerful Athenian. Herodotus tells us that Pisistratus installed his own illegitimate son Hegesistratus, also called Thessalus, as tyrant in Sigeum after driving out the Mytileneans by force.<sup>17</sup> It was to Sigeum that the Pisistratids fled after their expulsion from Athens (Hdt. 5.94; Thuc. 6.59.4). After the death of Hipparchus, Hippias made an alliance with Hippocles the tyrant of Lampsacus by marrying his daughter to the tyrant's son Aeantides (Thuc. 6.59.3).<sup>18</sup> Others too contracted such alliances, even with foreigners. The younger Miltiades married the daughter of a Thracian king, probably to strengthen his position in the Chersonese.

Moreover, if the ethnic designation of Thracian was meant to slander Hippas, why does the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (or the person writing the marginal note) preserve only part of the slanderous tradition without mentioning that this woman was married to Hippias? It seems that there were two traditions about the wife of Hippias: one that she was the daughter of a prominent Athenian; the other that she was a nameless Thracian. Perhaps the slander lay in the allegation that she was an

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<sup>15</sup> See Jacoby's discussion in FGrHist (3T, b, vol. 1, 70-72; vol. 2, 73-74).

<sup>16</sup> See Bicknell 1982; Lewis 1983. See also below, ch. 6.

<sup>17</sup> See How and Wells 1912: vol. 2, 55-56.

<sup>18</sup> See further below, ch. 6.

unknown flowergirl rather than the daughter of an important figure in the Thraceward region where Pisistratus would soon demonstrate extensive ties. We cannot safely disregard either version of the story.<sup>19</sup>

Pisistratus' second period of tyranny did not last either as he again fell afoul of Megacles. Pisistratus was soon forced abroad where he set about marshaling the support of his friends. Herodotus says that he spent ten years gathering a force from Thebes, Argos, Naxos, and other places while based in Eretria on Euboea. Finally, he landed at Marathon, defeated his Athenian enemies, and took control of the city, this time for good. He maintained power by means of many mercenaries (ἐπικούροι) and the great deal of money he derived from Athens and the area around the Strymon River in Thrace (Hdt. 1.61-64).

The account preserved by the *Athenaion Politeia* explains this reference to the Strymon. During his decade-long exile, Pisistratus had first ventured to the Thermaic gulf – near modern Thessaloniki – where he established a settlement (συνώκισε) at a place called Rhaecelus.<sup>20</sup> At this time, the area was very prosperous and still inhabited by Thracians, as the presence of wealthy Thracian burials attests.<sup>21</sup> Cole conjectures that the verb συνώκισε implies a joint colonization venture, perhaps with supporters

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<sup>19</sup> Interestingly enough, the Thracians were often characterized as unusually tall. Valerius Flaccus, for example, refers to the *immanes Bessi* (2.229). The Bessoi were a Thracian tribe inhabiting the western Rhodope range, not far from the northern stretches of the Strymon. See the map in Archibald 1998: 108.

<sup>20</sup> For the location, see Edson 1947: 89-91.

<sup>21</sup> For this material, see Baba (1990), who discusses the material from several sites, including Sindos. Many of the grave goods consist of luxury items including gold funerary masks reminiscent of those from Grave Circle A in Mycenae. For the masks see also Theodossiev 1998; and the catalogue of the Sindos finds, Vokotopoulou 1985. The region fell within the Macedonian sphere of influence after the Persian Wars, as implied by Thuc. 2.99-100. See Hammond et al. 1972-1991: vol. 1, 435-440; Cole 1975: 42, n. 1.

from Athens, or more likely a group from Eretria.<sup>22</sup> Soon Pisistratus went to the region of Mt. Pangaeum, adjacent to the Strymon and famous for its mines. Here he grew wealthy and hired soldiers. Cole suggests that Pisistratus may have introduced the large-scale worship of Dionysus in Athens as part of an arrangement with the Edonian Thracians dwelling near Mt. Pangaeum, analogous to the later introduction of the Thracian goddess Bendis in Attica. These Thracians did famously worship Dionysus.<sup>23</sup> After a decade in the north Pisistratus moved to Eretria to gather his Greek allies ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.2). Best offers compelling additional evidence that his mercenary force in Athens was based on Thracian soldiers: at precisely this period, Thracians began to appear in Attic vase-painting.<sup>24</sup>

Forsdyke argues that it was by involving a larger portion of the population that Pisistratus mollified the traditional aristocratic rivalries that often led to expulsion. She also argues that he allowed his rivals to have a suitable level of power in Athens rather than resorting to the weapon of exile. Yet, the elder Miltiades went into *de facto* exile. In order to explain this away, as well as the attested exile of the Alcmeonids during the Pisistratid period, Forsdyke resorts to faulting Herodotus' grasp of the situation. She attributes the account as preserved to Philaid and Alcmeonid propaganda in the oral tradition.<sup>25</sup> This explanation is unsatisfactory. Why would Herodotus uncritically accept such propaganda, aimed at dissociating these families from the Athenian tyrants, while at the same time expressly labeling, as we shall see, Philaid rule in the Chersonese as tyranny?

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<sup>22</sup> Cole 1975.

<sup>23</sup> Cole 1975. For Bendis, see above, ch.1.

<sup>24</sup> Best 1969: 1-15.

<sup>25</sup> Forsdyke 2005: 121-124.

Forsdyke and many others pay too little attention to the role Thrace played in cementing Pisistratus' third and lasting tyranny. Lavelle, followed by Forsdyke, thinks that Pisistratus relied on trade and temporary exploitation of Thracian resources by force in order to acquire resources during his exile, but any sort of permanent control of the mines of Pangaeum would have been unfeasible in light of the strength of the local Thracians.<sup>26</sup> Such reasoning, however, ignores Herodotus' comment that Pisistratus continued to rely on money from the Strymon in maintaining power at Athens, as is indicated by the use of the present participle συνιόντων (1.64.1). Also, Hippias once expelled was offered Anthemus on the Thermaic gulf by Amyntas of Macedon, which suggests that lasting ties had been established by the Pisistratids in the region (Hdt. 5.94).<sup>27</sup> While Pisistratus enjoyed a level of popular support in Athens, and many Athenians joined his side in the Battle of Pallene in which he defeated his rivals (Hdt. 1.61.3-4; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.3), the Thracian mercenaries constituted the backbone of his military resources.<sup>28</sup> Regardless of any change in the political mood, these soldiers would have remained loyal to their paymaster.

As far as we can tell, Pisistratus was the first Athenian to discover that Thrace could be a kingmaker. Unfortunately we are not told why he chose to go north during his second exile, or how he learned of the region's advantages. If during his second period as tyrant he did indeed choose a Thracian wife for his son, a prior connection to Thrace would be implied. The moves he made to acquire influence in the northern

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<sup>26</sup> Lavelle 1992; Forsdyke 2005: 118-119.

<sup>27</sup> Baba (1990: 16-17) suggests that Pisistratus gave aid to the Thracians in the Sindos region against their northern enemies and thus secured their friendship.

<sup>28</sup> Forsdyke (2005: 119-121) mentions these mercenaries, but only in passing. For her, the support of the Athenians was the linchpin of Pisistratus' success.



Troad demonstrate that he was well aware of the strategic importance of that part of Thrace. His ability to found a colony at – or at least settle – Rhaecelus and to secure mining rights around Mt. Pangaeum attests to his skill in dealing with the indigenous inhabitants of the Thermaic Gulf and Strymon valley. The forging of inroads in the north paid off for Pisistratus by allowing him to seize lasting power in Athens, and his successors benefitted from a suitable place of refuge after they were exiled. Scholars such as Cole have appreciated that Pisistratus set off a long lasting Athenian interest in the Pangaeum region, and that he demonstrated an especial diplomatic talent in doing so.<sup>29</sup> No one, though, has fully recognized that Pisistratus initiated a clear and pervasive pattern that would be followed by elite Athenians for the next two centuries. The aristocratic rivalries at Athens had made Pisistratus' position unstable. At one moment he was an ally of the powerful Megacles; at another he was driven from the city. The money and soldiers of Thrace proved to be an advantage that Pisistratus' rivals could not overcome.

### ***Regal Power and Royal Connections***

The Dolonci, an otherwise obscure Thracian tribe that inhabited the Chersonese, were continually under threat from their neighbors the Apsinthii, also Thracians. Rivalries between tribal groups were the norm for the region which lacked a dominant governing power. Around 545/4, the Dolonci set out for Delphi to inquire of the god as to how their situation might be remedied. The oracle replied that they should take as a founder (οἰκιστήρς) for their land the first person who should offer

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<sup>29</sup> See also Isaac 1986: 14-15.

them the traditional tokens of guest-friendship (ξείνια). The first person to do so was Miltiades, who noticed the foreigners from the porch of his country house as they walked by (Hdt. 6.34-35).<sup>30</sup> Herodotus' account of the Athenian foray into the Chersonese in the mid sixth century gives the distinct impression that the elder Miltiades desired more personal power than he was able to exercise in Pisistratid Athens. As such, he jumped at the chance to leave Athens and rule over a foreign land and people. For the next five decades, his family lived like kings in the north Aegean.

In introducing Miltiades, Herodotus outlines the political situation then current in Athens, namely, that Pisistratus held all the power (εἶχε μὲν τὸ πᾶν κράτος), but Miltiades was still a man of influence (ἀτὰρ ἐδυνάστευε καὶ Μιλτιάδης).<sup>31</sup> To clarify Miltiades' station, he is said to have had a household wealthy enough to race four-horse chariots (ἐὼν οἰκίης τεθριππιτρόφου), an indicator of vast resources. Furthermore, his illustrious ancestry, tracing back to Aeacus of Aegina and connected to Athens via Philaeus the son of Ajax, is outlined in detail.<sup>32</sup> Miltiades' father Cypselus was most likely the grandson of the Corinthian tyrant of the same name and had been eponymous archon in 596/5. Thus, the Philaid family was among the aristocratic *eupatridae* who had monopolized political power at Athens before Solon's reforms.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> As Scott (2005: 165) says, there is no *a priori* reason to reject this story of Thracians consulting the Delphic oracle. Many other non-Greeks did as well.

<sup>31</sup> Scholars dispute the chronology of much of the Philaid colonization of the Chersonese. The most comprehensive general treatment is given by Kinzl 1968. This passage, coupled with Miltiades' connection to Croesus, suggests that Miltiades set out during Pisistratus' third and lasting period of tyranny, probably in 545/4. Some scholars argue that one of the earlier tyrannies is indicated. For a concise account of this debate, see Scott 2005: 166.

<sup>32</sup> For family claims of descent from gods or heroes, see Scott 2005: 167-168.

<sup>33</sup> Bradeen 1963: 193-196.

Miltiades offered the Dolonci shelter (καταγωγή) and hospitality (ξείνια) once he had noticed their foreign clothing and the spears they were carrying (ἐσθῆτα ἔχοντας οὐκ ἐγχωρίην καὶ αἰχμὰς). Thucydides remarks that by his time only barbarians and some of the less civilized Greeks still regularly carried weapons due to their fear of bandits (1.5.3-6.2). The spear-brandishing Dolonci would have been readily identifiable as foreigners. Because of Pisistratus' use of Thracian mercenaries at Athens, it is possible that Miltiades was familiar with their specific style of clothing and weapons and recognized them as Thracian.

Miltiades was amenable to the request of the Dolonci that he accompany them to the Chersonese. He was unhappy (ἀχθόμενον) with Pisistratus' reign and wished to remove himself from the way (βουλόμενον ἐκποδὼν εἶναι). Many scholars think that Pisistratus himself sent Miltiades as part of a comprehensive foreign policy which included the Hellespont, and that Herodotus is offering a sanitized, pro-Philaid, version of events with Pisistratus' involvement removed. Even if this were true, Miltiades probably did resent the tyrant's grip on power and was eager for a way to advance his own interests. In that case, both men would have something to gain from the venture: Miltiades by finding an outlet from Athens; Pisistratus in removing a powerful rival. One can, however, reasonably trust Herodotus' version of events.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> For Herodotus relying on a pro-Philaid source, see Scott 2005: 163, 169-170. But Scott also argues (366-367, 526-527, 531, 643) that for the younger Miltiades Herodotus made use of an anti-Philaid tradition, namely that derived from the prosecution's arguments at Miltiades' tyranny trial which emphasized the link between his family and the Pisistratids. Why the inconsistency on the part of Herodotus? Herodotus seems to have been aware of both traditions, those for and against the Philaids, and for some reason felt the version he chose to be the more likely. The most vigorous argument in favor of the private nature of Miltiades' expedition (and also Pisistratus' activities at Sigeum) is given by Berve 1937: 26-28; 1967: 62, 80.

Seeing the Dolonci in their Thracian clothes, and having in mind the precedent set by Pisistratus, Miltiades eagerly embraced the opportunity to establish personal ties with the foreigners. The ξείνιαι so willingly offered the Dolonci might have been a deliberate first step in forging a formal ξενία relationship.<sup>35</sup>

Before setting out for the Chersonese, Miltiades assembled all of the Athenians willing to take part in such an expedition, offering them a chance to join him (Hdt. 6.36.1). A large number of Athenians probably went along, perhaps as many as 400-600, if we are to judge by the several settlements that were founded.<sup>36</sup> This group most likely included other ambitious Athenians dissatisfied with their prospects for advancement under the tyranny, possibly including the father of Themistocles.<sup>37</sup> If Pisistratus had brought some Athenian supporters along with him to settle Rhaecelus during his second exile, Miltiades would have had a ready precedent.

This entire episode bespeaks a Miltiades jealous of Pisistratus' ἀρχή and searching for an outlet for his own ambitions. The advent of the Dolonci seeking help against their rivals, the chance to be a prestigious οἰκιστής, and the legitimacy of power that could only be conferred by the Delphic oracle, furnished the ambitious aristocrat with the means of creating his own ἀρχή only a few days' sail from Athens.<sup>38</sup> He was evidently satisfied enough with his position in the Chersonese: he

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<sup>35</sup> Herodotus mentions ξείνιαι in the context of formal diplomatic relations in 2.115.4.

<sup>36</sup> As conjectured by Scott (2005: 170).

<sup>37</sup> Bicknell 1982: 168-173. For more on Themistocles relationship with the Philaids, which seems to have soured by the late 490's, see below, ch. 6.

<sup>38</sup> Herodotus indeed calls the Philaid principality in the Chersonese an ἀρχή (6.34.1), a term which would have had strong resonances in the time he wrote his history. For the complexity of Herodotus' views on the Athenian ἀρχή of the mid-late fifth century, see Fornara 1971b: 37-58.

died there between 525-516, having ruled for at least two decades.<sup>39</sup> Unlike Pisistratus, he never ventured to return to Athens and make a bid for power, in spite of being able to call upon significant numbers of both Thracians and Greeks living in his domain.

As holders of power in the Chersonese, the Philaids exercised what was tantamount to regal authority, treating the region as their personal property. Herodotus calls them tyrants, applying the verb τυραννέω and the nouns τύραννος and τυραννίς to their rule, explicitly equating it to the power wielded by Pisistratus in Athens (6.34.1, 36.1). The elder Miltiades was superior to many of the Thracian rulers in the area, as the kings (βασιλεῖς) of the Dolonci willingly surrendered their power to him. Accordingly, he “took possession of the land (ἔσχε τὴν χώραν)” once he arrived in the Chersonese. He ruled the Dolonci by virtue of their invitation and because he fought on their behalf and offered them security by building a wall across the Chersonese to keep out their Thracian enemies. After Miltiades’ death, possession of the land remained within the Philaid family. Many Athenians evidently disapproved of the exercise of such authority, even in a foreign land. Once the younger Miltiades, heir to the family dynasty, returned to Athens in 493 he was tried by his political enemies on a formal charge of tyranny (τυραννίς), though he was acquitted and elected general shortly afterwards (Hdt. 6.104.2).

The elder Miltiades’ nephew, Stesagoras son of Cimon, succeeded him as tyrant. When Stesagoras was assassinated by an enemy during a war with Lampsacus,

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<sup>39</sup> For the date of his death, see Scott 2005: 174.

the younger Miltiades, another son of Cimon, was sent out by the Pisistratids to succeed him around 515/14 (Hdt. 6.38.2-39.1).<sup>40</sup> This Miltiades was more heavy-handed than his uncle and his brother had been. He seized total control of the area by tricking the regional chieftains (οἱ δυναστεύοντες) and having them all imprisoned (ἐδέεθσαν). It seems that the various indigenous leaders were unable to unite in order to pose a challenge to Miltiades' power. Miltiades then maintained a force of 500 mercenaries in order to avoid his brother's fate, and held (ἴσχει) the Chersonese as his possession (6.39.2). It is unclear whether these mercenaries were Greeks or Thracians. It is likely that Pisistratus had shown the Philaids how useful Thracian mercenaries could be. Even in the fourth century, Iphicrates intimidated the Athenian law courts and secured an acquittal by surrounding himself with an armed band of retainers, who were possibly Thracian soldiers acquired during a long sojourn at the court of the Thracian king Cotys (Polyaen. 3.9.5, 29; Sen. Rhet. *Cont.* 6.5).

According to Nepos, Miltiades carried himself among the inhabitants of the Chersonese with a regal demeanor (*erat enim inter eos dignitate regia*) and secured for himself lifelong rule (*perpetuum imperium obtineret*). It should be noted that Nepos seems to conflate the careers of the elder and younger Miltiades, so the exercise of regal and perpetual authority might therefore apply to the elder.<sup>41</sup> Nepos says that Miltiades obtained such power largely through his justice and magnanimity, and that he had the full support of the Athenians, both those who had sent him on the mission

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<sup>40</sup> For the date, see Scott 2005: 178-179.

<sup>41</sup> Hammond (1956: 122-127), against the opinion of most scholars, argues that Nepos actually fills in some of the gaps concerning the younger Miltiades' career and does not in fact confuse the two men. Scott (2005: 164) argues that already in the fifth century there was a confusion of the elder and younger Miltiades, which was picked up by Ephorus and in turn Nepos.

and those that had accompanied him (*Milt.* 2.3). This support was the natural result of the great benefits he conferred, such as granting those Athenians that were with him tracts of land and enriching them through frequent raids (*crebris excursionibus*) into adjacent territories (*Nep. Milt.* 2.1). To be sure, the legitimacy of Philaid rule had been founded upon, and was increased by, the continued support of the Dolonci. Although the younger Miltiades seems to have had a more authoritarian style of rule than his predecessors, once he had fled the Chersonese because of a threat of Scythian invasion the Dolonci of their own volition asked him to return and reinstated him in power (*Hdt.* 6.40).<sup>42</sup>

During the course of the campaigns to secure his position on the Hellespont, the elder Miltiades was captured by his rivals from Lampsacus. According to Herodotus, Miltiades was then very much in the thoughts of Croesus (ἐν γνώμῃ γεγονώς), which suggests the two were political allies. Croesus threatened the Lampsacenes with total destruction should they fail to release their prisoner, and Miltiades was accordingly set free (*Hdt.* 6.37). The war with Lampsacus, a city on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, indicates that Miltiades aimed at complete control of the straits. Croesus, under threat from the growing power of Persia, doubtlessly desired to cultivate an alliance with the ruler of a territory as strategic as the Chersonese.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps, also, Croesus sought to increase his standing in the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to acquire influence with the Thracians, a potential target for

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<sup>42</sup> Scott (2005: 181-182) discusses the chronological and other problems with this Scythian invasion. In any case, Herodotus' text implies the esteem the Dolonkoi had for Miltiades.

<sup>43</sup> Isaac 1986: 171; McQueen 2000: 114; Scott 2005: 173.

future conquest, through Miltiades.<sup>44</sup> In any case, there was a personal connection between Miltiades and the Lydian king that benefitted both parties.

Once in the Chersonese, the younger Miltiades, though previously wedded to an Athenian woman, married Hegesipyle, daughter of a Thracian king named Olorus (Hdt. 6.39.2). Emphasizing its importance for Miltiades' position of authority, Herodotus lists the marriage along with the other measures Miltiades took to seize power, namely imprisoning all potential rivals and maintaining a private mercenary force. It was Hegesipyle, rather than Miltiades' Athenian wife, that would become the mother of the famous Cimon. The historian Thucydides' father was a man named Olorus, and Thucydides himself controlled mines in Thrace and wielded considerable influence among the local inhabitants (Thuc. 4.105.1). There was certainly a relationship between Thucydides and the Philaids, centered on Thrace.<sup>45</sup> It stands to reason that Miltiades' father-in-law Olorus was a king in the region near Mt. Pangaeum or on the mainland opposite Thasos where Thucydides would later have connections via his father of the same name. In addition to strengthening his position in the Chersonese, perhaps Miltiades also had an eye to securing some of the resources of Olorus' territory.<sup>46</sup>

Marriage alliances among the aristocracy of Greek states were common in the Archaic period, and in the northern kingdoms of Macedon and Thrace the custom would be the norm throughout much of antiquity. Hammond argues that many Archaic Greek aristocrats and tyrants often resorted to polygamy in order to cement

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<sup>44</sup> Danov 1976: 246.

<sup>45</sup> For Thucydides' family and Thracian ties, see above, ch. 1.

<sup>46</sup> Scott 2005: 180-181. How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 343) suggest that Miltiades had rendered Olorus some military service, though there is no direct evidence of this.



marriage alliances. Thus, they were essentially a “law unto themselves,” paralleled most closely by the Macedonian royals.<sup>47</sup> There is some evidence that Miltiades’ first wife was a relation, or even the daughter, of Hippias.<sup>48</sup> Sometime after the marriage alliance between Olorus and Miltiades, Hippias seems to have withdrawn his support for the venture in the Chersonese, instead throwing in his lot in with Lampsacus. Perhaps this was in response to Miltiades’ actions during Darius’ Scythian campaign of 513, when Miltiades had attempted to betray the Persians by having their bridge across the Danube destroyed, leaving them at the mercy of the Scythians (Hdt. 4.137).<sup>49</sup> After this episode, it has been argued that Hippias attempted to ingratiate himself with Darius and thus abandoned Miltiades and the territory on the European side of the Hellespont.<sup>50</sup> Other scholars have suggested that Hippias might also have been motivated by family pride to break ties with the Philaids after Miltiades took a Thracian wife.<sup>51</sup> Perhaps, then, Miltiades’ first wife, a relative of Hippias, was still alive when the marriage to Hegesipyle took place.<sup>52</sup>

Herodotus portrays the Thracians as polygamous (5.5). If Miltiades was still married to his first wife when he took Hegesipyle as a bride, in all probability Olorus would have had no qualms with the arrangement. In this way, members of the Archaic aristocracy might have been more at home among the Thracians than with their fellow Greeks. By marrying the daughter of a powerful local dynast, Miltiades prefigures Greeks such as Iphicrates and Charidemus who married Thracian princesses in the

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<sup>47</sup> Hammond 1956: 120, n. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Davies 1971: 302.

<sup>49</sup> The historicity of this story was long ago called into question. See the discussion in How and Wells (1912: vol. 1, 343-344), who accept the essentials of Herodotus’ narrative.

<sup>50</sup> Wade-Gery 1951: 218-219.

<sup>51</sup> Davies 1971: 302; Scott 2005: 180-181.

<sup>52</sup> For more on the break between Hippias and Miltiades, see below, ch. 6.

fourth century in order to cement their own political influence in the north. The historian Xenophon too was offered the daughter of the Thracian Seuthes in an exchange for military services but declined. As tyrant, Miltiades was adept at employing local customs in consolidating his position. It would seem that many of these particular customs fit in well with his aristocratic predispositions.

At the end of his tenure in the Chersonese, Miltiades filled five triremes with his personal possessions in the area and fled the region under threat from the Phoenicians who were engaged in the Persian annexation of territory after the Ionian revolt (Hdt. 6.41.1). This bespeaks the vast amount of wealth the Philaids were able to acquire during the course of their rule.<sup>53</sup> The crews of these ships were probably men of Athenian descent who were brought back into Athenian society upon their return to Athens. Scott estimates that those accompanying Miltiades in his flight from the Chersonese numbered between 500 and 900 men, along with their families and Miltiades' personal fortune. That Miltiades owned this many triremes is not out of the question since even at this time triremes were sometimes owned by wealthy families and rulers as an emblem of their power and status.<sup>54</sup> These ships of war would have added greatly to his ability to control the Hellespont.

The Phoenicians managed to catch up with part of Miltiades' fleet and to capture his son Metiochus, the offspring of his first marriage. The Phoenicians thought they had a great prize to present to Darius because of Miltiades' treachery during the Scythian campaign. In spite of this, Darius did not harm Metiochus.

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<sup>53</sup> As Scott (2005: 183) argues, though the typical Greek trireme would not afford much room for baggage, if Miltiades' ships were closer to the Phoenician design, fewer rowers would be needed. This might have allowed more space for material wealth.

<sup>54</sup> Scott 2005: 183.

Rather, he gave him a house and a Persian wife, by whom Metiochus had children. As far as we can tell, Metiochus never returned to Athens. We are told that his children lived as Persians (ἐς Πέρσας κεκοσμέαται, Hdt. 6.41.2-4). Scott interprets this passage as an example of the trope of Persian magnanimity towards prisoners.<sup>55</sup> But, as McQueen suggests, it is likely that Xerxes would have had uses for Metiochus had the invasion of 480 been successful.<sup>56</sup> The Persians surely saw the potential benefit of securing the services of a Greek of such high standing, and for his part Metiochus was schooled in dealing with foreign monarchs. His great uncle had enjoyed advantageous ties with Croesus, and his father had married into a Thracian royal house. That Miltiades was part of the Darius' Scythian campaign suggests that the Philaids may have had prior experience at the Persian court itself.

For half a century, the Philaid family enjoyed great power in Thrace. Pisistratus, who had achieved his own position through his Thracian connections, left no room for rival ambitions. Instead of seeing a return of the seesaw of competing aristocratic factions, as plagued Pisistratus' two first attempts at tyranny, Miltiades left on his own accord. Athens then remained stable for decades. Miltiades became a tyrant abroad, in a land within easy reach for any Athenian with a ship, abounding in resources yet populated by weak and divided tribes. The ancillary benefits of power in Thrace – from dynastic ties with other monarchs, to lordly authority made possible by armed retainers – suited the Philaids well. Let us explore further some of the “soft” factors that drew the Philaids to Thrace.

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<sup>55</sup> Scott 2005: 184-185.

<sup>56</sup> McQueen 2004: 120.

### ***Miltiades Kalos***

Some pieces of evidence suggest that the Philaids adopted Thracian habits. Foremost among these is a red-figure plate now in Oxford's Ashmolean Museum, dated to 520-510 BC and attributed to the Cerberus Painter. The inscription ΜΙΛΤΙΑΔΗΣ ΚΑΛΟΣ, or "Miltiades is Beautiful," frames an image of a beardless mounted archer clad in what seems to be Scythian clothing.<sup>57</sup> Scholars are divided as to whether the image represents the younger Miltiades himself, but given his family's presence in the north and the date of composition, it is attractive to think that the artist intended to link Miltiades with northern barbarians. We are told that Miltiades dealt with Scythians in addition to Thracians, both on the Danube in 513, and when the Chersonese was threatened by Scythian invasion at an unknown date. There is also a possibility that the artist simply made use of stock barbarian imagery on this plate, thereby conflating Thracians and Scythians.<sup>58</sup> The figure of the mounted archer may indicate some degree of assimilation to barbarian practices on the part of Miltiades and his men, such as adopting foreign styles of dress and military equipment. At any rate, a familiarity with mounted archers, either as enemies or allies, is implied.

The artist of this plate, possibly commissioned by the Philaids themselves, might have intended to celebrate and publicize the younger Miltiades' departure for

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<sup>57</sup> Oxford 310; ARV<sup>2</sup> 163 no. 8; Wade-Gery 1951: 212-221; Vos 1963: 52-60.

<sup>58</sup> The distinction between Thracians and Scythians is often unclear, and was so even in antiquity. For example, as Hoddinott argues (1981: 97), the so-called "Scythian" slaves provided to the Greeks by the Scythians were most likely Thracians from territories under Scythian control.

the Chersonese.<sup>59</sup> On the other hand, several Athenians closely connected to Thrace were censured for their adoption of foreign habits. Figures such as Alcibiades, Diitrephes, and Iphicrates were mocked and even at times faced prosecution because of their affinity for Thracian ways.<sup>60</sup> The Oxford plate, therefore, could also represent some sort of criticism or mockery of the Philaids and their dynasty in the north. In this vein, the plate could be understood to mean “Miltiades the barbarian pretty-boy.”<sup>61</sup> Whether positive or negative, foreign habits and affiliations on the part of Miltiades are indicated.

*Kalos* inscriptions in general were common on Attic pottery. Occasionally, they seem to refer to an individual portrayed on the vase. There are many cases, however, in which no direct correlation between the inscription and any depicted figure appears possible. Additionally, the precise significance of the inscription – whether it plays some role in pederastic courtship, is meant to advertise the beauty and nobility of a particular person or family, or intended as some form of mockery – is often unclear and likely differs from case to case. In the end, *kalos* vases allow of no

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<sup>59</sup> Wade-Gery 1951: 220. Miltiades’ Thracian activities might be commemorated on another vase as well, on which Hephaestus or Dionysus is depicted wearing a Thracian cloak. Sometime after Darius’ Scythian campaign in 513, Miltiades captured the island of Lemnos, the mythical home of Hephaestus. This vase may be a veiled reference to that event. See Pemberton 1988: 227-235. Pemberton cannot find any reason to link Dionysus, the other possible identification of the figure on the vase, with Miltiades since in her opinion Dionysus had limited connection to Thrace. Dionysus’ Thracian origins and the depiction of Dionysiac characters with Thracian attributes was a common artistic motif. As such, either god in Thracian clothing could be a reference to Miltiades’ activities. For this artistic motif, see Lissarrague 1990a: 161-177. For the Thracian origins of Dionysus, see Jeanmaire 1951: 99-100; Isaac 1986: 82-84; Fol and Ivanova 1993.

<sup>60</sup> For Alcibiades’ adoption of Thracian habits, see Lys. 14.38, Plut. *Alc.* 23; *Mor.* 51e. Diitrephes was called a madman, a Cretan, and barely Athenian (τὸν μαινόμενον, τὸν Κρήτα, τὸν μόγις Ἀπτικόν) because of his connection to Thracian mercenaries (Cratinus, fr. 31); and Timotheus threatened to prosecute his rival Iphicrates, who had married a Thracian princess and had worked for the Odrysian king Cotys, on a charge of ξενία (Dem. 49.66).

<sup>61</sup> For the role of *kalos* vases in Old Comedy-style mockery, see Shapiro (2004) who argues that depictions of a certain Leagros as *kalos* were sometimes meant to invoke Leagros’ infamous hard-drinking and hyper-sexuality.

single interpretation.<sup>62</sup>

There are several *kalos* vases depicting persons with Thracian and Scythian attributes. For instance, Leagros, a youth of legendary beauty who is commemorated in dozens of images, is named as *kalos* on a red figure vase showing a beardless youth riding a horse and clad in a Thracian cloak and boots.<sup>63</sup> Two other red-figure Leagros *kalos* vases should be mentioned here. One depicts several military scenes with warriors clad in Thracian cloaks leading horses, while a Greek hoplite fights in conjunction with a Scythian archer.<sup>64</sup> The other shows a Thracian leading a horse by the reins and preparing to hurl a javelin.<sup>65</sup> This Leagros was probably the general who in 465 led an Athenian expedition up the Strymon River to establish a colony and secure control of the region's gold mines and timber. The Athenians were ultimately defeated at Drabescus by a force of local Thracians, and Leagros was killed in the battle (Hdt. 9.75; Paus. 1.29.4-5).<sup>66</sup> That he was selected to lead the first of many attempts to establish a colony in the region implies that he had a connection to Thrace, an idea that is given weight by the several vases commemorating him as *kalos* which depict Thracian figures.

Aside from Miltiades, other members of the Philaid family are commemorated as *kalos* in vase-painting. A distant relative, one Epilycus, is inscribed as *kalos* on several vases dated to about 510, including at least one depicting warriors in foreign

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<sup>62</sup> For a general discussion, see Dover 1978: 111-124. Pemberton (1988: 233-234), discussing the Miltiades plate and the vases depicting his brother Stesagoras, suggests that *kalos* inscriptions might often have more to do with the honoree's achievements than with youthful beauty.

<sup>63</sup> Munich 2620; ARV<sup>2</sup> 16 (17); see Lissarrague 1990a: 217. For more on Leagros, who might not have been the most savory character, see Shapiro 2004.

<sup>64</sup> Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 10.196; ARV<sup>2</sup> 1592.

<sup>65</sup> Paris, Louvre G26, ARV<sup>2</sup> 317.13.

<sup>66</sup> See Gomme et al. (1945-1981: 189) for the connection between the general Leagros, and also his son Glaucon, with *kalos* vases.

costume with Thracian spears and shields.<sup>67</sup> Aside from a comment on Epilycus' beauty, this may indicate that he accompanied Miltiades to the Chersonese. A Stesagoras is labeled *kalos* on two red-figure vases dating to around the same time as the Miltiades plate. Scholars disagree as to whether this is the brother of Miltiades who preceded him as tyrant in the Chersonese or a younger member of the same family.<sup>68</sup> One of the vases shows a young warrior in traditional Greek armor, the other a running satyr.<sup>69</sup> Though tenuous, a connection to Thrace may be implied in the image of a satyr given the conventional artistic connection between satyrs – and Dionysiac imagery in general – and Thracian attributes.<sup>70</sup>

Lissarrague comments extensively on the large number of Attic vases, ranging in date from 510-460 BC, that depict horsemen in Thracian, and to a lesser extent Scythian, apparel. This Thracian dress usually includes a patterned cloak (*zeira*), a fox-skin cap (*alopekis*), and distinctive boots (*embades*).<sup>71</sup> Lissarrague argues that these images often represent Athenians rather than foreigners, which can usually be determined by the presence or absence of barbarian attributes such as blond hair and short pointy beards. Costume alone is insufficient for determining ethnic identity. The horsemen are almost always young beardless youths displaying an idealized beauty. In several scenes, they are depicted before what looks to be an official scrutinizing their mounts, evocative of the *dokimasia* of the Athenian cavalry as described in the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* (49.1-2). The preponderance of

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<sup>67</sup> Malibu, CA, J. Paul Getty Museum 83.Ae.247. For Epilycus' relation to the Philaids, see Davies 1971: 297.

<sup>68</sup> The tyrant: Davies 1971: 301; Pemberton 1988: 234-235. A younger family member: Immerwahr 1972: 181-182.

<sup>69</sup> Respectively, Copenhagen 3789, ARV<sup>2</sup> 179; Villa Giulia, ARV<sup>2</sup> 1609 (unpublished).

<sup>70</sup> For this artistic motif, see Lissarrague 1990a: 161.

<sup>71</sup> Lissarrague 1990a: 213-227, with images.

Thracian costume in images of horsemen, argues Lissarrague, becomes a key element in recognizing members of the Athenian cavalry or citizens of the social and economic class of *hippeis*. He concludes that this specific costume is worn to mark out the Athenian cavalry as distinct from the majority of Athenians, both in terms of technical training and social class.<sup>72</sup>

If Lissarrague is right – and his analysis is convincing – idealized aristocratic beauty, epitomized by young members of the *hippeis*, is often enhanced by Thracian and Scythian clothing. Certainly for Athenian horsemen to emulate the Thracians on a tactical level makes sense, as Thrace was famous for its horse-breeding and the skill of its mounted warriors. If the Athenians desired a model of horsemanship, the Thracians were an obvious choice, and the adoption of Thracian apparel may reflect this. But Lissarrague compellingly argues that the splendor of Thracian vestments is also used by the artists as a tool to convey the idealized beauty of the young noble horsemen of Athens. As Thracians and Scythians are thus paradigmatically *kaloi*, *kalos* vases depicting warriors with these foreign attributes may further emphasize the elite status and worth of particular Athenians.<sup>73</sup>

This situation appears to be reflected in the Parthenon frieze on which several of the Athenian *hippeis* involved in the Panathenaic procession are wearing Thracian clothing.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, the frieze grossly over-represents the role of cavalry in the

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<sup>72</sup> Lissarrague 1990a: 227. Vos (1963: 52-60) argues that figures of archers in barbarian dress, including the mounted archer on the Miltiades cup, are almost invariably foreigners rather than Athenians, regardless of the presence or absence of barbarian facial features. Vos's arguments, however, are far from conclusive, and as her own discussion demonstrates, many scholars maintain the view that Greeks are often represented in barbarian dress. Moreover, no mention is made of images of similarly clad *hippeis*, which surely represent Athenian horsemen in many cases.

<sup>73</sup> Lissarrague 1990a: 217, 240.

<sup>74</sup> Neils 2001: 135-136, 265 n.25.



Athenian military, and thus, as Osborne argues, “presents the very aristocratic image of Athenian democracy at its most elitist, where all citizens are not just soldiers but the quintessential soldier, the young man in the cavalry whom public inspection requires to be a model of physical fitness.”<sup>75</sup> In Lissarrague’s formulation, the addition of Thracian accoutrements would increase the aristocratic splendor of the horsemen depicted on this most public of monuments.<sup>76</sup>

Some comment should be made on the context of such imagery. Scholars agree that the shapes and uses of vases play an important role in interpreting the images portrayed. Peltasts, whether Thracian or otherwise, according to Osborne, are often depicted on cheap mugs intended for private personal use and even on alabastra, typically used as perfume jars by women. Only rarely do they appear on the public display vessels of the symposium, such as amphorae and hydriae. As such, peltasts were supposedly eschewed as models for the aristocratic Athenian men who attended the symposium, where scenes such as departing hoplites were much more prevalent.<sup>77</sup> Yet, Osborne himself concedes that peltasts do appear on sympotic vessels, but primarily on cups used by individual participants instead of on communal pots.<sup>78</sup> Even these cups were surely meant to be seen by fellow symposiasts, and either Osborne is mistaken in his assertion that only imagery designed to showcase the ideal of Athenian manhood was used in such a public context, or peltasts were not so completely disdained.

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<sup>75</sup> Osborne 1987a: 104.

<sup>76</sup> The artist’s use of Thracian imagery on the Parthenon, though, does not necessarily imply that these particular horsemen were connected to Thrace as Miltiades was.

<sup>77</sup> Osborne 2000: 35-40.

<sup>78</sup> Osborne 2000: 37-38.

In contrast to peltasts, images of Athenian horsemen in Thracian apparel were often painted on amphorae, kraters, and the like, in addition to drinking cups used by individuals.<sup>79</sup> If Thracian apparel actually served to increase the aristocratic appeal of the figure portrayed, such images would make for the perfect display at the symposium, as indeed they were on the Parthenon frieze. If Miltiades or a member of his family owned the Oxford plate displaying the barbarian rider and advertising Miltiades' beauty, it could have been an evocative status symbol meant to be seen by fellow aristocrats. Conversely, if the figure was meant to mock the Philaids, the atmosphere of drunken revelry of the symposium would have facilitated such a joke. In the same vein, perhaps the very nature of the symposium as a drinking party encouraged the display of Thracians, famous as prodigious drinkers. In the end, we need not interpret all images displayed in public contexts, including the aristocratic symposium, as meant to inspire civic virtue. Moreover, Thracian attributes need not be in conflict with such an ideal.<sup>80</sup>

A comment in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* might be relevant to Thracian imagery on pottery. Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians, is portrayed in the play as a true lover (ἐραστής) of Athens, to the point that he inscribes on his own walls "Ἀθηναῖοι καλοί" (142-144). Commentators on this passage have been quick to

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<sup>79</sup> See Lissarrague's catalogue, 1990a: 303-304.

<sup>80</sup> For the importance of visual imagery at the symposium, especially in the form of pottery, see Lissarrague 1990b: 47-67 and esp. 87-106. Lissarrague concludes that the imagery on sympotic vases "reflects both the guests' visual experience and poetic memory (106)," suggesting that the participants' actual experiences have a place in sympotic imagery along with mythological scenes. It has recently been argued that images of barbarians, especially in the context of the symposium, are meant to depict the Greeks' own past, wherein Hellenism was indistinct from barbarism; see Topper 2007: 141-173. This would fit with the notion that the Athenians saw in the Thracians a reflection of their own primitive but heroic past, a point which owners of such vessels might have wished to emphasize. See above, ch. 1.

point out its pederastic connotations, as Sitalces appears to play the part of the *erastes* attempting to woo the Athenians as prospective *eromenoi*. This notion is apparently strengthened by Sitalces' amatory graffiti, as many see *kalos* inscriptions as part of pederastic courtship.<sup>81</sup> In Aristophanes' plays, demagogues are often portrayed as ἐρασταί of the Athenian *demos*, trying to secure its favors.<sup>82</sup> Just a few years prior to the production of the *Acharnians* Pericles, at least in the Thucydidean Funeral Oration, had exhorted Athenians to be *erastai* of their city (Thuc. 2.43.1). Aristophanes may be presenting a comic take on Pericles' words. As for Sitalces' *kalos* graffiti, Aristophanes' joke might very well extend beyond notions of pederasty. It has been shown that the Athenians often equated their beautiful equestrian youth with Thracians, and there are several artistic depictions of young men in Thracian and Scythian apparel inscribed with the names of specific Athenians as being *kalos*. That a Thracian king should declare the Athenians to be *kaloi* would turn a popular artistic theme on its head, adding a further dimension to Aristophanes' joke.

We will never know the precise meaning behind the Oxford plate in question. That the mounted archer is beardless implies that he is a Greek – if not Miltiades himself – rather than a barbarian.<sup>83</sup> What is increasingly evident is the use of Scythian and Thracian imagery, sometimes accompanied by *kalos* inscriptions, as a comment on social class. It is significant that the Athenian elite, perhaps beginning with the Philaids, advertised their nobility by highlighting their connection to Thrace. As Archibald demonstrates, many of the Thracian kingdoms had a military elite similar to

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<sup>81</sup> Olson 2002: 117.

<sup>82</sup> See, for example, *Knights* 1340-1342.

<sup>83</sup> On the lack of beard, see Pemberton 1988: 232-233, n. 36.

that of the Scythians, characterized by warfare, hunting, feasts, and horsemanship.<sup>84</sup> To the educated Greek, Thrace was the land of the legendary horseman Rhesus, a society in which horse-racing and chariots, along with all the glory and prestige that such activities entail, continued to have a central place. What better source of emulation could there be for an ambitious elite constrained by the rule of the Pisistratids and later by the egalitarian ethos of the Athenian democracy?

### ***Competition and Olympic Victors***

In a famous speech given before the launching of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides' Alcibiades conveys, albeit rather baldly, an attitude that had once been pervasive among upper-class Athenians. Rather than skirting the issue of his wealth and extravagance, because of which he had aroused the suspicion of the Athenian populace, he tries to turn it to his advantage. His ostentation, or so he argues, is a credit (δόξαν) to his ancestors and a benefit (ὠφελίαν) to his city. As his prime example, he cites a celebrated victory at the Olympic Games in which he personally entered seven chariot teams – more than any private individual had ever done – and secured the first, second and fourth prizes. In such a way, the wider Greek world, expecting Athens to be thoroughly wrecked by the long war (καταπεπολεμῆσθαι), was shown a clear example of Athens' continued power and greatness. Alcibiades insists he should not be censured because of such qualities but, rather, he has every right and privilege to assume a haughty demeanor. Thus Alcibiades justifies his manner of living, his arrogance, and also his fitness to lead (Thuc. 6.16). There is no

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<sup>84</sup> Archibald 1998: 105.

greater testament to the agonistic ethos of Greek aristocrats than the importance they placed on athletic accomplishment, especially in the Archaic period.<sup>85</sup>

The centrality of Olympic victories to the early Athenian colonizing efforts on the Hellespont is striking. The elder Miltiades was an Olympic victor. His preferred event was the four-horse chariot race (Hdt. 36.1), as it was for his half brother Cimon, father of the younger Miltiades (103.2).<sup>86</sup> As Herodotus relates, Cimon won his first Olympic victory after he had been expelled from Athens by Pisistratus. Cimon won again at the next games with the same team of horses, but this time relinquished his victory in favor of Pisistratus. Thus he was allowed by the tyrant to return to Athens, a fact that highlights the political importance of such prestigious athletic accomplishments. Cimon later won an astonishing third victory with these horses, a feat previously achieved only once, but this time he was soon murdered at the instigation of the sons of Pisistratus (Hdt. 6.103.3). As this story implies, his third Olympic triumph made him dangerously popular at Athens and therefore a threat to the tyrants.<sup>87</sup> Pseudo-Andocides (4.33) says that the younger Miltiades and his son Cimon also won Olympic victories, presumably in the chariot competition, and an aside by Pausanias (6.10.8) indicates that Miltiades subsequently dedicated sculptures

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<sup>85</sup>For the importance of the *agon* in Archaic Greece, see Burckhardt and Hilly 1963: 54. In recent years, the pervasiveness of the agonistic ethos has been called into question. Ian Morris (2000: 156, 185-187), for example, argues that such a mentality was more a feature of an elite which set itself against the prevailing middling ideology that emphasized equality among the population of normal citizens. In such a climate, the elite ideology was the dominant position only in that it reinforced solidarity within a would-be aristocracy. Morris himself concedes, however, that the *agon* as a determiner of status still held an important place in Archaic society, and democratic forms of government only became possible at the end of the period with the collapse of elite ideology.

<sup>86</sup>The dates of these victories, and their implications for the chronology of settlement in the Chersonese, are disputed. See Hammond 1956: 114-119; Davies 1971: 299-300.

<sup>87</sup>Hammond 1956: 117.

of horses and chariots at Delphi.<sup>88</sup> A black-figure pyxis found near Brauron and dating to about 540 depicts a series of grooms leading horses, along with a slave pulling a chariot. A youth draped in a himation and holding a branch leads the procession. The artist has identified the youth as Stesagoras, probably the son of Cimon who would succeed the elder Miltiades as tyrant in the Chersonese. The prominence of horses and the chariot in the scene would fit in well with the family's propensity for chariot-racing.<sup>89</sup>

It is well known that a large part of the prestige associated with chariot-racing was the sheer expense required to raise horses.<sup>90</sup> As a comic take on this idea, Aristophanes begins his *Clouds* with Strepsiades lamenting the debt he has accumulated because of his son's passion for horses (12-24). It is therefore unsurprising that many of Athens' most eminent men were victors in the chariot race, as few others could afford even to enter such a competition. As the son of Alcibiades says, the raising of horses is only for the most fortunate (οἱ εὐδαίμονες τᾶτοι, Isoc. 16.33). Alcibiades' horse-breeding and chariot victories were legendary, as is attested in several sources. The fame he won from his Olympic victories was unmatched given that he accomplished a more spectacular victory than any private individual or even king (ιδιώτης οὐδὲ βασιλεύς) had before him (Plut. *Alc.* 11). The elite nature of the sport is brought out by Alcibiades' son who says that his father, though inferior to no one in terms of physical ability, chose to spurn the gymnastic competitions because many of the athletes in such sports were from insignificant cities and were of low birth

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<sup>88</sup> Hammond 1956: 119, n.4.

<sup>89</sup> Immerwahr 1972: 181-186.

<sup>90</sup> For a discussion of the financial implications of raising race-horses, see Scott 2005: 513-521.

(κακῶς γεγονότας, Isoc. 16.33).

In the late fifth century Alcibiades thought that a peerless victory at the Olympic Games in the quintessentially noble sport entitled him to political power even in a broadly based democracy. As the fate of the elder Cimon illustrates, Olympic victories were often crucial to one wishing to attain power in the Archaic period. If an aristocrat could afford to raise horses, the prestige and influence that could be acquired ensured that the expense was a worthwhile investment.<sup>91</sup> Herodotus seems to connect political power closely with the ability to raise horses, indicated by his introduction to the elder Miltiades: “Miltiades the son of Cypselus was also powerful in Athens, having a household that raced four-horse chariots.”<sup>92</sup> The younger Miltiades, who would eventually assume leadership over the Chersonese, evidently wanted to exploit his family’s prestigious victories. Herodotus says that along with Cimon were buried the four horses which had won him the victories (6.103.3), and Aelian says Miltiades himself saw to the burial of the horses in a prestigious plot in the Ceramicus (*Hist. An.* 12.40). The ostentatious burial of the horses which had won Cimon three Olympic victories, and caused him to run afoul of the Pisistratids, made an unmistakable political statement. Miltiades would avoid his father’s fate despite such a public affront to the rulers of Athens. He was made eponymous archon in 524/3 by the Pisistratids, which suggests that they wished to avoid alienating the powerful Philaid family any further.

From the time of Homer, the Thracians were legendary for their horsemanship.

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<sup>91</sup> McQueen 2000: 111.

<sup>92</sup> “ἀτὰρ ἐδυνάστευε καὶ Μιλτιάδης ὁ Κυψέλου, ἐὼν οἰκίης τεθριπποτρόφου, 6.35.1.”

In the *Iliad* the Thracians are called “horse-herders (ἵπποπόλοι, 13.4; 14.227)” and “horse-warriors (ἵπποκορουσταί, 16.287).” Dolon describes the horses of Rhesus as the largest and most splendid he had ever seen, snow white and pulling a chariot adorned with gold and silver, fitting spoils for Odysseus and Diomedes (10.435-440). Euripides describes the villainous Polymestor as king of the horse-loving people that sows crops in the fertile Chersonese (*Hec.* 7-9). The material evidence suggests that such descriptions are not without merit.<sup>93</sup> There are also several references to Thracian horse-racing. Xenophon describes the defeat of a force of Odrysian Thracians from the area near the Hellespont at the hands of their Bithynian rivals. After the battle the Odrysians buried their dead, drank a large amount of wine in their honor, and then held horse-racing competitions (*Hell.* 3.2.5). The elder Miltiades was honored after his death by the inhabitants of the Chersonese with gymnastic competitions and horse-races (*Hdt.* 6.38.2). The famous fourth century tomb of a Thracian noble at Kazanlak in central Bulgaria depicts lavish four-horse chariots and chariot races.<sup>94</sup> From the Early Iron Age horses became an important part of elite Thracian burials as a way to emphasize the martial prowess and wealth of their owner.<sup>95</sup> This practice resembles, and might have provided the inspiration for, the elder Cimon’s burial with his prize-winning chariot team.

Is it mere coincidence that the horse-loving Philaids were drawn to Thrace? Alcibiades grew weary of the many Olympic contests which included increasing numbers of competitors of low birth and dubious social status. He then focused

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<sup>93</sup> See the discussion in Archibald 1998: 94.

<sup>94</sup> Zhivkova 1973: pls. 1, 11-12, 22-23.

<sup>95</sup> Archibald 1998:69; Kouzmanov 2005.



entirely on horse-racing because of its exclusive nature. While horse-racing remained prestigious in Greece well into the Classical period and beyond, it seems that Alcibiades was unable to gain the political power to which he felt his victories entitled him. Once he fell out with the Athenians for the final time, he opted to go to Thrace.<sup>96</sup> Under Pisistratus, the elder Miltiades was forced to play a subordinate role in spite of his standing as an aristocrat and Olympic victor. Cimon's Olympic victories may have actually led to his political murder. While the younger Miltiades flaunted his father's Olympic triumph in Athens and managed to secure the archonship, he achieved his greatest political power when he went to Thrace to assume leadership of the family dynasty. There is every indication that the type of nobility epitomized by horse-breeding and chariot-racing held much more sway in Thrace than it did in an Athens controlled by the Pisistratids or under a democratic constitution.

### ***Heroic Honors***

When the elder Miltiades died he received special honors from the inhabitants of the Chersonese, including sacrifices and athletic competitions, both gymnastic and equestrian. Due to his conflict with Lampsacus, no one from that city was allowed to take part, implying that athletes from several cities in the area competed in these games (Hdt. 38.1). This passage has been held by many scholars to portray an archetype for founder-cults that existed in *poleis* throughout the Greek world, for which evidence is otherwise sparse. Key to this idea is the standard interpretation of Herodotus' comment that such is the usual custom for city-founders (ὡς νόμος

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<sup>96</sup> See below, chs. 4, 6.

οἰκιστῇ). However, Malkin, who has written the definitive monograph on Greek colonization and religion and believes that this passage implies the universality of the ancient founder-cult, can only provide a very few additional examples of such cult being celebrated in honor of historical persons. Two of these are from Thrace.<sup>97</sup> It is possible, then, that the type of founder-cult exemplified by that celebrated in honor of Miltiades was far from a universal phenomenon. Furthermore, such cult appears to be linked to Thrace. Accordingly, the precise meaning of Herodotus' comment must be reevaluated.

Malkin begins his survey of founder-cults by discussing the special oracular tomb associated with king Battus at Cyrene, followed by the supposed cult of Phalanthus, founder of Taras (Tarentum), who was of dubious historicity and seems to have been overshadowed by the legendary hero Taras himself. A few late Classical and Hellenistic cases are mentioned, as well as the honors bestowed upon some of the Sicilian tyrants as recorded in Diodorus. The remaining historical figures who received known cultic honors were Timesius, who was honored at Abdera; Hagnon and later Brasidas at Amphipolis; and Themistocles, who may have been treated as a founder in Magnesia. In all of these examples, the "heroic honors" are not specified as they are for Miltiades, save for Brasidas who was honored with annual sacrifices and games, and the exceptional case of the Sicilian Timoleon who received a yearly festival complete with athletic as well as musical competitions after his death in 336.

Timesius, as it is related by Herodotus (1.168), was given heroic honors by the Teian colonists of Abdera, though Timesius himself was a Clazomenian. He had

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<sup>97</sup> Malkin 1987: 189-203, 204-240.

attempted to found the site a hundred years prior to the Teian colony but was driven out by the local Thracians. Why should the Teians have honored Timesius with such a cult? While Timesius had attempted to establish a colony, he was neither Teian nor was he a successful founder. Malkin rejects the possibility that there was a preexisting cult to Timesius that the Teians simply adopted for themselves.<sup>98</sup> Yet, as Owen demonstrates, it was a regular practice of Greeks in the north Aegean to make use of and adapt preexisting Thracian cult centers. These were often linked to monumental structures such as tombs.<sup>99</sup> Perhaps the Teians were confronted with the local cult of a legendary Thracian and its accompanying structures and adapted it to include Timesius, a well known Greek that had strong connections with the site. The activities of Timesius and his status as an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός are mentioned in several later sources, attesting to his renown in antiquity.<sup>100</sup> This famous figure would have been ideally suited for incorporation as a hero into a preexisting Thracian cult center.

Thucydides tells us that after the final defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis at the hands of Brasidas, the residents of the *polis* destroyed the monuments or buildings of the Athenian Hagnon (τὰ Ἀγνώνεια οἰκοδομήματα) and made Brasidas the new οἰκιστής, honoring him as a hero with annual sacrifices and games (Thuc. 5.11.1).<sup>101</sup> This looks very much like the cult granted to Miltiades. Yet, it seems Hagnon had been afforded these honors while he was still alive. The transfer of the cult occurred in 422 and Hagnon lived long enough to be chosen as a *proboulos* at Athens in 413

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<sup>98</sup> Malkin 1987: 222.

<sup>99</sup> Owen 2000.

<sup>100</sup> For the accounts of Timesios, see Isaac 1986: 78-79.

<sup>101</sup> See Malkin 1987: 228-232.

(Lys. 12.65; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.30). To be sure, the text of Thucydides does not say explicitly that the new honors granted to the dead Brasidas had been previously bestowed upon Hagnon. Rather, it merely states that structures connected to Hagnon were torn down and the title of οἰκιστής was transferred. Malkin, however, is right in asserting that Thucydides' text does imply equivalence between the new honors granted to Brasidas and those now denied Hagnon.<sup>102</sup> That Hagnon enjoyed an active cult while still living is not out of the question, though it would seem to be unique among the Greeks until the honors granted to the Spartan Lysander two decades later.

It is generally agreed that the Greek settlers in Amphipolis incorporated elements from local Thracian cults into their own religious practices. For example, coinage and several inscriptions from the area demonstrate the worship of Artemis Tauropolos, who is to be identified with the Thracian goddess Bendis. Additionally, the cult of Rhesus which was practiced at Amphipolis was most likely a Greek adaptation of the worship of a Thracian god or hero. The Greeks probably made use of this particular cult to demonstrate an affinity with the indigenous population.<sup>103</sup> The Greeks who settled nearby Thasos made use of preexisting Thracian religious structures, and likely also Thracian deities, in the practice of their own rites. The evidence suggests that the Cave of Pan on the acropolis of Thasos was originally a Thracian rock-cut tomb, associated with ritual feasting and connected to Thracian hero- or ancestor-cult. The worship of Pan at this site by Greek settlers in the Classical period indicates that not only was the structure itself respected and utilized,

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<sup>102</sup> Malkin 1987: 230-232.

<sup>103</sup> Isaac 1986: 55-58; Archibald 1998: 101.

but perhaps also the earlier Thracian cult practices themselves were adapted to fit into Greek ritual.<sup>104</sup> We can reasonably conclude that, rather than abandoning local non-Greek religion, Greek newcomers to the north Aegean regularly respected and adopted Thracian cult. The unique honors granted to Hagnon and later to Brasidas can perhaps be best explained in the context of Thracian religious practices.

Another historical figure to whom Malkin attributes a proper founder-cult is Themistocles. He was given power by the Persians over several cities in Asia Minor after his expulsion from Athens. These cities included Magnesia and Myous, which were both in southern Ionia near Miletus, and Lampsacus on the Hellespont (Thuc. 1.138.5). While Malkin argues that Themistocles received heroic worship specifically at Magnesia, he admits that there is no direct evidence of this.<sup>105</sup> The only indication that Themistocles received honors akin to those given Miltiades comes from a decree, dated to around 200 BCE from Lampsacus, which affords an unknown recipient the same honors that were given to Themistocles' son, namely the good things (ἀγαθὰ) associated with a festival.<sup>106</sup> Presumably this festival would have included athletic contests and the like. While this decree proves little, it is interesting that the only hint of heroic honors granted to Themistocles is connected to a city in Thrace rather than any of the other areas over which the great Athenian was given dominion.

The universality of the founder-cult is far from certain. That nearly all of the unambiguous references to such a cult in our sources can be situated within a Thracian milieu is striking. The Χερσονησίται who celebrated the rites in honor of Miltiades

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<sup>104</sup> Owen 2000: 139-143.

<sup>105</sup> Malkin 1987: 224.

<sup>106</sup> Malkin 1987: 226.

surely included both Thracian inhabitants of the Chersonese, as they were the ones who had initially invited Miltiades and benefitted from the security he was able to provide, and the Greeks who had been settled in the region. Yet, rather than this being a noteworthy case of foreigners participating in Greek rites, as most scholars have assumed, perhaps it was the Greeks who were taking part in local Thracian cult practices.<sup>107</sup> Thus, Herodotus' statement that the sacrifices, and by extension the other rites, were carried out in accordance with the customary honors due a city-founder (ὡς νόμος οἰκιστῇ) might imply a Thracian, rather than Greek, νόμος.

In his discussion of Thracian customs at the beginning of his fifth book, Herodotus outlines the funeral rites held after the death of prominent Thracians. These rites include feasting after the ritual slaughter and sacrifice of many different victims (παντοῖα σφάξαντες ἱρήια εὐωχέονται), and every sort of athletic competition (ἀγῶνα...παντοῖον, Hdt. 5.8). That such rites were uniquely Thracian is evinced by their inclusion in a Herodotean passage meant to highlight the strange customs of the Thracians.<sup>108</sup> Moreover, the feasting held in honor of the dead might be connected to the ritual feasting archaeologists have associated with Thracian tombs in southern Thrace including the Thasian Cave of Pan.<sup>109</sup> Xenophon partially corroborates this image, as he describes Odrysian Thracians from the northern shore of the Hellespont burying their war dead and then honoring them with copious drinking and horse-racing competitions (*Hell.* 3.2.5). The literary evidence, therefore, suggests

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<sup>107</sup> See Malkin (1987: 192) for a discussion of the identity of the participants and the phenomenon of barbarians worshipping along with Greeks.

<sup>108</sup> For this passage and Herodotus' ethnological treatment of the Thracians, see Asheri 1990:131-163. Asheri emphasizes that Herodotus was primarily interested in θῶματα in his study of Thrace.

<sup>109</sup> See Owen (2000: 141-143) for further bibliography on Thracian burial practices and ritual.

that the Thracians, quite independently of the Greeks, celebrated their prominent dead much as the inhabitants of the Chersonese did for Miltiades.

Herodotus' language may also indicate the non-Greek nature of the sacrifices for Miltiades. The verb *θύειν* is used in the context of Miltiades' honors, implying sacrifices in honor of a god instead of a hero, which would not be in accordance with the Greek νόμος for hero-cults. Earlier in his work, Herodotus uses the example of the divine versus heroic Heracles to clearly distinguish between the sacrifices made for an Olympian (*θύειν*) and those made for a hero (*ἐναγίζειν*, 2.44.5). Though there are exceptions to this rule, as has been noted by several scholars, Herodotus has chosen to comment on the distinction.<sup>110</sup> The other notable οἰκιστής to be given sacrifices in this manner (*θυσίαι*) was none other than Brasidas, and perhaps by analogy Hagnon (Thuc. 5.11.1). This naturally has been offered as proof of the connection between *θυσίαι* and Greek founder-cult.<sup>111</sup> Yet, it might reflect the non-Greek elements of Brasidas' cult.

Malkin remarks on the lack of musical contests in the games held for Miltiades, which he argues are a central element in typical Greek hero-cults. Otherwise, Miltiades' festival would seem to be completely regular.<sup>112</sup> Habicht, cited

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<sup>110</sup> See Malkin 1987: 193; McQueen (2000: 115) notes the two exceptions to this rule in Herodotus, namely the sacrifices in honor of Onesilos at 5.114.2 and Artachaites at 7.117.2. It should be noted that the latter case may prove the rule rather than the other way around. Artachaites was a physically stunning Persian and a member of the Achaemenid family. He died at Akanthos, a city north of the Athos peninsula and thus in the vicinity of Thrace, and was given a lavish funeral and burial mound by Xerxes and the Persians. Herodotus does say that the people of Akanthos offered sacrifice (*θύειν*) on the advice of an oracle, but it seems plausible that they were influenced in this decision by the Persians or even the local traditions of their region.

<sup>111</sup> Malkin 1987: 193, 228-232.

<sup>112</sup> Malkin 1987: 193, n. 22.

by Malkin, enumerates the types of *agones* held in conjunction with hero worship, which include gymnastic, equestrian, and musical competitions. Yet, the examples Habicht furnishes are all connected with Hellenistic ruler cult, such as that held in the Ptolemeia in Alexandria. The only exception is the festival for Timoleon, which is, strictly speaking, late Classical.<sup>113</sup> The lack of musical competition in the case of Miltiades, and also Brasidas, possibly reflects the non-Greek aspect of these honors. The sacrifices performed and the gymnastic and equestrian contests held are perfectly in line with the particularly Thracian practices as described by Herodotus and Xenophon.

If this new interpretation of the founder-cult of the elder Miltiades is correct, we must reexamine the nature of Greek founder-cults in general. Malkin himself concludes: “The cults of founders of cities which in later periods also served as a basis for the ruler-cults in the Hellenistic and Roman periods – seem to have been the creation of Greek colonies.”<sup>114</sup> If such practices stemmed from Thracian rites, even a Greek reinterpretation and adaptation of Thracian cult, the Thracians thus had a profound influence on Greek religion. Furthermore, if mortal men such as Miltiades could expect to receive even the semblance of divine honors, the appeal of Thrace for ambitious Athenian aristocrats is made even more apparent. Hagnon, for example, might have preceded Lysander by decades in the receipt of heroic honors while he was yet alive.

Cimon too, son of the younger Miltiades, and great-nephew of the elder, was the recipient of cultic honors, but at the hands of the residents of Citium on Cyprus.

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<sup>113</sup> Habicht 1956:150-153.

<sup>114</sup> Malkin 1987: 266.



His tomb was revered and he was worshipped and honored as a great being (ὥς κρείττονα σέβεσθαι καὶ γεραίρειν, Plut. *Cim.* 19.4). It is a reasonable assumption that Cimon, who might have desired distinction such as his great-uncle enjoyed, exploited the divine honors paid to Miltiades by the inhabitants of the Chersonese. That he would receive a cult in Cyprus attests to his success in fostering an image of himself as worthy of these honors throughout the course of his wide-ranging campaigns. Though purely speculative, let me conclude by suggesting that Cimon, the descendent of the tyrants of the Chersonese and himself a major player in the Thraceward area, implanted Thracian notions of hero-worship throughout many of the areas in which he had influence.<sup>115</sup> His cult among the Citians would thus represent the realization of a deeply held ambition of Cimon, one which he inherited from his family and its connection to Thrace.

### ***Military Influences***

A central theme of Best's seminal 1969 book *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* is that Thracian warriors were important fixtures in Greek armies well before the supposed reforms of Iphicrates in the first quarter of the fourth century.<sup>116</sup> In his first chapter, Best remarks upon the presence of Pisistratus' Thracians at Athens in the sixth century and the possibility that Greek settlers of the northern Aegean littoral adopted Thracian tactics relatively early.<sup>117</sup> The first Greek

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<sup>115</sup> For Cimon's activities in Thrace, see Archibald 1998: 114.

<sup>116</sup> Best 1969: esp. 102-108. For the older view, which emphasized the epoch-changing nature of Iphicrates' reforms as the catalyst that led to regular contingents of light troops in Greek armies, see Lippelt 1910: 65-67; Parke 1933: 77-83; Griffith 1935: 5, 7, 196, 239, 317.

<sup>117</sup> Best 1969: 3-16.

strategist, though, cited by Best as employing Thracian-style light armed tactics in any great measure is the Athenian general Demosthenes during the Peloponnesian War.<sup>118</sup> The genius of Demosthenes is presented as a bolt from the blue, with no mention of Greek and Thracian military cooperation during the more than a century that passed between Pisistratus' seizure of power and Demosthenes' victory at Pylos in 425.<sup>119</sup>

While Best's analysis is correct in the essentials, and his work provides a needed corrective to the outsized importance placed on Iphicrates, he overlooks a crucial point: the special role of Athens in developing the role of Thracian soldiers in Greek armies. It was not that Athens produced men of exceptional strategic and tactical acumen, but that Athenians from the time of Pisistratus had a special connection with the Thracians and therefore appreciated the usefulness of Thracian tactics in ways other Greeks could not. As a case in point, during their long tenure in the Chersonese, the Philaids fought alongside – and learned from – the local inhabitants.

It was for military assistance that the Dolonci sought the advice of Delphi, and the elder Miltiades was evidently successful in defending them from their enemies. His first act upon arriving in the Chersonese and being made tyrant was to wall off (ἀπετείχισε) the entire peninsula at its isthmus in order to prevent the destructive plundering raids (δηλέεσθαι ἐσβάλλοντες) of the Apsinthii. This wall, according to Herodotus, was some thirty-six stades, or just over seven kilometers, in length

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<sup>118</sup> Best 1969: 17-29.

<sup>119</sup> For more on Demosthenes, see below, ch. 3.

(6.36.2).<sup>120</sup> Apparently Miltiades was able to end the raids in this way (τοὺς Ἀψινθίους τρώπῳ τοιούτῳ ὠσάμενος), at least to the point where he felt able to initiate a war with Lampsacus (Hdt. 6.37.1). The settlement of his Athenians seems to have been part of Miltiades' overall fortification strategy, as he established them at sites near the wall such as Cardia, Agora and Pactye. This would have effectively controlled access to the Chersonese.<sup>121</sup> Nepos corroborates this picture, saying that Miltiades – though it is difficult to tell whether the elder or younger is meant – scattered his enemies, barricaded the Chersonese with fortifications (*castellis...communiit*), settled his fellow Athenians and enriched them by leading frequent raids into enemy territory (*Milt.* 2.1). That the wall was rebuilt several times throughout antiquity demonstrates that this strategy of fortification was effective.<sup>122</sup>

While Miltiades was brought in to lend his military mettle to the Dolonci, it seems that he himself learned from the experience. In particular, he was forced to contend with a type of enemy much different from that typically faced by Late Archaic Athenians. How does one defend territory from hostile neighbors prone to raiding and pillaging rather than any sort of “regular” warfare as epitomized by pitched battle?<sup>123</sup> Miltiades' answer was his fortification wall, presumably manned by inhabitants of the adjacent *poleis*. Later in antiquity, such a wall would be dubbed a

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<sup>120</sup> For the length, see How and Wells 1912: vol. 2, 76. For the location, which is still uncertain, see Scott 2005: 171.

<sup>121</sup> Isaac 1986: 166-167.

<sup>122</sup> Rebuilt by Pericles who brought additional settlers around 447 (Plut. *Per.* 19.1); Dercyllidas the Spartan in 398 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.8-10; Diod. 14.38.7); by Justinian in Late Antiquity (Procopius *De Aed.* 4.10.5). No physical remains of any of these walls have been found.

<sup>123</sup> For the norms of Archaic Greek warfare, see Hanson 2000: 27-39; but, see Krentz (2000) who argues that trickery and deception were a much larger part of Archaic warfare than Hanson acknowledges.

διατείχισμα, the technical term applied to a barrier intended to close off an entire region. The strategy of fortifying an area by means of a barrier wall was employed several times in antiquity. Examples include the wall across the Dema Gap in Attica, Hadrian's Wall in Britain, Constantine's long wall in Thrace, Justinian's long wall at Thermopylae, and of course the wall across the Isthmus of Corinth which was attempted at several periods beginning with Xerxes' invasion of 480-479.<sup>124</sup> The wall across the Chersonese is the first such fortification employed by the Greeks that is mentioned in our sources.<sup>125</sup> Was this the direct inspiration for the wall the Greek allies would attempt to utilize at the Isthmus of Corinth a few decades later?<sup>126</sup>

Miltiades also recognized that in order for a fortification wall, no matter how imposing, to be effective, it needed to be adequately manned. Thus, he settled his Athenians in its vicinity. In this vein, later barrier walls would be built with forts interspersed along the entire length.<sup>127</sup> As for offensive operations, the raids into Thracian territory which Nepos describes would have fulfilled a function beyond

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<sup>124</sup> For the strategy of blocking off an entire region, see Lawrence 1979: 167-172; Gregory 1993: 128. For the Isthmus of Corinth, see Wiseman 1978: 59-63; Gregory 1993: 4-6.

<sup>125</sup> There is some evidence of a Mycenaean wall on the Isthmus of Corinth from the Late Bronze Age, but most archaeologists now believe that the remaining stones represent terracing for a road rather than a fortification, and in any case there is no evidence that this structure spanned the entire Isthmus. See Broneer 1966, 1968; Gregory 1993: 4-5. One might object that the so-called Phocian wall at Thermopylae, mentioned by Herodotus (7.176), is an earlier example, but this structure is of uncertain date; see Pritchett 1958: 212-213. In any case, Herodotus says that the Phocians built the wall to keep out the Thessalians who likely fought very much like the Thracians threatening Miltiades' territory, hence the need for such a fortification.

<sup>126</sup> In 338-335, a wall was built across the Dema Gap in Attica, lying between Mt. Parnes and Mt. Aegaleus. This defensive work was designed with special sally-ports interspersed along its length that would have allowed light-armed troops to dart out against the enemy and fall back again to the safety of the wall. See Jones et al. 1957; Anderson 1970: 134-135; Lawrence 1979: 170-171; Ober 1985: 150. Such a fortification was ideally suited to Thracian-style troops, and was probably inspired by the increasing use of light troops by Athens in the late fourth century. Did Miltiades' wall have a similar feature, to take full advantage of Doloncian soldiers?

<sup>127</sup> See, for example, Gregory (1993: 129-132) who discusses the use of fortresses along the Late Antique Hexamilion Wall across the Isthmus of Corinth.

enriching Miltiades' men. Essentially, such raids would have harried and weakened the Apsinthii and rendered them less able to attack the Chersonese. It is unlikely that the Apsinthii would have faced hundreds of Athenian hoplites, supplemented by Doloncian allies, in pitched battle. Thus, in order to take the offensive, the Philaids adopted the tactics of the enemy for themselves.<sup>128</sup> While many scholars have commented on the Greeks' inability to fight in a non-hoplite fashion and their general ineffectiveness against light-armed troops, Miltiades and his men seem to have fared quite well against Thracian fighters by pioneering the use of a barrier wall and employing local tactics.<sup>129</sup> That the Athenian settlers and the Dolonci learned from each other and found ways to fight in conjunction is only a reasonable result of their coexistence.

If the Oxford plate discussed above does in fact depict the younger Miltiades or even one of the Athenians that accompanied him to the Chersonese, some sort of military assimilation is implied. We can never know whether or not Greeks actually fought in the manner of Scythian or Thracian mounted-archers, but that Athenian *hippeis* are so often depicted with Thracian equipment indicates that they esteemed the skill of the Thracian horseman. Best and Isaac both remark on the strength of the cavalry units in Greek cities in the Thraceward region, which is attested by several ancient sources.<sup>130</sup> Isaac notes especially Pindar's second Paean, which describes the pivotal role of the cavalry in protecting the Greek settlement of Abdera from the local

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<sup>128</sup> Herodotus says that all Thracians esteemed the living gained from warfare, and specifically this type of plundering raid (ληιστύς), above all else (5.6.2).

<sup>129</sup> See Anderson (1970: 11-140) for a discussion of how hoplite armies in the fourth century adapted to incorporate and combat different types of troops, especially the Thracian peltast. Miltiades' campaigns in Thrace took place a full century and a half before most of the innovations described by Anderson.

<sup>130</sup> Best 1969: 13; Isaac 1986: 85-86.

Thracians. Such cavalry units, a rarity in southern Greece, would have been a necessity for Greeks struggling to secure their position amongst horse-loving Thracians.<sup>131</sup> Miltiades, the scion of a family filled with avid horse-breeders, would perhaps have relished the chance to fight on horseback along with the native inhabitants of his territory. Even if no Greeks in the Chersonese fought in this way, they would have been familiar with this style of warfare through constant contact with their barbarian neighbors, and they presumably would have found a way to fight alongside and against mounted-archers and other light mobile troops. More than a century later, Xenophon would demonstrate the value of his experience with different types of troops by devising a method by which his hoplites avoided being separated during a night march from the Thracian cavalry and peltasts of his ally Seuthes.<sup>132</sup>

A cup fragment by Onesimus, now in the Getty Museum, displays an image so far unique in vase-painting.<sup>133</sup> What remains of the interior of the cup depicts the upper torso and head of a lone hoplite, holding a shield and engaged in combat with an unseen enemy. The warrior's helmet is topped with a scalp still wearing a laurel wreath. The Scythians were famous for scalping their enemies, as Herodotus demonstrates (4.64-65), and the Greek verb for scalping was aptly ἀποσकुθίζειν, or “to act like a Scythian.” As one scholar suggests, this cup, which can be dated to the later 490's, might be a reflection of the upsurge in knowledge about Scythians following the return of Miltiades to Athens in 493. Perhaps Miltiades and his men not only learned of this Scythian practice but even adopted it to a certain extent

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<sup>131</sup> For Greek cavalry in general, see Spence (1993), who argues that most Greek states did not maintain regular forces of cavalry until at least the late fifth century.

<sup>132</sup> For Xenophon and Seuthes, see below, chs. 5, 6.

<sup>133</sup> Malibu, CA, J. Paul Getty Museum 86.AE.311; Williams 1991: 47, fig. 7a.

themselves, much like the Europeans who encountered scalping among the Native Americans.<sup>134</sup> We do not know whether the Thracians living more in the immediate vicinity of the Chersonese engaged in such activities, but the Apsinthii were particularly savage and sacrificed the Persian Oeobazus to one of their gods in accordance with their custom (τροόπω τῷ σφετέρῳ, Hdt. 9.119.1).

Perhaps the famous charge of the Greeks at Marathon was due to Miltiades' influence (Hdt. 6.112.1). While most scholars do not think that the Greek hoplites could have covered the entire distance of around 1500 meters at a full run, it is clear by Herodotus' emphatic repetition of δρόμῳ that they did run for at least the final part of the advance.<sup>135</sup> The best explanation for this charge is that the heavily armed Greek infantrymen, unsupported by regular contingents of cavalry or archers, needed to reduce the effectiveness of the Persian arrows by quickly closing the gap between the two forces.<sup>136</sup> That the Persians had and employed archers in the battle is proven by the presence of many Persian arrowheads in and around the Soros, or Athenian burial mound, which has been excavated on the Marathon plain.<sup>137</sup> Miltiades had spent many years in the Chersonese among peoples that made extensive use of archers. He served in Darius' force during the Persian invasion of Scythia, which would have

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<sup>134</sup> As argued by Williams 1991: 47.

<sup>135</sup> For the charge, see Hammond (1968: 28-29), who argues that the facts as stated by Herodotus are unimpeachable, including the supposed charge of the Greek hoplites. How and Wells (1912: vol. 2, 112) and others had previously argued that no hoplite army could have performed such a charge.

<sup>136</sup> Scott (2006: 624) cites several tests which have shown that few could have run the entire distance, but that a run for the last portion of the advance would have been perfectly feasible.

<sup>137</sup> Hammond (1968: 28-29) brings to bear the evidence of many Persian arrows found at the site which indicate that the Persian barrage was intense for the last 150 meters or so of the Greek advance. Most recently, Storch (2001) has argued that the Persians did not shoot their arrows at Marathon, since no arrows are depicted on the Stoa Poikile, nor are arrows mentioned in the literary sources. He has, however, no adequate explanation for why so many Persian arrow heads were found *in situ* on the Marathon plain. For the arrow heads being of distinctly eastern types, see E. Forsdyke 1919.

brought him into contact with Scythians and Persians (Hdt. 4.137.1). And of course he fought with the Thracian inhabitants of the Chersonese against their enemies which included other Thracians from the adjoining regions. While the extent to which he was actually in control of troop movements at Marathon is unclear at best, the tradition does give Miltiades a key role in masterminding the battle and urging his fellow generals to fight.<sup>138</sup> Faced with commanding an army of heavy infantrymen with little in the way of cavalry or archer support, he may well have applied his experiences in the north in advising the Greeks to close ranks quickly with the Persians.<sup>139</sup> Herodotus does say that the Athenians at Marathon were the first Greeks, “so far as we know,” to charge at a run.<sup>140</sup> For their part, the Persians thought the Athenians were mad in attacking without adequate light-armed and mounted support (Hdt. 6.112.2-3).

There was supposedly another first at Marathon, one that Herodotus fails to mention.<sup>141</sup> In his description of the Marathon plain, Pausanias identifies two different burial mounds, one for the Athenian dead, which has been identified as the Soros in the middle of the plain, and another for the Plataeans and the slaves, about two kilometers to the west (1.32.3).<sup>142</sup> Pausanias says that the Battle of Marathon was the

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<sup>138</sup> Aside from the accounts in Herodotus and Nepos, Pausanias describes Miltiades’ prominent presence in the commemorative painting of the battle in the Stoa Poikile (1.15.3), as well as the monument to Miltiades in the plain itself (1.32).

<sup>139</sup> Scott (2005: 388) thinks it unlikely that Athenians could have fielded a cavalry force at this date even if they wanted to.

<sup>140</sup> Van Wees (2004: 180) says that running into battle was actually an established custom at this time, but, as Scott (2005: 389) points out, van Wees bases this conclusion on artistic evidence rather than any descriptions of specific battles.

<sup>141</sup> Evans (1993: 279) gives the best reason for Herodotus’ silence, namely, that in the later fifth century Marathon had come to symbolize the ideal hoplite battle, especially in contrast to the naval mob’s victory at Salamis.

<sup>142</sup> See Hammond (1992: 147-150) for the second mound’s location and contents. See Marinatos (1970) for the fullest excavation report.



first time slaves fought beside their masters. Elsewhere, he attributes this innovation to Miltiades who had passed a decree (βούλευμα) freeing the slaves before the battle (7.15.7). The evidence suggests that, at least by the late fifth century, hoplites were regularly attended on campaign by a personal slave, though the duties of these slaves did not usually involve fighting.<sup>143</sup> Why the innovation to involve slaves in the battle? A shortage of Athenian manpower in the face of a large Persian army does not suffice as an explanation. As Hunt observes, the thousands of Athenians of the thetic class were not mobilized, perhaps due to fears that they would derive too much political power from participation in the army.<sup>144</sup> But if the Athenians really were desperately outnumbered, facing a threat to their very survival as a *polis*, it seems that they would have called upon the thetes regardless of potential political repercussions.

What role did the slaves play in the fighting? Usually, it has been assumed that they would have fought as hoplites, just as their masters.<sup>145</sup> Some, though, have speculated that they would have served as light troops, possibly to cover the Athenian flanks.<sup>146</sup> The latter seems much more likely as such inexperienced and probably ill-equipped troops would have been a liability within the closely packed phalanx itself. The Athenians were clearly afraid of being outflanked, hence the thinning of the center in order to lengthen the line. To place light troops on the flanks would have added further insurance against a longer Persian line. Even newly freed slaves inexperienced in combat would have been better than nothing, and they could have made good use of the terrain as the ground rose sharply on either side of the Athenian

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<sup>143</sup> For slave attendants, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 1, 49-51.

<sup>144</sup> Hunt 1998: 27.

<sup>145</sup> See, for instance, Hammond 1992: 150.

<sup>146</sup> Delbrück 1975: 77; 81, n. 3; Lazenby 1993: 64; Doenges 1998: 7.

phalanx.<sup>147</sup> If the slaves were used as light troops, this would be a very early example of a combined-arms force, however *ad hoc*, which would prefigure the tactics of later influential generals from Demosthenes to Iphicrates. After Marathon, the Athenians seemed to gain an appreciation for light troops, as there was a corps of citizen archers at Plataea in 479 that played no small part in the battle (Hdt. 9.22, 60).<sup>148</sup>

Spending so much time in the Chersonese and facing threats from local Thracians and Greeks alike, the Philaids would have been forced to apply innovative ways of fighting. They would have had considerable latitude to work outside the confines of the phalanx while leading the Dolonci along with Athenian settlers. Necessity would have played a considerable role in encouraging changes in tactics. Miltiades might well have applied the military lessons he learned in Thrace to the Battle of Marathon, making the unprecedented decision to free a number of Athenian slaves in order to complement the citizen hoplite. Many of these Attic slaves might have been Thracians themselves, or at least from other lands familiar with light-armed warfare.<sup>149</sup> Their military value in the battle might have been minimal, but the

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<sup>147</sup> There are two main schools of reconstructing the positions of the Athenian and Persian lines. For the first, which places both forces parallel to the coast, with the Greeks to the west towards Vrana and nestled between Mt. Kotroni and Mt. Agriliki, see the map in Hammond 1968: 19. For the second, which places both forces at right angles to the coast, with the Greeks to the south towards Nea Makri with Mt. Agriliki on their left and the sea on their right, see Vanderpool 1966: 103-105. In either case, there was high ground on at least one flank which could have been utilized by light troops.

<sup>148</sup> For the Athenian archers at Plataea, and the notion that the Athenians might have learned the usefulness of archers from the experience of Marathon, see Wardman 1959: 55-56 and n. 12.

<sup>149</sup> For the prevalence of Thracian slaves at Athens at this time, see Rosivach 1999: 155-156. It is interesting that in the late Archaic period, precisely when the Philaids were in the Chersonese, not only do Thracians begin to appear on Attic pottery, but so too do barbarian archers. These archers are often shown paired with hoplite, working as a duo. See, for instance, a late sixth century black figure amphora from Rhodes that depicts three hoplites marching to battle each accompanied by what looks to be a Scythian archer (Rhodes, Archaeological Museum, 12329; *ABV* 288.17). Exactly what is signified by the presence of these archers is much debated. Some see them as evidence of a barbarian archer corps in Athens even in the late sixth century (Vos 1963: *passim*; Raeck 1981: 10-21), while others think that these were Athenian archers wearing barbarian clothing (Wardman 1959: 55-56, n. 12,

Athenians had to make the most of what they had on hand. Herodotus neglects their presence because Marathon had come to represent the glory of the Athenian hoplite class. But at the time, in 490, the slaves who had fought along with their hoplite masters were accorded a singular honor: burial on the battlefield itself.<sup>150</sup>

### ***Cimon: Continuing the Family Legacy***

After returning to Athens, although Miltiades successfully defended himself against a charge of tyranny and gained renown from his role at Marathon, he never reacquired his family's territory in Thrace. Instead, he died in disgrace after being fined fifty talents for the failure of an expedition to Paros in 489. It was left to his son Cimon to pay the fine, and as a result, the family was reduced to poverty and relative political insignificance for some time (Hdt. 6.132-136; Plut. *Cim.* 4.3). Isaac, following Perdrizet and Ehrenberg, argues that Miltiades' expedition to Paros was merely a prelude to a concerted effort to acquire the gold mines opposite Thasos and thus enrich Athens substantially. Paros, after all, was the mother city of Thasos, and its reduction would have been a fitting first step in challenging Thasian interests in Thrace. Also, Olorus, Miltiades' father-in-law, was probably a king in the vicinity of the Thasian-controlled gold mines, a connection the Athenian leader surely hoped to exploit. Finally, the Parians set up a grave monument to a certain Tokes on the

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following Plassart). More recently, several scholars have argued that these scenes should be seen in a mythological context. The Scythians, for example, might have originated as attendants of Achilles, but came to denote a generic heroic attendant (Pinney 1983: 130-131). Miller (1991) argues that as Athenians dressed as Thracians, so too did they dress as Scythians, probably to denote an upper-class affinity for the exotic. In the end, there is no scholarly consensus as to the meaning of these images, but we cannot rule out that foreign archers, perhaps slaves, were introduced to Athens at this time.

<sup>150</sup> Thucydides (2.34.5) says that the Athenian war dead were traditionally buried in the same spot on the outskirts of Athens, except for the warriors of Marathon who were buried where they fell.

mainland opposite Thasos between around 525-490, which shows continued Parian interest in the region shortly before the time of Miltiades' expedition.<sup>151</sup> But, with Miltiades' disgrace and death, and the consequent penury of his surviving family, Philaid influence in Thrace seemed at an end.

Cimon, as is well known, would eventually attain prestige and political power at Athens, largely through his wealth and acts of philanthropy. He regularly entertained and feasted the citizens of his deme Laciadae, and he let any who wished pick fruit from his extensive estates. All this was in addition to his liberal execution of liturgies. To combat such wealth and the public favor it fostered, Pericles, Cimon's rival, was forced to offer the citizens of Athens jury pay ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 27.3; Plut. *Cim.* 10.1-3). The financial straits in which Miltiades had left the family had been remedied and more, largely through Cimon's own campaigns in Thrace. As scholars point out, in Thrace Cimon was careful to appear as Athens' champion while enlarging his own personal fortune through conquest.<sup>152</sup> He had learned from his father that vast wealth and territory were up for grabs in the northern Aegean, and though Miltiades failed in his final attempt to expand his own power as well as that of Athens in the region, Cimon would enjoy tremendous success.

In 476, Cimon led a force of Athenians to Thrace. For this first campaign he concentrated on the region opposite Thasos and along the Strymon, fulfilling his father's thwarted ambitions. After a destructive siege of Eion, a city on the Strymon under the control of the Persian governor Boges, Cimon expelled the Persians from the city and also ravaged the local Thracians who had been bringing the Persians supplies

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<sup>151</sup> Isaac 1986: 5-7, 18-19.

<sup>152</sup> Isaac 1986: 34; Archibald 1998: 114.

(Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. *Cim.* 7-8.2). Though Eion itself had been destroyed by the Persians at the end of the siege, Plutarch tells us that the surrounding countryside was beautiful and fertile and Cimon turned it over to the Athenians for settlement (*Cim.* 7.3).<sup>153</sup> Plutarch additionally remarks that by this feat Cimon achieved greater fame in Athens than either Themistocles or Miltiades had. At Cimon's insistence, stone herms were dedicated in Athens celebrating his victory, though Miltiades and Themistocles had received not so much as a laurel crown. Plutarch guesses that the Athenians were so enthralled with Cimon's achievement because, whereas the other great generals of Athens were primarily engaged in defending their city from external enemies, Cimon had brought the offensive to the enemies themselves and had in the process acquired new territories for the Athenians to settle (*Cim.* 7.3-8.2). Isaac suggests that Cimon's success on the Strymon brought such great excitement because of the possibility of the untold riches of Thrace falling into Athens' hands.<sup>154</sup>

In 466, following the Battle of Eurymedon, the Chersonese was brought back under Athenian influence by another expedition of Cimon. The Persians in the area had enlisted the help of Thracians to the north, perhaps tribesmen connected to the very Thracians whom the elder Miltiades had driven from the Chersonese, in order to fight against Cimon. With but a few ships and vastly inferior numbers, according to Plutarch, Cimon defeated the combined forces of the Persians and Thracians, both on

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<sup>153</sup> See Isaac (1986: 19-20) for the extent of the Athenian settlement on the Strymon organized by Cimon, which may have included an expedition to Ennea Hodoi and the first attempts to found a city at the future location of Amphipolis, as indicated by Nepos (*Cim.* 2). For the date of the campaign, see Archibald 1998: 114, n.101.

<sup>154</sup> Isaac 1986: 21.

land and sea, and won for Athens the entire Chersonese (*Cim.* 14.1). Philaid influence on the Hellespont was thus restored, though Cimon ostensibly gave the land to all Athenians.

Immediately following this victory, Cimon put down a revolt on Thasos. From our sources, it is clear that Thasos and Athens disputed the control of the *emporion* on the mainland opposite the island, as well as the lucrative gold mines in the vicinity (Thuc. 1.100.2; Plut. *Cim.* 14.2).<sup>155</sup> After a victory at sea and a successful siege of Thasos, Cimon acquired for Athens the disputed mainland territory along with its mines.<sup>156</sup> His victory was so complete, in fact, that many Athenians thought he should capitalize on his gains by moving against Alexander of Macedon. That Cimon failed to do so brought upon him the charge of taking bribes from Alexander, for which his enemies prosecuted him at Athens. Cimon's defense consisted of insisting that he was not a *proxenos* of wealthy Thessalians or Ionians, as some other Athenians were, but rather of the frugal Spartans. All the riches gained by his campaigns were funneled directly into the city of Athens. By implication, he would never be swayed by a bribe (Plut. *Cim.* 14.2-3). In reality, though, Cimon was greatly enriched by his activities in the northern Aegean, in no small part from the very mines he had wrested from Thasos.

Cimon made great gains for Athens in the north Aegean, reestablishing Athenian control on the Chersonese, making the first major inroads up the Strymon

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<sup>155</sup> Meiggs (1972: 79-82) discusses the date of the Eurymedon and Cimon's subsequent expeditions to the Chersonese and Thasos. From the evidence of a surviving casualty list (IG i<sup>2</sup> 928) which contains a record of the fallen from both the Chersonese and Thasos, a coherent and comprehensive campaign in the north Aegean led by Cimon is indicated.

<sup>156</sup> Thucydides (1.100.2) tells us that at about the same time, Athens attempted to establish a colony at Ennea Hodoi, later Amphipolis, with 10 000 settlers, which ended in disaster at Drabeskos. For this colonization attempt, see Isaac 1986: 24-30; Archibald 1998: 115.

valley, and securing lucrative mines and territory on the mainland opposite Thasos. All of these areas would figure prominently in Athenian foreign policy for over a century following Cimon's career. It is also clear that Cimon's own personal fortunes were vastly improved by these activities, as he became one of the wealthiest men in Athens and a leading political actor. His innate military talent was combined with extensive connections in the region to achieve his aims. In the case of the Chersonese, Plutarch is explicit that the Persians disdained Cimon because of his small number of ships, but still Cimon was successful. This indicates that he drew on his family ties in the area, probably with Greek settlers and friendly Thracians alike, to drive the Persians and enemy Thracians from the peninsula. He followed in his father's footsteps by bringing the fight to Thasos in order to open up new sources of revenue for Athens. Again, family connections probably played a key role. Cimon, the grandson of Olorus, would have had useful friends in the area, friends who might have been a help in his earlier siege of Eion and colonization efforts on the Strymon.

As the ignominious end of Cimon's father Miltiades reveals, the Athenians could be a very fickle people. Even the hero of Marathon was not immune from prosecution and humiliation at the hands of a vengeful *demos*. Athens' impatience with its generals and political leaders is a prominent theme of ancient history. Pericles was of an exceptionally rare breed in that he managed to maintain the favor of the Athenians until his death, though had not the plague killed him in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, there is no telling how long the city would have abided his policies. Many of the fallen stars of Athens turned to Thrace as a place of refuge. The elder Miltiades had set out for the Chersonese because the political situation in Athens

was unbearable and there was no room for so prominent a rival to Pisistratus. The elder Cimon was murdered precisely because he represented a challenge to Pisistratid power. Once driven from Athens, the Pisistratids themselves found refuge with their friends at Sigeum. Like his father, the younger Cimon too fell out of favor with the democracy at home. Though his Thracian connections had led to power and prestige at Athens, Cimon would be overshadowed and driven from the city by his political rivals Ephialtes and Pericles in 461 (Plut. *Cim.* 17.2). His family, by contrast, had managed to hold onto power in the Chersonese for half a century. The historian Thucydides, a kinsman of Cimon and the Philaids, was given a prestigious command in the Thraceward region during the Peloponnesian War precisely because of his own ties in the area. But when he seemed to fail in his duty, he remained abroad, probably retiring to his estates on the mainland opposite Thasos.<sup>157</sup> In the case of Pisistratus, Thrace turned out to be a kingmaker at Athens. But under the increasingly entrenched democratic constitution, the zero-sum game of Athenian politics proved too volatile even for men as capable as Cimon. We are in the dark concerning Cimon's whereabouts during his period of exile. He seems not to have returned to Thrace where he might have been able to reassume his family's tyranny free of his democratic rivals.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>157</sup> For Thucydides, see above, ch. 1.

<sup>158</sup> He appears in Boeotia at the Battle of Tanagra in 457 and offers to fight on Athens' side against Sparta (Plut. *Cim.* 17.3-5). In 451 Plutarch tells us that Cimon was recalled to Athens, on a proposal by Pericles no less, to negotiate a truce with Sparta (*Cim.* 17.6). Gomme et al. (1945-1981: vol. 1, 325-329), however, argues based on the testimony of Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 88) that Cimon was recalled in 357 after only five years in exile. See also the discussion in Hornblower (1991-2008: vol. 1, 167-168) who argues that Theopompus is guilty of some telescoping. Thucydides tells us little about Cimon in this period, so we are largely in the dark.



## ***Conclusions***

Thrace was the ideal resource for Athenians eager to acquire power. Pisistratus used Thrace as a source of money and soldiers with which he dominated Athens. While he had been twice ousted from power by his aristocratic rivals, the introduction of foreign mercenaries and large sums of foreign money into the equation tipped the balance decisively in Pisistratus' favor. Once he was established at Athens, what were similarly ambitious elites to do? The elder Miltiades removed himself to Thrace at the fortuitous advent of Thracian tribesmen eager for a champion. He was able to take advantage of the power vacuum created by continual strife between competing tribes. Unlike Pisistratus, he never returned to Athens in an attempt to overthrow his rivals. In Thrace he founded colonies, fought at the head of Thracians and Greeks, and forged alliances with figures as powerful as Croesus. After death, he was honored as divine hero. In Thrace he lived as a king. What need to return home?

His successors controlled the region for a further two to three decades. In addition to enjoying wealth and power, they entered into dynastic marriages with Thracian nobility and might have adopted certain Thracian practices themselves. Ostensibly working on behalf of Athens, Cimon reestablished his family's dominance in the Chersonese that had been lost to the Persians. He also expanded his power to the Strymon valley, where his grandfather had reigned and where his father had set his sights before his ignominious death. Like his great uncle, Cimon received posthumous cult honors, though at the hands of the Cypriots. The Philaids were first and foremost in control of a strategic and richly resourced area; but we cannot utterly discount the ancillary benefits they derived from life among the Thracians.

The Philaids revealed how useful experience in Thrace could be for the military strategist. Greek fortification techniques seem to have been greatly influenced by the elder Miltiades' barrier wall, and the successful campaigns he waged against his Thracian neighbors evinces both an ability to adapt to a new type of enemy and a level of cooperation between Greek and non-Greek soldiers. At Marathon, the younger Miltiades might have made the most of a hoplite army facing Persian archers because of his prior experience with light-armed fighters. That the Athenians failed to incorporate Thracian-style tactics before the Peloponnesian War can perhaps be explained by the continuing prestige of the hoplite. Thrace was the ideal proving ground for innovative tactics, far away from the massed phalanxes of warring *poleis*. But, few influential Athenian leaders spent such a substantial time in Thrace until Hagnon founded Amphipolis in 437. Hagnon, it turns out, probably did gain military experience from his time among the Thracians.

Finally, the career of the Philaids demonstrated to any astute Athenian the opportunities Thrace could afford in terms of territory, material wealth, and political power. Archibald contrasts the activities of Pisistratus and the Philaids – that is, the *personal* foreign ties they cultivated irrespective of any coherent Athenian policy – with the “civic enterprises” of the Classical Athenian state once it had developed the “institutional machinery” of international relations.<sup>159</sup> Yet, as the rest of this study will show, personal connections, and usually by extension individual private interests, continued to play an integral part in Athens' relationship with Thrace. Athens may have become more sophisticated in its use of diplomacy, and a definite foreign policy

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<sup>159</sup> Archibald 1998: 112.

may have been advanced by the state as a whole, but prominent individuals who more or less conformed to the Philaid paradigm continued to drive that policy. And they did not always subordinate their own aims to those of Athens.

## CHAPTER 3

### DIEITREPHES AND THE MYCALESSUS MASSACRE

#### *Introduction*

In 413 BC the Athenians were facing immense difficulties as the Peloponnesian War entered a new phase. According to Thucydides, not only were they engaged in a war with Sicily, a war on the same scale as that which they had been waging against the Peloponnesians, they were also facing financial ruin due largely to the damage caused by the Spartan fortification of Decelea. It was in this context that one of the most gruesome episodes of the war took place (Thuc. 7.27.1-2; 28-30).

A contingent of Thracian fighters from the tribe of the Dioi had arrived in Athens to serve with the general Demosthenes in Sicily, but had arrived too late. The Athenians, not willing or able to cover the expense of keeping these soldiers on the payroll, sent them back to Thrace under the command of a certain Dietrephes. While sailing back to Thrace through the Euripus Strait, the Athenians had instructed Dietrephes to inflict as much damage as possible on the enemy. After plundering Tanagra, the Thracians moved further inland and attacked the town of Mycalessus, catching the inhabitants entirely off guard. Mycalessus was far enough from the sea so as to supposedly prevent a sea-borne attack, and the walls of the city had been neglected to the point of disrepair and were crumbling in several sections. The band of 1300 warriors stormed into the town and systematically butchered all they encountered, sparing not even the livestock. Most shockingly, they entered into the region's largest boys' school and slaughtered all the children found inside. In a

chilling note, the entire Thracian race, like other barbarous peoples, is portrayed as at its most murderous (φονικώτατον) when its spirits are up (ἐν ᾧ ἂν θαρσύνῃ), presumably when the killing is easy (7.29.4).<sup>1</sup> Thucydides insists that this attack represented an utter calamity for the town of Mycalessus, a disaster as complete and pitiable as any which occurred during the long war (7.30.10). Eventually, the Thebans sent their cavalry and hoplites to the aid of Mycalessus, and catching a sizable group of the Thracians still involved in looting the town, killed many of them. The Thracians that managed to retreat in an orderly fashion performed well against the Thebans, adopting the tactics of their native land by charging at the enemy in small groups and subsequently falling back again. Having lost some 250 out of 1300 men, the Thracians escaped to their boats and sailed north.

Thucydides is an author fond of paradigms. For example, although many *staseis* occurred during the war, he chose to describe only the one at Corcyra (3.69-85). The brutality and horrors of the civil strife amongst the Corcyreans, so vividly illustrated by the historian, would serve to inform the reader's picture of subsequent revolutions which would take place in various cities throughout the course of the war, without the need for Thucydides to go into such detail again. Other paradigmatic descriptions can be found, the famous passage concerning the plague in Athens (2.47-55) being an example. In the same way, the episode at Mycalessus was employed by Thucydides to paint a striking portrait of the levels of brutality and cruelty to which the war had descended. Other terrible atrocities had been committed, but the slaughter

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<sup>1</sup> Kallet (1999: 240 n. 49) thinks this statement is gnomic rather than a reflection of Thucydides' own opinion of the Thracians. Thucydides had a high opinion of at least the martial skill of the Thracians involved at Mycalessus, if not fully condoning their more vicious behavior. For more on Thucydides and Thrace, see above, ch. 1.

at Mycalessus provided a powerful enough image to serve as a paradigm.<sup>2</sup>

This episode sparks several questions. Foremost among these, what were the Athenians doing with such a terrible band of killers in their employ? Moreover, what was the role played by the Athenian commander Dieitrephes? What was the character of his relationship with the Thracian troops under his command, and what sort of control did he have over them? The bulk of the evidence indicates that Dieitrephes was leading a group of mercenaries that would have been familiar to several Athenian commanders in 413. Dieitrephes had his own family ties to Thrace and, for at least the two decades preceding the attack on Mycalessus, some of Athens' most illustrious men had led the Dioi and others like them. Athens, and especially those Athenians who had an interest in the Thracians, knew exactly what type of soldiers these mercenaries were. Dieitrephes exploited his connection to a band of bloodthirsty Thracians to obtain special commands, and a segment of the Athenian elite were all too happy to use Dieitrephes and his Thracians to further their own interests. All of this came at a terrible cost for the people of Mycalessus.

### ***The Attack***

Dieitrephes had been instructed to inflict as much damage as he could while sailing up the Boeotian coast. The use of Thracian mercenaries to ravage Boeotia may have been a strategy planned by the Athenians for quite some time. In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, performed in 425, the Athenian envoy to Thrace suggests that if the

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<sup>2</sup> See for example Lateiner (1977), who argues that Thucydides often uses events of little significance (such as the massacre at Mycalessus) to serve as a paradigm for the *pathos* of war. See also Quinn 1995: 573 n. 2.

Athenians pay his group of Thracian soldiers two drachmas per day, they will “thoroughly peltast (καταπελάσσονται)” all of Boeotia (159-160). Diitrephes’ first action was to lead his troops against the territory of Tanagra, which suffered only a quick raid and the loss of plunder according to Thucydides. Plundering raids and the destruction of crops were common offensive operations during the Peloponnesian war, employed by Archidamus in the early years of the conflict and central to Athens’ strategy in Messenia.<sup>3</sup> The city of Tanagra itself, like Mycalessus without effective walls, was situated several kilometers from the sea.<sup>4</sup> Between the city and the sea was a large flat area suited to agricultural activity and Tanagra is known to have had extensive extramural habitation in so-called suburbs (προάστεια).<sup>5</sup> Presumably, the broad plain in Tanagra’s territory, widely settled and lying next to the sea, afforded both ample material for plunder and ease of access for sea-borne invaders. This would at least partially explain the sparing of the city itself. That being said, the settlers on the plain would have suffered from the raid, perhaps in lives, and at least in terms of property and livelihood. The city as a whole surely felt the economic sting.

After leisurely ravaging these lowlands on the coast, the Thracians continued in their ships to Chalcis on Euboea. After nightfall (ἀφ’ ἑσπέρας), Diitrephes led them across the Euripus and they spent the night about three kilometers from Mycalessus at a temple of Hermes. As noted by Thucydides, the inhabitants of Mycalessus did not expect any attack from the sea as their city lay apparently safely

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<sup>3</sup> See for example Thuc. 2.19-20; 4.41.

<sup>4</sup> Tanagra’s walls were destroyed by Athens in 457/8 (Thuc. 1. 108.2) and not rebuilt until probably after the Peace of Antalcidas. See Roller 1974.

<sup>5</sup> Hansen 2006: 45-46. For a complete topographical study of the region around Tanagra, including its rich agricultural areas, see Fossey 1988: 43-99.

inland. Though actually quite close to the Euripus, Mycalessus was separated from the sea by a high range of mountains which effectively formed the border between Boeotia and the territory of Chalcis. The temple of Hermes was most likely situated on the Anephorites Pass which affords access over the mountain barrier, and may have demarcated the official boundary of Boeotia.<sup>6</sup> The group's ascent to a mountain pass five kilometers or so from the sea after nightfall indicates both a high level of skill and familiarity with mountainous terrain.

From this elevated situation, Dieitrephe and his troops could look down on Mycalessus below, corresponding to the modern village of Rhitsona. At daybreak, the Thracians stormed down from the heights, and quickly crossed the few kilometers to the unsuspecting town. Two low knolls are visible from the pass, and the ancient town occupied either one, or perhaps both, of these.<sup>7</sup> Mycalessus was situated in the midst of a fertile basin, which fits in well with Homer's epithet for the site in the Catalogue of Ships: εὐρύχορον Μυκαλησσόν (*Il.* 2.498).<sup>8</sup> Although most readings of Thucydides imply that the town was small (οὐση οὐ μεγάλη, 7.29.3), nearly all manuscripts omit the negative οὐ, and the excavated necropolis of the town extends for the better part of a kilometer.<sup>9</sup> Ulrichs in the mid eighteenth century noted that the area was covered with ancient stones and tile, and today the fields are completely full

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<sup>6</sup> Burrows and Ure (1907-1908: 232-242) provide a good topographical discussion of the area. See also Bakhuizen 1970; Fossey 1988: 80-85.

<sup>7</sup> See Burrows and Ure (1907-1908: 235) for a discussion concerning the size of the town.

<sup>8</sup> Fossey 1988: 83.

<sup>9</sup> Burrows and Ure 1907-1908: 235. It is true that most editors of Thucydides follow the Vatican manuscript B in including the negative particle, and this would appear to fit better in the text. Yet the possibility remains that the town was of a substantial size.



of substantial building blocks brought to the surface by modern agricultural plowing.<sup>10</sup> A sizable settlement may be indicated.

Ultimately, it is impossible to determine the exact number of casualties. According to Pausanias, although other Boeotian towns which had been destroyed in the past had been re-occupied by survivors, Mycalessus remained deserted, implying that the entire population had been wiped out (1.23.3). That the town declined significantly in the years after the attack is confirmed by archaeological evidence.<sup>11</sup> As for the numbers present at the ill-fated boys' school, we are equally in the dark. Thucydides says that it was the largest in the area (αὐτόθι, 7.29.5). This either means that Mycalessus itself had several schools, further indication of a settlement of substantial size, or that the school served children from the surrounding countryside and villages as well as the town proper. We only have two figures for schools in the fifth century, one from Herodotus who describes 119 out of 120 boys dying in Chios when their school collapsed (6.27.1), and another from Pausanias who relates the story of an enraged Olympic boxer on the tiny island of Astypalaea slaughtering sixty children as they were learning letters (6.9.6-7). Setting aside issues such as whether publicly funded schools existed for the majority of free-born children, or whether only relatively rich children could afford the requisite private tuition fees, it would be reasonable to guess that at least several dozen children were killed at Mycalessus.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Fossey 1988: 81-82.

<sup>11</sup> Excavations have focused on graves, which mostly date to the sixth century, with a few in the fifth century. Although there are Hellenistic remains in the cemetery, nothing from the intervening period (i.e., late fifth through fourth centuries) has been found, and the site itself was a ruin by Hellenistic and Roman times. This all implies that the site lay deserted from the third quarter of the fifth century onward. See Burrows and Ure 1907-1908; Bakhuizen 1970: 18-31.

<sup>12</sup> For the issue of school attendance, see W. V. Harris 1989: 96-102; M. Griffith 2001: 66-68.

While Thucydides says explicitly that Dieitrephes led the Thracians in the attack (ἦγεν αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Μυκαλησσόν, 7.29.2), this is the last we hear of the actions of the Athenian commander during the episode. Did he intend for such a massacre to take place, or had he merely envisioned a repeat of the raid on Tanagra and was forced to watch powerlessly as the foreign soldiers under his command wreaked havoc? Moreover, did the Athenians themselves countenance such an atrocity? Thucydides is silent on the matter. His history, however, coupled with other literary and epigraphic evidence may give us some insight into the character of Dieitrephes and his connections to the Thracians.

### ***Dieitrephes: The Man and his Family***

Dieitrephes' family was distinguished in Athens. Ostraka from around 460 were found in the agora depicting the name Dieitrephes son of Euthoinos.<sup>13</sup> To be a candidate for ostracism does not necessarily imply one is an aristocrat, but it at least signifies political prominence to such a degree as to threaten the egalitarian democratic order. The son of this elder Dieitrephes, Nicostratus, was a prominent general in the first half of the Peloponnesian War and was placed in command along with Nicias of an expeditionary force to attack the Thraceward cities Mende and Scione in 423 (Thuc. 4.129.2).<sup>14</sup> In this force were some 1000 Thracian mercenaries

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<sup>13</sup> See Vanderpool (1968), who includes a genealogical table for this family. For an alternate genealogical table, see Fornara 1971a: 56-57, 64-68; Develin 1989: nos. 830, 2177.

<sup>14</sup> Nicostratus, a general for at least five years during the war, is also mentioned in Thuc. 3.75, 4.53, 4.119, and 5.61, and was killed at Mantinea in 418/7.

and an undisclosed number of peltasts from Athens' northern allies.<sup>15</sup> This Nicostratus is mentioned in Aristophanes' *Wasps* as addicted to sacrifices (φιλοθύτης) and fond of foreigners (φιλόξενος, 81-84).<sup>16</sup> His connection to the Thracians would explain the second label, and perhaps the first is a slur against the foolish superstition that is often attributed by the Greeks to barbarous peoples.<sup>17</sup> Aristophanes tells us that Nicostratus' deme was Scambonidae. Thus, he was a both a co-general and fellow tribesman of Thucydides who was appointed to Thrace in 424/3, and in 418/17 he was co-general with his fellow demesman Alcibiades, who had Thracian connections of his own.<sup>18</sup> By extension, Dieitrephe, who was also from Scambonidae, conceivably had an association with Alcibiades.

Nicostratus was heavily involved in trying to prevent violence between the democratic and oligarchic factions at Corcyra in 427 (Thuc. 3.75). He was a mediator between the two sides, but it was the oligarchs who benefitted most from his interventions as the democrats were prevented from going on an extra-judicial killing spree. Nicostratus' efforts in preventing a massacre contrast poignantly with the inaction of another Athenian general, Eurymedon, who sat idly by with his sixty ships while the democrats butchered their opponents (7.81). Nicostratus may simply have

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<sup>15</sup> For the phenomenon of Greek *poleis* in the Thraceward area adopting peltast tactics for themselves, see Best 1969: 12-13. They were doubtlessly also mustering points for Thracian mercenaries entering Greek service.

<sup>16</sup> While φιλόξενος often denotes hospitality or the entertaining of guests, Strabo at least (10.3.18) uses the verb φιλοξενέω to mean "fond of foreign fashions" while discussing the Athenians' taste for all things foreign, particularly Thracian and Phrygian religious practices. For the identification of the comic Nicostratus with the general, see MacDowell 1965; Fornara 1970.

<sup>17</sup> The scholiast to these lines says that those who are φιλοθύται are irrationally superstitious (δεισιδαίμονες). For an alternate interpretation of these lines, see MacDowell (1988: 140-141), who argues that these words are terms of praise rather than reproach, and are brought up primarily to make fun of Philoxenos.

<sup>18</sup> Fornara 1970: 41, n. 3; Canfora 2006: 6-7, and n. 12.

been a better man than Eurymedon, or he may have had more sympathy for the oligarchic Corcyreans who were threatened with violence from the democrats.

Although Thucydides gives no patronymic for the Dieitrephes of 413, the rarity of the name strongly implies that he was a relative, if not the son, of this Nicostratus, and in any case the grandson of the elder Dieitrephes.<sup>19</sup> By the time of his command in 413, men from at least two generations of this family had been put in charge of Thracian forces, suggesting a family connection to Thrace and the Thracians.<sup>20</sup>

Other prominent members of this family are known to us. Herodotus names a champion in the *pankration*, Hermolycus the son of Euthynos, as the most conspicuous fighter among the Greeks at the Battle of Mycale (9.105). Euthynos is almost certainly the same man as Euthoinos named in the above-mentioned ostraka, signifying that Hermolycus and the elder Dieitrephes were brothers.<sup>21</sup> Pausanias saw a statue of Hermolycus the pankratiast on the Acropolis (1.23.10). Nearby, Pausanias also saw a statue of a Dieitrephes, whom he equates with the younger Dieitrephes that led the Thracians in 413 (1.23.3-4). A statue base was found in 1839 between the Propylaia and the Parthenon with an inscription mentioning a Hermolycus the son of Dieitrephes as the dedicator (IG i<sup>3</sup> 883). Scholars are divided as to whether this base belonged to the statue of Hermolycus the pankratiast or with that of Dieitrephes. The inscription on the base had been dated to around 440, but recent scholarship indicates

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<sup>19</sup> Inscriptional evidence, for example, furnishes only sixteen instances of this name in Attica (twenty-two in the entire inscriptional record). Including the ostraka and inscriptions already mentioned, there are a total of only four examples from the fifth century. By way of comparison, the name Nicostratus appears in Attic inscriptions 293 times.

<sup>20</sup> See Andrews in Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 5: 156-157; Connor 1971: 156, n.75.

<sup>21</sup> The manuscripts of Herodotus give several variant readings for the name, Euthoinos being among them.

a date toward the end of the fifth century.<sup>22</sup> In any case, a family link between the Hermolycus of Mycale fame, the elder Dieitrephes, and the younger Dieitrephes is manifest. A red-figure vase now in the Getty Museum, dated to the first half of the fifth century, includes the inscription “ΕΡΜΟΛΥΚΟΣ ΚΑΛΟΣ”.<sup>23</sup> On the vase are depicted young men locked in athletic combat. The name, date, and sport portrayed point to this vase representing the same Hermolycus mentioned by Herodotus. It is clear that Hermolycus, a warrior and athlete, was a famous and leading figure in early fifth century Athens, justifiably so according to Herodotus’ account. All of this indicates a family of means and prominence both politically and militarily.<sup>24</sup>

Was command over the group of Thracian mercenaries in 413 a prestigious appointment or a lowly task reserved for a leader of little import? The campaign in Sicily was at this time the focus of Athens’ military objectives, led by Nicias and newly reinforced by a group under the prominent general Demosthenes. It is unclear whether or not Dieitrephes was officially a general in 413, but that he was not in Sicily need not imply he was somehow out of favor and relegated to minor tasks. Demosthenes himself, the hero of Pylos, did not go to Sicily until several months after the beginning of the expedition when additional forces were called for. Command of Thracians was often given to Athens’ most illustrious men. Hagnon, the founder of Athens’ vitally important former colony Amphipolis, was sent to aid Sitalces in 429/8. Nicostratus had shared command over his Thracian mercenaries with Nicias. The

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<sup>22</sup> Earlier date: Stevens 1936; Dinsmoor 1942: 163-164; Vanderpool 1968. Later date: Keesling 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Malibu (CA), J. Paul Getty Museum, 83.Ae.217; see *Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum* 4 (1989) 66-69, figs. 1A-F.

<sup>24</sup> Connor (1971: 156-157) also argues for the political and military prominence of this family, in spite of the seeming comic slander against them as *nouveau riche*. See below.

group of Thracians under Dieitrephes was initially intended to serve under Demosthenes in Sicily, a leader who had previously sought out and employed Thracians and other light-armed troops to great effect. Finally, if Dieitrephes was not in fact a general in 413, his command would have been a special one granted by the city, implying a certain amount of prestige.<sup>25</sup>

Two years after the massacre at Mycalessus, in 411, Dieitrephes was appointed by the oligarchic regime which then held power in Athens to take overall control of the Thracian area, and his first action upon arriving in the region was to install oligarchies in various states such as Thasos (8.64). This special command tells us several things. First of all, Dieitrephes had at least a moderate degree of anti-democratic feeling to be used as an agent of the oligarchy. Anti-democratic tendencies are evinced also by his task of replacing democracies with oligarchies in the north Aegean. The oligarchy had been formed in Athens in order to affect the recall of Dieitrephes' fellow demesman and Thrace-haunter Alcibiades (Thuc. 8.76.7), which might further suggest an association between the two.

Secondly, that Dieitrephes was given such a high-level post a mere two years after the brutal massacre over which he presided is interesting to say the least. Certainly his experience with Thracians would have been useful for the operations he carried out on behalf of the oligarchy, allowing him to rely on local connections and networks to support his political objectives in the Thraceward area. The evidence indicates that Thasos and the other north Aegean *poleis* contained large numbers of

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<sup>25</sup> Thucydides never calls Dieitrephes a *strategos*. Jordan (1970) argues that there existed a military office subordinate to the *strategoi* called the *archon*. He argues that Dieitrephes' official title in 411 (see below) was *archon epi Thrakes*, rather than *strategos* (234). In 413 he may have been in a similarly "subordinate", or even unofficial, command.

Thracian inhabitants on whose sympathies Dieitrephes might have relied.<sup>26</sup> As mentioned above, Thucydides is silent on Dieitrephes' role at Mycalessus in 413. He is also silent as to the general Athenian reaction to this slaughter of a defenseless population. The events of 411 would indicate that the upper echelons of Athenian society, those backing the oligarchy, did not condemn Dieitrephes for his role two years earlier. Either Dieitrephes was powerless to stop his soldiers from committing the atrocity, in which case his competence to hold an effective command in the Thraceward area would be called into question, or he was complicit in the destruction of the town. If the latter is true, his assignment in 411 would indicate that his fellow elites not only approved of his connection to the Thracians, even to a group as murderous as the Dioi, but actively rewarded it. At the very least, they appreciated Dieitrephes' usefulness. The leadership qualities of Dieitrephes and the sort of Thracians he was accustomed to commanding were embraced by a significant portion of the Athenian elite as a way to further their cause in the north.<sup>27</sup>

In 409/8 the Athenians passed a decree to honor one Oeniades of Sciathus for his service to the Athenians (IG i<sup>3</sup> 110). Dieitrephes is listed on the inscription as the proposer of the decree. We know that Sciathus had long been an ally of Athens, in fact a member of the Delian league. As a league member Sciathus was listed as part of the Thracian district, although fairly far south, just off the coast near Mt. Pelium (IG i<sup>3</sup> 269.II.30). Dieitrephes' role in the honors bestowed upon Oeniades shows that

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<sup>26</sup> Isaac (1986: 289-292) discusses, among other things, the high level of religious and cultural assimilation between Greeks and Thracians in the *poleis* of the North Aegean and the need for cooperation between the two peoples in order for the Greek settlements to be successful. Owen (2000) presents the possibility that the Greek settlers of Thasos respected and adopted pre-existing Thracian cult practices on the island, implying some level of assimilation and co-habitation.

<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, see Thrasybulus' activities as an agent of the democracy in the north, particularly at Thasos: below, ch. 4.

he was still involved in the affairs of the Thraceward area in 409/8, after democracy had been restored in Athens. Evidently he continued to be concerned with maintaining his connections in the north Aegean, and his work on behalf of Oeniades, securing for him *proxenos* status among other privileges in Athens, was conducted with that end in mind.<sup>28</sup> Dieitrephe's ability to thrive in both democratic and oligarchic climates speaks either to his skill as a politician, to his indispensability as a leader, or both.

I should add a final note on the statue of Dieitrephe on the Acropolis seen by Pausanias (1.23.3-4). There is debate among scholars as to whether this statue actually represented the elder Dieitrephe and Pausanias simply got it wrong because the younger was the more famous figure.<sup>29</sup> As mentioned, recent epigraphic studies of the extant statue base suggest that the inscription which mentions the dedicator Hermolycus son of Dieitrephe, as well as the sculptor Cresilas, can be dated to the end of the fifth century instead of the middle of the century as had been previously thought.<sup>30</sup> The later date could indeed correspond to the younger Dieitrephe. The most interesting aspect of this statue is that we are told it depicted a man pierced by arrows. Pausanias is at a loss to explain this, adding that among the Greeks only the Cretans are known for their use of the bow. Pliny the Elder attributed to Cresilas a famous work of High Classical sculpture, called the *volneratus deficiens*, which depicted a mortally wounded man (HN 34.74). This piece, which may be the very

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<sup>28</sup> See Walbank 1978: 444-448. For a parallel, see Axiochus, the uncle of Alcibiades, honoring the people of Neapolis in 407: below, ch. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Stevens 1936; Dinsmoor 1942: 163-164; Vanderpool 1968.

<sup>30</sup> For a thorough bibliography on the debate, see Keesling 2004. Keesling, appealing to the difficulty inherent in using letter forms to accurately date dedicatory inscriptions, and examining parallel inscriptions mentioning Kresilas, convincingly argues for a date of 410-400.



sculpture of Dieitrephes seen by Pausanias, is represented by several extant Roman copies depicting a hoplite pierced by arrows.

While it is true that archers were not a particularly prominent part of Greek armies, they were a mainstay in the armies of other peoples, particularly the Scythians and also the Thracians. Archaeological evidence attests to the bow being, along with the javelin, a key weapon for the Thracians as many arrowheads have been found in Thracian tombs.<sup>31</sup> The northern Thracian tribes, such as the Getai, were armed much like the Scythians, that is, as mounted archers (Thuc. 2.96.1). Thucydides' account of the battle at Pylos in 425 tells us that Cleon led a force of light armed troops that included peltasts from Thrace via Ainus as well as many archers from foreign lands (4.28.4).<sup>32</sup> It is reasonable to assume that some at least of these archers were Thracians. Thucydides' remark that the Thracian ships had been anchored out of bowshot (ἔξω τοξεύματος, 7.30.2) during the Mycalessus attack suggests that arrows were flying in the engagement, although admittedly this need only imply that the Thebans were using them. It is tempting to see in this statue an image of Dieitrephes hoisted by his own petard, killed by the type of barbarous soldier with whom he habitually consorted. One thinks of Cleon, that notorious leader of light-armed troops who elicited so much scorn from the Spartans, killed by a Myrcinian peltast at the Battle of Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.10.9). After Dieitrephes proposed the decree in honor of his friend in 409/8 we hear nothing more about him. This statue indicates that he continued in his role as a soldier, most likely among barbarians.

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<sup>31</sup> Archibald 1998: 203.

<sup>32</sup> See Isaac (1986: 153) for Ainus as a mustering point for Athens' mercenary peltast forces.

### *Dieitrephes' Thracians*

The specific group of Thracians over whom Dieitrephes was given command in 413 was made up of members of a tribe known as the Dioi. As can be found in Thucydides 2.96, this was a tribe of mountain dwelling Thracians who lived mostly in the Rhodope range in what is today southern Bulgaria. The Rhodope Mountains are extremely rugged and inaccessible, containing the highest peaks in the Balkans, averaging over 1800 meters and punctuated by deep valleys. Climatically, this area is distinct in its harshness from the neighboring Aegean coast and Thracian plain.<sup>33</sup> The ease with which the Dioi were able to achieve surprise at Mycalessus by ascending a mountain pass at night reflects their mountainous homeland. Thucydides calls the Dioi “autonomous,” meaning they had no type of wider state organization or leadership beyond the tribal, and more particularly that they were not under the sway of the Odrysian kingdom which then held power over much of southern Thrace. It is a prevalent trope throughout ancient (and for that matter, modern) literature that those dwelling in mountainous regions are often the most warlike and fearsome of all peoples, nearly impossible to subdue and rule over. Countless examples suggest that this trope is not without merit. The inability of the mighty Odrysian kings to extend their influence over those inhabiting the rugged terrain of the Rhodope range attests further to the wild and lawless nature of such tribes.

While describing the huge force accompanying the Thracian king Sitalces in his expedition against Macedonia in 429/8, Thucydides calls the Dioi the most warlike

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<sup>33</sup> Archibald 1998: 12.

(μαχιμώτατοι) of the Thracians. By means of a μέν . . . δέ clause they are placed in stark contrast to the rest of the horde (ὄμιλος ξύμμεικτος) which is fearsome only because of sheer numbers (2.98.4). This is a morally dubious distinction to say the least, but the reader is left with no doubt as to the sheer ferocity and military prowess of the tribe. A further indication of this tribe's bellicosity is that whereas Sitalces needed to persuade some of them to come by offering them pay as mercenaries, others came of their own free will (Thuc. 96.2).<sup>34</sup> Best explains this desire to join in the expedition as rooted in the prospect of plunder. The Dioi, he argues, suffered in extreme poverty and thus jumped at the chance to enrich themselves through a military expedition.<sup>35</sup> I would posit that a fondness for warfare and all the adventure and pillaging it entails should not be ruled out as a motivating factor. Otherwise, why did many of the Dioi not hold out for wages as well? Presumably those paid by Sitalces would have had just as much opportunity for plunder as those volunteering for service.

In Thucydides the Dioi are further distinguished as sword-bearers, or μάχαιοφόροι (2.96.2; 7.27.1). A Thracian μάχαιρα can be best described as an inverted scimitar, that is, a curved sword suited for slashing and hacking, a truly terrible weapon of which several survive and are on display in Bulgarian museums.<sup>36</sup> The Dioi, however, were perfectly capable of fighting in the peltast manner as well. While retreating from Mycalessus, Thucydides describes the Thracians employing the

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<sup>34</sup> “καὶ τοὺς μὲν μισθῷ ἐπειθεν, οἱ δ’ ἐθέλονται ξυνηκολούθουν.”

<sup>35</sup> Best 1969: 133.

<sup>36</sup> Archibald (1998: 202) argues that in the Classical period, a Thracian μάχαιρα referred to the curved dagger native to the region, significantly smaller than a slashing sword. I question whether such a small weapon could have served as the primary offensive arm, as indicated by the epithet μάχαιοφόροι, and whether the dagger which was common kit among many Thracian peoples would have so distinguished the Dioi from other Thracians. See Best (1968: pl. 5) for a Thracian μάχαιρα.

tactics of their native land (ἐν ἐπιχωρίῳ τάξει) against the Theban cavalry, namely swarming out in detachments and then falling back into mass formation (προεκθέοντές τε καὶ ξυστρεφόμενοι), presumably with javelins (7.30.2). By utilizing these tactics, which are exactly those employed by peltasts, the Dioi performed quite well against the Thebans, losing but a few men. It would appear that while rampaging through the town, encountering men, women and children helpless and unawares, the Dioi opted to use the weapon for which they were famed and undoubtedly feared, hacking and slashing their way through Mycalessus with ease, while ready to employ more suitable weapons and tactics against the Theban cavalry.

Thucydides seems impressed with the martial skill of the Dioi. Most of the 250 Thracians that were killed were struck down while trying to embark on their ships since they did not know how to swim and those manning the ships had anchored them out of bowshot (ἔξω τοξεύματος). As mentioned above, others were killed due to their negligence while looting the town (7.30.2). Those that did stand and fight, utilizing coordinated peltast tactics, lost only a few of their own men while killing several Theban hoplites and horsemen, including one of the Boeotarchs. The expression Thucydides employs to describe the Thracians' performance in the orderly retreat is οὐκ ἀτόπως, or "not in an unaccustomed manner," which is clarified by the historian's account of the tactics of their native land. The translations of this passage typically render οὐκ ἀτόπως as "very creditably" (Warner), "a respectable defense" (Crawley), and "a very fair defense" (Jowett).<sup>37</sup> The scholiast to this passage explains

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<sup>37</sup> Warner and Finley 1972 (1954); Crawley 1903; Jowett 1900.

οὐκ ἀτόπως as οὐκ ἀκόσως, or “not in a disorderly way”.

These renderings miss Thucydides’ intended meaning. The LSJ, citing this specific passage, defines ἀτόπως as “marvelously” or “absurdly”, but I believe we can arrive at a more specific definition. While this is the only adverbial use of the word in Thucydides, there are four instances of the adjective. ἀτόπον is used to describe the strange or unnatural breath of sufferers of the plague (2.49.3). Continuing the description of the plague, Thucydides says he will pass over the peculiarities, ἀτοπίας, of individual cases (2.51.1). During the Mytilenian Debate τῶν ἀτόπων, “newfangled” or “unaccustomed” things, are contrasted with τῶν εἰωθότων, or “customary” and “usual” things (3.38.5). And finally, in his horrific description of the *stasis* at Corcyra and the effect it had on the rest of the Greek world, Thucydides notes that people seeking revenge contrived ever more novel devices, τεχνήσει . . . ἀτοπία, to use against their foes (3.82.4). Thus, Thucydides employs this word to denote something which is strange, unaccustomed, or unusual.

In the context of the Thracians’ retreat at 7.30.2, I would render οὐκ ἀτόπως as follows: “In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians fought in a *not unaccustomed* manner”, in other words, they fought *exactly how one would expect them to*. The way Thucydides would have expected them to fight is explained by the description of their native tactics and by the loss of only a few fighters. It is those who were killed while looting the town and trying to embark on their ships that are the exception rather than the rule. As in the use of the adjective μαχιμώτατοι, Thucydides is again passing

favorable judgment on, at the very least, the formidable martial *skill* of the Dioi. That these were the fighters placed under Dieitrephe's command suggests a connection between his family and not merely the Thracians in general, but to this specific group of fearsome and talented warriors.<sup>38</sup>

There are very few references in our sources to the Dioi and more field work needs to be done in the Rhodope range to shed light on settlements there. Mention is made in several places of two other important tribes inhabiting the same area, namely the Satrai and Bessoi, with whom the Dioi were likely connected.<sup>39</sup> In any case, the Dioi probably shared many characteristics with their better known mountain-dwelling neighbors. The Satrai appear in Hecataeus (FGrHist 1 F 157) and also figure prominently in Herodotus' description of Xerxes' invasion route (7.110-113). Herodotus says that the Satrai were the only tribe of the Thracians that Xerxes was unable to subject to himself, adding that they remained to his own day the only Thracians that had never been subject to anyone. The reason for this is the nature of their home terrain, namely thickly wooded and snow-covered mountains. Also, they are said by the historian to be surpassing in the arts of war (τὰ πολέμια ἄκροι). The similarity to Thucydides' description of the Dioi is manifest. Seemingly at odds with their designation as ferocious inhabitants of the mountains, the Satrai are also said by Herodotus to have been the most prominent tribe in exploiting the gold and silver

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<sup>38</sup> The name "Dieitrephe's," being quite rare, is striking in its similarity to the Greek form of the tribal name "Dioi." I asked Cornell linguistics professor Alan Nussbaum whether or not Dieitrephe's could possibly mean "nurtured by the Dioi" rather than simply being another form of "Diotrephe's," or "nurtured by Zeus." Dr. Nussbaum is skeptical whether any connection such as the former exists here, and thinks the latter case is far more likely. In any case, it is interesting to ponder whether or not Dieitrephe's contemporaries would have punned on his name and connection to the Dioi.

<sup>39</sup> Archibald (1998: 109) notes the attestation of the tribal name "Diobessoi." See Plin. *NH* 4.40.

mines of Pangaeum.

Herodotus says that the Bessoι, according to him a branch of Satrai, were responsible for an oracle of Dionysus, located on the highest of their mountains. Herodotus' description indicates that this oracle was well known to the Greeks.<sup>40</sup> Strabo mentions the Bessoι as an independent tribe inhabiting the region from the Rhodope range to the Illyrian frontier (7.5). He says that the tribes in this region are of all peoples the most prone to brigandage (ληστροικώτατα ἔθνη), but that the Bessoι are called brigands even by the other brigands (καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ληστών λησταὶ προσαγορεύονται). Strabo rounds out his description with the detail that the Bessoι live in huts (καλυβῖται) and lead a wretched life (λυπρόβιοι). Aeschylus, in the *Persae* (869-870), calls the dwellings of the Thracians ἐπαύλοι. An ἐπαυλος usually describes a fold for cattle, whereas ἔπαυλις can denote a farm-building, crude country dwelling, an army camp, or even an open unfortified village. A crude dwelling of some sort seems to be implied. An inscription found near Vetren in Bulgaria, dating from the fourth century, mentions ἐπαυλισταί, a *hapax* that may either mean encamping soldiers or hut-dwellers.<sup>41</sup> It is clear that the Thracians, especially those living in mountainous regions, lived in rough structures. Finally, these rugged mountain men were said by Valerius Flaccus to be massive in stature (*immanes...Bessi*, 2.229).

Herodotus' comments on the oracle of Dionysus in the Rhodope range may

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<sup>40</sup> How and Wells 1912: vol. 2, 168.

<sup>41</sup> Domaradzka 2002: 341.

give us an idea of the religious and cultural character of the above-mentioned tribes, including the Dioi. That this oracle was famous in antiquity is evinced by Suetonius, who says that it predicted Octavian's rise to power, as it had for Alexander the Great (*Aug.* 64). Recent excavations undertaken by a Bulgarian team at a site in the eastern Rhodope Mountains called Perperikon suggest that the place of the oracle may have been found.<sup>42</sup> According to the archaeologists, the site was used for cult practices as far back as the Neolithic period, and finds from the Late Bronze and Iron Ages are abundant. Most interesting are a series of small clay altars and a large open hall with a round altar in its center. The area around Perperikon is littered with troughs and basins, which some archaeologists have equated with wine-making facilities for ritual purposes. According to the excavators, there is also evidence for the practice of Orphic ritual, traditionally connected to Dionysiac worship. All of this points to a cult center, and the location coupled with what appears to be wine related activity evince Dionysiac activities. Increasingly elaborate structures were built on the site into the Roman period, suggesting continuity of religious activity.

Certainly the deities worshipped at such sites by Thracians for several centuries and even millennia before extensive contact with the Greeks were not the exact manifestations of Dionysus and Orpheus that we see in Classical sources. But the nature of the cult practices resembled Orphic and Bacchic rites enough to lead the Greeks to postulate a connection. It was widely held among the Greeks that Dionysus

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<sup>42</sup> The site's official website, sponsored by the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture, is the only comprehensive source on the excavations currently available: [www.perperikon.bg](http://www.perperikon.bg), accessed on July 2, 2010.



had Thracian origins and held a special place in Thracian religious practices.<sup>43</sup>

Orpheus as well had ties to Thrace, and it was ultimately a band of frenzied Thracian women that killed him with an assortment of Thracian weapons.<sup>44</sup> Depictions of both figures in Attic vase-painting nearly without exception highlight their barbarian, and specifically Thracian, attributes.<sup>45</sup> The Dioi, therefore, may have routinely engaged in the cult practices that the Greeks equated with savage and barbaric religion *par excellence*, namely orgiastic frenzies and wanton sexuality. As noted above, Dieitrephe's relative Nicostratus who led a group of Thracians was slandered as a superstitious lover of sacrifices.

### ***Precedents for Working with the Dioi***

Scholars have suggested that the Dioi, along with the Satrai, Bessoï, and other mountain tribes, had common customs, shared the worship of Dionysus, and discouraged foreign influences.<sup>46</sup> How did Athens come to acquire the services of these autonomous and lawless fighters in 413? Who made the necessary arrangements? If we trace Athenian activities in the region during the decades preceding Mycalessus, we see that several prominent figures, most notably Hagnon,

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<sup>43</sup> In the ancient sources, see for example Hdt. 5.7. Fol and Ivanova (1993) collect all the sources for the "Thracian Dionysus". See also Jeanmaire 1951: 99-100.

<sup>44</sup> Guthrie 1952: 25-68. See 64, n.6 for a comprehensive list of the visual sources depicting the death of Orpheus at the hands of Thracian women.

<sup>45</sup> See, for example, an Attic red-figure vase from the mid fifth century, now in Berlin, depicting Orpheus charming a group of Thracians equipped as peltasts: Guthrie 1952: pl. 6; also discussed by Lissarrague 1990a: 210-211. Lissarrague (161-177) discusses the portrayal of satyrs and other elements linked to Bacchic cult as Thracians. He concludes that this imagery was meant to convey the savagery of Thrace.

<sup>46</sup> As Archibald (1998: 110) points out, the Satrai's dominance of the mines at Pangaeum, coupled with the distribution of both Greek and Thracian coins throughout the Rhodope range and beyond, suggests some sort of interaction with the Greeks. The coins, of course, could be as much from raiding and theft as from legitimate economic contacts with the Greek world.

had gained experience with such troops and could have acted as liaisons between Athens and those providing mercenary services.

In the sixth century, Pisistratus gained a great deal of wealth and managed to hire mercenaries from the Pangaeum region, with whom he took control of Athens for the third and final time. The famously hardy and warlike Satrai who worked the mines at Pangaeum would have provided the perfect force for one wishing to strong-arm his way into power. The Philaids, from the elder Miltiades to the younger Cimon had of course numerous ties to Thrace and had experience with Thracian soldiers. The younger Miltiades' father-in-law Olorus was probably from the region near Thasos, and Cimon might have encountered some of these mountain-dwellers during his campaign in 476 to capture Eion for the Athenians. Eion is located at the mouth of the Strymon River that extends north to the interior of Thrace, just west of the Rhodope range. In 465, an abortive Athenian attempt to settle upriver from Eion met with fierce resistance at Drabescus at the hands of local Thracians, a force that might have included some of these autonomous tribes.<sup>47</sup>

After Cimon's activities on Thasos and its environs in the mid 460's, it is unclear what ties Athens continued to have with this region of Thrace. There was probably a continued Athenian presence at Eion and also on the mainland opposite Thasos, as indicated by Thucydides' interests there.<sup>48</sup> Plutarch tells us of an expedition of Pericles to the Chersonese in 447, in which he restored the wall of Miltiades and drove out the marauding Thracians (*Per.* 19.1-2), but we hear nothing of

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<sup>47</sup> Thucydides refers to a force of combined Thracians that destroyed this Athenian colonization effort (4.102). Herodotus, though, refers only to Edonians (9.75). See Isaac 1986: 25-26.

<sup>48</sup> Isaac 1986: 31-34.

Athenian activities in the central part of the northern Aegean for several years.<sup>49</sup>

In 431, Athens resorted to the traditional instrument of proxeny to establish an alliance with Sitalces. In a very detailed account, Thucydides tells us that Nymphodorus of Abdera, who had given his sister in marriage to Sitalces, was made an Athenian *proxenos* and acted as the negotiator between Athens and the Odrysian king (1.29).<sup>50</sup> Through Nymphodorus' agency, Sitalces' son Sadocus was brought to Athens and made an Athenian citizen in order to cement the alliance. Courting Sitalces' favor might also have been partially behind the public adoption of the cult of Bendis at this time.<sup>51</sup> The Odrysians were persuaded to send cavalry and peltasts to aid Athens in the Thraceward region. Nymphodorus also arranged an alliance between Athens and Perdiccas of Macedon, whereby Athens restored Therme to the Macedonians and the Macedonians in turn aided the admiral Phormio in an expedition to the Chalcidice. Thucydides is unusually explicit in recording the Athenian motives in these dealings, due likely to his own interest and expertise in the region. Hornblower wonders whether Thucydides actually had a hand in encouraging the Athenians to ally with Sitalces.<sup>52</sup> That Thucydides was in favor of an Odrysian alliance would explain his unusual polemic aimed at correcting Athenian misconceptions of Sitalces' father Teres who had been slandered as a descendant of

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<sup>49</sup> For the date of Pericles' expedition, based on the evidence of tribute lists and a list of Athenian casualties, see Meiggs 1972: 159-161.

<sup>50</sup> See also Hdt. 7.137 who says that Nymphodorus had captured Spartan envoys to Asia and sent them to Athens where they were executed. This is also related by Thucydides (2.67), but with no mention of Nymphodorus' involvement. For Nymphodorus' proxeny and the alliance between Athens and Sitalces, see Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 2, 89-90; Walbank 1978: 167-168; Isaac 1986: 99-104; Hornblower 1991-2008: vol.1, 284-289; Archibald 1998: 118.

<sup>51</sup> See above, ch. 1.

<sup>52</sup> Hornblower 1991-2008: vol. 1, 286.

the savage Tereus.<sup>53</sup>

The use of Nymphodorus as an agent in Thrace appears to be the exception rather than the rule for Athens during this period. In Thucydides' history, Nymphodorus is the only Athenian *proxenos* in Thrace of any consequence.<sup>54</sup> Instead, much more emphasis is given to the activities of Athenians in the Thraceward region, men such as Alcibiades and Thucydides himself. Proxeny is usefully defined by Hornblower as a consular arrangement whereby a citizen of city A looked after the interests of city B in city A. It was largely a public variant of the *xenia* relationships that existed between notables throughout the Greek world.<sup>55</sup> Though the institution of proxeny was already old and well established by the time of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian Thrace-haunters were responsible for a majority of Athenian diplomatic gains in the north.<sup>56</sup> For example, though Athens had *proxenoi* in such northern places as Sciathus and Selymbria, these men seem to have been connected personally to Athenians with interests in the area, respectively Dieitrephes and Alcibiades.<sup>57</sup> In spite of the role played by Nymphodorus in initiating the alliance between Athens and Sitalces, soon certain Athenian individuals would deal directly with the Odrysian king.

An Athenian connection to the Dioi, perhaps even to some of those who accompanied Dieitrephes, was made in 429/8. Sitalces made preparations to invade Macedonia at the head of a massive coalition of tribes. Along with him, he brought

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<sup>53</sup> Gomme et al. (1945-1981: vol. 2, 90) suggests that Thucydides aimed at correcting Hellanicus, and perhaps Sophocles.

<sup>54</sup> As Hornblower (1991-2008: vol. 1, 285) points out, only five of the ninety-four fifth century Athenian *proxenoi* collected by Walbank (1978) are mentioned by Thucydides.

<sup>55</sup> Hornblower 1991-2008: vol. 1, 285.

<sup>56</sup> For the history and origins of proxeny, see Wallace 1970.

<sup>57</sup> Oeniades as Sciathus is honored as a *proxenos* of Athens in a decree proposed by Dieitrephes. See Walbank 1978: 444-448. Apollodorus of Selymbria is similarly honored in a decree proposed by Alcibiades. See Walbank 1978: 432-444; and below, ch. 4.

Amyntas son of Philip, intending to put him on Perdiccas' throne. He was also accompanied by several Athenian ambassadors who happened to be in the area, and the Athenian Hagnon who was to act as commander (ἡγέμων). For their part, the Athenians were to send a fleet and as many troops as possible to aid Sitalces in subduing the Chalcideans (Thuc. 2.95). The Athenians never made good on their promise of added support, but so far as we can tell the Athenian ambassadors went along with Sitalces and Hagnon did act as a military leader for the invasion. The Dioi had come down from the Rhodope range to serve as prominent members of this army, comprising the most fearsome contingent in the infantry (Thuc. 2.96.2; 98.4). In 429/8, then, Hagnon was placed in command of a Thracian infantry force that included the Dioi.

Hagnon was chosen for this task because of his own Thracian connections. In 437/6 he was sent out as the leader of an expedition to the Strymon River to found a colony where several other attempts had failed. In 497, Aristagoras of Miletus went to Thrace after the Persians had recalled his uncle and father-in-law Histiaeus from the region. After conquering the territory of Myrcinus on the Strymon, Aristagoras was killed by Edonian Thracians, probably at the site known as Ennea Hodoi, or Nine Ways (Hdt. 124; 126; Thuc. 4.102; Diod. 12.68.1-2). In 465, at the time Cimon was putting down the revolt on Thasos and acquiring territory for Athens on the mainland opposite, an Athenian expedition of 10 000 settlers was sent to the site of Ennea Hodoi. The leaders of this venture were the Athenians Sophanes and Leagros. Our sources tell us that this group, along with its leaders, was massacred by a force of Thracians, mostly Edonians, at the nearby Thracian site of Drabescus (Hdt. 9.75;

Thuc. 4.102; Diod. 12.68; Paus. 1.29-4-5).<sup>58</sup> The site of Ennea Hodoi was very advantageous, occupying an elevated position surrounded on three sides by the Strymon.<sup>59</sup> But the major attempts to settle it by the mid fifth century had met with bloody failure at the hands of the local Thracians. Hagnon, however, succeeded in founding a lasting Greek city in 437/6, which he named Amphipolis.

After giving a brief synopsis of the history of the site, Thucydides describes Hagnon's foundation. From their base at Eion on the coast, which had been earlier established by Cimon, the Athenians drove (ἐξελάσαντες) the Edonians out of the area. Hagnon named the new city, three miles from the port at Eion, Amphipolis because it was surrounded on both sides by the river. He built the city in such a way that it was conspicuous (περιφανής) from land and sea, and he planned to fortify it with a long wall stretching from one portion of the river to the other (τείχει μακρῷ ἀπολαβὼν ἐκ ποταμοῦ ἐς ποταμόν, Thuc. 4.102). Athenian citizens formed the backbone of the new settlement's garrison, but a majority of the population was non-Athenian, mostly from the nearby city of Argilus (Thuc. 4.103.5, 106; Diod. 12.68.3).<sup>60</sup> We do not know why Hagnon was specifically chosen to lead this venture. He was already prominent, having been an Athenian general at Samos in 440/39 (Thuc. 1.116-117.1), and Cratinus calls him an ἀρχαίοπλουτος (F 171 K-A), but it

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<sup>58</sup> For this settlement attempt and the battle at Drabescus, see Isaac 1986: 24-30. For more on Leagros, who may have had his own Thracian connections prior to leading this mission, see above, ch. 2.

<sup>59</sup> For the topography, see Pritchett 1965-1992: vol. 3, 298-346. In point of fact, Ennea Hodoi might have been situated on Hill 133, just slightly to the north of the later Amphipolis.

<sup>60</sup> For Hagnon's settlement and the city's population, including the relative civic status of the Athenians and non-Athenians, see Isaac 1986: 36-40. It seems that all were citizens, but that the Athenians may have formed a separate group among themselves. Certainly the loyalty of those from Argilus to the Athenians was weak, as they eagerly handed the city over to Brasidas (Thuc. 4.103).

is unclear whether he had prior Thracian connections. Most scholars assume that the colonization of Amphipolis was part of Pericles' overall expansionist policy, but it is uncertain to what extent Hagnon and Pericles were political allies.<sup>61</sup>

Why did Hagnon succeed at Amphipolis? Archibald argues that he must have come to some sort of arrangement with the neighboring Edonians to prevent attacks against the city. Previous ventures had been viewed by the area's Thracians as hostile incursions, and Hagnon sought to remedy that.<sup>62</sup> One way this could have been accomplished was by seeking common cultural and religious ground with the local population. Isaac and Archibald both insist that the worship of Rhesus by the Greeks at Amphipolis was a way to do just that.<sup>63</sup> Polyaeus says that it was Hagnon who established the cult, bringing the bones of Rhesus to Amphipolis from the Troad (6.53). Shrewd diplomacy probably played a role in cementing alliances with the Thracians. Cimon had made inroads nearby, and several Athenians such as Thucydides had connections in the area.<sup>64</sup> Many local Thracians would eventually be allies of Athens, such as the Edonian king in Myrcinus, Pittacus, who had to be murdered before his city was handed over to Brasidas (Thuc. 4.107). Hagnon's military mettle, though, was equally important to his success. Thucydides' emphasis is on Hagnon driving the Edonians from the region and encircling the city with fortifications. In the case of the bones of Rhesus too, Polyaeus describes Hagnon as tricking the Thracians into a brief truce which let him cross the river with the bones

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<sup>61</sup> Isaac (1986: 36) calls the colonization of Amphipolis Pericles' "most ambitious project in the north Aegean." For questions surrounding the supposed alliance between Hagnon and Pericles, see Pesely 1989: 198-203.

<sup>62</sup> Archibald 1998: 117.

<sup>63</sup> Isaac 1986: 55-58; Archibald 1998: 101.

<sup>64</sup> See Isaac (1986: 31-33) for Athens' influence in the area even after the defeat at Drabscus.

and also construct his defensive works.<sup>65</sup> This hardly indicates that relations with the locals were always amicable.

What of the city's defenses? As Amphipolis sits upon a hill surrounded on the north, west, and south by a bend in the Strymon, many scholars have attempted to reconstruct the plan of the long wall mentioned by Thucydides as essentially forming a 2500 meter arc from north to south, totally closing the city off from the land to the east towards Pangaeum.<sup>66</sup> This would seem to suit Thucydides' description. Pritchett, investigating the remains of the wall excavated in the 1970's by Lazaridis and drawing extensively on Thucydides' text, suggests that Hagnon had intended to encircle the city and construct a long wall that extended out from the enclosure wall and down to the river. But, the planned long wall was not completed when Brasidas attacked in 424, and the city was defended only by a 2220 meter inner enclosure wall. To be sure, this enclosure was rather extensive and impressive in its own right.<sup>67</sup> The excavator Lazaridis, however, argues that the material evidence indicates the city was encircled on all sides by a massive set of enclosure walls even in Hagnon's time. According to Lazaridis' plan, the wall circuit was about 7450 meters in length, with a smaller enclosure for the citadel of 2220 meters. He compares the enclosure at Amphipolis to the massive areas within the fourth century fortifications at Messene and Megalopolis. According to Lazaridis, Amphipolis was so extensively fortified to protect the resources of the region, including much of the arable *chora* outside of the citadel

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<sup>65</sup> See Pesely (1989: 196-197) who sees no reason to doubt the story in its essentials.

<sup>66</sup> For the standard reconstruction of the fortifications, see Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3, 574 and map facing 654.

<sup>67</sup> Pritchett 1965-1992: vol. 3, 304-314.



proper, and to enforce a unity among the disparate inhabitants of the new colony.<sup>68</sup>

In spite of the discrepancies in the various reconstructions of the Hagnonian fortifications, it remains clear that comprehensive fortifications were envisioned by the city's founder and that the result was impressive. In addition to being a skilled leader of soldiers, evinced by his ability to expel the Thracians from the region and by his special appointment to lead Sitalces' troops in 429/8, Hagnon protected Amphipolis with defensive works of nearly unparalleled scale. In doing so, he seems to have safeguarded not only the city itself, but much of its territory. In this way, he kept the Edonians at bay, and even Brasidas was only able to take the city through the treachery of the non-Athenian inhabitants (4.106). Like the elder Miltiades, who had protected the people and territory of the Chersonese by means of a unique barrier wall, Hagnon relied on extensive fortification to safeguard his gains on the Strymon from attacks of the Edonians and other Thracians. His military skill, probably coupled with a sharp instinct for diplomacy, enabled Hagnon to deal with the Thracians dwelling near Amphipolis more effectively than his predecessors had.

Hagnon remained prominent at Athens well after his success at Amphipolis. He was appointed to the board of *probouloi* in 413, a body created after the Sicilian Expedition meant to be a check on the excesses of democracy. His son Theramenes was a key player in the oligarchic coup of 411, in which Dieitrephes seems to have been involved, and also the overthrow of democracy in 404 (Lys. 12.65; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.30).<sup>69</sup> Theramenes, inheriting his father's northern connections, took part in the

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<sup>68</sup> Lazaridis 1986. For his plan of the walls, showing the excavated sections and his reconstructions, see Lazaridis 1997: 22-23.

<sup>69</sup> For a thorough study of Hagnon's life and career, see Pesely 1989.

Athenian campaigns in Thrace and the northern Aegean from 411-407.<sup>70</sup> Because Hagnon had led the Dioi in 429/8, it is attractive to see him as the connection through which the Athenians acquired the services of these mercenaries in later years. Hagnon had demonstrated an ability to command Thracian troops, and also in turn to fight against them and keep hostile incursions at bay. We might conjecture that he imparted some of his acquired tactical sense to his fellow Athenian commanders, namely Demosthenes and Dieitrephes.

Thucydides tells us that the Dioi who arrived in Athens in 413 were originally intended to serve with Demosthenes in Sicily. This general had used light-armed troops, including Thracians, before and was keenly aware of their usefulness. His tactical ingenuity is widely acknowledged by scholars.<sup>71</sup> He seems to have developed his talents in response to a crushing defeat at the hands of light-armed Aetolians in 427/6 (Thuc. 3.94-98). For his renowned victory at Pylos in 425, in which he captured the Spartans on the island of Sphacteria, he employed hundreds of peltasts, archers, and slingers, troops which utterly confounded the Spartan hoplites (Thuc. 4.32-33). It was Cleon that had brought these troops from Athens to reinforce Demosthenes.

Thucydides tells us that Cleon's force consisted of soldiers of unspecified type from Imbros and Lemnos, peltasts from Aenus, and 400 archers from other locations (4.28).

Imbros and Lemnos had been captured and granted to Athens by the younger

Miltiades while he was in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.141), and Aenus seems to have

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<sup>70</sup> See below, ch. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Best (1969: 17-29) gives Demosthenes pride of place as the leader who singlehandedly introduced peltast tactics to the Athenians. Best does not seem to think that Pisistratus' Thracians or any of the Athenians who had contact with Thrace during the period between Pisistratus' tyranny and Demosthenes' generalships had any measurable impact on Athenian military practices. For a comprehensive treatment of Demosthenes' use of ambush and surprise, see Roisman (1993), who, I should note, is not overly impressed with his generalship and use of light troops at Sphacteria (39-40).

served as a mustering point for Thracian mercenaries entering the service of Athens.<sup>72</sup> Cleon deliberately selected Demosthenes as his fellow commander (4.29), and many scholars have conjectured that Demosthenes and Cleon were working together to effect a prearranged plan to use light troops in the battle against the Spartans.<sup>73</sup> In the capable and experienced hands of Demosthenes, the fearsome Dioi could have been very effective in Sicily in 413.

Cleon himself might have had Thracian ties through one Theorus. In the *Acharnians* produced in 425, Aristophanes portrays Theorus as an Athenian envoy to Thrace leading a group of Odomantoi to Athens (153-156). Theorus proudly declares his group of Thracians to be the most warlike of all (μαχιμώτατον). We learn from Herodotus that they mined Pangaeum along with the Satrai (7.112). Although it is implied in the play that the Odomantoi were subject to Sitalces, Thucydides says they were an independent tribe dwelling beyond the Strymon in the plains (2.101.3).<sup>74</sup> Archibald, following Hammond, locates them in the southernmost foothills of the Rhodope range.<sup>75</sup> This places them very near the home of the Dioi and other mountain tribes, and their designation as independent and warlike would indicate a similarity in character to Dieitrephe's men. Perhaps Theorus was among the Athenian ambassadors that took part in Sitalces' invasion of 429/8.

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<sup>72</sup> For Lemnos and Imbros, see Scott 2005: 452-454. For Aenus, see Isaac 1986: 153. Gomme et al. (1945-1981: vol. 3, 469) believes that the manuscript reading for this passage of Thucydides (4.28.4) cannot be retained, and after ἔκ τε Αἴνου we should understand a lacuna of the type καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Θοάκης. If this emendation is right, other Thracian suppliers of troops would be indicated.

<sup>73</sup> For the notion that Demosthenes planned his entire strategy at Pylos around the use of light-armed troops, see: Woodcock 1928:101; Stahl 1966: 151; Best 1969: 21; Hunter 1973: 72; Hornblower 1991-2008: vol. 2, 189. That Demosthenes and Cleon worked together on a prearranged plan, see Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3, 486; Kagan 1974: 242; van de Maele 1980: 121-124; Rhodes 1998: 229; Lazenby 2004: 75.

<sup>74</sup> Olson 2002: 120.

<sup>75</sup> Archibald 1998: 85-86, n. 35.

Aristophanes portrays Theorus in several passages, especially throughout the *Wasps*, as a close political associate of Cleon and a fellow demagogue.<sup>76</sup> We know little about Theorus outside of these two plays, but there is no reason to suspect his connection to the Odomatoi or to Cleon. In 422, Cleon, perhaps relying on his connection to Theorus, made a special appeal to the Odomantian king Polles for mercenaries to help in retaking Amphipolis from Brasidas (Thuc. 5.6.2). Unfortunately for Cleon, the issue was forced before these mercenary troops arrived. The Athenians were defeated by Brasidas, and Cleon himself was killed by one of the Spartan's mercenary peltasts (Thuc. 5.10.9). In spite of Thucydides' derogatory portrayal of Cleon's activities surrounding the Pylos affair in 425 and the undignified manner of his death in 422, Cleon certainly seems to have had an appreciation for Thracian-style light troops.<sup>77</sup>

The evidence, then, indicates that Hagnon, Demosthenes, Cleon, and Dietrephes' close relative Nicostratus had all led Thracian troops during the Peloponnesian War before 413. Some of these troops were Dioi, and others were very similar to the Dioi in fighting style and geographic origin.

We know that there were extensive contacts between the Thracians and Greeks at this time, especially in the coastal Greek cities in the north Aegean and in the form

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<sup>76</sup> Olson 2002: 114

<sup>77</sup> Best (1969: 29-35), in discussing Cleon's campaign to retake Amphipolis from Brasidas, argues that Cleon might have been inspired by Demosthenes' use of light troops, but was himself an inferior leader unable to take full advantage of this new type of soldier. While Cleon may have been inferior to Demosthenes in terms of skill, he did have Thracian ties in his own right and might have been instrumental in securing light troops for Demosthenes in 425. In the end, Best goes too far in arguing that Demosthenes and his appreciation for light-armed troops existed in a vacuum. For Thucydides' unfair treatment of Cleon, see Woodhead 1960; but see also Spence (1995) who argues that Cleon might have been as much a failure as Thucydides portrays him to be. In either case, he understood the usefulness of Thracian mercenaries, though he might have failed to use them to their full effect.

of official diplomatic contacts with the upper echelons of the Odrysian court of Sitalces and his successors.<sup>78</sup> There is also evidence of contact and cultural and economic interchange between Greeks and Thracians deep in the interior of Thrace. Over the last couple of decades a site identified with the attested Greek *emporion* of Pistiros has been excavated by a joint team of Bulgarian, British, Czech, Polish and French archaeologists.<sup>79</sup> The *emporion*, flourishing in the fifth and fourth centuries, was officially founded in the mid fifth century on the site of a pre-existing center of tribal trade.<sup>80</sup> It is located near Vetren, on the northern foothills of the Rhodope Mountains and at the extreme eastern part of the Maritsa valley which was a key route between the Thracian plain and the Aegean. The Rhodope range and surrounding areas were rich in deposits of precious metals, and the Greeks chose the site of Pistiros because of its proximity to the sources of metal extraction as well as to important transport routes.<sup>81</sup> Pistiros was close to the home of the Dioi and the other independent mountain tribes.

The site is unique in that it is the only inland Greek center excavated to date in the heart of Thrace. As such, it affords an invaluable glimpse into the relationship between Greeks and Thracians. Excavations have demonstrated the presence of both peoples in the town. For example, Greek and Thracian names have been found as graffiti on pottery, and loom weights of a distinctly Thracian style were found.<sup>82</sup> There is evidence of religious integration among the inhabitants of Pistiros, as

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<sup>78</sup> See Danov 1976, esp. 175-221; Isaac 1986; Archibald 1998, esp. 93-125.

<sup>79</sup> See especially Bouzek, Domaradzki, et al. 1996; Bouzek, Domaradzka, et al. 2002.

<sup>80</sup> Domaradzka and Velkov 1994: 8.

<sup>81</sup> See Archibald (1998: 23) for a map of areas of metallurgical extraction in the area.

<sup>82</sup> Domaradzka 1996; Bouzek 2002: 347-348.

Thracian cult objects and altars have been discovered along with the attestation of Greek and Thracian divinities, especially Dionysus.<sup>83</sup> An inscription from the fourth century found nearby, likely originating from a successor to Cotys I, outlines some of the benefits afforded by the Odrysian king to the Greek merchants inhabiting Pistiros and other *emporía*, such as exemption from customs dues and guarantees of the preservation of their property.<sup>84</sup> The inscription, reflecting Thracian religious practices in its invocation of Dionysus, also deals with issues such as territorial disputes between Greeks and locals. After the founding of Pistiros, settlement in the area literally exploded, with several new sites emerging especially toward the mountains to better exploit the natural resources.<sup>85</sup> This bespeaks close relations among the Greeks and Thracians in the area at the edge of the Rhodope range.

There is some indication of a military relationship at Pistiros, both symbiotic and adversarial. Surely the Greeks would have had some sort of armed protection for an economic center in the heart of foreign territory. For one thing, the site was fortified in the third quarter of the fifth century with a curtain wall and tower that may have reached over six meters in height.<sup>86</sup> These defenses were strengthened in the fourth century. Although profitable contact was made with many of the Thracians in the area, there was still some danger of attack. The above-mentioned inscription demonstrates that the Odrysian rulers protected the Greek merchants at Pistiros, but that would have been no guarantee against attack from the independent tribes dwelling in the nearby mountains. In the town itself, some Thracian weapons including the

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<sup>83</sup> Lazov 1996; Domaradzka 1996; Domaradzki 2002: 18, 25;

<sup>84</sup> Domaradzka and Velkov 1994; Chankowski and Domaradzka 1999; Domaradzka 2002.

<sup>85</sup> Chankowski and Gotzev 2002: 276-278.

<sup>86</sup> Kolarova 1996.

heads from a spear and several arrows have been found on the main road.<sup>87</sup> Arrian, describing Alexander's campaigns in Thrace, says that the autonomous Thracians of Mt. Haemus banded together with many armed merchants (ἐμπόρων πολλοὶ ὀπλισμένοι) to oppose Alexander from the heights (1.1.6-7). These ἐμπόροι were most likely Greek inhabitants of *emporía* like Pistiros.<sup>88</sup> That the Greeks opted to fight along with the Thracians, and indeed to exploit the mountainous terrain to their advantage in a typically Thracian fashion, demonstrates that the Greeks and Thracians dwelling in the heart of the Balkans worked together militarily and learned from one another.

Dietrephes was not the first and certainly not the only Greek to deal with the Dioi and others like them. Though our sources describing Dietrephes' mission in 413 are regrettably sparse, we can speculate about some of the aspects of his command. The excavations at Pistiros and the accompanying inscription show that religious common ground was sought in Graeco-Thracian relations. The Greeks worshipped Dionysus, a god linked to Thrace and Thracian cult practices. The Dioi may have been especially connected to the worship of Dionysus since an important Dionysiac oracle was located in or near their territory. Dietrephes, like Nicostratus, could have taken part in the religious rites of his men and have been φιλοθύτης, either because of his own personal disposition or to build a better rapport with his troops.

Just as Greeks and Thracians had to find some way to communicate with one

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<sup>87</sup> Domaradzki 2002: 16.

<sup>88</sup> This is reading given by the manuscripts, although most scholars have emended the text to mean "natives" instead of merchants. In light of the discovery of Pistiros, and therefore Greek merchants, so deep in Thracian territory, the manuscript reading must be correct. See Domaradzka and Velkov 1994: 9.

another in *emporion*, either somebody acted as an interpreter between Dieitrephes and the Dioi, or Dieitrephes himself could speak their language. Another Athenian with close ties to Thrace, Alcibiades, was given a Thracian tutor named Zopyrus by his guardian Pericles (Plut. *Alc.* 1.22). Certainly this relationship paid dividends later in Alcibiades' career when he took refuge on his personal estates in Thrace and had under his command Thracian soldiers.<sup>89</sup> Thracian slaves were prevalent at Athens and could presumably teach people their language. There were several ways in which Dieitrephes could have learned to communicate with the Dioi. After all, his relative Nicostratus was connected to the Thracians.

From a military standpoint, Dieitrephes commanded his men in such a way as to complement their own style of warfare. As Thucydides says, it was Dieitrephes himself who led the Dioi across the Euripus after nightfall and took them to a mountain pass in the dark. Mountain warfare would have been the particular specialty of denizens of the Rhodope range. Swift lightly armed troops were especially suited to surprise assaults, and a position on a mountain overlooking the town of Mycalessus would have added greatly to the element of surprise, not to mention to the horror of any townspeople unfortunate enough to catch a glimpse of 1300 warriors hurtling towards their homes. Before 413 many Athenian generals had gained experience with the Dioi and other similar Thracian mercenaries. The Dioi were probably specifically selected because of their fearsome reputation. In spite of Thucydides' silence, it is difficult to believe that Dieitrephes, seemingly knowledgeable about his troops' fighting style and having spent several days with them as their commander, was

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<sup>89</sup> See below, chs. 4, 6.



unaware of their propensity for rapine and slaughter and the implications this would have had for the town of Mycalessus.

### ***The Athenian Perception of Dieitrephes***

The evidence indicates that a large segment of the elite in Athens approved of Dieitrephes and his command over the Dioi. What did the general Athenian population think of this friend of the Thracians? Dieitrephes is mentioned a few times in Old Comedy, particularly by Aristophanes in the *Birds*. In this play, Dieitrephes is presented as a typical swaggering soldier, rising from relative obscurity to becoming a φύλαρχος and ἑπάρχος, both prestigious military commands connected to the cavalry. He finally ends up as a “horsecock” (ἵππαλεκτρύων), representative of a haughty general (798-800).<sup>90</sup> Strangely, Dieitrephes is portrayed as *nouveau riche*, although the evidence regarding his family history suggests otherwise.<sup>91</sup> Later in the play, he is again connected to horsemanship, apparently persuading the young men of Athens to take up horse-riding (ἵππηλατεῖν, 1442-1443). The *Birds* was performed the year before the Mycalessus massacre, but already Dieitrephes had a reputation as an arrogant military man connected to the aristocratic branch of military service *par excellence*, the cavalry. The Athenian cavalry did have a special affinity for the Thracians.<sup>92</sup>

The slander against Dieitrephes’ supposedly humble origins presents a curious problem. The scholiast to these lines of Aristophanes attempts to clarify the poet’s

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<sup>90</sup>See *Peace* 1177 for a “horsecock” symbolizing an arrogant general.

<sup>91</sup>See also Connor 1971: 156-157.

<sup>92</sup>See above, ch. 2.

jokes, explaining Dieitrephes' trade as a maker of wicker jars before his lot in life improved. As evidence that he was a νεόπλουτος a line from a lost play of Aristophanes called the *Heroes* is quoted: "even from Dieitrephes' table."<sup>93</sup> The implication appears to be that Dieitrephes is so poor that his table, a symbol of one's wealth and lifestyle, is bare. Yet, the scholiast allows for the possibility that this line was meant to be ironic. If irony is intended, the line would be further confirmation of Dieitrephes' great wealth and luxurious living. The note also includes the information that everywhere Dieitrephes is depicted as a thief, a lowlife, and a busybody (ἄρπαξ καὶ πονηρὸς καὶ πολυπράγμων). Additionally, there is an intriguing quote from Plato Comicus. According to the scholiast, Plato Comicus in his play *Feasts* refers to Dieitrephes as a madman, a Cretan, and barely Athenian (τὸν μαινόμενον, τὸν Κρηῖτα, τὸν μόγις Ἀττικόν, F 30 K-A). In his play *Cheirones*, Cratinus, a slightly older contemporary of Aristophanes, has Dieitrephes hauled before the ναυτοδίκαι as one of three shameless brutes (κνώδαλ' ἀναιδῆ, F 251 K-A). The primary responsibility of the board of ναυτοδίκαι was to deal with cases involving foreigners, further evidence that Dieitrephes was labeled non-Athenian.

The epigraphic and literary sources confirm that Dieitrephes' family had been prominent for several generations as political and military leaders and even as athletes. Aristophanes' comments that suggest otherwise are tongue-in-cheek, a comic trope

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<sup>93</sup> "κάπο τῆς Διτρέφους τραπέζης."

used throughout his plays, which the scholiast seems not to have realized.<sup>94</sup> The fragments from Old Comedy give a glimpse into what the popular perception of this leader of Thracians was. To be sure, lines from the comic playwrights, men by no means representative of the general populace, are to be used with caution in determining how Athenians viewed Dieitrephes. But these slanders must be reflective to some degree of popular sentiment – albeit in the exaggerated fashion of a caricature – in order for them to have struck a chord with the audience. They also may be indication that not all of the elite approved of Dieitrephes and his connections. Certainly Aristophanes himself seems to have had a low opinion of Athens’ alliance with Sitalces.<sup>95</sup>

In addition to being an ostentatious and boastful soldier and cavalry commander, Dieitrephes is labeled a vicious thief and a raving lunatic base enough to be reckoned among foreigners. Cretans were stereotypically savage and wild, which may go toward explaining this specific label from Plato Comicus.<sup>96</sup> A scenario which seems likely is that before the events of 413 Dieitrephes was already well known as a military leader, one from a rich, powerful, and possibly less than democratic family that incurred the jealous ridicule of the Athenian population. After the horrific events

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<sup>94</sup> Dunbar (1995: 485) suggests the possibility that Dieitrephes owned a *factory* for making wicker jars, much like Cleon’s tannery, and this was a source of comic jibes.

<sup>95</sup> See for example the mockery of the Thracians and the Athenians connected with them in *Acharn*. 135-171. For a general study of the comic treatment of prominent Athenians, including the reasons behind certain figures being chosen as *komodoumenoi*, see Sommerstein 1996. As Sommerstein argues (336-337), it seems that the most likely way for a leading political actor to incur the wrath of a comic playwright was to tend toward radical democracy and thus offend the elite. It is difficult to see exactly how Dieitrephes would fit into this scheme, but it is possible that some of the aristocratic elite in Athens looked down upon his ties to Thracian mercenaries. Carey (1994), on the other hand, argues that the comic poets represented the opinions and grievances of the mass of Athenians.

<sup>96</sup> As discussed above, perhaps the label of Cretan may also indicate that Dieitrephes and his men were linked to archery.

at Mycalessus, his reputation became much more sinister. As a leader of murderous brutes notorious for their savagery and greed, Dieitrephes is presented as a madman and plunderer in the same mold as the troops under his command. His actions and character essentially disqualify him from normal Athenian society, as the remarks of Plato Comicus suggest. By many he is ranked among the foreigners, just like the Thracian troops on the payroll of Athens.

### ***Conclusions***

It is clear from his family history and his own military commands that Dieitrephes was a wealthy and powerful leader. It is also clear that he was in league with the non-democratic elite of the city as he was an instrument of the oligarchy of 411. This wealthy, powerful and elitist military commander was connected very closely to Thrace and the Thracians, even to one of Thrace's most fearsome and lawless tribes. This connection had been established by at least one previous generation of Dieitrephes' family before he led the attack on Mycalessus. His appearances in comedy suggest that a significant portion of the general population of Athens, and perhaps even some aristocrats, were resentful of his wealth and standing and severely critical of his connection to the Thracians. We will never know the full extent to which Dieitrephes was complicit in the slaughter of 413. We do catch glimpses of the Athenians holding him responsible for the massacre and connecting him to the baser excesses of the Dioi. Much of the elite, on the other hand, appreciated the usefulness of the relationship between Dieitrephes and the Thracians. It was precisely this connection on which the oligarchy would rely in their attempts to

mould the northern Aegean *poleis* in their likeness. This does not evince an image of Dieitrephes incompetently unable to control the troops under his command, no matter how savage.

The answer to why Dieitrephes and his relative Nicostratus were drawn to Thrace and the Thracians is multi-faceted. Doubtless they were able to acquire the benefits in terms of wealth and influence that characterized other elite Athenians' interest in the region. Dieitrephes was quite possibly not a general in the year 413, nor was he in 411. His assumption of command over the Dioi amounts to the exploitation of a unique opportunity. He was appointed to an *ad hoc* leadership position over a group with whom he probably already had connections. The mission of 413 yielded fruit two years later with another special command. Under the democracy he continued to hold influence and took steps to maintain his northern ties. The evidence suggests that he held further military posts, which might have led to his death in a foreign land. For Dieitrephes, Thracian connections provided an avenue to political and military influence at Athens. We do not know how he profited from these opportunities in a material sense, but we cannot rule out the possibility that he took his share of the plunder from Boeotia and that he exploited lucrative ties in the north as many other Athenians, including Thucydides, had done.

Some of the social tensions in Athens are illustrated by the disparate views of Athenians concerning Dieitrephes and the Thracians. Many Athenian authors – Aristophanes in the *Acharnians* and Euripides in the *Hecuba* are two examples – caution against such strange bedfellows.<sup>97</sup> Yet, this did not prevent notables from

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<sup>97</sup> For negative portrayals of Thracians, see above, ch. 1.

fostering close ties to even the most fearsome of Thracian tribes. It also did not prevent other members of the elite from actively encouraging such ties and seeking to exploit them for their own purposes. The tension between Thrace as barbarous and a dangerous source of allies on the one hand, and a unique source of power and influence on the other, was carried to its logical and terrible conclusion at Mycalessus.

## CHAPTER 4

### ALCIBIADES AND THRASYBULUS

#### ***Introduction***

Thrasybulus was the iconic figure of Athenian democracy at the end of the fifth century. After the destruction of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami and the subsequent subjection of the city to Lysander's puppet regime, the murderous Thirty Tyrants, it appeared as though the broadly-based democracy of Pericles had been on the wrong side of history. Yet, starting out with only seventy supporters, Thrasybulus managed to capture the Attic stronghold of Phyle and eventually defeat the forces of the Thirty decisively in the Piraeus, thereby brining about a restoration of the democratic constitution. As a sign of the ultimate magnanimity, he was a major proponent of the famous amnesty law that prevented a violent backlash against the oligarchs once the democrats were back in power.

Alcibiades had a decidedly different reputation in antiquity. Haughty, vain, and ambitious, he was a talented politician and general who worked towards his own advancement rather than that of Athens. Upon falling out with the Athenian *demos*, Alcibiades had no qualms about aiding the Spartans and even the Persians. The duplicitous and treacherous opportunism of Alcibiades ensured his place as one of the arch-villains of Greek history. At the same time, nearly all ancient authorities agree that his talents exceeded those of his contemporaries and that following the death of Pericles he alone was in a position to win the war for Athens. After the failure of the Sicilian expedition, Alcibiades' naval commands and his alliance of sorts with

Tissaphernes kept Athens afloat for several years, and had the Athenians heeded his advice at Aegospotami, they might well have defeated the Spartans. He captivated ancient writers as much as modern, his complicated story providing endless fodder for sophisticated historical analysis and amusing anecdotes alike.

Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were close political and military allies from the time of the Ionian War, the period of predominantly naval conflict which followed the Athenian disaster in Sicily. In fact, Alcibiades owed many of his greatest successes to Thrasybulus, including his recall to Athens and subsequent position as supreme leader of the Athenian war effort. As Nepos says, while Thrasybulus accomplished many things without Alcibiades, Alcibiades did nothing without him. But, because of certain traits of character and the vagaries of fortune, Alcibiades managed to secure the credit for himself (*Thras.* 1). As partners, both men were tied to Thrace. After the naval battle at Abydos in 411, Alcibiades and Thrasybulus remained in the north Aegean, exacting financial contributions from cities in the area, putting down revolts against Athenian authority, and dealing individually with Thracian rulers. They both also secured the services of Thracian soldiers, at times as *de facto* private armies. While Alcibiades employed his Thracian forces mainly for his own purposes as an exile in Thrace, Thrasybulus made use of Thracian fighters in Athens itself during the battle to restore democracy in 404-403.

The careers of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades exemplify the complexity of Athenian ties to Thrace. In many ways, Alcibiades fits the paradigm established by the other figures examined in this study. If there was ever an Athenian who was discontented with the democracy, especially its check on elite ambitions, it was



Alcibiades. Moreover, throughout his life he exhibited the sort of fondness for luxury and proclivity for tyrannical pomp and lordly power that could find fullest expression among the Thracians. Alcibiades, the would-be tyrant, alienated first the Athenians, then the Spartans, and finally the Persians in his unscrupulous pursuit of power, before finding in Thrace the ideal outlet for his autocratic designs. At the same time, his activities in Thrace made important gains in Athens' interest, and the territory he managed to possess as an exile might well have provided the Athenians a stepping stone towards rebuilding the empire; that is, had not the Spartans destroyed Athenian naval power at Aegospotami. His place in Athens as yet again the savior of the city would have been assured.

Thrasybulus strengthened Athens' position in the north during the Ionian War and again in the early years of the fourth century. He also used his Thracian connections to rescue Athenian democracy from the grip of tyrants. In contrast to Alcibiades, Thrasybulus consistently worked for the cause of democracy at Athens, though he was no radical ideologue. At times, his activities seemed to be independent of Athens, and he engaged in less than savory practices, including the pillaging and plundering of cities in order to raise money for his cash-strapped city. Some Athenian sources indicate that he was later censured for this, and it is implied that such financial exactions were more for his own benefit and that of his henchmen than for the state. He was accused by Lysias of considering taking personal possession of a force of Athenian triremes, occupying Byzantium, and marrying a Thracian princess, all to escape legal consequences back home (Lys. 28.5-6). Such accusations need not imply Thrasybulus' guilt, but they fit in well enough with the paradigm established by other

Thrace-haunters as to be plausible. In any case, Thrasybulus' ties to Thrace were extensive enough to provide fodder for forensic oratory.

Thrasybulus' actions highlight a paradox of Athenian democracy, indeed of many democracies throughout history. Democracy at Athens was dependent upon the cynical exploitation of allies and subjects abroad, often facilitated through connections with despotic foreigners. Throughout the course of Classical Athenian history, democracy was nurtured by the undemocratic actions of often undemocratically minded people solidifying alliances with undemocratic foreigners. Most scholars agree that the Athenian policy of maintaining an overseas empire, a source of vast revenue from less than enthusiastic subject states, was most ardently supported by the democratic masses. The loss of the empire following the Peloponnesian War hit Athens hard, and it was figures like Thrasybulus and their empire-building activities in Thrace that renewed the hopes of the Athenian people.<sup>1</sup> Thrasybulus also made crucial use of these undemocratic connections in his campaign against the Thirty Tyrants and their narrow oligarchy. In an ironic twist, Thracian barbarians were instrumental in rescuing democracy for the autochthonous citizens of Athens.

### ***The Necessity of Thrace following the Sicilian Disaster***

We catch a first glimpse of collaboration between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus in 411. Thrasybulus, one of the leading Athenians at Samos during the tumultuous

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<sup>1</sup> For the benefits of the empire, see Strauss 1987: 51-53. For the attempts at restoring the empire following the war and the role of Thrasybulus, see Seager 1967; Cawkwell 1976. Buck (1998: 12) states that "a good democrat like Thrasybulus was also an ardent supporter of the concept of the Empire, while oligarchs were not nearly as enthusiastic for it." See, however, Strauss (1987: 100-101) who argues that some of wealthy notables also supported imperialist expansion.

period of the oligarchic coup at Athens, persistently advocated the recall of Alcibiades (Thuc. 8.81). As such, he seemed to stake his political future on Alcibiades' potential successes in the service of Athens.<sup>2</sup> Once Alcibiades had regained Athens' trust, the two men worked together in the Hellespont from 411-407, combating Sparta's navy and its Persian support, and bringing cities over to Athens. During this period, the Athenian generals in the Hellespont, led primarily by Alcibiades but with Thrasybulus also playing a central role, worked more or less independently of the newly restored democracy back home.<sup>3</sup> It was at this time that Alcibiades and Thrasybulus began making connections in the Thraceward region that would play a decisive role in the remainder of their respective careers.

The campaigns in the Hellespont were necessitated by the dire situation at Athens following the Sicilian Expedition, which had ended in disastrous defeat in September of 413. The massive force the Athenians had sent to Sicily had been utterly annihilated, resulting in the loss of perhaps 3000 citizen hoplites, 9000 thetes, and many thousands of metics. Of the Athenian ships, 160 had been destroyed, leaving only a hundred or so left in the Piraeus.<sup>4</sup> The loss of so many men, which the Athenians saw as irreplaceable, and materiel was compounded by the paltry funds remaining in Athens' treasury. The high cost of the war effort, exacerbated by the economic ruin wrought by the Spartan presence in Decelea, left no money to build

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<sup>2</sup> Strauss 1984: 42, and nn. 21-22.

<sup>3</sup> For their activities in this period, see especially Andrewes 1953.

<sup>4</sup> For these numbers, see Kagan (1987: 1-11), who gives a comprehensive account, along with a survey of scholarship, of the consequences of the Sicilian disaster. See also Strauss (1987: 179-182) for a rendering of all Athenian casualties during the war, especially those of the thetic and metic classes.

more ships.<sup>5</sup> Even if there had been ships, there were no men to fill them. In such straits, the Athenians despaired of their own survival (Thuc. 8.1.2).

Athens' principal source of revenue had been its empire, which was threatening to fall apart. Thucydides says that the Athenian defeat in 413 had made all the states in Greece eager to turn against Athens, the subjects of the empire in particular, a result the Spartans and Persians were all too eager to precipitate (8.2.2; 8.5.4-6.1). When the Spartans sent a fleet to the Hellespont and Propontis in 411, eventually causing the revolt of Byzantium, Athens' grain supply and very survival came under threat (Thuc. 8.80). In response, the Athenians sent out a fleet under the command of Thrasybulus, which defeated the Spartans at Cynossema, marking Thrasybulus' first significant victory (Thuc. 8.100-106).<sup>6</sup>

From 411-407/6, Thrasybulus was continuously active in the north, involved with the other generals in raising money (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8), and re-elected general several times, even *in absentia* (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.10).<sup>7</sup> His activities included bringing several cities back over to Athens, beginning in early 410 after a victory at Cyzicus (Diod. 13.64.3), and retaking both Thasos and Abdera with a fleet of thirty ships (Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.9; Diod. 13.72.1-2). Diodorus says that Thrasybulus won a battle at Thasos and followed up with a successful siege. Xenophon tells us that Thasos had been reduced to a miserable state due to continuous war, revolution, and siege-induced famine before submitting to Thrasybulus. Even before Cyzicus, Thrasybulus had been

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<sup>5</sup> For the effect of Decelea, see Kagan 1987: 3. See also Kallet (1999), who discusses the moral and psychological effects of this financial devastation, which culminated in the massacre at Mycalessus.

<sup>6</sup> For this campaign in the Hellespont, see Kagan 1987: 211ff; and 218, n.31, for Thrasybulus' position as commander-in-chief. See also Buck 1998: 31-32.

<sup>7</sup> For his re-election as general, See Buck 1998: 40, n.112.

active at Thasos, attempting to bring the city back under Athenian control (Xen. 1.1.12).

Krentz suggests that sometime during this period Thrasybulus had been appointed by Athens as the overall commander in the Thraceward area, just as Dieitrephes had been shortly earlier by the oligarchy in 411.<sup>8</sup> Such an appointment would make perfect sense, especially in light of Thrasybulus' focus on Thasos. Dieitrephes, a commander closely tied to Thrace, was chosen by the oligarchy of 411 to establish an oligarchic government on Thasos, which promptly revolted from Athenian control mere weeks after Dieitrephes had left the island. As Avery persuasively argues, though Thasos revolted from Athens, it maintained an oligarchic government of some form. The anti-Athenian oligarchs were supported by Athens' enemies, specifically the admiral Timolaus of Corinth (*Hell. Oxy.* 7[2].4).<sup>9</sup> Thrasybulus, a man quickly cementing ties in Thrace, was chosen by the re-established Athenian democracy to combat the rebellious Thasian oligarchs. Athens had the greatest chance of regaining Thasian allegiance by crushing the island's oligarchs and restoring democracy. The juxtaposition of the missions of Dieitrephes and Thrasybulus neatly demonstrates that both oligarchs and democrats saw the value in maintaining an Athenian foothold in the north Aegean and that Thracian ties could be as important to a democrat as they were to an oligarch, depending on the political situation. Thrasybulus' mission also shows that a "good democrat" was not above breaking the will of recalcitrant allies through siege and famine.

Alcibiades was similarly engaged during this period. After Abydos he

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<sup>8</sup> Krentz 1989: 127. For Dieitrephes, see above, ch. 3.

<sup>9</sup> Avery 1979: 236-238.

collected money along with the other generals before he was briefly imprisoned by Tissaphernes (Xen. *Hell.* 1.8-10). Subsequent to a period of relative inactivity following Cyzicus, he turned his attention to attacking the interests of Pharnabazus along the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont and Propontis.<sup>10</sup> The literary sources agree that Alcibiades did great damage to the territories of the King, and Diodorus tells us that he secured enough goods from the Persians not only to satisfy his men, but also to lessen the tax burden (*eisphorai*) levied against Athenian citizens for the prosecution of the war (Diod. 13.64.4). As Strauss points out, revenue from the empire was a main guarantee against excessive taxation for Athenians.<sup>11</sup> Alcibiades' activities would have met with the approval of the Athenian masses. He soon turned his attention to fortifying Lampsacus and made an excursion against nearby Abydos. Spending the winter at Lampsacus, he conducted further raids into Persian territory.

Following this, he set out for Chalcedon which had revolted from Athens. The people of Chalcedon had gathered all their movable property (λεία) and handed it over to their allies, the Bithynian Thracians. Alcibiades, through the help of his imposing forces, struck his own deal with the Bithynians and seized the goods of the Chalcedonians. He then set about walling off Chalcedon, and in the process defeated both the forces of Hippocrates, the Spartan *harmost* of the place, and Pharnabazus who had come to the city's aid. Alcibiades continued in this manner, heading to the Hellespont and Chersonese to raise money, and in the process recruited many Thracians and the entire population of the Chersonese to his cause. He took Selymbria

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<sup>10</sup> For the issue of his inactivity after Cyzicus, see Hatzfeld 1940: 274-280.

<sup>11</sup> Strauss 1987: 51.

by betrayal, bringing in a small force of Greeks and Thracians and having his friends on the inside arrange for the city's surrender. Once the city was in his hands, if Plutarch is to be believed, Alcibiades feared that his Thracian troops, who were fiercely loyal to him due to goodwill and affection (χάριτι . . . εὐνοίαν), would plunder the city. So, he sent the Thracians out and left the city and its territory intact, merely leaving a garrison and collecting a sum of money (Plut. *Alc.* 30.4-5). Finally he besieged Byzantium and took the city, once again with the collusion of his friends on the inside.<sup>12</sup>

As is evident from our sources, Alcibiades and his lieutenants struck their own agreements with the peoples in the north. With the Bithynian Thracians, Alcibiades concluded a treaty of good faith or friendship (πίστεις, Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.4; φιλίαν, Plut. *Alc.* 29.3); with Chalcedon, his lieutenants, principally Theramenes, arranged that the same tribute should be paid to Athens as before (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.9; Diod. 13.66.3; Plut. *Alc.* 31.1); from Selymbria he exacted a sum of money after establishing a garrison (Diod. 13.66.4; Plut. *Alc.* 30.4-5); and he arranged to return the city of Byzantium to its own citizens after making them allies (συμμάχους, Diod. 13.67.7). Though Alcibiades and the other generals were at this time acting on their own initiative, the epigraphic record confirms that many of the arrangements made in 410-408 were subsequently ratified at Athens once Alcibiades made his return to the city.

During this period Alcibiades depended heavily on his friends in the north, principally as betrayers of cities, as he relied on local forces, both Thracian and Greek,

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<sup>12</sup> For all of these events, see the accounts in Xenophon (*Hell.* 1,2,15-3); Diodorus (13.64.4-67); and Plutarch (*Alc.* 29-31).

to accomplish his ends. While Athens reacquired many of its interests in the north and gained some much needed revenue, Alcibiades, raising substantial numbers of local troops who were loyal to him personally, consolidated his own position among the Thracians. At some point between 411-407, he established several fortified settlements in the Hellespontine region, which would later serve as his refuge from the Athenians once he fell out of favor after the Battle of Notium in 407/6. From his base in Thrace, Alcibiades waged campaigns with his own private Thracian armies, and forged alliances with several Thracian kings.<sup>13</sup> By these campaigns he enriched himself and increased his fame. He offered his own forces, plus those of the kings Medocus and Seuthes, to the Athenian generals at Aegospotami, which those generals refused to their own ruin (Nep. *Alc.* 7-8; Plut. *Alc.* 30.4-5; 36.3; 37.2; Diod. 13.105.3-4).

In 407/6, Alcibiades had left his fleet at Notium under the command of a subordinate, for reasons not entirely known.<sup>14</sup> In his absence, the Athenians were defeated by the Spartans under Lysander, most likely due to the folly of the officer Alcibiades had left in charge (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.10-15; *Hell. Oxy.* 8[4].1-4). Following the defeat, the anger of Athenians burned against their supposed hero Alcibiades, and he was dismissed from command. He then fled to his Thracian strongholds (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.17-18). Alcibiades perhaps had an eye to making himself indispensable to Athens. As discussed throughout this study, Athens had demonstrated a keen interest in the Hellespont since the seventh century. By setting up his own autonomous

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<sup>13</sup> See also below, ch. 6

<sup>14</sup> For this campaign and the scholarly issues surrounding it, see Buck 1998: 43-46. It seems Alcibiades had left in order to lend support against oligarchic exiles at Clazomenae (Diod. 13.71.1) or to confer with Thrasybulus at Phocaea (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.11).



statelet in the region, Alcibiades might have hoped to offer the Athenians the chance to regain their influence in a key strategic area. As such, he once again could have regained Athens' favor.<sup>15</sup> Even so, he was acting with his own interests, as always, in the forefront. To re-emerge once again as Athens' savior, and to have personal control over a piece of territory the city so desired, would have made him more powerful still. After Notium, Thrasybulus also fell out of favor at Athens, it would seem due to guilt by association with Alcibiades. As evidence of his political decline, he failed to be elected general the following year.<sup>16</sup> He remained out of the spotlight until he led the overthrow of the Thirty in 404-403, a feat which catapulted him to unprecedented stardom.

In 390-389, Thrasybulus again ventured to the Hellespont, and he is mentioned as the overall commander in the region (ἡγε[χεν], IG ii<sup>2</sup> 24). Here he made great gains for Athens, not least of which was effecting an alliance between the quarreling Thracian kings Medocus and Seuthes, joining them both to Athens in the process (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26). Xenophon tells us that by so doing, he figured that not only would he gain powerful Thracian allies for Athens, but the Greek cities in the area would be much more inclined towards Athens. His campaigns continued down the Ionian coast, where he exacted money by any means necessary. Eventually, he ended up in Aspendus, where he continued his financial exactions. The people of Aspendus were so angered by the raiding and looting of Thrasybulus' men that some locals stormed into the Athenian camp at night and killed Thrasybulus in his tent (Xen. *Hell.*

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<sup>15</sup> For these plans of Alcibiades, see Hatzfeld 1940: 321-323.

<sup>16</sup> Buck 1998: 46.

4.8.26-30; Diod. 14.94; 99.4-5).

During the period of the Ionian War and in the early fourth century, legitimate means of raising money were not sufficient to keep any sizeable military venture going. Pritchett argues that the so-called *condottieri* of the fourth century, that is, Greek generals who seemed to operate independently of their home state, were forced to resort to brigandage in order to pay for their soldiers and supplies. The financial situation in the fourth century was so poor that the states themselves, Athens included, sanctioned such activity.<sup>17</sup> The situation was similar for Athens during the last decade of the fifth and first decade of the fourth centuries. It seems that Thrasybulus, who had worked closely with the Thracians, famous as thieves and brigands, and with Alcibiades, a proven master at raising money by any means necessary, had learned well how to exact funds from unwilling peoples. The Athenians demonstrated their implicit approval of Thrasybulus' activities by sending out Iphicrates as his replacement in the Hellespont. Iphicrates had already shown himself to be a resourceful and cunning commander of irregular troops, as well as a man close to the Thracians. Accordingly, he was sent out with 1200 peltasts, troops ideally suited for the very sort of missions for which Thrasybulus was censured by Lysias (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34).

Many scholars have suggested that Thrasybulus, a staunch democrat, wanted to restore Athens' former empire in the early fourth century, and his activities in the Hellespont were aimed at such an end.<sup>18</sup> Democracy itself was arguably in much need

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<sup>17</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-116, esp. 68-70.

<sup>18</sup> Seager 1967; Cawkwell 1976; Buck 1998: 97-98, 115-118. Cawkwell argues that the main point of rivalry between Thrasybulus and Conon was the extent to which the Persians should be included in the

of empire. Moreno, discussing the connection between Athens and the grain-producing states in the Crimea, remarks that the despotic governments of the northern Black Sea were cynically influenced and supported by Athens, a democratic state. Athens' very food supply was dependent upon overseas expansion and the contact established between Athenian aristocrats and the authoritarian dynasts in far-flung places.<sup>19</sup> The situation in the Crimea is in many ways analogous to Thrace, itself closer to home for Athens and a source of elite interest for a much longer period. As Alcibiades raised much needed funds for Athens by raiding and pillaging, Thrasybulus employed similar methods and entered into close negotiations with Thracian kings in order to provide for the democracy back home. In Xenophon's words, he hoped thus to perform some good service to Athens.<sup>20</sup> While he certainly made important gains for Athens, in good elite fashion he also established personal ties with the Thracians that would work in his own interest.

In the end, both Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were vitally important to Athens in the north Aegean. They also looked to their own interests in Thrace. Thrasybulus could not have failed to notice how his colleague and ally had made use of Thrace as insurance against the anger of the Athenians. Iphicrates, Thrasybulus' replacement in the north, worked on Athens' behalf in the region and also, just like Alcibiades, took refuge in Thrace once the Athenians turned against him. Thrace, duly exploited by the activities of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, was a possible source of salvation for an

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restoration of Athens' empire. Thrasybulus wanted to exclude them utterly, while Conon saw them as a potential asset. It seems, though, that both men were guided more by personal rivalry and a pragmatic desire for personal power rather than any sort of democratic or anti-Persian ideals. See Strauss 1984.

<sup>19</sup> See Moreno 2007, esp. 204.

<sup>20</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.26: "ἐνόμισε καταπράξαι ἅν τι τῇ πόλει ἀγαθόν."

embattled and impoverished Athens. At the same time, Athens' generals in the north, knowing how fickle the Athenians could be, looked to secure in Thrace their own salvation against any potential threat at home.

### ***Thracians at Athens, 404-403***

In 404-403, during the fight to restore democracy, Thracians may have played a key role. Middleton argues that Thrasybulus relied heavily on Thracian fighters in the battles against the forces of the Thirty and the Spartans which took place in the Piraeus.<sup>21</sup> Middleton bases his argument on three things: the location of the Battle of Munichia, which was in the vicinity of the shrine of the Thracian goddess Bendis; the names of some of the foreigners involved in the struggle; and also on the fighting style of the troops with Thrasybulus. Xenophon describes a large number of light-armed troops that fought with the democratic forces in the Piraeus. These fighters included peltasts and light-armed javelin-throwers (πελτοφόροι τε καὶ ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί), as well as stone-throwers or slingers (πετροβόλοι, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.12). Thrace was of course well known for such light-armed fighters, especially peltasts and javelin-throwers. As Middleton suggests, Athens' use of Thracian troops during the course of the Peloponnesian War, and Thrasybulus' own activities in Thrace from 411-407, make it all but certain that a sizable number of these light troops were Thracians.

Why did the Thracians in the Piraeus fight for Thrasybulus on behalf of democracy? Middleton argues that metics, including those of Thracian origin, were well treated under the democracy, and they participated in the struggle in the hope of

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<sup>21</sup> Middleton 1982.

winning even more rights.<sup>22</sup> Thrasybulus could have made personal appeals to the Thracians of the Piraeus too as he had spent a great deal of time in Thrace. Middleton insists that the location of the battle was decided largely by proximity to the shrine of Bendis, and therefore to the local Thracian population. This argument hinges on Xenophon's comment that the light-troops lived in that very district. Xenophon's wording, however, need only mean that the third group of light troops, that is, the slingers, lived in the immediate vicinity.<sup>23</sup> Instead, many of the Thracian fighters could have been mercenary soldiers, hired by supporters of the democracy and under the personal command of Thrasybulus.

The orator Lysias paid for at least 300 and as many as 500 mercenaries for the democratic forces. He also persuaded his guest-friend Thrasydaeus of Elis to contribute two talents, presumably also to pay for mercenaries (Plut. *Mor.* 835f; Just. 5.9.9; Oros. 2.17.9).<sup>24</sup> Lysias implies that there were many others who supported the men from Phyle with money and materiel (Lys. 31.15), and some of this support could have gone to fund mercenaries as well. As we have no explicit record of the activities of these troops during any part of the struggle, we ought to understand their presence in the Piraeus battles in which many light-armed mercenary-style fighters participated.<sup>25</sup> Thrasybulus had many Thracian connections with which to secure mercenaries, enlisting the help of his contacts in the north to supply him with the

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<sup>22</sup> Middleton 1982: 303.

<sup>23</sup> *Hell.* 2.4.12: “ἐτάχθησαν μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς πελτοφόροι τε καὶ ψιλοὶ ἀκοντισταί, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις οἱ πετροβόλοι. οὗτοι μέντοι συχνοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτόθεν προσεγένοντο.” The οὗτοι of the last sentence need only refer to the latter group of the three mentioned.

<sup>24</sup> See Buck (1998: 73-74) for Lysias' contributions. Although the sources are late, they were probably relying on now lost testimony from Lysias himself.

<sup>25</sup> As argued by Buck 1998: 77.

appropriate troops. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, suggests the possibility that Thrasybulus commanded a skilled group of Thracian fighters in Athens itself, just as Alcibiades had mercenaries at his beck and call while he was based in Thrace.

After democracy had been restored, Thrasybulus proposed rewards for his supporters which included full Athenian citizenship. This motion was opposed by Archinus of Coele, who charged Thrasybulus with introducing an unlawful motion (*graphe paranomon*) on the grounds that several of those to whom he wanted to grant citizenship were slaves ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 40.2). Strauss suggests that Archinus might have been motivated less by a principled aversion to granting citizenship to slaves and foreigners than by a fear that his political rival Thrasybulus would have gained more than 1000 new supporters.<sup>26</sup> In any case, Xenophon's account of the democratic uprising and a surviving inscription indicate that many of Thrasybulus' troops were eventually granted the lesser honor of *isoteleia* (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 10).<sup>27</sup>

While the Athenians granted citizenship to slaves and foreign allies in exceptional circumstances, such as after the Battle of Arginusae (Ar. *Ran.* 693-694 and schol.), it was a regular practice for foreign powers to offer mercenaries lands on which to settle as a reward for services rendered.<sup>28</sup> Many Greeks, including most

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<sup>26</sup> Strauss 1987: 96; 116, n.26.

<sup>27</sup> Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.25) records that oaths were exchanged which promised *isoteleia* to the non-Athenians present. For the numbers of foreign supporters and the decree granting *isoteleia* instead of citizenship, see Krentz 1980. Although many of the specific honors given, including possibly *isoteleia*, are missing from the extant fragments of the inscription, leading many scholars to conclude that Thrasybulus' abortive citizenship grant is depicted, Krentz persuasively argues that a failed motion would not have been recorded on stone, and that the tell-tale language of citizenship is absent.

<sup>28</sup> See for example Pritchett (1974 -1991: vol. 2, 67) who discusses the practice in the context of Ptolemaic Egypt. See also Hdt. 2.152-154 for an account of Greek mercenaries settled by Psammetichus in Egypt in the seventh century.

notably Xenophon and Iphicrates, were offered such perks by Thracian kings.<sup>29</sup>

During the Peloponnesian War, Athens had granted citizenship to influential Thracians in return for military alliance. Sadocus, the son of Athens' Odrysian ally Sitalces, dwelt in Athens and was made a citizen in 431 (Thuc. 2.29.5; Ar. *Ach.* 145-149). The Demosthenic *Letter to Philip* indicates that in the mid fourth century the Thracian rulers Teres and Cersobleptes had been made Athenian citizens ([Dem.] 12.8). The mercenary captain Charidemus was granted Athenian citizenship and sundry other honors in 357 for helping Athens regain the Thracian Chersonese through his mediation with Cersobleptes (Dem. 23.23, 65, 89, 145, 185, 188).<sup>30</sup> The Thracians were given special property rights at Athens from the time of the Peloponnesian War, and they evidently returned the favor.<sup>31</sup> Beyond seeking to grant citizenship and other rewards to metics who already lived in the Piraeus, perhaps Thrasybulus intended to reward his Thracian mercenaries, or at least their commanders, according to the custom practiced by the Thracians themselves and by the Athenians in the case of some of their more important Thracian friends.

Archinus' opposition to these rewards is especially interesting in light of a decree mentioned by Aeschines (3.187-190) and corroborated on stone in which Archinus himself honored around a hundred supporters of Thrasybulus with laurel crowns and a token sum of less than ten drachmas apiece. Based on the surviving fragments of the decree's inscription, Raubitschek first proposed that, in addition to Athenians, many foreigners were honored in this decree, albeit in a second list of

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<sup>29</sup> See below, chs. 5, 6.

<sup>30</sup> For these honors, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 86.

<sup>31</sup> See also above, ch. 1.

names now lost. Recently Taylor has provided further evidence and analysis in support of these conclusions, particularly noting that the current list of slightly more than fifty names does not account for the hundred or so implied by Aeschines, and that the stele itself would have been large enough to list many more honorands, specifically foreigners.<sup>32</sup> Taylor convincingly argues that those honored, both Athenians and foreigners, were the earliest participants in Thrasybulus' rebellion against the Thirty, namely, the small band that withstood the Thirty's brief siege of Phyle in the opening days of the occupation of the fort (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2-3). Krentz has argued that the decree honored the much larger number of those who defeated the Thirty and their Spartan allies in a subsequent battle in northern Attica, probably in the plain towards Acharnae which lies only a few miles from Phyle (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.4-7; Diod. 14.33.1). Accordingly, the small number of names listed in the decree denotes the entire Athenian contribution to the battle, leaving out what would have amounted to several hundred foreigners, indeed the vast majority of the fighters.<sup>33</sup> Taylor, however, decisively refutes Krentz's arguments by showing that foreigners were probably listed in the decree and that Aeschines more accurately describes the siege of Phyle rather than the later battle.<sup>34</sup> If this is the case, it follows that Archinus had no objection to honoring foreigners *per se*, in spite of his strident opposition to Thrasybulus' proposal. We must ask, then, why he chose to honor only those few early supporters of Thrasybulus rather than the larger number of fighters who defeated the Thirty in later battles in northern Attica and the Piraeus.

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<sup>32</sup> Raubitschek 1941; Taylor 2002.

<sup>33</sup> Krentz 1982: 82-84.

<sup>34</sup> Taylor 2002: 382-386.



Perhaps Archinus carefully honored only the earliest participants in the resistance to the Thirty because Thrasybulus' later force consisted not only of an increasingly large portion of foreign troops, but significant numbers of Thracian mercenaries in particular. While our sources are not explicit about the makeup of the democratic forces, especially prior to the battles in the Piraeus, it is plausible that Thracians were involved even at Phyle. As already mentioned, many hundreds of mercenaries were supplied to Thrasybulus, paid for by Lysias and other wealthy opponents of the Thirty. In the battle on Munichia hill, the democrats had with them many peltasts and javelin-throwers, which were very effective against the Thirty. Following the battle, Xenophon says that members of Thrasybulus' growing army needed to equip themselves with arms by making shields out of wood or wickerwork (*Hell.* 2.4.25). As the soldiers who fought at Munichia appear to have been fully equipped already, it follows that they had accompanied Thrasybulus from Phyle. The Thirty had, after all, rushed out to confront Thrasybulus immediately (εὐθύς) upon his arrival in the Piraeus (*Xen. Hell.* 2.4.10). The peltasts and javelin-throwers in question, then, may not only have been Thracians, but even part of the mercenary forces supplied by Thrasybulus' supporters who joined the struggle while the democrats were still at Phyle.

After the Thirty had been rebuffed by a snowstorm in their attempt to besiege Phyle in the very early period of the conflict, they were worried that Thrasybulus' men would be able to plunder the nearby fields (ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν λεηλατήσοιεν). Accordingly, they sent a large force, including nearly the entire Spartan garrison and two divisions of cavalry, to keep watch over the fields (*Xen. Hell.* 2.4.4). Although

Xenophon says that they encamped only three kilometers or so from Phyle, this appears to denote the distance from the center of the deme itself rather than the fort.<sup>35</sup> The fort lies high on the slopes of Mount Parnes, at an elevation of over 650 meters and several kilometers into the mountain, whereas the forces of the Thirty were positioned so as to protect the lower lying fields. Diodorus says that they were close to Acharnae, lying on an open plain about ten kilometers from the fort itself and at an elevation of approximately 150-175 meters (14.33.1). This would have situated the Thirty and their Spartan allies to protect the fields in terrain ideal for their cavalry forces. Both Xenophon and Diodorus say that Thrasybulus and his forces, numbered at 700 and 1200 respectively, descended from the fort by night and made a surprise attack against their enemies.<sup>36</sup> Not only is the fort of Phyle at a considerable elevation, it is also surrounded by sheer cliffs and extremely rugged terrain, perfect for the fort's purpose as providing a strong defensive position. As night maneuvers were a specialty of highly skilled Thracian fighters, evinced by Dieitrephe's attack on Mycalessus, it is attractive to conceive of this operation as spearheaded by Thrasybulus' Thracians.<sup>37</sup> Citizen volunteers, most familiar with hoplite warfare, would have found a nocturnal descent over several kilometers and a 500 meter drop in elevation very difficult.

Xenophon vividly describes the attack itself (*Hell.* 2.4.6-7). Shortly before dawn, Thrasybulus led his troops at a full run (δρόμῳ) against the unsuspecting oligarchs. Thrasybulus' forces straightaway killed some of the enemy and put the rest

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<sup>35</sup> The location of the deme itself is currently unknown. For the position of the fort, see Ober 1985: 145-147.

<sup>36</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.5: “καταβαίνει τῆς νυκτός”; Diod. 14.33.1: “νυκτὸς ἀπροσδοκῆτως”.

<sup>37</sup> For Dieitrephe's night maneuvers, see above, ch. 3.

to flight, pursuing them for the better part of a mile. They killed more than 120 of the enemy hoplites, and notably three of the cavalry commanders who were caught still in their beds. Xenophon's phrasing suggests that most of the hoplite casualties resulted from the lengthy chase.<sup>38</sup> Thracian peltasts, relatively lightly armed, would have been well suited for such a pursuit, and that they were able to kill so many of the enemy bespeaks their deadly effectiveness at a run. Furthermore, the verb used to describe the initial killing of some of the men in the camp, καταβάλλω – a compound form of βάλλω meaning to throw or hurl – is strongly evocative of a missile attack. In fact, of the instances of this verb in Xenophon's corpus which denote killing, all but one describe killing by ranged weapons such as javelins, arrows and stones, including at the hands of Thracian peltasts. In these cases, the verb is accompanied by a participle of either ἀκοντίζω (to hurl a javelin), τοξεύω (to shoot an arrow), or both.<sup>39</sup> The one exception is used in the context of Spartans pursuing and killing Locrians, who incidentally had first attacked the Spartans with stones and javelins and were fleeing through a dense wood.<sup>40</sup> Thus, Xenophon describes the forces of the Thirty as literally being struck down by missile weapons of the sort used by Thracians.

We know that by 404 Thrasybulus had spent several years in Thrace, crushing

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<sup>38</sup> “καὶ ἔστι μὲν οὖς αὐτῶν κατέβαλον, πάντας δὲ τρεψάμενοι ἐδίωξαν ἕξ ἢ ἑπτὰ στάδια, καὶ ἀπέκτειναν τῶν μὲν ὀπλιτῶν πλεον ἢ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν, τῶν δὲ ἵππέων Νικόστρατόν τε τὸν καλὸν ἐπικαλούμενον, καὶ ἄλλους δὲ δύο, ἔτι καταλαβόντες ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς.” Note the μὲν . . . δὲ clause in the first part of the sentence that contrasts the few killed initially with the many killed in the subsequent rout.

<sup>39</sup> See *Hell.* 3.2.4 (Thracian peltasts killing Greeks); 4.1.19 (Persian cavalry and chariots, units which primarily used the bow, killing Greeks); *Cyr.* 1.3.14; 1.4.8; 4.6.3; 4.6.4 (all describing the hunting of game with ranged weapons).

<sup>40</sup> See *Hell.* 4.3.22. The other uses of the verb range from cutting down trees to dismounting from horseback.

revolts and exacting funds by any and every means. It makes sense that he would have used the monetary support given him by his supporters to pay for Thracian mercenaries, supplied through his northern contacts. He had seen firsthand the effectiveness of Thracian fighters, and his actions in 404 demonstrate that he knew how to apply their strengths, from complicated nighttime maneuvers over mountainous terrain, to nimble assaults with ranged weapons. In this way, Thrasybulus might have prefigured the genius of Iphicrates and the innovations of Xenophon in the use of light troops. Several months had probably passed between the initial siege of Phyle and the battle in the plain, more than enough time for soldiers to have arrived from the north.<sup>41</sup> These mercenaries accompanied Thrasybulus to the Piraeus and were instrumental in defeating the Thirty and the Spartans at Munichia and in subsequent engagements. Middleton is right in asserting that many Thracians lived in the Piraeus. Once Thrasybulus had arrived perhaps with hundreds of Thracians in tow, those Thracians dwelling in the area would have been quick to take up arms for Thrasybulus and alongside their countrymen. Perhaps it was the Piraeus Thracians who picked up sling stones with which to pelt the Thirty and later set about improvising light shields out of wood and wickerwork, from which *peltai* and other light shields were typically made.

Strauss argues that Archinus proposed subtle honors to the hundred or so heroes of Phyle, of which he was one, in order to deemphasize their achievements and in turn deemphasize the villainy of their opponents, namely the Thirty. In this way, Archinus played the role of a reconciler, though his sympathies were more in line with

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<sup>41</sup> For the date, see Buck 1998: 75; Taylor 2002: 382.

the few than the many.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, the epigram affiliated with Archinus' decree, quoted by Aeschines and partially surviving on stone, praises those who placed themselves in mortal danger in order to lead the fight against "the men ruling the city with unjust laws."<sup>43</sup> This does not whitewash the reign of the Thirty, nor is it subtle praise of the democratic forces from Phyle. Furthermore, Thrasybulus himself was instrumental in bringing about the reconciliation between the democrats and oligarchs, including the famous amnesty law (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.40-43), and was reckoned by the Oxyrhynchus historian as a member of the few (1.2-3). Strauss does allow that the ideological differences between Archinus and Thrasybulus were probably not great and the opposition to Thrasybulus' decree was based at least as much on political rivalry as principle.<sup>44</sup>

Archinus' uneasiness with Thrasybulus' later supports is in line with Strauss' description of the factional opposition between the two men. Archinus might have disapproved of the involvement of so many Thracian soldiers, especially if they were personally tied to Thrasybulus. Striving for political power in his own right, Archinus would have been wary of such a powerful military force in the hands of a rival, all the more so if substantial civic rewards were thrown into the mix. Also, rather than deemphasizing the crimes of the Thirty or the achievements of the democratic

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<sup>42</sup> Strauss 1987: 96-97.

<sup>43</sup> Aesch. 3.190:

“Τούσδ’ ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαίχθων  
 δῆμος Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ποτε τοὺς ἀδίκους  
 θεσμοῖς ἄρξαντας πόλιος πρῶτοι καταπαύειν  
 ἤρξαν, κίνδυνον σώμασιν ἀράμενοι.”

For the partial preservation of the epigram on the inscription itself, which adds further credibility to Aeschines' description of the decree, see Taylor 2002: 378.

<sup>44</sup> Strauss 1987: 96, 98.

opposition, Archinus wished to acknowledge the role of Athenian citizens such as himself and those early foreigners who lent assistance, namely, distinguished Greek metics and citizens of Thebes. Thrasybulus' Thracians were to be excluded if at all possible. In the factional competition among the elite at Athens, a private foreign army and a large bloc of loyal new citizens in the hands of any one politician was too much of a threat to the balance of power. Perhaps Thrasybulus overplayed his hand and made himself vulnerable to Archinus' charge.

### ***Political and Family Connections***

As in the case of Diitrephes, Thrasybulus and Alcibiades both had connections to Thrace extending far beyond their official military commands in the area. Alcibiades, for instance, might have acquired an interest in the Thracians and knowledge of their customs from an early age. His guardian Pericles had secured the services of a Thracian named Zopyrus as Alcibiades' tutor (Plat. *Alc.* 1.122b; Plut. *Alc.* 1.2). Alcibiades and Thrasybulus were also tied to other prominent Athenians who were active in Thrace in this period, notably Hagnon and his son Theramenes. Aside from the obvious political and military links that would have arisen among the most eminent Athenians of the fifth century, the common connection to Thrace seems too strong to be a mere coincidence of military assignment. The respective backgrounds of Thrasybulus and Alcibiades, like their careers, provide further evidence that Athenian ties to Thrace were personal, were passed on within families, and were fostered in conjunction, and sometimes rivalry, with fellow elites.

Little is known about Thrasybulus' family other than that he was from the

deme of Steiria and his father was a man named Lycus.<sup>45</sup> Also from the deme of Steiria were Hagnon and Theramenes.<sup>46</sup> Hagnon was very active in Thrace, from successfully founding Amphipolis, to serving as a general in the service of the Odrysian king Sitalces and possibly acting as the vehicle through which Athens acquired the services of the infamous Dioi.<sup>47</sup> His son Theramenes was probably born in the 440's, around the same time as Thrasybulus. Steiria was a deme of modest size, sending only three quota members to the *boule* each year.<sup>48</sup> Two such prominent land-owning families most likely interacted a great deal.<sup>49</sup> It is tempting to imagine Thrasybulus and Theramenes growing up together on the eastern coast of Attica, where their deme was located, and participating in local activities including demotic government.

Many scholars have juxtaposed Thrasybulus and his supposed uprightness and integrity with the opportunism and cynicism of men like Theramenes. Against the “double-dealing, unscrupulous, and treacherous” Theramenes, according to Buck, the “honorable, honest, and sincere” Thrasybulus provides a stark contrast.<sup>50</sup> Yet there is considerable evidence of cooperation between these two men.<sup>51</sup> In the convoluted account provided by Thucydides (8.45-98) of the oligarchic coup of 411, the upshot seems to be that Athens needed the support of Persia and that the best way to achieve

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<sup>45</sup> Davies 1971: 240-241.

<sup>46</sup> Davies 1971: 227-228.

<sup>47</sup> See above, ch. 2.

<sup>48</sup> Traill 1975: 68.

<sup>49</sup> Strauss (1987: 90) argues that Thrasybulus' family may have been insignificant, perhaps wealthy members of the merchant class. It is possible, however, that a member of the family, one Lycus, was commemorated as *kalos* on several vases in the early fifth century, which would indicate an aristocratic background for the family. See below.

<sup>50</sup> Buck 1998: 9.

<sup>51</sup> See also Strauss (1987: 94) for the relationship between Thrasybulus and Theramenes.

this was to introduce an oligarchic form of government in Athens and also to recall Alcibiades, who enjoyed close ties with Tissaphernes.<sup>52</sup> One of the leaders of the oligarchs at Athens was Theramenes, who, according to the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia*, desired a moderate form of oligarchy as represented by a government of 5000 citizens rather than the narrower council of 400 (*Ath. Pol.* 33).

While Thrasybulus was in Samos, he worked fervently to maintain the peace between partisans of the Athenian oligarchy and Samian democrats. Although Thrasybulus was officially on the side of the democrats against the oligarchs, he prevented the democrats from going on a killing spree, and instead strove to hold Samos together as a crucial Athenian ally and keep the peace among the many Athenian troops stationed there (Thuc. 8.75). Though at this time Theramenes and Thrasybulus were in different political camps, both were moderate voices arguing for the expedient path in their respective locations. After democracy had been assured on Samos, Thrasybulus did champion the recall of Alcibiades with the express purpose of winning over the Persians (Thuc. 8.81). This, after all, had been the chief motivation behind the formation of a moderate oligarchic government in Athens (Thuc. 8.49).<sup>53</sup> Alcibiades, like Theramenes, had declared his support for the 5000 but not the 400 (Thuc. 8.86.6).

During the period between the naval battles at Abydos and Cyzicus, in 411-410, Theramenes participated along with Thrasybulus in the campaign to exact money from cities in the north (Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8-12). While Thrasybulus and Alcibiades were

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<sup>52</sup> Thucydides' account is complemented by [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 29-33, and to a lesser extent Diod. 13.37-52.

<sup>53</sup> For more on Theramenes' role in advocating the 5000 and recalling Alcibiades, see Diod. 13.38.2; 42.2. See also Andrewes 1953: 2, n.5.



in Thrace, Theramenes was in Macedonia, giving aid to the king Archelaus. Eventually, Theramenes decided to leave Macedonia as Archelaus was bogged down in an unproductive siege of Pydna. He chose then to join Thrasybulus in Thrace and aided in the money-raising campaigns in the region (Diod. 13.49.1, 3). The son of Hagnon would have been a great asset in dealing with those on the mainland opposite Thasos where much of this campaign took place.<sup>54</sup> At the very least he would have had knowledge of the region and probably also local contacts. The military cooperation between Theramenes and Thrasybulus mere months after the political upheavals of the oligarchic coup provides further suggestion of political affinity between them.

During the post-war oligarchy, the Thirty sent envoys to Thrasybulus in an attempt to entice him to join their ranks after he had seized Phyle and enjoyed some successes. They offered him the very position which had been occupied by Theramenes before he had been executed. Diodorus says Thrasybulus rejected this offer due to a lofty dedication to liberty (14.32). On a practical level, while Thrasybulus was quickly gaining ground as a democratic champion against the Thirty, he had no sensible political reason to join the government which had murdered his fellow demesman and former military colleague. While Thrasybulus demonstrated himself to be a democrat, he was no mean populist or demagogue. The Oxyrhynchus historian, in fact, connects Thrasybulus to the faction of the sensible men of property (οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες), as opposed to the democratic mob (οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί, 1.2-3). Some Athenians even accused Thrasybulus of

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<sup>54</sup> Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.1.12) says that Thrasybulus arrived from Thasos to fight at Cyzicus in 410.

contemplating oligarchy at the end of his career. At any rate, he had a great deal in common with Theramenes, as the Thirty recognized.<sup>55</sup>

Alcibiades, too, might have been connected to the family of Hagnon. One of the generals in the early phases of the Peloponnesian War was a man named Cleopompus, son of Clinias. Nothing is known about this man other than his patronymic. It has been suggested that he was related to Alcibiades, whose father was named Clinias from the deme of Scambonidae.<sup>56</sup> We do not know whether Cleopompus and his father were also from this deme, but a small fragmentary inscription tentatively dated to the fourth century connects a Cleopompus, which is a very rare name, to a woman related to a Diodorus of Scambonidae (*IG* ii<sup>2</sup> 7401). If a family connection does exist between Cleopompus and Alcibiades, then Cleopompus' activities as general in 430 are of some significance. Thucydides tells us that he was chosen to take command of a fleet in conjunction with Hagnon to campaign in Thrace against the Chalcidians and Potidaea (2.58.1). It is clear that Hagnon was chosen to lead this command because he had recently founded Amphipolis and had dealt successfully with the local inhabitants, both militarily and diplomatically (Thuc. 4.102). The following year, in 429/8, Hagnon was sent by Athens to aid Sitalces in his campaigns against Macedonia and the Chalcidians in Thrace (Thuc. 2.95). Perhaps Cleopompus too had previous connections in Thrace. At any rate, after this expedition he would have gained experience in the region and a close tie to one of Athens' greatest Thracophiles, Hagnon. Two decades later, Alcibiades led a group of Athenian

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<sup>55</sup> See Strauss (1987: 90-94) for a detailed discussion of Thrasybulus' political ideology and alliances.

<sup>56</sup> For the possible family connections, see Beloch 1884: 323. Davies (1971: 16) thinks it is equally possible that this Cleopompus is related to a Cleopompus from Oeneis who appears in a couple of mid-fourth century inscriptions.

generals in Thrace, a group which included Hagnon's son Theramenes.

Another general appointed to lead Thracian troops and campaign in Thrace during the Peloponnesian war was Nicostratus, the father or uncle of Dieitrephes. Not only was Nicostratus a co-general with Alcibiades in 418/17, he was also from Alcibiades' deme Scambonidae. Also from this deme was Dieitrephes, who was an agent of the 411 oligarchy that had championed Alcibiades' recall to Athens.<sup>57</sup>

Is anything known about Thrasybulus' father Lycus? As Thrasybulus and Theramenes were contemporaries, it stands to reason that their respective fathers were as well, born in the first third of the fifth century. Lycus is not a common Attic name, and from the fifth and fourth centuries only two or perhaps three men of this name are known, one of whom is Thrasybulus' father.<sup>58</sup> Several red-figure vases by Onesimus and others, and a couple of black-figure vases, all dated before the second half of the fifth century, bear the inscription ΛΥΚΟΣ ΚΑΛΟΣ.<sup>59</sup> These inscriptions represent the other one or possibly two instances of the name Lycus from this period. Davies cautions that the majority of these vases are too early, from the first decade or so of the century, to represent Thrasybulus' father.<sup>60</sup> Given the rarity of occurrences of this name, and given that Thrasybulus was quite wealthy and thus likely came from a prominent family, it is tempting to postulate a connection between Thrasybulus and the figure honored in vase-painting. If this Lycus is not in fact Thrasybulus' father, he might still be an earlier relative.

Two of the red-figure vases stand out in their depiction of Thracians, or Greeks

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<sup>57</sup> See above, ch. 3.

<sup>58</sup> For all the surviving instances of this name in Attica, see Kirchner 1901: nos. 9239-9245.

<sup>59</sup> For further discussion of this type of pottery, see above, ch. 2.

<sup>60</sup> Davies 1971: 240.

clothed in Thracian apparel. A cup by Onesimus from the Louvre, dated by Beazley to about 490, depicts two horses with three beardless grooms.<sup>61</sup> The horse on the left is accompanied by a naked groom holding twin spears, much in the Thracian style, while the horse on the right bears a rider clad in Thracian boots and a cloak, also wielding two spears. In the middle, between the two horses, a figure clad in a Thracian cloak, boots, and animal-skin cap holds the reigns of the left horse. The interior of the cup depicts a beardless horseman with a traveler's cap, cloak, boots, and two spears, which is evocative of Thracian horsemen. Another cup, now in Boston and attributed to Antiphon, depicts a beardless lightly-armed youth framed by the *kalos* inscription.<sup>62</sup> The youth wears a cap and is naked except for a cloak and boots. He is armed with a sword and a spear. While it has been suggested that the figure represents a huntsman or traveler, his cloak, boots, spear, and strange cap all suggest Thracian influence, perhaps a Greek emulation of Thracian style.

As in the case of the Philaid family and others mentioned above, these vases might imply a connection between this Lycus and Thrace. Though we cannot know for certain, if the Lycus commemorated as *kalos* is related to Thrasybulus, either as his father or an earlier ancestor, Thrasybulus' family might have had links to Thrace as far back as the early fifth century. Though purely speculative, Hagnon and Thrasybulus' father Lycus, contemporaries and fellow demesmen, might have had plenty to discuss at home on the Attic coast. Hagnon passed his connections in Thrace to his son

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<sup>61</sup> Paris, Louvre G105; ARV<sup>2</sup> 1579, 1595.

<sup>62</sup> Boston, Museum of Fine Arts 01.8030; ARV<sup>2</sup> 1596.

Theramenes. Lycus might have done the same.<sup>63</sup>

Alcibiades repeatedly visited Abydos with his paternal uncle Axiochus, beginning as early as 435 when the former was a young man, and once again around 411. This further demonstrates that ties to Thrace were routinely shared within families. In Abydos the two men were allegedly engaged in libertine activities such as siring illegitimate children and incest, and Axiochus married a local woman named Medontis (Lys. *In Alc.* F 4 Thal). A decree passed in 407 honors the residents of the Thracian city Neapolis, located on the mainland opposite Thasos, for remaining loyal to Athens in spite of the revolt of Thasos. The decree's proposer is one Axiochus, likely this uncle of Alcibiades (*IG* i<sup>2</sup> 108).<sup>64</sup> Like Diitrephes who proposed decrees honoring his friends in the Thraceward area, Axiochus seems to have desired to nourish the connections he made in the North Aegean while accompanying his nephew.<sup>65</sup>

There is additional intriguing evidence concerning cooperation between Alcibiades, his uncle Axiochus, and other Athenian aristocrats. The generals in the north during this period were more or less acting on their own authority, having little contact with the democracy back at Athens. Two inscriptions survive, however, showing that the agreements made between Alcibiades and various cities in the north

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<sup>63</sup> Vos (1963: 53) attempts to use the case of Lycus to disprove the notions that Greeks appear on vases in barbarian dress and that *kalos* vases sometimes depict the object of the *kalos* inscription. She argues that "nobody ever thought of recognizing Lycus in barbarian costume," and therefore the Lycus *kalos* vases must not depict Lycus himself. That no one has advanced such an argument does not imply its falsehood. And at the risk of employing circular reasoning, if Lycus is connected to the family of Thrasybulus, a Thracian connection may have existed to provide a basis for such an artistic portrayal. As argued above, the famous Leagros, mentioned on several *kalos* vases, including ones that depict Thracian figures, was probably heavily involved in Thrace, leading the Athenian expedition which was destroyed at Drabescus. See above, ch. 2.

<sup>64</sup> Andrewes 1953: 7.

<sup>65</sup> For Diitrephes' activities in this regard, see above, ch. 2.

were later officially ratified in the assembly. The inscriptions both list Alcibiades himself as the proposer of the measures, accomplished after he had returned to Athens in 407. IG i<sup>3</sup> 199 preserves only the beginning of an agreement between Athens and Daphnus, a city to the south of the Propontis in the vicinity of modern-day Lake Uluabat. The inscription says that the *demos* and *boule* ratified the agreements made between the people of Daphnus and the generals, that is, those Athenian leaders with Alcibiades who had been acting independently of the *demos*. IG i<sup>3</sup> 118, missing the preamble but preserving the body of the agreement, details the arrangements made between the Athenian generals, trierarchs, soldiers, and all others present, with the people of Selymbria (24-27).<sup>66</sup> Alcibiades himself added an amendment praising the Selymbrian Apollodorus, son of Empedoklos, making him an Athenian *proxenos* as his father had been, and inviting him and the other envoys to the prytaneum for meals (27-43).<sup>67</sup>

An interesting clause in the latter inscription states that all the property of Athenians or their allies that had been lost in the struggle with Selymbria should not be recovered, except for real property in the form of arable land and private dwellings (γῆς καὶ οἰκίας, 14-18). We should probably understand this clause in the missing second half of the former inscription as well. This implies that before the conflict individual Athenians had been able to own property of all kinds in Selymbria, and afterwards they were still able to possess landed estates. Thus, along with securing funds for the war effort and providing the Athenians relief from *eisphorai*, Alcibiades

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<sup>66</sup> See Tod 1950, vol. 1, no. 88; Bengtson 1962-1969: vol. 2, no. 207; Meiggs and Lewis 1988: no. 87

<sup>67</sup> For this decree, see Walbank 1978: 432-444.

was also safeguarding the right of Athenians to own private property abroad. The bulk of the evidence suggests that in addition to overseas *clerouchies*, which were conceived of as the communal property of all Athenians, powerful and wealthy individuals could have their own estates abroad.<sup>68</sup> This was particularly true in the Thraceward region, and it was a privilege exploited most extensively by Alcibiades' closest associates.

The famous Attic Stelai detail the property confiscated from those condemned for desecrating the herms in 415.<sup>69</sup> Along with Alcibiades as the supposed ringleader of the group, the *hermokopidai* included notables such as Axiochus, Alcibiades' uncle, and Adeimantus, an associate of Alcibiades and fellow demesman from Scambonidae. From Adeimantus, the stelai record the confiscation of farmland (ἀγρός) and a house (οἰκία) from Thasos, and the farming rights for a plot of land (ἐπικαρχία τῆς γῆς) in Ophryneum, a city in the Troad not far from Abydos.<sup>70</sup> Axiochus is mentioned several times on the stelai, but the exact location of his property is missing from the extant fragments. Gauthier posits that some of it at least was near Abydos, given the connection Axiochus and Alcibiades had with the city.<sup>71</sup> In any case, some of the *hermokopidai* had property in Abydos.<sup>72</sup> Along with real property, slaves were also confiscated and sold, and a very high proportion of them were of Thracian origin.<sup>73</sup> It

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<sup>68</sup> For the overseas property of individual Athenians, see Gauthier (1973), who mentions this inscription (169).

<sup>69</sup> The Attic Stelai were published in several volumes of *Hesperia*. See Pritchett 1953; Pritchett and Pippen 1956; Amyx 1958; Amyx and Pritchett 1958.

<sup>70</sup> See Pritchett 1953: stele VI.53-56 (Thasos); stele X.10-11 (Ophryneum). For more on Adeimantus' property, see Gauthier 1973: 168-169; Strauss 1987: 53.

<sup>71</sup> Gauthier 1973: 168-169.

<sup>72</sup> Pritchett 1953: stele VII.77-78.

<sup>73</sup> Pritchett 1956: 278. For Thracians as slaves in Athens, see above, ch. 1.

is reasonable to surmise that many of the *hermokopidai* who had property in the Thraceward area had an inside track to acquiring Thracian slaves close to their point of origin. Upon his return to Athens, Alcibiades brought with him the massive spoils of his campaigns, including many prisoners (Plut. *Alc.* 32.1). Perhaps among these were Thracian slaves taken from the Persians and Athens' recalcitrant allies.

Alcibiades was not interested in crushing the cities in the north during his campaigns of 410-408. Instead, he relied on his personal contacts and sympathizers to win over cities by betrayal if possible and by offering reasonable terms of truce if battle seemed imminent. He struck his own deals and drafted his own treaties with cities throughout the Thraceward area, arrangements which were later ratified at Athens once he made his triumphant return. First and foremost, he was concerned with raising money, either by plundering the lands of the King or by ensuring that tribute was once again collected from Athens' chastened allies. The epigraphic record shows that he was also keen to solidify the rights of Athenians to control property in the north. There are only a very few pieces of scattered evidence that attest to private holdings abroad as opposed to public clerouchies. The Attic Stelai and the treaty with Selymbria represent a large portion of this evidence, in fact nearly the whole of the non-literary evidence at our disposal.<sup>74</sup> At any rate, elite Athenians including Alcibiades and his associates could hope to own their own private estates abroad.

As the Pisistratids and the Philiads had a foothold in Thrace, so too did Alcibiades and many of his friends. Winning back allies and harming the interests of the Persians, all with the net result of raising money for Athens, also furthered the

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<sup>74</sup> For the evidence in general, see Gauthier 1973.



interests of a group of Athenian elites personally linked to Alcibiades. A segment of the aristocracy was therefore acutely interested in maintaining an Athenian empire and specifically ties to Thrace. To this end, Axiochus proposed honors to the people of Neapolis. Similarly, Alcibiades bestowed prestigious rewards upon his Selymbrian friend Apollodorus, whose father had been an Athenian *proxenos* in Selymbria. That Alcibiades was able to take Selymbria by betrayal evinces the utility of such connections.

Admittedly, the nature of the evidence necessitates a great deal of speculation in reconstructing the connections among Athenian Thracophiles. But enough circumstantial evidence has survived from antiquity to suggest that such connections existed and permeated every aspect of Athens' relationship with Thrace. There was a distinct cadre of political and military leaders at Athens that saw in Thrace the key to their personal success. Alcibiades and Thrasybulus reinforced one another's interest in the region, as they worked in conjunction with prominent Athenian figures such as Hagnon and Theramenes. Additionally, the seeds of their interest in Thrace might have been sown by the ties forged by family members. The foreign policy of the Athenian democracy was advanced in the north by the aristocratic bonds between not only leading Athenians and Thracian dynasts, but also the most elite and often undemocratic of Athens' citizens.

### ***Ambition and a Place of Refuge***

Plutarch (*Alc.* 23) and Nepos (*Alc.* 11) tell us that Alcibiades was extraordinarily adept at emulating whichever people among whom he happened to be

living. Among the Spartans, although he was one of the wealthiest and most decadent men in Athens, he lived a life of frugal hardiness. In Thrace, he reveled among and out-drunk even the locals. Among the Persians, he was all-exceeding in luxurious living and pomp, and excelled in the hunt. But, as Plutarch adds, he did not alter his inmost character in every instance (παῖσαν . . . τῷ ἥθει μεταβολήν). Rather, he assumed an appropriate external façade (σχῆμα καὶ πλάσμα) to please those around him. It would seem, though, that in Thrace there was little need for Alcibiades to alter his natural behavior. He was, in fact, prone to drunken excess and lewd behavior, like the Thracians, and he was fond of luxury and aristocratic leisure pursuits, like the Persians.<sup>75</sup> The Thracians as well were known to enjoy luxury and displays of conspicuous consumption. Consequently, during his sojourns in both Thrace and the Persian Empire, he was able to freely exercise his basest and most excessive character traits. Among the Athenians he tried to live as he wished while continually aiming at glorious conquest and the aggrandizement of personal power. This, more than anything else, led the Athenians to mistrust him and so excited the righteous indignation of his political opponents that he was destined at one point or another to be driven from the city, or worse.

Thrasybulus as well might have had his share of difficulties with the Athenian democracy. In spite of the renown he enjoyed for leading the effort against the Thirty in 404-403, his conduct at the end of his career was called into question at Athens. Lysias, in his oration against Ergocles delivered after Thrasybulus' death, accuses one

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<sup>75</sup> For Alcibiades' unsavory behavior, see for example, Andoc. 4.10, 20; Thuc. 6.15.3; Plat. *Sym.* 212c; Plut. *Alc.* 4.5, 8.1, 16.1-2, 36.2.

of Thrasybulus' lieutenants of cheating the Athenians and wasting the city's money for personal gain. Lysias implies that had Thrasybulus been alive, he too would have faced the same charges. Instead, it was better for a former hero of Athenian democracy to have been killed abroad instead of face prosecution at home (28.8). In another of Lysias' speeches, we are told that Thrasybulus' associate Ergocles had not only been convicted of the crimes for which he was prosecuted, namely acting as a rogue commander and failing to give an account to Athens of funds acquired, he was in fact executed. The clear implication is that Thrasybulus too had so wronged the Athenian democracy that he would have deserved the death penalty had not the angry people of Aspendus killed him in his tent. This, though, may be no more than slander on the part of Lysias trying to bolster his own case.

Lysias accuses Ergocles of advising Thrasybulus to take personal possession of the Athenian ships on the expedition of 390, occupy Byzantium, and marry the daughter of Seuthes, the Thracian dynast in the region. By so doing, Thrasybulus could have avoided prosecution at the hands of the fickle Athenians. Lysias says that by such activities, these men demonstrated that they considered themselves to be completely alien to their city (ἄλλοτρίους τῆς πόλεως), a stock slander leveled against Athenian Thrace-haunters (28.5-6).<sup>76</sup> He continues by explaining that as soon as such men get rich, they are no longer content with being subjects but seek to be rulers, to occupy strongholds, to establish oligarchies, and to keep the population in fear so that they can freely go about their awful business (28.7). It has long been

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<sup>76</sup> See, for example, Cratinus' attack against Dieitrephes as being barely Athenian (F 31 Kock); Iphicrates prosecuted for being too tied to foreigners ([Dem.] 49.66); Lysias' accusation that Alcibiades preferred to become an actual citizen of Thrace rather than live in his own native city (14.38).

argued that the primary concern for the Athenians was that Thrasybulus and his men were not providing enough funds for Athens and its fleet because they were pocketing the money for themselves.<sup>77</sup> The rest of the accusations, from trying to occupy Byzantium, to aiming at establishing an oligarchy, are but misleading rhetorical tricks with the aim of setting up a glaring contrast with Thrasybulus' earlier seizure of Phyle in the name of democracy.<sup>78</sup> Seager wonders at Ergocles' third piece of advice, to marry Seuthes' daughter, as he can find no immediately recognizable precedent for it.<sup>79</sup>

Despite any rhetorical exaggeration, Ergocles' advice was not out of keeping with the real actions of several Athenians. This, though, does not prove Thrasybulus' complicity. Alcibiades had also been accused of trying to establish his own power base in Thrace in case he needed a refuge from the Athenians, which in the end he did. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades' enemies had accused him of delegating command of the fleet to his cronies in order that he might be free to sail around and extort money for himself while engaging in general debauchery. He had also constructed a private fortress at Bisanthe, or so the accusation went, as a place of refuge (καταφυγή) in case he was no longer willing or able to live at Athens (*Alc.* 36.2). During the period of 410-407, Alcibiades seems to have been in overall command of a group of generals making use of an Athenian fleet in the north independent of, and perhaps in competition with, Athens.<sup>80</sup> This would have provided a precedent for Ergocles' advice of seizing the Athenian fleet. After the failure at Notium in 407/6, Alcibiades

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<sup>77</sup> Blass 1887: 456-457.

<sup>78</sup> Buck 1998: 117.

<sup>79</sup> Seager 1967: 112, n. 164.

<sup>80</sup> For the military activities in Thrace in this period, see Andrewes 1953.

fell out of favor with the Athenians and accordingly repaired to his estates in Thrace. Thrasybulus seems to have incurred the anger of the Athenians as well.<sup>81</sup> Knowing the dangers the Athenian *demos* could pose for generals, and after the example set by Alcibiades, Thrasybulus could well have considered making his own connections in Thrace so as to provide a possible καταφυγή.

Lysias had also composed a speech against Thrasybulus which is no longer extant. The surviving fragments consist only of several glosses by Harpocration, and the general content is all but impossible to reconstruct.<sup>82</sup> This speech, too, appears to have been a denunciation of Thrasybulus' activities while in command in the Hellespont in the early fourth century. According to Harpocration, mention is made of Anaxibius, who was a Spartan admiral active in the area and who would be made governor in Abydos after Thrasybulus' death. Seuthes is also discussed in the speech, as is a satrap of the Great King, Strouthes. All of this indicates the activities in the Hellespont and Ionia for which Thrasybulus was censured in the oration against Ergocles. A curious mention is made of a certain Polystratus, described in the speech as a man whom the Athenians blamed for the infamous desecration of the herms which preceded the Sicilian Expedition. Though we cannot know the context in which Lysias mentioned Polystratus and the herm incident, it is curious that one of the most notorious excesses of Alcibiades, which the Athenians feared was an attack upon the democratic government itself, should be included in a legal speech against

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<sup>81</sup> Buck 1998: 46-47. For Thrasybulus' political fortunes being pegged to Alcibiades' star, see Strauss 1984: 42, and nn. 21-22.

<sup>82</sup> See Harpocration, *s. v.* Ἀναξίβιος; Δικαιοπόλις; ἐπιθέτους ἐορτάς; Ἰσμενίας; Πολύστρατος; Σεύθης; Στρούθης.

Thrasybulus.

There is no evidence that Thrasybulus was ever an advocate of oligarchy at Athens, neither in an extreme form such as the rule of the Thirty, nor even a government in line with the ideals of his colleague Theramenes. He was, though, no champion of radical democracy. The evidence suggests that he had a keen sense of the pragmatic. He was, like Alcibiades, an ambitious man, and he was ever eager to lay hold of opportunities as they arose. He staked his political future on the notorious Alcibiades, and largely followed his example. At Samos, he chose the sensible and necessary course in supporting the democrats. He did what he thought was needed by advocating Alcibiades' recall in order to secure the support of Tissaphernes. He also knew that should Alcibiades succeed in regaining the favor of the Athenians, his own political star would quickly rise.

The political opportunism of Thrasybulus can be seen in several other instances. After the defeat of Athens and ascendancy of Sparta, Thrasybulus had vehemently opposed Athens sending any aid to the rogue general Conon who was serving with the Persians (*Hell. Oxy.* 1.1-3). Scholars have argued that Thrasybulus desired Athens to increase in power without the help of the despotic Persians. Yet, he had advocated Alcibiades' recall during the Ionian War for the express purpose of securing Persian support. Perhaps his opposition to Conon arose out of political rivalry more than any sort of principled opposition to Persia.<sup>83</sup> The scholiast to Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* says that Thrasybulus was a rash man prone to accepting bribes (αὐθάδης καὶ δωροδόκος). He was also contemptuous of the Athenian

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<sup>83</sup> See Strauss (1984) for a detailed account of the very personal sources of rivalry between Thrasybulus and Conon.

*demos* and desired to control everything himself (ὑπερόπτης τοῦ δήμου, ἡβούλετο δι' αὐτοῦ πάντα πράττεσθαι, *schol. ad Eccl.* 203). Strauss, following Saur, suggests that the latter trait indicates neither an aspiring oligarch nor tyrant, but a man in the mold of Pericles, who led democratic Athens as its leading citizen.<sup>84</sup> While a young Thrasybulus might have set out to emulate the greatest Athenian politician of the age, Thucydides' assessment of the political situation in Athens following Pericles' death indicates that few could hope to follow in Pericles' footsteps. Essentially, internal dissention and rivalries for the leading spot ensured that no common policy was followed and no man was able to lead Athens himself (2.65.6-13).<sup>85</sup> The ambitious Thrasybulus would have found it difficult to bear an Athenian *demos* that continually oscillated between rival politicians instead of placing him at the helm of the state. The humiliation resulting from the *graphe paranomon* charge levied against Thrasybulus by Archinus is a case in point.

Thrasybulus' known activities in Thrace, from his personal dealings with several Thracian kings, to the strengthening of alliances and the vigorous collection of money from cities in the area by any and every means, all suggest he was following a path similar to the one traveled by Alcibiades. The evidence from Lysias and other sources suggests that Thrasybulus may not have been a straightforward democrat always upright in the service of his city. Given the historical parallels, such as the marriage alliances between Athenians and Thracian kings and the personal control

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<sup>84</sup> Strauss 1987: 94

<sup>85</sup> For this passage and its scholarly issues, including the accuracy of Thucydides' description of post-Periclean politics, see Rusten 1989: 207-215. While, as Connor (1971: 119-133) argues, Pericles might have been the first of a new generation of politicians rather than the last of an old one, in the decades following his death, no individual was able to achieve the same sort of continuous control over Athens.

often assumed by ambitious generals over Athenian forces in the north, we should at least consider Lysias' charges. At a minimum, the idea of an Athenian commander commandeering a fleet and marrying a Thracian princess was plausible enough to Lysias' audience. For Thrasybulus, Thrace promised a place of political refuge, and also great personal power, just as it had for Alcibiades. That Thrasybulus could have been the sort of man to be enticed by such things provided, if nothing else, material for Lysias' prosecutions.

### ***Conclusions***

In the final years of the Peloponnesian War, Aegean Thrace was central to Athens' strategy. Athens' hard-won foothold on the Strymon, Amphipolis, had been wrested away by Brasidas. Thasos had revolted from Athenian control and many other states had broken away from the empire or were threatening to break away at the slightest opportunity. The last straw was the revolt of Byzantium, brought about by a Spartan fleet. Alcibiades, who had been in exile aiding Athens' enemies, was once again seen as a possible source of salvation. Thrasybulus, who prior to 411 does not appear to have been a prominent figure, championed Alcibiades' recall and thus intertwined his own political fate with the controversial figure. It was to Thrace that Thrasybulus and Alcibiades turned most of their attention, and for several years they enjoyed great success in sinking Sparta's ships and chastening rebellious allies. After the crushing defeat in Sicily, the Athenians had lost all hope of surviving the war. The activities of their generals in the north demonstrated that Sparta, even supported by the Persians, could still be defeated militarily and that Athens' crumbling empire could be



restored.

The situation was similar in the 390's. Athens had been dealt a severe blow by Sparta's victory in the war. Her own military might had been damaged beyond recognition, and she had watched helplessly as the Greek cities across the Aegean succumbed to the wily Lysander or were sold out to the Persians. Confidence was restored somewhat after the Battle of Cnidus in 396, in which the rogue Athenian admiral Conon had led a Persian fleet to victory over the Spartans, effectively ending Sparta's domination of the Aegean. But, Athens was still bereft of an empire, and with Persia's control of the sea there seemed little chance of the situation improving. Thrasybulus' success in the Hellespont in 390-389, winning over several important cities and securing alliances with Thracian kings, reestablished an Athenian foothold in a key region.

At one time or another, both Thrasybulus and Alcibiades seemed the best hope for increasing Athens' power in the Aegean. Thucydides says that the Athenian dismissal of Alcibiades and subsequent empowering of lesser figures went as far as anything else in bringing about the city's downfall (6.15-2-3). Thrasybulus, in addition to being one of the ablest of Athenian commanders in Thrace, was instrumental in ensuring the survival of democracy itself. His struggle in 404-403 saved the city from the murderous Thirty Tyrants and paved the way for decades of unbroken democratic rule, no small feat after democracy's humiliation at the hands of Sparta. Alcibiades could have been the savior of Athens had he not alienated himself from the city. Thrasybulus actually was the city's savior in 404-403 and promised to make great gains toward restoring Athens' former glory abroad.

Aiming at tyrannical authority, Alcibiades hit upon in Thrace a source of great power and wealth – as well as an outlet for his excesses – that he could not find elsewhere. He wielded his own private armies and managed to make himself valuable to the local Thracian kings. He also found a refuge from the angry Athenians. By contrast, Thrasybulus' own Thracian connections paid off decidedly in democracy's favor in 404 and also in the campaign of 390-389. It is a testament to the complexity of Atheno-Thracian relations that the very region which attracted Alcibiades and others as an alternative to democracy also provided many of the soldiers that freed Athens from the grip of tyrants. Thrasybulus, though, a gifted leader who some say desired to control everything himself, was careful to make personal inroads in Thrace to increase his standing and influence, and perhaps also to guard against any threat back home. Lysias' charges cannot be dismissed out of hand as they are corroborated by numerous historical parallels and various passing references in other sources. The execution of his subordinate Ergocles at the hands of an irate *demos* indicates that Thrasybulus might have been well advised to remain in Thrace, as Alcibiades had done and Iphractes would later do. His untimely death at Aspendus prevents us from ever knowing his true plans. What is certain is that Thrasybulus was a skilled commander and man of nuanced political views. Athenian democracy needed him and his Thracian connections, as it needed elitist leaders cooperating with Thracian dynasts and pillaging states across the Aegean. For his part, Thrasybulus needed Thrace to secure his own political success in Athens, achieving his greatest renown in 404-403 and 390-389 because of his ties to Thracians.

## CHAPTER 5

### IPHICRATES AND THE ODRYSIAN COURT

#### *Introduction*

Iphicrates, an Athenian military leader of the fourth century, was credited in antiquity with important infantry reforms that revolutionized Greek warfare by regularizing light-armed peltasts. That Iphicrates was a talented and innovative commander is universally declared by the ancient sources. Much of his prestige derived from a stunning victory at Corinth's port of Lechaeum in 390 where he led a force of mercenary peltasts that destroyed an entire *mora* of Spartan hoplites. In addition to serving for several years in the field with this particular group of warriors – a majority of whom were Thracian – Iphicrates spent at least two lengthy periods in Thrace itself, at the court of the Odrysian king Cotys I. While in Thrace he married Cotys' daughter and fought a naval battle on behalf of his father-in-law against the forces of Athens.

Iphicrates had a son by his Thracian wife, and he named this child Menestheus after the legendary king who led the Athenian contingent in the Trojan War. Davies points out that Iphicrates' son is only the second attested historical Athenian to bear the name, the first having been born only a few years previously. Perhaps, as Davies conjectures, the character of Menestheus was enjoying a literary rehabilitation at this time.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps also Iphicrates' choice of name reflects the complex and ambiguous relationship Iphicrates had with both Thrace and Athens. Iphicrates was a notorious

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<sup>1</sup> Davies 1971: 81.

Thracophile: his tactical prowess derived largely from his experiences with Thracian soldiers; he seemed to prefer the court of a Thracian king to his own city; and he married a Thracian princess who would bear his children. These activities led to a charge of *xenia* at Athens at the hands of his political rivals. A bitter remark from his son, as related by Nepos (*Iph.* 3.4), testifies to the problematic nature of Iphicrates' ties to Thrace. When asked whether he esteemed more his father or mother, Menestheus replied that he preferred his mother. His reason was that his father, as much as was in his power, had made Menestheus a Thracian, while his mother strove to make him an Athenian. Even naming his son after the Athenian leader of an expedition against barbarians could not disguise Iphicrates' awkward position astride two cultures and that at times he opted for Thrace at the expense of Athens.

Menestheus personifies the tension inherent in the Atheno-Thracian connection. Half Thracian and half Athenian, his name reflects an expedition sent across the Aegean to combat an enemy in a foreign land and bring glory to Greece. This, after all, was what Iphicrates had been sent out by the Athenians to do some 800 years after Agamemnon's war against Troy. Yet no mere name could compensate for Menestheus being the issue of his father's aristocratic and dynastic marriage to the daughter of a non-Greek king, for which Iphicrates would be censured at Athens. Menestheus' bloodline would also forever attest to his father's neglect of Athens in the pursuit of his own interests.

The generals of fourth century Athens have often been labeled *condottieri*, equating them with the mercenary commanders of medieval and Renaissance Italy in their propensity for conducting self-serving campaigns that neglect the needs of their

home city. In an influential study, Pritchett objects to this characterization of commanders such as Chabrias, Chares, and especially Iphicrates, arguing that they were always loyal in their service to Athens and remained subservient to the wishes of the *polis*. If unsavory and seemingly independent military actions were carried out – the plundering of sundry states around the Aegean, for example – it was due to the financial exigencies of impoverished post-Peloponnesian War Greece. Generals, lacking the requisite funds from the state, had to resort to unorthodox methods in securing resources. All activities toward these ends were implicitly sanctioned by the *polis* that had knowingly sent out under-resourced expeditions.<sup>2</sup>

While Iphicrates acted more like a *condottiere* than Pritchett allows, he did not represent a new type of Athenian commander for the fourth century. He was perfectly in line with the preceding century and a half of Athenian Thrace-haunters. In general, Iphicrates' connection with Thrace – his use of Thrace as both a path to advancement in Athens and in turn a refuge when he fell out of favor, and even his close relationship with a Thracian king and marriage to a Thracian princess – had been prefigured in the careers of elite Athenians from Pisistratus to Thrasybulus.

Above all, Iphicrates was a soldier. His prodigious tactical sense was so famous in antiquity that Polyaeus attributes to him sixty-four stratagems, by far the largest number given to any man, eclipsing even Julius Caesar (*Strat.* 3.9). In the field he was an able experimenter, unconfined by traditional Greek military practice and ever ready to adapt the tactics and equipment of his soldiers to suit the needs of the campaign and more effectively combat the enemy. Thracian warfare provided the

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<sup>2</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 59-116.

inspiration for many of his innovations, and the unusual experience of almost continuous campaigning with unconventional auxiliary troops provided the ideal forum for honing his craft, leaving an indelible mark on Greek military history. Iphicrates' demonstrated facility with the staples of unconventional warfare, including ambush and deception, were perfectly complemented by the Thracian peltast as well as the Thracian habits of brigandage and raiding. He was a true cross-cultural soldier in that he fought alongside Thracians, both in Thrace and in mainland Greece, and immersed himself in Thracian society and culture to an extent that was parodied by the comic poets.

Nepos and Diodorus attribute important infantry reforms to Iphicrates, namely, the regularization of peltast troops in Greek armies. This has been questioned by modern scholars, especially Best. For Best, Iphicrates was a cunning strategist, but his reforms never actually took place. Thracian peltasts, after all, had been fighting in Greek armies for decades before Iphicrates held his first command, and there is no indication that peltasts were in any way modified or standardized as a fixture in Greek armies after his supposed reforms.<sup>3</sup> Best is right in that Iphicrates did not exist in a strategic and tactical vacuum. He could draw upon many precedents in the use of Thracian mercenaries. What Best overlooks, however, is that Iphicrates was but one in a long line of Athenians with ties to Thrace. The career of this fourth century general demonstrates the importance of the Thracian connection as a catalyst for military innovation.

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<sup>3</sup> Best 1969: 102-108.

### ***Iphicrates' Involvement with the Thracians: An Outline***

In 393, the Persians in collaboration with Conon the Athenian funded the establishment of a mercenary force at Corinth in order to bolster the Corinthians, Argives, Athenians, and Boeotians in their struggle against Sparta. To take charge of this force, Conon appointed Iphicrates, a young and valiant soldier who had most likely served under him at the Battle of Cnidus in 394 and during the subsequent campaign to liberate cities in Asia from Spartan control. Iphicrates was a formidable warrior and a man of great personal courage and daring. He first gained repute by boldly boarding an enemy ship, probably at Cnidus, seizing its captain, and carrying him off in full armor to his own ship (Plut. *Mor.* 187a; Justin 6.5). Because of this exploit, he was given command at the age of twenty of the forces sent to relieve the Boeotians after the Battle of Coronea. The age required for election to the *strategia* was thirty, so this command must have been a special appointment and quite an extraordinary one.<sup>4</sup> Iphicrates, reputedly the son of a humble shoe-maker named Timotheus (Paus. 9.14.6; Suda s.v. Ἰφικράτης), was reviled by the Athenian upper-class and self-conscious about his origins (Arist. *Rhet.* 1367b18; Plut. *Mor.* 186f-187b).<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, his daring had impressed Conon enough to earn him two special commands in as many years.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Parke 1933: 51-52. Justin's comment that Iphicrates was twenty years old might mean simply that he was not yet thirty. In any case, he was too young to hold a *strategeia*.

<sup>5</sup> For his humble origins, see Davies 1971: 248.

<sup>6</sup> For the succession of command over the mercenaries at Corinth, see Harpocration s. v. Ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, who cites Androtion and Philochorus. Thompson (1985) argues that there was a complex command structure at Corinth with an overall Athenian *strategos* and a subordinate mercenary commander. While a succession of *stratego*i came and went (Chabrias, Diotimus, Callias), Iphicrates stayed on for the duration as the mercenary commander. For the possibility that Conon and Iphicrates

Pharnabazus and Conon had raised a force of mercenaries while liberating the Asian cities after the Battle of Cnidus. These mercenaries were acquired in the region around the Hellespont (*Hell.* 4.8.7). As Parke argues, it is reasonable to assume that these mercenaries were those later stationed at Corinth. This is especially likely since the force at Corinth consisted largely of javelin-wielding peltasts, readily available from the area around the Hellespont. This implies a sizeable Thracian presence at Corinth.<sup>7</sup> Still, there is debate among scholars as to the exact makeup and origin of the mercenary force. Best argues that Greeks from the Hellespont made up most of the force, supplemented with peltasts from Athens' allies in central Greece, such as the Acarnanians.<sup>8</sup> Pritchett supposes the force was a mixture of Greeks and Asians recruited by Conon and Pharnabazus.<sup>9</sup> It is most likely that the mercenary force at Corinth, called τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ by Aristophanes (*Plut.* 173), consisted of foreign mercenaries from the Hellespont supplemented by Greek citizen fighters. It is unclear the extent to which these Hellespontines were Thracians, Greeks, or a mixture of both.

It is evident that the citizens of Greek cities in the Thraceward area adopted Thracian military practices at an earlier date and to a greater extent than cities further south.<sup>10</sup> The formation of citizen cavalry and peltast units by states such as Abdera and Aenus is hardly surprising. Parke believes that the peltasts in the service of

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were distantly related, which may also help explain the special appointment as mercenary commander, see Strauss 1987: 133.

<sup>7</sup> Parke 1933: 50-52. For their use of javelins, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.16-17.

<sup>8</sup> Best 1969: 85-97.

<sup>9</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 118.

<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Best 1969: 12-13; Isaac 1986: 85-86, 103-104.



Olynthus were citizens, as they are described as part of the regular army.<sup>11</sup> Peltasts from Olynthus and the surrounding area had bested Athenian troops in the Chalcidice early in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.79). A coin from Abdera dating to the third quarter of the fifth century shows a naked peltast, which Isaac takes as proof that Abdera had a corps of citizen peltasts. Others, though, suggest this peltast represents a soldier in Sitalces' Thracian army.<sup>12</sup> As we have seen, during the campaigns of Alexander throughout Thrace, the Greek traders living in the Haemus range banded together with the Thracians and opposed Alexander from the heights, drawing upon the particular strengths of Thracian infantry techniques (Arr. 1.1.6-7).<sup>13</sup>

Regular contact with Thracians would have necessitated soldiers suited to dealing with the threats specific to the region. Also, the inherent tactical effectiveness of these non-hoplite arms would have been readily apparent to those Greeks who had witnessed them in action time and again. The innovations of Athenian commanders such as the elder and younger Miltiades, Hagnon, and Demosthenes were largely due to extended contact with lightly armed foreign fighters. Greeks living on the edge of the Thracian world could hardly afford the luxury of maintaining affected hoplite snobbery.<sup>14</sup>

Best, though, overstates his case in insisting that when peltasts are listed as

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<sup>11</sup> Parke 1933: 84, n. 3.

<sup>12</sup> Isaac 1968: 103-104. For the peltast being a Thracian in Sitalces' service, see Mattingly 1977: 93.

<sup>13</sup> See above, ch. 3.

<sup>14</sup> For the hoplite ethos, see Hanson 2000, and his concise discussion in 1991: 3-6. For Hanson, during the period of the hoplite (ca. 650-450), only the owners of small farms, the "wearers of bronze armor," had any reason to enter the battlefield, and then only to defend their land from other Greeks (1991: 5). This, of course, would not apply to Greeks needing to defend themselves against the incursions of Thracian marauders. See also above, ch. 1.

coming from northern allies, Greek peltasts are always meant.<sup>15</sup> As Isaac argues, the Greek city of Aenus probably acted as a mustering point for peltasts, both native Thracians and Greeks, in the service of Athens.<sup>16</sup> Isaac posits that Aenus was also likely a hub of the Thracian slave trade, collecting slaves destined to mainland Greek cities. He continues this line of reasoning to assert that Pisistratus recruited his Thracian mercenaries in the sixth century from Aegean Greek cities.<sup>17</sup> It stands to reason that in the fifth and fourth centuries Thracian mercenaries were recruited from Greek cities in the northern Aegean. How else would a Greek commander come into contact with Thracian soldiers-for-hire? Thus, when the sources tell us that a particular mercenary force originated in Aenus, such as that accompanying Cleon to Pylos in 425 (Thuc. 4.28.4), or from the Hellespont as was the case with the force recruited by Conon (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7), there is reason to believe that a majority of the fighters were Thracians that had been mustered in Greek cities.

In the years preceding the recruitment of the force for Corinth, Thracian mercenaries from the Hellespont were active under Greek commanders. While Alcibiades was in the area, he commanded large numbers of Thracian troops whose support he offered the Athenians at Aegospotami (Plut. *Alc.* 30.4-5, 36.3, 37.2; Diod. 13.105.3-4). Plutarch says that these Thracian soldiers were numerous and zealous in their service for Alcibiades because of the affection they had for him (*Alc.* 30.4-5). The Spartan Clearchus had recruited a large force of mercenaries in the Hellespont. Xenophon tells us that when he joined Cyrus for the expedition against Artaxerxes,

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<sup>15</sup> See Best 1969: 13, n. 72.

<sup>16</sup> Isaac 1986: 152-153.

<sup>17</sup> Isaac 1986: 145-146.

Clearchus brought 1000 hoplites, 800 Thracian peltasts, and 200 Cretan bowmen (*An.* 1.2.9). Note that the while the mercenary hoplites might have been Greek, the peltasts were Thracian.

Pritchett remarks on the unique nature of the mercenary force at Corinth, that for nearly five years an army was maintained outside the borders of Attica under the control of a single commander, made possible in no small part by Persian money.<sup>18</sup> In many ways, Iphicrates' position resembles Dieitrephes' leadership over the Dioi in 413. Both men seem to have exploited the opportunity of a special command over a group of Thracians in order to circumvent the confines of the *strategia*. Iphicrates was appointed to positions of leadership before reaching the age traditionally required to be a *strategos*, and both men were given commands without being elected by the *demos* as *stratego*i. Long ago, Rehdantz speculated that Iphicrates owed his appointment at Corinth to pre-existing ties to Thrace, though there is no firm evidence of this.<sup>19</sup> In 390, after several years of campaigning, Iphicrates and these mercenary peltasts put to rout an entire *mora* of Spartan hoplites – that is, 600 of Greece's most fearsome heavy infantrymen – near Corinth's port at Lechaenum (*Xen. Hell.* 4.5).<sup>20</sup> This feat brought Iphicrates nearly unparalleled renown in antiquity as it shattered the myth of Spartan invincibility much as Demosthenes' victory at Pylos had. Good Greek hoplites, let alone the Spartan warrior elite, simply were not supposed to be bested by light-armed troops, especially ignoble Thracian soldiers-for-hire.

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<sup>18</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 117, 123.

<sup>19</sup> Rehdantz 1845. This is followed by Parke (1933: 52) and Best (1969: 86).

<sup>20</sup> See Konecny 2001 for a comprehensive account of the battle. While scholars have variously suggested anywhere between 1200 and 4000 (!) for the size of Iphicrates' peltast force, Konecny estimates around 1500, which seems reasonable. See also Best 1969: 87-88; Anderson (1970: 123-126), who emphasizes the importance of the hoplite support of the peltasts in this battle; and Lendon 2005: 93-94.

Iphicrates was soon back in Athens, having relinquished command of the mercenaries to Chabrias. In 389 the Spartan Anaxibius was wreaking havoc with Athenian and Persian interests in the Hellespont, and it was Iphicrates whom the Athenians sent out to counter him (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33-35). Thrasybulus had recently secured several cities for the Athenians in and around the Hellespont, primarily by obtaining the alliance of the Thracian kings Medocus and Seuthes after arbitrating a dispute between the two men (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25-26). Following Thrasybulus' assassination in Aspendus, the Athenians selected Agyrrhius to take control of all naval operations (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31). Despite Agyrrhius' recent appointment, he was bypassed in favor of Iphicrates for the mission of settling the situation in the Hellespont.

With Iphicrates and his eight ships sailed 1200 peltasts. Xenophon tells us that most of them had been among those who had served under Iphicrates at Corinth (*Hell.* 4.8.34). It is unclear what remained of τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ after the loss of nearly 1200 fighters, but Chabrias evidently continued to carry on military operations in the Corinthia.<sup>21</sup> That such a large force of peltasts was more attached to an individual commander than to a military posting is striking. As Pritchett highlights, because of Persian money Iphicrates was able to drill and hone his soldiers' skill constantly for a period of several years. A powerful *esprit de corps* resulted such that Iphicrates' incredible success at Corinth could not be duplicated until the time of

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<sup>21</sup> In 389, Xenophon tells us that Chabrias sailed out with some 800 peltasts to bring aid to Evagoras on Cyprus, stopping first to get more ships and hoplites from Athens (*Hell.* 5.1.10). Presumably, the hoplites already under his command were taken from the mercenary force at Corinth. There is also some indication that Chabrias won victories at Phlious and Mantinea after taking control of the force at Corinth, though this has been called into question by Thompson (1985).

Alexander, when continuous military training became the norm.<sup>22</sup> Several ancient writers, notably Nepos, remark on the military discipline and cohesion that Iphicrates demanded, facilitated by this special environment (*Iph.* 2.1-2). For all intents and purposes, the force of 1200 soldiers that followed Iphicrates in 389 was a private army. That it consisted largely of Thracians, or at least warriors from a region familiar with Thracian-style tactics, would have ensured their suitability for operations in the Hellespont. Thrasybulus had made important gains for Athens because of his formidable blend of military skill and diplomatic savvy. In 389 the Athenians were afraid that the good things they had acquired through the agency of Thrasybulus would be lost.<sup>23</sup> Iphicrates and his peltasts were seen as the best fit to fill Thrasybulus' shoes.

Once in the north, Iphicrates and Anaxibius attacked one another's territory by sending out raiding parties (ληστάς) until Iphicrates executed an ambush near Abydos. In the ensuing battle, Anaxibius and twelve local Spartan governors were killed, along with 200 men from the Spartans' mercenary force and fifty hoplites from Abydos (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35-39).<sup>24</sup> Iphicrates thereby regained control of the Hellespont and Chersonese for Athens, though this situation would be short-lived. In 387, the new Spartan leader in the region, Antalcidas, connected to the Persian king by marriage and thus supported with a sizeable Persian fleet, defeated the Athenians in a

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<sup>22</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 123-125. For Iphicrates' care in fostering an *esprit de corps*, see Parke 1933: 78.

<sup>23</sup> Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.34: "δεδιότες μὴ φθαρείη σφίσιν ἃ κατεσκεύασεν ἐν τῷ Ἑλλησπόντῳ Θρασύβουλος."

<sup>24</sup> Anderson (1970: 128-129) argues that this battle shows Iphicrates' worth as a commander more than the superiority of peltasts over hoplites, since Anaxibius' force probably included mercenary peltasts as well.

naval battle and set up a blockade against Athenian ships (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25-29). Iphicrates, probably now an official *strategos* along with Diotimus, was still in command of the Athenian naval forces in the area and was engaged in a blockade against the Persians when Antalcidas outwitted and defeated a contingent of the Athenian fleet under subordinate commanders (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.25-27).<sup>25</sup> In this way, the Spartans retook Abydos and control of the straits. The King's Peace, or Peace of Antalcidas, followed shortly thereafter and brought an end to the Corinthian War.

This is the last we hear of Iphicrates in Xenophon's account until over a decade later. We know from other sources, however, that Iphicrates did not return to Athens after the loss of the Hellespont under his watch. Upon the conclusion of the peace, he remained in the north and entered into close relations with the Odrysian court. Did he remain in Thrace on his own initiative, or was he acting on behalf of Athens in an official capacity? Scholarship is divided on the issue.<sup>26</sup> From the evidence available we can piece together many of the characteristics of the relationship between Iphicrates and the Odrysians, especially Cotys I, which may shed light on the reasons behind Iphicrates' sojourn.

After the largely Spartan-dictated King's Peace, Athens continued to have an interest in Thrace, and though Athenian generals could no longer operate openly in the Aegean, Athens tried to maintain a foothold in the north. An inscription has been found, dating from 386, on which the Athenians honor Hebryzelmis, king of the

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<sup>25</sup> For a discussion of this action, see Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64.

<sup>26</sup> See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64-67. See also Kallet 1983; and E. Harris 1989. Kallet and Harris differ from Pritchett in their interpretation of the chronology of Iphicrates' activities in Thrace, the former two placing certain key events in the 360's that Pritchett ascribes to the period immediately following the King's Peace. All three, however, explore the nature of Iphicrates' relationship with the Thracians.

Odrysians.<sup>27</sup> It is uncertain who exactly Hebryzelmis was – whether the son of Medocus I, a usurper, or otherwise – but it is clear that he was the successor to Medocus' reign.<sup>28</sup> As such, he was the enemy of Seuthes II who was trying to establish himself as ruler over the Odrysians and had been doing so since at least the turn of the century when Xenophon and the Ten Thousand fought on his behalf.<sup>29</sup> This inscription, which appears to mention Greeks working on behalf of the Odrysians and what might be Athenian ships on the Thracian coast in the service of Hebryzelmis, has been taken by several scholars as proof of Athenian diplomatic interest in the region, and by extension that Iphicrates was working on behalf of Athens in Thrace.<sup>30</sup>

The reconciliation between Medocus and Seuthes brought about by Thrasybulus a few years earlier seems to have been short-lived. Nepos tells us that Iphicrates fought against the Thracians on behalf of Seuthes II and restored him to his throne (*Iph.* 2.1). This implies Iphicrates was fighting the forces of either Medocus or his successor Hebryzelmis. Nepos calls Seuthes the ally of Athens but, by 386 at least, the Athenians were siding instead with Hebryzelmis. Lines 8-9 of the honorific inscription state that Hebryzelmis should enjoy all of his ancestral rights (ἐναι αὐτῶι ἅπερ τοῖς π[ρογόν]οις / νοι[ς] ἅπα[ν]τ[α]), in other words, the territories sought by Seuthes. There is some evidence that Seuthes was actually hostile to Athens in this period and made attacks against its interests.<sup>31</sup> While Athens had a stake in Thrace

<sup>27</sup> IG ii<sup>2</sup> 31 = Tod 1950: no. 117 = Harding 1985: no. 29.

<sup>28</sup> For the range of possibilities, see Archibald 1998: 219.

<sup>29</sup> For Xenophon in Thrace, see below, ch. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Rehdantz 1845: 24-25; Hoeck 1891: 458; Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 64-65.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Aristides *Panath.* 172.19 in which Seuthes is listed among the enemies facing Athens; Polyaeus (7.38) describes Seuthes attacking the Athenians in the Chersonese with a mercenary force of 2000 Getai.

and made diplomatic overtures to Hebryzelmis, it seems that Iphicrates was fighting on behalf of the other side.<sup>32</sup> This inscription, therefore, can hardly stand as confirmation of Iphicrates' official capacity in Thrace.

Why, then, would Iphicrates have elected to remain in the Thraceward area? First of all, his long experience as commander of a group of peltasts might have given him a keen appreciation for the Greeks' neighbors to the north. He had already grown proficient in peltast warfare, and spending time in Thrace would have yielded many opportunities to enhance further his tactical prowess and renown as a general. It also would have offered a path to advancement in spite of the new environment established by the King's Peace. The prestigious commands he had achieved during a time of war might no longer have been available. Finally, as commander Iphicrates was responsible for the loss of Abydos to Antalcidas. Although his subordinate commanders were the ones to be outmatched by the Spartan leader at sea, the official blame would have rested with Iphicrates and his colleague Diotimus. A return to Athens to face the notoriously fickle and vengeful *demos* might have seemed imprudent. A few years abroad could cool any public outrage against an unsuccessful general. This, after all, had worked for Conon who found refuge for a time on Cyprus and among the Persians after being part of the disastrous Athenian defeat at Aegospotami.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Beloch (1893-1904: vol. 3.2, 87) first posited that Iphicrates fought on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys in succession against Hebryzelmis.

<sup>33</sup> Pritchett (1974-1991: vol.2, 64) attempts to demonstrate that the Athenians did not find Iphicrates at fault for the defeat. As evidence, he argues that Dionysius, one of the subordinate commanders, was named by Demosthenes as a general who was convicted of defeat in Thrace, indicating that it was the subordinate commanders who were held responsible. It would not have been below the Athenian *demos* to convict all the generals involved, directly responsible or otherwise, and in any case the mere threat of conviction could have kept Iphicrates away from Athens. As E. Harris (1989) argues,



Seuthes died in 383 and was replaced by his son Cotys I.<sup>34</sup> At some point Iphicrates married the daughter of Cotys.<sup>35</sup> This probably took place around 386 since Iphicrates' son from this marriage, Menestheus, was a general in 356 (Isoc. 15.129; Nep. *Tim.* 3.5).<sup>36</sup> Iphicrates was thus connected very closely to Cotys' inner court. Iphicrates was instrumental in securing the line of Seuthes and Cotys in the Odrysian kingdom and we hear no more about their rival Hebryzelmis after 386. Cotys became the undisputed king of the Odrysians, bringing an end to the dynastic feud which had existed between Medocus and Seuthes.<sup>37</sup> Demosthenes remarks upon the great things Iphicrates accomplished for his Thracian father-in-law, showing that Cotys was not without reason in honoring Iphicrates with his daughter in marriage (23.129).

Iphicrates seems to have remained in Thrace for several years. It is not until 380/79 that we hear of him back in Athens, at which time he was sent to Egypt to serve Pharnabazus (Diod. 15.29.1-4). While in the north, Iphicrates crafted a close personal relationship with another northern king, the Macedonian Amyntas.<sup>38</sup> Amyntas adopted Iphicrates as his son around 383, probably after the former had been restored to his throne by the help of Athens and Sparta.<sup>39</sup> Xenophon tells us that the Spartans advised Amyntas to hire mercenaries and dispense money to the kings in the area in order to regain his own power (*Hell.* 5.2.38). During the process of courting

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Iphicrates' second sojourn in Thrace was due to the fear of the Athenian courts after his failure to retake Amphipolis. His actions in 387, therefore, might have prefigured those of the 360's. For Conon, see below, ch. 6.

<sup>34</sup> For the date, see Hoeck 1891: 89.

<sup>35</sup> Dem. 23.129; Nep. *Iph.* 3; Anaxandrides *Prot.* frs. 40-41; Sen. Rhe. *Contr.* 6.5. In spite of the ancient tradition, some scholars think Iphicrates actually married a sister of Cotys. See Davies 1971: 249-250, with further bibliography. At any rate, Iphicrates was a κηδεστής of Cotys.

<sup>36</sup> See Davies 1971: 249-251.

<sup>37</sup> Archibald 1998: 219. For Cotys' reign, see Hoeck 1891: 89-100.

<sup>38</sup> Theop. FGrHist 115 F 289; Aesch. 2.26-29; Scholia in Aesch. 2.29-32; Dem. 23.149; IG ii<sup>2</sup> 102.

<sup>39</sup> See the scholia to Aesch. 2.26 for the help rendered to Amyntas by Athens and Sparta.

fellow northern kings in order to secure alliances and soldiers, Amyntas likely came into diplomatic contact with Cotys. It is probable that Cotys sanctioned the relationship between Iphicrates and the Macedonian. Both kings were at the time consolidating their positions and it would seem that they were seeking mutual support with Iphicrates as their agent. Archibald aptly describes Iphicrates during this period as an “international fixer.”<sup>40</sup>

Diplomacy among the Thracians and Macedonians often involved dynastic alliances sealed by marriage or adoption. That Iphicrates was accepted into the families of two northern kings, and thus a member of the inner court of two different kingdoms, is remarkable. These new familial connections were not made solely in the interests of furthering Athens’ interests. They did enhance Iphicrates’ diplomatic clout, which would be duly exploited by Athens in later years, but the primary motivation of the ambitious Athenian was surely more personal. Was Iphicrates simply seeking material gain, which he achieved most visibly in the form of settlements in Thrace, or could he have been aiming at the unthinkable, namely, the acquisition of genuine royal authority in Thrace or Macedon? He is the only Athenian that comes to mind who was related to two foreign kings, a son-in-law to one and the adopted son of another, by which he was legally the elder brother of the future rulers Perdiccas and the great Philip of Macedon.<sup>41</sup>

Iphicrates returned to the north Aegean around 367 when Athens sent him to retake Amphipolis (Diod. 15.71.1; Aesch. 2.28-29). During this mission he provided

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<sup>40</sup> Archibald 1998: 219.

<sup>41</sup> The closest parallel is Nymphodorus of Abdera, who served as Athens’ *proxenos* with the Odrysian king Sitalces in 431 and was connected by marriage to both Sitalces and Perdiccas of Macedon (Thuc. 2.29). See above, ch. 3.

support for the Macedonian royal house. Upon Amyntas' death, one of his sons, Alexander, succeeded him to the kingship but was assassinated. His mother Eurydice, the widow of Amyntas, assumed the throne with her lover Ptolemy acting as regent in lieu of her other two sons Perdiccas and Philip. Under threat from a pretender named Pausanias, Eurydice appealed to Iphicrates for help, even placing the young Philip in the arms of the general. She called upon Iphicrates as a brother to her children in his private capacity (ἰδίᾳ) and as a friend of the Macedonian state in his public one (δημοσίᾳ, Aesch. 2.28). Accordingly, Iphicrates drove Pausanias from the kingdom. Eurydice's rhetorical distinction between Iphicrates' duties as an official representative of Athens, Amyntas' ally, and his personal duties as a close relative of the royal family is interesting.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately for Iphicrates, his ties to Eurydice were ultimately unfruitful as the regent Ptolemy and his successor Perdiccas both aided Amphipolis against Athens (Aesch. 2.29).

Iphicrates failed to retake Amphipolis and the Athenians relieved him of his command (ἀποστράτηγον ἐποιήσατε), sending Timotheus as his replacement (Dem. 23. 149). As Harris convincingly argues, the Athenians forcibly removed Iphicrates from this post due to his failure and most likely would have formally tried him had he returned to Athens. Accordingly, Iphicrates once again elected to remain in the north and went to the court of Cotys.<sup>43</sup> It is during this second stay in Thrace, probably around 362, that Iphicrates had the audacity (ἐτόλμησεν) to fight a naval

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<sup>42</sup> For the formal alliance between Athens and Amyntas, forged around 375, see Bengston 1962-1969: vol. 2, no. 264.

<sup>43</sup> E. Harris 1989, especially 265, n.10. Kallet (1983) argues that Iphicrates was always acting on behalf of Athens' interests, often in concert with Timotheus, a claim Harris rejects as unsubstantiated by the evidence and largely disproved by Iphicrates' subsequent actions.

action against the Athenians in defense of Cotys' interests (ὑπὲρ τῶν Κότυος πραγμάτων, Dem. 23.130).<sup>44</sup> This action served as conclusive proof for Cotys of Iphicrates' loyalty to him (τῆς ἐκεῖνου φιλίας πεῖραν) and he later tried to send Iphicrates to lay siege to Athenian territory. This was a step the Athenian commander was unwilling to take, which caused a decisive falling out between the two men.

Unable to return to Athens after having aided a barbarous Thracian against his home city, and likewise fearful of remaining at the court of Cotys who by then had become negligent of his safety, Iphicrates withdrew to Antissa on Lesbos and then Drys, his own possession in Thrace (Dem. 23.131-132). The language of Demosthenes is clear.<sup>45</sup> Iphicrates had fought one defensive military action against Athens which led Cotys to assume that he could be trusted to lead an actual assault on Athenian possessions. Iphicrates refused to take the offensive and effectively alienated both sides. The relationship between Iphicrates and Cotys which had continued on good terms for over two decades was over. The Athenians, in need of skilled generals, eventually welcomed Iphicrates back and chose him as one of their commanders in the Social War of the 350's.

### *At the Court of Cotys*

Several pieces of evidence illuminate the workings of the relationship between Iphicrates and Cotys. There are many references to Iphicrates' service in the Thracian

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<sup>44</sup> For the date, see E. Harris 1989: 266, n.11.

<sup>45</sup> As E. Harris (1989: 268) argues, Demosthenes' primary target in this speech is the mercenary commander Charidemus of Oreus; the orator is either neutral or favorably disposed towards Iphicrates. His testimony, therefore, is probably free of rhetorical falsification of Iphicrates' story.

court in our literary sources. Also, Xenophon's firsthand account of the court of Cotys' father, Seuthes II, provides an invaluable glimpse into the aesthetics, ritual, and politics of a Thracian court. Finally, some material evidence can be brought to bear, such as more than a few luxury goods found in Bulgaria, some of which are actually inscribed with Cotys' name, that largely corroborate the image of the Odrysian court provided in literature.

First and foremost, the relationship was based on a military alliance, either as a formal extension of Athenian foreign policy or, more likely, an informal cooperation between Iphicrates and Cotys. While in Thrace, Iphicrates seems to have been acting against the general policy of Athens. Little is known about specific campaigns, but Polyaeus provides six stratagems of Iphicrates that occurred while in Thrace (3.9.4, 41, 46, 50, 60, 62). Nepos says that he waged war against the Thracians on behalf of Seuthes (*Iph.* 2.1). And Demosthenes provides vague references to Iphicrates' station as an agent of Cotys (Dem. 23.130-132, 135, 156). None of these sources makes explicit what troops Iphicrates was using in these engagements, whether they were Greeks, Thracians, or a combination of both, nor whether Iphicrates brought his own men or merely commanded the forces of the Odrysians.<sup>46</sup> With such a stellar record in the field, the strategic and tactical advice of Iphicrates, let alone his actual leadership on the battlefield, would have provided invaluable help to any ruler. Yet it seems likely that he also provided men.

As Xenophon's account of Iphicrates breaks off after the King's Peace, we

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<sup>46</sup> Pritchett (1974-1991: vol. 2, 66) argues that in the case of Polyaeus, Iphicrates is always commanding Greeks against a Thracian enemy. While he is fighting against Thracians, there is no reason why his own troops must necessarily be Greek.

hear no more about the 1200 men, mostly from the force at Corinth, who had accompanied their commander to the Hellespont. Did this force remain under Iphicrates' control? For Iphicrates to have rendered such decisive service in restoring Seuthes to his throne, he probably needed substantial numbers of his own troops. Employment in the forces of a Thracian king would have been a lucrative prospect for mercenaries who otherwise might have been out of work after the imposition of the Peace. And if these mercenaries were Thracians themselves, they might have had more at stake in Odrysian dynastic squabbles than mere pay. At least some Greeks were part of the force fighting on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys. Isaeus refers to two Athenian brothers who took part in Iphicrates' campaigns in Thrace in order to "achieve something of note" (2.6), a reference probably to Iphicrates' campaigns in the late 380's.<sup>47</sup> Iphicrates' fighters had served together for many years under the strict and inspired leadership of a gifted commander. 1200 such hardened warriors would have been a force to be reckoned with.

During his second period at Cotys' court, Iphicrates again likely had a force of soldiers with him, perhaps some of those that had been part of his mission to take Amphipolis. Charidemus of Oreus is one example. Later to become an infamous mercenary leader variously working for Athens, the Thracians, and even the Persians, Charidemus had been a light-armed soldier under Iphicrates in the 360's and was part of the mission to Amphipolis. He followed his commander to the Odrysian court after

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<sup>47</sup> For the date, see Edwards 2007:31-32.

Timotheus had been sent to take over operations at Amphipolis (Dem. 23.149-165).<sup>48</sup>

It is plausible that along with Charidemus other soldiers accompanied Iphicrates to Thrace to serve under Cotys.

Iphicrates was a close advisor to Cotys on many matters in addition to providing military expertise. There are several references in our sources to Iphicrates' talent for finding money with which to pay his troops. From Xenophon's account of his activities in the Hellespont in 388 we learn that it was the Athenian commander's customary practice to sail up and down the straits in order to exact financial contributions from the local people (*Hell.* 4.8.35-39). It is difficult to imagine that such contributions were made entirely willingly. As mentioned above, both Anaxibius and Iphicrates initially carried on their conflict with one another by conducting plundering raids (ληστάς) against their respective holdings. The resulting booty would have helped to pay the troops. Years later, when appointed to lead an expedition to Corcyra, Iphicrates made many raids along the way, including capturing several Sicilian ships, in order to raise funds (Diod. 15.47.7; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.35, 38). While in Corcyra, he instructed his troops to work the land in order to make money, and his force was also hired as mercenaries by allied mainland states (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.37). This and other similar means of acquiring funds with which to maintain an army were necessitated by the difficult financial straits faced by the Greek cities in the fourth century.<sup>49</sup> Commanders were therefore expected to conduct raids in order to raise their own money as the city was unable to finance sizeable military expeditions

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<sup>48</sup> See discussion in Parke 1933: 125-126. For more on Charidemus, who remained active in Thrace and was involved by turns with the Thracian king Cersobleptes and the Athenian commander Chares, see Kelly 1990.

<sup>49</sup> As argued by Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 68-70.

through the regular channels.

Iphicrates, then, had a penchant for plundering raids and for devising novel ways to raise funds. His particular military experiences would have been instrumental in developing these talents. Polyaeus tells us of three episodes which demonstrate Iphicrates' financial savvy: marching his troops through poor lands when short of money to encourage less spending; withholding a portion of his soldiers' pay as a security against desertion; and dressing some men in Persian clothes to give the impression to the other troops that even larger sums were on their way from the Great King (3.9.35, 51, 59). This ingenuity came in handy for his patron Cotys. Pseudo-Aristotle tells us of one of Iphicrates' schemes to raise money for his father-in-law (*Econ.* 1350a30). Essentially, Iphicrates advised Cotys to demand a quantity of grain from the lands under his control, which was then sold at the local *emporia* for a huge profit, providing pay for the whole army.

As for what court life would have been like for a close associate of the Odrysian king, we are fortunate to have Xenophon's account of his own dealings with Cotys' father Seuthes. In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon describes the march of the Ten Thousand through Thracian territory on their return journey from Cunaxa in 399.<sup>50</sup> Seuthes, outlining for Xenophon his situation, told how he shrewdly acquired men and horses from the more powerful king Medocus and that he regularly conducted raids against his ancestral lands (ληζόμενος τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ πατρώαν χώραν) in order to wrest control of the kingdom away from Medocus. With Xenophon's help, Seuthes

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<sup>50</sup> See especially *Anabasis* books 6-7. See also Stronk (1995) for a comprehensive commentary on the Ten Thousand in Thrace. For more on Xenophon, who had no love for Seuthes, see below, ch. 6. In spite of his biases, Xenophon's account of Seuthes' court seems to be trustworthy and is corroborated by other sources.



said that his goals would be easily achievable (7.2.31-34).

Xenophon and his men agreed to fight on behalf of Seuthes against his Thracian enemies, and the Greek hoplite force complemented well the light-armed infantry and cavalry of the Thracians. Mercenary peltasts had been used in conjunction with the hoplites of the Ten Thousand at Cunaxa, so Xenophon was well aware of their effectiveness (Xen. *An.* 1.10.6). When the Greeks had first arrived in Thrace, they fared poorly against the local warriors because of their lack of cavalry and light-armed troops (6.3.7). But Xenophon and Seuthes eventually were able to work out a way to integrate their two types of soldiers to great effect, and they overcame the mountain-dwelling tribes that had been harassing them (7.3.37-4.24). The successful implementation of this combined-arms force provides an illustration of the trend in warfare that had begun during the Peloponnesian War under generals such as Demosthenes and would reach its zenith under Alexander.<sup>51</sup> Xenophon's account, therefore, is a key source for the development of Greek warfare at the turn of the century and provides an important description of the way in which Greek and Thracian tactics could be integrated to enhance the armies of both peoples.

Xenophon's remains the most complete portrait we have of the workings of a Thracian royal court. Several of the Greek generals, including Xenophon himself, were courted by Seuthes in an attempt to secure their support against the independent tribes. Seuthes tempted them with promises of lavish gifts, including horses, estates, and even women (7.2.2, 38; 7.5.8). He declared that Xenophon and two of his comrades would be made brothers of the king, sharing in his seat of power

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<sup>51</sup> For the effectiveness of such a force, see Best 1969: *passim*, and esp. 75; Anderson 1970: 112-140; Stronk 1995: 226.

(ἐνδιφρούς) and taking a portion (κοινωνούς) of the kingdom's acquisitions.

Xenophon himself was offered Seuthes' daughter in marriage as well as the port of Bisanthe, the most beautiful of all of the king's estates (κάλλιστον χωρίον, 7.2.38).

Later on Seuthes offered Xenophon two additional estates, Ganos and Neon Teichos (7.5.8). Two of these holdings, Bisanthe and Neon Teichos, were earlier offered to Alcibiades, who had gained influence with both Medocus and Seuthes (Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.17; Diod. 13. 105. 3; Nep. *Alc.* 7.4).

Iphicrates himself was offered a royal Thracian bride and estates, most notably Drys, in return for his service on behalf of Seuthes and Cotys, a proposition he accepted. Harpocration, quoting Theopompus as his source, says that Drys was settled by Iphicrates (ὑπὸ Ἰφικράτους κατοικισθῆναι, s. v. Δρυς). As Pritchett points out, in Ptolemaic Egypt *katoikoi* were foreigners settled on the land in return for military service. Polybius has a similar definition (5.65.10). Pritchett goes on to argue that in the case of Iphicrates, Harpocration is merely referring to a free citizen settled in a foreign land.<sup>52</sup> If one takes into account the parallel examples of Alcibiades and Xenophon, however, one is left with the impression that Iphicrates owned these settlements outright. Additionally, the verb κατοικίζειν implies that Iphicrates actively colonized the site, perhaps with his own veterans. In any case, it was regular practice for Odrysian kings to reward foreign generals with valuable property that was sizable enough to allow for many settlers. Such estates would generate a great amount of wealth. That Iphicrates fled to Drys and remained for several years after he fell out

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<sup>52</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 67.

with Cotys indicates that the Athenian had considerable autonomy while on his estate. If Drys was settled with Iphicrates' own soldiers, Cotys' inability to threaten him there even though it was located in Odrysian lands would be explained.

Seuthes himself received valuable gifts as emblems of his royal authority. Xenophon describes how Heraclides of Maronea made a circuit around the Greek camp trying to extort gifts for Seuthes, accosting Xenophon specifically and saying that the greater the gifts Xenophon should give, the greater would be Seuthes' support (7.3.16-20). In the feast that followed, hosted by Seuthes, distinguished guests vied with one another in presenting their gifts, which included ornate vessels, horses, and even clothes for the king's wife. Xenophon, having no material gifts to offer, instead presented the service of his soldiers, claiming that not only would Seuthes thus regain much of his ancestral land, but the Greek mercenaries would willingly offer up the spoils of horses, men, and beautiful women to the Odrysian king as gifts (7.3.21-33).

Archibald discusses the phenomenon of gift exchange which occurred at all levels of Odrysian society. In contrast to the Persians who gave gifts to facilitate the smooth running of the empire, by granting parcels of land to ensure loyalty for example, Archibald argues that notable Odrysians received gifts in recognition of their own superiority.<sup>53</sup> This Odrysian custom is reminiscent of that practiced by Homer's heroes.<sup>54</sup> Great warriors like Achilles could expect to be given the choicest spoils as a

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<sup>53</sup> Archibald 1998: 148-150. See also Testard and Brunaux (2004) who argue based on this passage of Xenophon that Thracian gift-exchange, namely the flow of gifts from the poorer to the richer, is the exact inverse of the practice as it existed in most "primitive" societies.

<sup>54</sup> It will be recalled that the destructive conflict that arose between Achilles and Agamemnon in the first book of the *Iliad* was a result of the latter's claim upon Achilles' prize Briseis. Though Agamemnon had taken no part in the action by which Briseis had been acquired, his position as the more powerful king entitled him to the pick of the spoils. For a concise discussion of Homeric gift-

reflection of their greatness. Prestige objects, such as those given to Seuthes by his distinguished guests, were for Homeric heroes the necessary outward symbol of their γέρας, the prerogative conferred upon the nobility. Thus, the exchange of gifts was crucial for the demarcation of social rank and prestige in Homeric society, as it seemed to be for the Odrysians. For notable Greeks such as Alcibiades, Xenophon and Iphicrates, the similarity to the world of epic would have been obvious. It matters little whether rulers such as Seuthes and Cotys were aware of Homeric precedent.

Another ritual integral to maintaining the social order in Homer's world was the feast. As van Wees succinctly states, Homeric feasts were key in the "creation of personal networks, the formation of groups, and the differentiation of social status."<sup>55</sup> The host of a feast would be sure to make use of the most ornate utensils and serving vessels possible, while displaying his collection of valuable prestige objects in the dining hall. As such, the diners would often stand in awe at the wealth of their host (*Od.* 4.75).<sup>56</sup> Van Wees demonstrates that heroes would take part in a sort of cycle of invitations and counter-invitations to feasts. Feasts were a way to define one's elite status, as only members of the nobility were invited and in turn invited others to their own homes; the masses were generally excluded.<sup>57</sup>

Seuthes' feast falls into this rubric. The most distinguished men in the region were invited to the event, including the most powerful of the Thracians, the Greek

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exchange, see Finley 2002 [1954]:46-70. See also Donlan 1982; 1989; Jones 1999. *Contra*, see Hooker (1989), who argues that there was no formal institution of gift-exchange as such.

<sup>55</sup> Van Wees 1995:148.

<sup>56</sup> Van Wees 1995: 150-154.

<sup>57</sup> See van Wees 1995: 164-177, including more detailed bibliography.

generals and commanders, and the ambassadors from various communities (7.3.21).<sup>58</sup> Seuthes had tripods, traditionally the most lavish of status objects, brought out for the guests, and each tripod was laden with skewers of meat (κρεῶν μεστοὶ νενεμημένων, 7.3.21).<sup>59</sup> Another notable parallel to Homeric dining is the abundance of meat, in stark contrast with the diet of Classical Greeks. In addition to Xenophon's account, there is archaeological evidence that suggests many Thracians hunted big game and regularly ate meat.<sup>60</sup> Throughout the course of the meal Seuthes was presented with valuable gifts as the various nobles competed with one another by giving ever more lavish things (7.3.26-29).

A copious amount of wine was consumed at Seuthes' banquet, evoking further the imagery of heroic camaraderie as well as the elite institution of the symposium, prevalent at Athens at this time.<sup>61</sup> Several times nobles drained entire horns (κέρας) of wine as they drank to Seuthes, and the king himself emptied a horn with Xenophon (7.3.26-32). Xenophon notes that this ritualized drinking was an established Thracian custom (τὸν Θράκιον νόμον). Earlier, the negotiations between Xenophon and Seuthes over the employment of the Greek soldiers were inaugurated by means of this ritual (7.2.23). After drinking at the feast itself, Seuthes let out a war cry and performed a dance emulating combat in order to show his own martial prowess (7.3.33). As if this feat of dexterity was not enough, at the end of the festivities

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<sup>58</sup> “Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσῆλθον ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον τῶν τε Θρακῶν οἱ κράτιστοι τῶν παρόντων καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ λοχαγοὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ εἴ τις πρεσβεία παρῆν ἀπὸ πόλεως.”

<sup>59</sup> For tripods as status objects for Homer's heroes, see van Wees 1995: 151.

<sup>60</sup> Stronk 1995: 231.

<sup>61</sup> Van Wees (1995: 177-179) makes explicit the link between Homeric feasting and the Archaic and Classical symposium as a means of expressing social class.

Seuthes sprang up, showing no sign whatsoever of being drunk (οὐδέν τι μεθύοντι  
ἐοικώς), in spite of the large quantities of drink imbibed (7.3.35).

The Thracians were stereotypically heavy drinkers.<sup>62</sup> That Seuthes was able to drink so much and still appear sober suggests an affinity for alcohol. There is ample material evidence to support this notion. The Rogozen treasure, found in northern Bulgaria in 1985, contains a large number of ornate vessels made from precious metals. The objects seem to date from the end of the fifth to the mid fourth century, and scholars have argued that the treasure was collected by a noble Thracian family over the course of several decades.<sup>63</sup> The vessels, many of which are inscribed with the names of known Odrysian rulers, including Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, were most likely given to the Odrysian kings as gifts or tribute payments from subject cities. The names of these cities, most of which are located in south-eastern Thrace near the Hellespontine region, are sometimes included on the vessels.<sup>64</sup> The overwhelming majority of these vessels – 163 out of 165 – are drinking *phialai* and wine jugs. Likewise, the Panagyurishte treasure from central Bulgaria at the western end of the Thracian plain, an astonishing find consisting of several fourth century drinking vessels totaling over six kilograms of pure gold, includes several *phialai* and *rhyta*, horn-shaped vessels equivalent to the *kerata* used by Seuthes and his guests.<sup>65</sup> Both of these treasures, as well as several more from Bulgaria, include objects of incredibly ornate workmanship and valuable materials that were certainly meant to

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<sup>62</sup> For more on Thracians and alcohol, see above, ch. 1.

<sup>63</sup> See Fol et al. 1986 and Fol 1989 for a comprehensive study of the treasure. See Fol (1989: 140-194) for a complete catalogue.

<sup>64</sup> Fol 1989: 8-11.

<sup>65</sup> For this treasure, see Vendikov 1961.

showcase their owners' wealth and status. That they consist primarily of drinking vessels demonstrates the centrality of drink-ritual for the Thracian nobility. Van Wees suspects that the profusion of precious metal at the feasts described by Homer is a glamorous fiction, hardly reflected in the poet's real world.<sup>66</sup> It clearly was, however, a part of the world of the Thracian rulers of the fifth and fourth centuries.

The comic playwright Anaxandrides presents a colorful description of the drink-laden wedding feast (συμπόσιον) to which Iphicrates was treated by his father-in-law Cotys (F 42 K-A). Purple carpets (στρώμαθ' ἄλουργῇ) were strewn about for the cow-cheese-eating dirty-haired Thracians to dine in their thousands (ἄνδρας βουτυροφάγους, ἀχμηροκόμας μυριοπληθεῖς). Ornate vessels were used, including massive bronze cauldrons and golden pitchers, from which Cotys himself served the guests. Seuthes likewise is portrayed as portioning out the food in Xenophon's account. There was plenty of musical entertainment, as at Seuthes' feast. As a dowry Iphicrates received two herds of horses, a herd of goats, a quantity of gold, and other splendid treasures. Allowing for comic exaggeration, Iphicrates' wedding feast might have looked very much like the description given by Anaxandrides. Nothing is out of keeping with Xenophon's portrayal of Seuthes' lavish banquet or with the material evidence discovered. The valuable vessels used, the gifts presented and the centrality of the king as host are all entirely plausible elements. In addition to such a feast, Xenophon and his generals were offered kinship with Seuthes and a share in the kingdom. Iphicrates most likely obtained similar honors. Athenaeus follows a

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<sup>66</sup> van Wees 1995: 150.

quote from this passage of Anaxandrides with a description of other sumptuous dinners in order to emphasize the sparseness of meals at Athens itself (4.131-137). Therein may lie part of the impetus for an Athenian such as Iphicrates to turn to Thrace.

Iphicrates, a close advisor to Cotys in military, financial, and other important matters, was treated as *de facto* royalty. He was given the daughter of the king in marriage, feted with lavish feasts and granted valuable gifts of livestock, precious metals and lucrative property. He was intimately connected to a world which to an educated Greek would have resembled that of Homer's *basileis*. Status was determined by ostentatious wealth and military prowess, both of which Iphicrates possessed in abundance thanks to his own surpassing talents and the favor shown by the Odrysian king. For his part, Xenophon had no love for Seuthes or the Thracians, representing them as at once decadent and savage. Though his account is the fullest one we have of Thracian royalty, it is a hostile portrayal. Xenophon preferred instead to find refuge among the Spartans, the quintessential hoplite elite who by their conservatism and restraint served as his model. Thus, he spurned Seuthes' offers in the end. Iphicrates, on the other hand, had no such scruples.

Throughout his speech against Aristocrates, delivered in 352/1, Demosthenes contrasts the society of Thrace with the civilized world of the Greek *polis*. For example, Charidemus of Oreus, Iphicrates' successor at the Odrysian court, did not dwell in any civilized state (πόλιν μὲν οὐδ' ἦντινοῦν οἰκοῦντι), but rather fought on behalf of a Thracian king and exploited his patron's royal authority to mistreat many (διὰ τῆς ἐκείνου βασιλείας πολλοὺς ἀδικοῦντι, 23.138). Earlier in the



speech, Demosthenes ponders what the consequences would be if Charidemus were to leave Thrace to settle in a civilized Greek state (εἰς πόλιν οὐκῇ πού) while continuing to commit the many crimes which were permitted to him by the authority and license (ἐξουσία) available in Thrace (23.57). Though Charidemus is particularly singled out, his mentor Iphicrates is also said to have fought a sea-battle against Athens on behalf of Cotys (23.130). The situation of the two men was quite similar. Both opted for the license of barbarous Thrace and for the royal authority of a powerful foreign patron, spurning the confines of the *polis*. Charidemus eventually became connected by marriage to Cersobleptes in the same way Iphicrates had been to Cotys (Dem. 23. 129). Demosthenes certainly had a motive to portray Charidemus in the worst possible light, as the aim of this speech was to censure Aristocrates for proposing that Charidemus should be inviolable.<sup>67</sup> The picture of the Odrysian court we are given by Xenophon and Anaxandrides, however, substantiated by material finds, fits Demosthenes' characterization. As many Athenians discovered and exploited to their advantage, Thrace afforded the unscrupulously ambitious ample opportunity for material enrichment and the exercise of regal authority. Aside from the sparseness of Athenian dinners, a democratic constitution could not have furnished equivalent opportunities for power, wealth and influence.

### ***Ambition and Anti-Democratic Tendencies***

The sources outlining Iphicrates' life and career describe a talented leader

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<sup>67</sup> As Kelly (1990: 103-104) points out, Charidemus was honored at Athens because he had performed valuable services for the Athenians, which Demosthenes wished to downplay.

driven by ambition and desire for power. The more extreme manifestations of these attributes did not always align well with traditional Athenian politics, according to which a military commander was answerable to the *demos*. Thrace and the court of Cotys offered Iphicrates a path to influence, wealth and standing that would have been largely closed to him at Athens.

In the 380's, Acoris, the king of Egypt, rebelled against Persian rule and acquired as his general Chabrias, who left for Egypt without the permission of the Athenians (Diod. 15.29.1-4).<sup>68</sup> In 380/79 the Persian general Pharnabazus sent envoys to Athens to denounce Chabrias' aiding of the Egyptians and to ask the Athenians to send Iphicrates to act as a general for the Persians. The Athenians, anxious to gain the favor of the Persians, complied. During the campaign Iphicrates and Pharnabazus disagreed over whether to invade an undefended Memphis immediately or to await the entirety of the Persian army, with Iphicrates urging the former course. Iphicrates demanded that Pharnabazus give him the use of all available mercenaries to assault the city lest an opportunity be squandered. According to Diodorus, Pharnabazus began to fear Iphicrates' boldness and courage and worried that the Athenian would take possession of Egypt for himself (15.43). In this climate of mistrust, Iphicrates prudently decided to steal away at night and left the service of the Persians. Clearly, the Persian satrap saw in Iphicrates the type of ability and ambition that would make such a power-grab plausible. In spite of his formidable skill, Iphicrates became a threat to Persian interests in the region.

An overweening ambition was already displayed by Iphicrates as a young man

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<sup>68</sup> For the date, see Stylianou 1998: 100-101. For more on Chabrias, see below, ch. 6.

at Corinth. Following the destruction of the Spartan *mora* at Lechaenum in 390, the Argives acquired power in Corinth with the help of pro-Argive Corinthians in the city. Diodorus says that Iphicrates conceived of seizing the city of Corinth itself, reasoning that its strategic position was well-suited for achieving hegemony over Greece (14.92.1-2).<sup>69</sup> Such a plan must have seemed outrageous to many since the democratic faction then holding Corinth was allied with Athens in the conflict against Sparta and the oligarchic Corinthian exiles. The Athenian *demos* opposed such a brazen move, and Iphicrates gave up his command to be replaced by Chabrias. Pritchett points out that although this episode shows Iphicrates to be haughty and domineering, he was nonetheless compliant with the *demos*' wishes.<sup>70</sup> While it is true that Iphicrates did not strictly act against the wishes of his *polis* in this instance, that he formulated such a plan with a mind to achieving supremacy over all of Greece, albeit on behalf of Athens, bespeaks a great will to power. Diodorus' phrasing implies that Iphicrates gave up his command of his own volition (ἀπέθετο τὴν ἀρχήν) rather than having had it stripped from him by the Athenians. His ambitions thwarted, it seems the hero of Lechaenum walked away from his post in disgust.<sup>71</sup>

Xenophon's account makes no mention of Iphicrates' desire to seize Corinth, but it does say that the Argives who had effected a merger between Argos and Corinth no longer wanted Iphicrates in their territory. Iphicrates, according to Xenophon, had

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<sup>69</sup> For a discussion of this merger, see Griffith (1950) and Whitby (1984) who argue that full unification occurred in 390 after a period of *isopoliteia* beginning in 392; Tuplin (1982) argues that full unification had already occurred in 392.

<sup>70</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 62-63.

<sup>71</sup> Tuplin (1982: 83 n.29) and Whitby (1984: 307 n.29) argue that the *demos* in this passage refers to that of the Corinthians. Iphicrates' subsequent resignation and his replacement by Chabrias, who showed no intention of carrying through with any type of similar plan on behalf of Athens, to my mind indicates that it was the Athenians who opposed Iphicrates.

actually put to death some of the members of the pro-Argive faction (*Hell.* 4.8.34). The Argives had supported the democratic party in Corinth, it seems, in order to exercise control over the city. The boundary stones between Corinth and Argos had been removed and the Corinthians were given the rights of Argive citizenship. This did not go over well with the pro-Spartan faction in Corinth, forced into exile by those loyal to the alliance with Athens, Argos and Boeotia. As such, the exiles joined forces with Sparta and after a military victory occupied Lechaëum (*Hell.* 4.4). It was this group, namely Corinthian exiles and Spartan soldiers, against whom Iphicrates was campaigning when he cut down the Spartan *mora*.

Throughout his account, Xenophon displays a clear bias in favor of the pro-Spartan faction, portraying the democrats as murderous tyrants (*Hell.* 4.4.1-5).<sup>72</sup> He does not, however, give any reason as to why Iphicrates had killed some of the so-called ἀργολιζόντες. The verb used for killing, ἀποκτείνω, often implies judicial execution.<sup>73</sup> Xenophon perhaps wants us to see Iphicrates as an instrument of the law, putting to death those guilty of wrongdoing; or perhaps Iphicrates was acting like a tyrant, arbitrarily executing his enemies. The historian generally thinks highly of Iphicrates (*Hell.* 6.2.39; 6.5.51) and is decidedly against the Argive-Corinthian alliance (4.4). A portrayal of Iphicrates justly condemning perfidious Argives would be in keeping with such biases. Yet, Iphicrates' campaigns around Corinth were specifically against the Spartans and those Corinthians with whom they were allied.

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<sup>72</sup> Whitby (1984: 296-297) suggests that Xenophon's sources for these events were oligarchic Corinthians.

<sup>73</sup> See the second definition under the entry in the LSJ. See also Xenophon's use of the term in the case of the judicial execution of the Athenian captives after Aegospotami (*Hell.* 2.1.32) and those performed under the Thirty (*Hell.* 2.3.21).

As such, he was fighting on the side of, in fact on behalf of, those citizens of Corinth who were pro-Argos and who had willingly accepted the merger.<sup>74</sup> A glaring inconsistency is apparent.

Perhaps motives of a more personal nature were behind Iphicrates' execution of members of the pro-Argive faction. As Diodorus tells us, Iphicrates had formulated a plan to seize Corinth. Ultimately the Argives managed to do just that, perhaps as a direct response to the threat that Iphicrates might anticipate them. Iphicrates may have undertaken these killings in order to crush his rivals in the pursuit of control over Corinth. Diodorus' account makes it clear that the Athenians themselves wanted no part in such a scheme. There is no record of any conflict between Iphicrates' replacement Chabrias and the pro-Argive faction. Chabrias maintained a military presence in the area, and may have led several raids against Spartan allies, to ensure the security of Argive-controlled Corinth against the Spartans and their partisans.<sup>75</sup> Thus, Iphicrates might have acted on his own, seeking to fulfill his own personal ambitions, when he killed these men.

According to Polyaeus, when Iphicrates was facing a capital charge at Athens, rather than take his chances with the judges, he arranged for a band of his own

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<sup>74</sup> Whitby (1984: 301, 307) argues that Iphicrates was acting on behalf of Athens as a check on the more extreme elements in the pro-Argos faction. According to this reconstruction, Iphicrates' execution of certain pro-Argive partisans gave the Argives an opportunity to demand Iphicrates' withdrawal and thus take full control of Corinth. In this way, Iphicrates' independent actions actually hurt Athens' cause in that it gave the pro-Argive party enough leverage to achieve their aim of unification without Athenian protest or intervention. Neither Xenophon nor Diodorus make any mention, however, of an Athenian desire to check the more radical aims of Argos. The evidence for such is based only on a few lines from one of Andocides' speeches (3.26, 32). Yet, within this same speech (3.41), Andocides implies that both the Corinthians and Argives appealed for Athenian military aid, which would indicate that the Argives at least did not view the Athenian military presence as a threat to their aims of unification.

<sup>75</sup> Scholia in Ael. Arist. *Pan.* 171.3; Polyaeus. *Strat.* 3.11.6. But, see Thompson (1985) for possible problems with these sources.

thugs to bear their swords to intimidate the court. He also made sure the judges saw his own sword, which he flashed before them (3.9.15, 29). We cannot know with certainty whether Iphicrates' unofficial bodyguard was made up of Thracians, but the incident is reminiscent of Pisistratus' seizure of power in Athens with the help of Thracian mercenaries. Iphicrates, with his personal ties to Thrace and access to Thracian soldiers, could have relied on a group of Thracian retainers to ensure that he got his way in the Athenian courts. The elder Seneca, using this incident (albeit with some ahistorical elements) to illustrate a legal point, does say that Iphicrates' bodyguard was made up of Thracians (*Contr.* 6.5). In any case, Iphicrates was not above the use of violence and intimidation to subvert the democratic process.

Polyaenus says that the trial in question was the one resulting from the Athenian failure at the Battle of Embata during the Social War in 356. Due to adverse weather conditions, Iphicrates, his son Menestheus, and Timotheus refused to fight along with Chares, leaving Chares to suffer defeat. The latter subsequently brought a charge of treason against the other three generals, with his ally Aristophon leading the prosecution. We know from other sources that Iphicrates and his son were acquitted, while Timotheus was found guilty and ordered to pay a fine of 100 talents. In disgrace, Timotheus withdrew to Chalcis and died shortly afterwards.<sup>76</sup> Why would Iphicrates and his son be acquitted while their colleague was found guilty on exactly the same charge? The answer seems to lie with Iphicrates' intimidation of the court by means of his own personal retinue.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Diod. 16.21.4; Isok 15.129; Dein 1.14; Nep. *Iph.* 3.3, *Tim.* 3; Polyain. 3.9.29; Plut. *Mor.* 801-802.

<sup>77</sup> For the trial, see Sealey 1955: 74-75; Cawkwell 1962: 48-49; Moysey 1987: 83; Burich 1994: 57-60. Most scholars attribute Timotheus' conviction to political factors, such as a popular opposition to his

There is some indication that Iphicrates jealously guarded his special place among the Thracians. A famous rivalry through much of the first half of the fourth century is that which existed between Iphicrates and Timotheus the son of Conon.<sup>78</sup> Interestingly enough, Iphicrates and Timotheus might have been distantly related as Iphicrates' father was named Timotheus.<sup>79</sup> The favor shown to Iphicrates by Conon and their close relationship may have been a source of tension for Conon's son.<sup>80</sup> Conon had given Iphicrates the command of the mercenaries that had been recruited from Thrace. Timotheus also attempted to exploit the opportunities presented by Thrace throughout the course of his career, as well as serving abroad in Egypt and Persia. Both were talented and ambitious generals who gained much of their power and prestige from campaigns abroad, particularly in the north.<sup>81</sup> This is what lay behind much of the conflict between the two men.

In 373 the Athenians had appointed Timotheus to lead an expedition to Corcyra. In order to bolster the force given to him, Timotheus went to Thrace to recruit men and ships and to entice the cities in the region to join in an alliance with Athens. This side trip, though, apparently took too much time and Timotheus was put on trial by the Athenians for the delay and stripped of his command.<sup>82</sup> To take his

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policies of moderation and restraint. Isocrates claims that Timotheus failed to court the populace adequately, and was thus convicted (15.131). In the main, Timotheus seems to have shied away from the more unscrupulous methods adopted by men like Iphicrates. See below, ch. 6.

<sup>78</sup> Kallet (1983) argues that the two actually cooperated to a greater extent than most scholars have assumed. The bulk of the evidence, however, suggests that a strong rivalry did exist. There is no indication that the two cooperated until the Social War of the 350's.

<sup>79</sup> See Strauss 1987: 133; Sealey 1993: 12-13.

<sup>80</sup> As pointed out by Kallet (1983: 241).

<sup>81</sup> For some examples of Timotheus' northern activities and ties to foreign kings, see Dem. 49.26, Diod. 15.36.5, Nep. *Tim.* 2.1.

<sup>82</sup> After this trial, Timotheus served as a mercenary in Persia for several years. For more on his career and foreign connections, see below, ch. 6.

place, the Athenians chose Iphicrates who immediately made the most of the opportunity, employing his legendary discipline and vigorously recruiting men and materiel. He even managed to secure the symbolic flagships *Paralus* and *Salaminia* as part of his fleet (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.12-14; Diod. 15.47.2-3). While the Athenians were initially outraged at Timotheus' delay, Diodorus says that they soon saw the benefits inherent in the sizeable force of thirty triremes he had been able to gain in the north, as well as the numerous allies he had won for the Athenian cause. Consequently, Timotheus was accepted back into favor (Diod. 15.47.3). From Pseudo-Demosthenes we learn that Iphicrates and his ally Callistratus had led the prosecution of Timotheus (49.9). The favor that Timotheus' efforts would eventually gain him in Athens was evidently foreseen by Iphicrates who preempted it with a trial. That Timotheus had made such diplomatic gains in Thrace probably intensified Iphicrates' desire to humble his rival.

Timotheus would later return the favor. He brought a charge of ξενία against Iphicrates and pledged in the *ecclesia* to prosecute it with all his might (Dem. 49.66).<sup>83</sup> This was probably based on Iphicrates' extensive ties to Cotys and perhaps also to Amyntas.<sup>84</sup> We do not know the date of this charge and scholars variously place it between 370/69 and 362.<sup>85</sup> Timotheus had been chosen to replace Iphicrates around 364 upon the latter's failure to take Amphipolis, and perhaps the charge played a part in Timotheus' attempt to secure his own position in the north. A γραφή ξενίας would also be appropriate after Iphicrates had aided Cotys against Athens around 362.

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<sup>83</sup> For a discussion of this type of charge, see Harrison 1968-1971: vol. 2, 23-24.

<sup>84</sup> Kallet 1983: 241, n.8; Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 63, n.36; Sealey 1993: 83.

<sup>85</sup> Kallet 1983: 241, n.8; Sealey 1993: 83.



Alternatively, if an earlier date is assumed, it may be connected to Iphicrates' adoption by Amyntas or his marriage to a Thracian princess. The elder Seneca implies that Iphicrates had been chastised because of this marriage (*contr.* 6.5). In any case, the nature of such a charge implies that Iphicrates was too intertwined with foreigners, a fact that Timotheus attempted to exploit. This is reminiscent of Plato Comicus' slander directed at Dieitrephes (μόγλις Ἀττικόν, F 31 K-A), and similar accusations were often made against Athenian Thracophiles.<sup>86</sup> In the end the prosecution was never pursued and the two reconciled through a marriage alliance. Timotheus gave his daughter to Menestheus, the son of Iphicrates and his Thracian wife ([Dem.] 49.66).<sup>87</sup>

As a final note on Iphicrates' ambition, let us consider what Demosthenes tells us about the falling out with Cotys (23.129-132). In this speech, *Against Aristocrates*, Iphicrates is employed as a rhetorical device to emphasize the much worse behavior of his successor Charidemus. As such, Demosthenes had no inherent interest in impugning Iphicrates through rhetorical exaggeration, let alone falsehoods.<sup>88</sup> As outlined above, Iphicrates lost Cotys' favor after he refused to attack Athenian possessions. Cotys had come to expect the complete loyalty of Iphicrates after the latter had fought a naval battle against Athenian forces. When Iphicrates refused to take the offensive, Cotys reduced him to such dire straits (τοῦτο . . . ἀπορίᾳς) that he left the royal court and withdrew to Antissa and Drys. Scholarship has largely concluded, following Rehdantz, that while Iphicrates was willing to defend his patron

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<sup>86</sup> See above, ch. 3.

<sup>87</sup> Despite the arguments of E. Harris (1988: 51-52), it is unlikely that this marriage took place in the earlier part of the decade since Iphicrates' son Menestheus, whose mother was the daughter of Cotys (Nep. *Iph.* 3), would have been too young.

<sup>88</sup> For Demosthenes' generally favorable or ambivalent attitude toward Iphicrates, see E. Harris 1989: 268.

against Athenian attack, he was unwilling to take the offensive against Athenian possessions. He thus followed a shrewd but delicate policy whereby he tried to serve Cotys while at the same time keeping open the possibility of some day returning to Athens.<sup>89</sup>

Demosthenes tells us that Iphicrates elected to serve Cotys in spite of the surpassing honors he had earlier received from the Athenians. Though he had a bronze statue, free meals in the Prytaneum, and other conspicuous distinctions, he nonetheless dared to fight for Cotys against the city which had so honored him. Could it be that Iphicrates acted in such a way because he expected even greater honors from Cotys? He had already received Cotys' daughter in marriage, estates in Thrace, and certainly other material benefits for his prior service for the Odrysians. After the naval battle, Cotys felt that he was secure (βεβαίως . . . σῶς) and began to take Iphicrates' services for granted. Consequently, he no longer took pains to reward him (οὐχ ὅπως ἀποδώσει χάριν ἐσπούδασεν αὐτῷ). Once the benefits had dried up, Iphicrates refused to aid Cotys any further against Athens. In reaction to Iphicrates' new tack, Cotys reduced Iphicrates to desperation and became "negligent of his safety (ὀλιγωροῦνθ' . . . τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σωτηρίας)." Iphicrates' felt a sufficient threat of harm so as to despair of remaining at court. It seems that Cotys fully expected Iphicrates to attack Athenian interests in the north and was enraged when he failed to do so. It is odd that the Odrysian king seems to have had no notion of Iphicrates' supposedly delicate strategy of playing both sides.

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<sup>89</sup> See, for example, Rehdantz 1845: 149; Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 66; E. Harris 1989: 267.

Iphicrates' own reasoning, at least according to Demosthenes' account, was that he could not well (καλῶς) return to Athens since he had slighted his home city in favor of a barbarous Thracian. This does not evince a subtle policy whereby Athenian favor could have been maintained. That he was able to return to Athens years later, probably once the Social War had broken out, bespeaks Iphicrates' sheer indispensability as a commander more than a carefully crafted scheme to remain in Athens' good graces. It is plausible that Iphicrates threw all his cards in with Cotys as the source of the greatest rewards, only to be disappointed when the lavish benefits dried up. In this context, perhaps the ἀπορία to which Iphicrates had been reduced signifies material poverty and a diminution of prestige at the Odrysian court as a consequence of Cotys' new attitude. This would provide a neat contrast with Demosthenes' earlier description of the surpassing benefits the Athenians had bestowed on their commander. It would also provide an additional motive underlying Iphicrates' retreat to his own strongholds.

### *Iphicrates' Style of Warfare*

Although Iphicrates has often been credited with making peltasts a prominent feature of Greek armies, he was not the first to realize the usefulness of light-armed Thracian troops and exploit them to great effect, as Best conclusively shows.<sup>90</sup> The light infantry tactics of the Thracians certainly had a profound and lasting effect on Greek military practice, but peltasts had been used by the Athenians at Pylos in 425, by the Cyreans in 401, and during many other engagements before their famous

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<sup>90</sup> Best 1969: 47, 102-110.

exploits during the Corinthian War. This is not to discount Iphicrates' military talent. His victory over the Spartans at Lechaenum was a *tour de force*. Although only peltasts were involved in the actual fighting as described by Xenophon, Callias did marshal the hoplites during the battle and advanced toward the Spartans once they had already been badly thrashed by Iphicrates' men. It was this hoplite threat that finally caused the Spartans to withdraw (*Hell.* 4.5.14-17). Again, coordination between hoplites and peltasts had been utilized by Xenophon and Seuthes a decade earlier. The singular achievement of Iphicrates at Corinth seems to have been his use of strict discipline and constant drill, made possible by such an extended time in the field as financed by the Persians.<sup>91</sup>

Iphicrates' skill as a commander and as an enforcer of discipline, as well as his prodigious resourcefulness, made him a valuable addition to the Odrysian court and the perfect man to make the best use of Thracian troops who were likely unaccustomed to such rigorous drill and maneuver. Whether or not he had connections with Thrace prior to his command of τὸ ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, he did demonstrate a penchant for Thracian-style warfare, including more than the use of peltasts. Iphicrates was adept at plundering raids. He probably began raiding enemy territory while part of Conon's expedition after Cnidus. Beginning in the Hellespont, Conon and Pharnabazus laid waste to Spartan possessions near Sestus and Abydos and then ravaged Spartan territory itself, doing as much damage as possible (ἐκακούργει ὅ τι ἐδύνατο, Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.6-11). While stationed at Corinth, Iphicrates led many

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<sup>91</sup> Thus Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 123-125. Anderson (1970: 121) emphasizes Iphicrates' innovation in marshalling peltasts so skillfully that they became accustomed to fighting in formation when the situation demanded it. This was no small feat for troops accustomed to fighting loosely as individuals.

raids against the adjacent territories, attacking Phlius and plundering (λεηλατῶν) its territory (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15). He also attacked Arcadia, assaulting walled towns and seizing plunder (ἐλεηλάτουν). The Arcadian hoplites did nothing to prevent this since they were terrified of the peltasts (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.16).

Raiding was a particularly Thracian form of warfare. It was the preferred method of attack for the Dioi of Dieitrephes (Thuc. 7. 29-30).<sup>92</sup> Strabo says that the peoples inhabiting the Thracian lands of the Balkans are of all nations the most steeped in brigandage (ληστροικώτατα ἔθνη, 7.5). Seuthes told Xenophon that his mode of living consisted largely in raiding Medocus' territory (καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ ζῶ τούτους ἔχων, ληζόμενος τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ πατρώαν χώραν, *An.* 7.2.34).

Isocrates, in the *Panegyricus*, suggests that peltasts could threaten to seize cities just as pirates (καταποντισταὶ) would take over the sea, implicitly equating peltasts with pirates (4.115). Thrace, therefore, would be a natural haven for a commander prone to such a style of warfare.

Iphicrates also demonstrated on several occasions an ability to attack under cover of darkness and to make effective use of trickery and ambush. At Phlius he ambushed the men of the city when they came out to defend themselves, and killed a great many of them (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15). In the Hellespont he slaughtered Anaxibius along with hundreds of his soldiers after springing a trap (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.35-39).

Polyaenus' enumeration of Iphicrates' stratagems includes many instances of trickery, ambush and night operations (3.9). Night maneuvers, even over rough terrain, were a

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<sup>92</sup> See above, ch. 3.

specialty of the Dioi (Thuc. 7.29-30), and perhaps also the Thracians under Thrasybulus.<sup>93</sup> Xenophon and Seuthes had difficulty with the Thracian mountain tribes who attacked them during the night (*An.* 7.4). The similarity of the speed, mobility, and trickery inherent in Thracian warfare to the maxims prescribed by guerilla leaders such as Mao has been noted by Best.<sup>94</sup>

Diodorus (15.44) and Nepos (*Iph.* 1) detail Iphicrates' supposed military reforms by which he radically modified the standard Greek infantry soldier. Both authors agree that the large and unwieldy hoplite shield, the *aspis*, was replaced by the smaller Thracian-style *pelte*. Allegedly because of the adoption of the *pelte*, these soldiers became known as peltasts. Iphicrates increased the size of the spear, Diodorus says by half, while Nepos says the length was doubled. Also, the sword was lengthened to up to twice its original size. The soldiers were all given boots that were light and easy to untie, aptly dubbed ἰφικρατίδαι. Finally, Nepos provides the detail that the standard mail or brass armor was replaced by a lighter linen cuirass. All of these reforms were designed to make the infantryman more maneuverable and agile, much like traditional Thracian soldiers. Diodorus places these reforms after Iphicrates' experiences in Egypt in the early 370's.

Best dismisses the reforms as spurious.<sup>95</sup> For a long time, the standard interpretation of these passages was that this new "Iphicratid" infantryman, a sort of hybrid soldier, became a staple throughout the fourth century and was the key military

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<sup>93</sup> See above, ch. 4.

<sup>94</sup> Best 1969: 25-26.

<sup>95</sup> Best 1969:102-109.

development of the time.<sup>96</sup> The problem with this line of argument is that there is no evidence in our sources for such an infantryman in the Classical period.<sup>97</sup> Also, Diodorus and Nepos seem to imply that these reforms introduced peltasts to Greek warfare, but peltasts had been used by the Greeks for decades by this point. Additionally, the reforms in question seem to point to a modification of hoplite soldiers with sturdy thrusting spears rather than a creation of new light-armed peltasts.<sup>98</sup> Yet, as Stylianou argues, it is doubtful whether both Nepos and Diodorus fabricated this information. Rather, it would seem that they used Ephorus as a source and simply misunderstood the information he provided. Stylianou concludes that Iphicrates probably equipped some of his men in Egypt in this fashion to better combat the unwieldy heavy infantry of the Egyptians, and that these reforms were only temporarily used in this specific context.<sup>99</sup>

While it is true that Diodorus places these reforms within the Egyptian campaign and that they applied to heavy-armed hoplite troops rather than peltasts, they could have been inspired by Iphicrates' experiences with Thracian soldiers. The most effective type of army, especially for combating the tribesmen of Thrace, was a combined-arms force of heavy and light infantry and cavalry. The branch of the Ten Thousand accompanying Xenophon fared poorly against their mobile enemy when they first arrived in Thrace because they lacked light troops and cavalry. Yet, when they combined forces with Seuthes' plentiful peltasts and mounted fighters, they

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<sup>96</sup> See for example Lippelt 1910: 65-67; Parke 1933: 77-83; Griffith 1935: 5, 7, 196, 239, 317.

<sup>97</sup> Stylianou 1998: 344.

<sup>98</sup> Parke 1933: 77-83; Best 1969:102-110; Anderson 1970: 129-131.

<sup>99</sup> Stylianou 1998: 343-345. Another perspective is given by Griffith (1981), who thinks that Nepos and Diodorus conflated many reforms of Iphicrates, occurring over several years, into the single context of the Egyptian campaign. Griffith argues that it was only the longer spear that was introduced in Egypt.

devastated the hostile tribes and forced them to submit to Seuthes' authority. A commander as adept as Xenophon was quick to formulate a way to integrate such disparate arms, staggering their march through the night to ensure that the faster units did not outpace the slower (*An.* 7.3.37-39).

Peltasts were effective against heavy infantry unsupported by other arms but were vulnerable against a variegated force. Iphicrates chose to attack the Spartan *mora* at Lechaeum because he saw that the Spartan hoplites were largely unsupported by either cavalry or peltasts of their own (*Xen. Hell.* 14.5.13). Thus peltasts alone were able to cut down the more encumbered Spartans. Callias, however, did draw up the Athenian hoplites in case they were needed in the battle. The final blow was struck when the Athenian hoplite phalanx began to advance against the Spartans. The Spartans attempted to chase down Iphicrates' troops with what horsemen they did have, but the horsemen never drove home their pursuit as they attempted to maintain a continuous front with the hoplites (*Xen. Hell.* 4.5.16). In this way, the Spartans failed to use their cavalry support to its full potential.

Some more or less effective measures were devised by the Spartans to combat a light-armed enemy. Xenophon says that Iphicrates' peltasts were initially terrified of the Spartans because on one occasion, the younger and more agile of the Spartan hoplites had managed to capture some retreating peltasts even over a long distance (*Hell.* 4.4.16).<sup>100</sup> This tactic had already been employed by Brasidas in 423 against lightly armed Illyrians (*Thuc.* 4.125). It was indeed attempted by the Spartan *mora* against Iphicrates' peltasts at Lechaeum when the polemarch ordered the men in the

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<sup>100</sup> Anderson (1970: 123) argues that perhaps the Spartans learned these tactics from the Thracians themselves.



age classes of 25-30 (τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἄφ' ἡβης) to run out in pursuit of the enemy. This time, however, they were unsuccessful, primarily because the peltasts exploited the gaps formed during the pursuit and cut down many men (*Hell.*4.5.16). It would appear that Iphicrates learned from his earlier experience of this new Spartan tactic and found a way to turn it his own advantage.<sup>101</sup>

That his peltasts worked in conjunction with hoplites and that he noticed the Spartans were unprotected by faster troops implies Iphicrates well understood the importance of diversity of arms. He likened an army to a human body, with the phalanx as the breast, light-armed troops as the hands, and the cavalry as the feet (Polyaen. 3.9.22). During his first stay in Thrace in the service of Seuthes and Cotys, he probably developed such ideas further, much as Xenophon had a decade and a half earlier. It would also seem that Iphicrates grasped the potential of having more heavily armed soldiers able to execute speedy maneuvers as the Spartans did at Lechaem, however unsuccessfully. Polyaenus tells us that Iphicrates never allowed his troops to break formation during a pursuit, which suggests that he also learned from the Spartans' mistakes (3.9.2). Perhaps his reforms, if they did take place in Egypt, were based on a combination of his prior experiences. If he was leading primarily hoplites in Egypt, it would have been difficult to change their way of fighting completely, which would have resulted from a conversion to proper peltasts. Also, a force consisting solely of peltasts could be left vulnerable if unsupported by heavier arms, as Xenophon's mountain enemies found out. Could, then, Iphicrates'

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<sup>101</sup> Anderson (1970: 124-125) argues that it was the presence of the Athenian hoplites that prevented the Spartans from using their "running out" tactics to the fullest advantage. Xenophon's account, though, is clear in that the Spartan runners were cut down when they were returning to their lines in a disordered fashion.

reforms have been an experiment in creating an ideally versatile soldier, capable of fighting in a dense phalanx formation with a long thrusting spear while light enough to harass a less mobile enemy with relative ease? Such a soldier would also be able to chase after a lightly-armed foe, as the Spartans had attempted, and cut him down with a long slashing sword.

We will never know why this new type of soldier is absent from our sources.<sup>102</sup> Such a novel fighting style could probably only be developed and maintained during continuous military service over a long period, which was the case in Egypt. This is in line with Pritchett's explanation as to why Iphicrates' success at Lechaeum was not repeated until the professional war machine of Philip and Alexander.<sup>103</sup> Once back in the service of Athens, Iphicrates probably had to rely on the traditional citizen-hoplite supplemented by specialized foreign troops. We are not told what types of troops he had at his disposal while in the service of Cotys, but we can speculate that the impressive wealth of the Odrysians enabled continuous military exercise and perhaps similar experimentation. In any case, we should accept the accounts of Iphicrates' capacity for invention and creativity presented by Nepos and Diodorus.

Iphicrates' particular talents made him a natural commander of Thracian

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<sup>102</sup> Some have seen a prototype of this new soldier in Chabrias' famous maneuver in Boeotia in 378. Chabrias, or so the sources seem to indicate, received a charge by ordering his troops to kneel on one knee and extend their spears outward (Nep. *Chab.* 1; Diod. 15.32-33; Polyæn. 2.1.2). Parke (1933: 81) argues that this was "just the maneuver suited to a peltast in the new equipment." Burnett and Edmonson (1961) have suggested that fragments from a statue of Chabrias in the Agora indicate that a kneeling hoplite was depicted on the monument. This, however, has been adequately refuted by both Anderson (1963) and Buckler (1972), who insist that the statue fragments do not support such a reconstruction, and moreover the literary sources are in fact muddled. In reality, it seems that Chabrias ordered his men to stand "at ease" with their shields resting against their knees and their spears standing straight up. It was their apparent contempt and nonchalance that caused the enemy army to break off the attack.

<sup>103</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 123-125.

troops. The Thracians in turn helped to inspire this most gifted of tacticians to new heights of innovation. More than that, since Iphicrates was unconstrained by the Greek hoplite ethos, he was free to innovate in ways others were not. Thracian tactics were disdained by most Greeks as ungentlemanly and base. As the Spartans would pour scorn upon the methods by which they were defeated at Pylos in 425 (Thuc. 4.40.2), Thucydides would contemptuously report the death of Cleon at the hands of a peltast near Amphipolis (Thuc. 5.10.9). Ferrill argues that Philip might have been able to fuse the phalanx with different troop types because the Macedonians were largely outside of the Greek hoplite ethos, a notion that has a lot of merit.<sup>104</sup> Brasidas, who seems to have introduced novel tactics for dealing with a light-armed enemy, perhaps enjoyed a relatively free hand to innovate because a full 700 of his 1700 hoplites in Illyria were helots rather than Spartiates (Thuc. 4.80.5). The 1000 who were not helots were probably allied soldiers from Corinth, Sicyon and Phlius.<sup>105</sup> A very few, then, of Brasidas' troops would have been proper Spartans, the archetypical hoplite soldiers. By leading a force of foreign mercenaries and by serving in Thrace Iphicrates similarly had plenty of leeway to work out his tactics as the situation demanded.

Proximity to Thracians more often than not spurred on military innovation. The Greeks dwelling in northern Aegean cities probably adapted Thracian tactics and equipment because they had to fight against Thracian enemies and because they could readily observe the effectiveness of new styles of fighting. Clever Spartans like Brasidas, when faced with a light-armed barbarian enemy, could improvise new

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<sup>104</sup> Ferrill 1997: 150.

<sup>105</sup> See Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 3, 532.

methods to deal with them. That two of the pioneers of peltast tactics, Demosthenes and Iphicrates, were Athenian suggests that the development of light-armed infantry in Greece was due as much to Athens' close ties to Thrace as it was to the tactical ingenuity of particular commanders.

### *Iphicrates' Successors in Thrace*

Nepos concludes his biography of Iphicrates' contemporary Timotheus with a grim assessment of the Athenian *strategia* in the following years: "The time of Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus was the last age of Athenian generals. After their death, there was no captain from that city worthy of remembrance (*Tim.* 4.4)."<sup>106</sup> There were, however, several generals who earned considerable notoriety. But, were the careers of Charidemus and Chares really so different from those of their predecessors? Athens was under increasing pressure as its allies revolted in the Social War of the 350's and as Philip began to consolidate his power over all of Thrace, starting in the west with Amphipolis and moving ever eastward until he threatened Athens' interests on the Hellespont. In such a climate, the exigencies of generalship in the service of a cash-strapped *polis* might have led to ever more unseemly measures to finance expeditions.<sup>107</sup> Decades earlier, though, even Thrasybulus had resorted to financial exactions and plundering, and when Athens was particularly beset by financial difficulties in 413, Diitrephes had unleashed his Thracians on

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<sup>106</sup> "*Haec extrema fuit aetas imperatorum Atheniensium, Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei, neque post illorum obitum quisquam dux in illa urbe fuit dignus memoria.*"

<sup>107</sup> See, for instance, the comment of Salmond (1996: 44): "[Chares'] elevation marks something of a turning-point in the development of the fourth-century *strategia*... Chares demonstrated to the Athenians, if any evidence was still needed, that if they required continued success from their *strategoi*, they had to accept that the demands of campaigning often required less than honourable solutions."

Mycalessus.<sup>108</sup> There is little to suggest that the commanders active in the north in the mid fourth century exceeded earlier leaders by their methods or readiness to derive advantage from the chaotic situation in the region.

Iphicrates' immediate successor was Charidemus of Oreus. As it happens, our fullest source for his career is Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates*, a hostile account to say the least.<sup>109</sup> Charidemus was originally from Euboea, and in the 370's he fought as a slinger and light infantryman for various states before he was hired by Iphicrates as a *xenagos* for the campaign to Amphipolis from 368-364 (Dem. 23. 148). As Parke suggests, it seems likely that Charidemus left the service of Athens to work for the Thracians after Iphicrates had been replaced at Amphipolis by Timotheus.<sup>110</sup>

Charidemus thus followed the example set by his commander. Charidemus later became connected by marriage to Cotys' son Cersobleptes in the same way Iphicrates had been to Cotys (Dem. 23. 129). He seems to have campaigned on behalf of Cersobleptes against Athens for a time (Dem. 23. 163-165). Eventually, though, he was granted Athenian citizenship and various other honors, including the title of *eueregetes*, in 357. These honors were principally due to his role in convincing Cersobleptes to cede the Chersonese to Athens.<sup>111</sup> As Kelly points out, Charidemus and Cersobleptes must have rendered valuable services for the Athenians to account for so many prestigious honors, a point Demosthenes wished to downplay in his

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<sup>108</sup> See Kallet (1999; 2001: 121-146) who argues that Thucydides means to link the massacre at Mycalessus with the moral degradation of Athens brought on by troubled finances.

<sup>109</sup> Pritchett (1974-1991: vol. 2, 85-89) provides a useful summary of Charidemus' career, including a chart outlining the various states by which he was employed.

<sup>110</sup> Parke 1933: 125-126.

<sup>111</sup> For the date and reason for the honors, see Parke 1928: 170; Davies 1971: 571; Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 86; Kelly 1990.

oration.<sup>112</sup> Later in his career Charidemus remained popular at Athens. Plutarch says that many Athenians desired to have Charidemus made their general after the Battle of Chaeronea, but Phocion was chosen instead (*Phoc.* 16.3). In 335 Alexander demanded that Charidemus be banished from Athens (Arr. 1.10.6). The general then took up service with Darius III, who had him executed in 333 for an ill-advised criticism (Diod. 17.30).

Charidemus was a commander skilled enough to be chosen to accompany Iphicrates to Amphipolis. But it was after the death of Cotys that Charidemus revealed the extent of his talent, both military and political. In 360/59 Cotys was murdered and his kingdom was divided among his three sons, Bersiades in the west, Medocus in the center, and Cersobleptes in the east. Demosthenes advocated a policy of keeping the Odrysian kingdom divided, thus limiting a potential threat to Athenian interests in Thrace (23.103). But Charidemus took advantage of the confusion and division, becoming essentially the court general of Cersobleptes. Demosthenes relates that Charidemus fought on Cersobleptes' behalf against the Athenians in the Chersonese, and supported Cersobleptes against his two pro-Athenian brothers (23.163-168). It is clear that Charidemus became an important player in Thrace at this time, and because of this he was positioned to help or harm Athenian interests to no end. In 357, the Athenians came to an arrangement with all three kings according to which Cersobleptes granted Athens the Chersonese through Charidemus' influence

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<sup>112</sup> Kelly 1990: 103-104. See also Archibald (1998: 218-222) for Athenian relations with Cotys and Cersobleptes, which were not always as dire as Demosthenes contends.

(Dem. 23.173).<sup>113</sup> In 353/2, Cersobleptes urged the Athenians to appoint Charidemus as their general in Thrace, as he alone could recover Amphipolis. Despite Demosthenes' objections to Charidemus, in 351/0 the Athens sent out Charidemus with ten ships, mercenaries, and lots of money (Dem. 3.5). Demosthenes' attempts to turn Athens against Charidemus had obviously failed.<sup>114</sup>

It is remarkable that this lowly light-armed mercenary from Euboea rose to such a level of prominence. After serving with Iphicrates he became a top advisor and kinsman of Cersobleptes, and in short order a citizen and prominent general of Athens. He died while serving as a military advisor to the Persian king. He had three sons by his Thracian wife who were counted as Athenian citizens and were still present in Athens in 330/29 and wealthy enough to pay off their father's naval debt (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 1627.205-222).<sup>115</sup> Just like Iphicrates, Charidemus rose from obscurity because of his military skill and by making himself an indispensable agent to both Athens and a Thracian king. As for many Athenians, the dynastic quarrels of Thracian rulers coupled with Athenian interest in the Thracian littoral provided Charidemus with an opportunity to obtain power and influence abroad and in Athens itself. If Charidemus is a unique figure at all, it is because he achieved great success despite his foreign birth rather than his opportunism that dictated service for Thrace at one moment and service for Athens at another.

Chares had a long and checkered career as an Athenian commander, with a reputation as utterly profligate with little regard for the wishes of the *polis*. Yet, as

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<sup>113</sup> This treaty was arranged by Chares and is preserved in an inscription: IG ii<sup>2</sup> 126 = Bengtson 1962-1969: vol. 2, no. 303; Harding 1985: no. 64.

<sup>114</sup> See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 86-87; Archibald 1998: 221.

<sup>115</sup> See Davies 1971: 571-572.

many scholars have pointed out, the ancient sources, particularly Isocrates, were unduly harsh in their portrayal of Chares.<sup>116</sup> Chares was consistently popular with the *demos*, elected general numerous times over several decades.<sup>117</sup> He may have been less scrupulous than Isocrates' pupil Timotheus, but he was no less so than countless other Athenian generals who were treated positively by the sources. As Moysey argues, Isocrates and Chares occupied opposite ends of the political spectrum in the mid fourth century, a spectrum that was much narrower than that of the fifth century. Isocratean rhetoric is largely responsible for the distorted picture of Chares we have inherited.<sup>118</sup>

In 355, the last year of the Social War, Chares aided the satrap Aratabazus in his revolt from the Persian king Artaxerxes, a decision made apparently without any instruction from Athens. This has led many scholars to suggest that Chares was the quintessential *condottiere*.<sup>119</sup> We are told, however, that Chares joined in the satrap's revolt because he was desperately in need of money with which to pay his troops. Athens' did not seem to object to his actions until the Persians complained and threatened to bolster Athens' rebellious allies (Diod. 16.22).<sup>120</sup> Chares' sack of Sestus two years later, after which he slaughtered the male inhabitants and enslaved the women and children, has also been censured by scholars (Diod. 16.34).<sup>121</sup> Sestus'

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<sup>116</sup> See Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 77-85; Moysey 1985; 1987; Salmond 1996; Bianco 2002.

<sup>117</sup> Moysey (1985: 225) calls him the "darling of the *demos*."

<sup>118</sup> Moysey 1987.

<sup>119</sup> Parke (1974-1991: vol. 2, 77), says that Chares is generally regarded as the *condottiere par excellence*.

<sup>120</sup> See Pritchett (1974-1991: vol.2, 80) for the suggestion that Athens tacitly approved of Chares' support of Artabazus until threatened by Persia. This situation recalls Chabrias' service in Egypt, for which see below, ch. 6.

<sup>121</sup> Salmond (1996: 45), who largely defends Chares, nevertheless argues that the sack of Sestus reveals Chares' lack of scruples.



fate, however, had been inflicted by Athens on many cities before Chares' career. There is no indication in the sources that Chares violated any Athenian directives in this action. Despite his service abroad and his seemingly independent and self-interested campaigns, the Athenians esteemed him enough to select him as one of their two generals at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 (Diod. 16.85).

As with other generals in Thrace, Chares was sure to secure his own interests while campaigning in the region. He is listed by Theopompus as the general who opted to go to Sigeum instead of remaining in Athens (FGrHist 115 F 105). Though we are not told when Chares first settled in the northern Troad, Arrian tells us he was living there in the mid 330's as he came from Sigeum to crown Alexander at Ilium (*An.* 1.12.1). Pritchett thinks that Chares retired to Sigeum only after the Battle of Chaeronea, when many prominent Athenians left the city.<sup>122</sup> The political situation after 338 was less than favorable for generals such as Chares who had fought the forces of Philip. And besides, the loss of Athens' autonomy in terms of foreign affairs meant that there would be a shortage of lucrative campaigns for Athenian soldiers. Iphicrates seems to have realized the same after the imposition of the King's Peace in the 380's. Though we hear nothing more about his life and career after this point, Chares seems to have found refuge, and perhaps the prospect of military service, in the Thraceward parts of Asia once his position in Athens became untenable.

Despite Nepos' pronouncement, the Athenian generals after Timotheus continued to show skill and energy, and in the case of Thrace at least, it was business as usual. Thrace as always was a central concern for Athens, and generals were all too

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<sup>122</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 100.

happy to exploit that to their own advantage while making personal inroads among the Thracians and the Greek settlements in the vicinity. It was only after Philip had secured his control over all of coastal Thrace and eliminated the ability of the Greek *poleis* to project power over the Aegean that the age of great Athenian campaigns abroad came to an end.

### ***Conclusions***

Iphicrates was a man of surpassing talent and overwhelming ambition, which, coupled with his diplomatic sense and extensive foreign ties, was often of great benefit to Athens. Yet, he was not always subservient to the wishes of the *polis*. His victory at Lechaeum, as many of his other campaigns in and around the Corinthia, were stunning successes for Athens and its allies against the Spartans. At the same time, this special appointment launched Iphicrates' brilliant career and paved the way for ever increasing individual honors. When the Athenians refused to countenance his desire to seize the city of Corinth, Iphicrates walked away from his post. When he had achieved copious honors at Athens, such as very few had before him, he remained unsatisfied. It was Thrace that promised ever more opportunities for levels of wealth and status that democratic Athens could not provide. Similarly, Thrace was a proven refuge for unsuccessful Athenian generals. When Iphicrates found himself faced with the threat of legal consequences back home, he followed the examples set by Thracophiles from Thucydides to Alcibiades, and also of his mentor Conon, in refusing to submit to the authorities.

Demosthenes says that Thrace provided a level of *exousia* that allowed

unscrupulous men to obtain material enrichment and regal power by the exercise of their grandest ambitions. The life Iphicrates enjoyed at the court of Cotys, complete with heroic feasts, rowdy drinking parties, and valuable treasures, indicates that he had a penchant for extravagant living as well – the *aselgeia and poluteleia* that to Theopompus characterized Chabrias and others who chose to leave Athens. Though he was offered similar advantages in Thrace, Xenophon spurned Seuthes and his enticements and was allowed to live out his exile among his friends the Spartans, on his own estates in the Peloponnese. Iphicrates demonstrated little of Xenophon's high-mindedness, and instead reveled in the ostentation of the Thracian court.

There is every indication that Iphicrates sought military adventure. As he exhibited an innate talent for leadership and innovation, two things which brought him power and renown, he also probably sought the camaraderie of life on campaign. The great amount of time he spent with a particular group of soldiers would have led to a deep *esprit de corps*. The temporary and sporadic nature of traditional Greek armies, levied for specific occasions, could not have fostered comradeship among the men in the same way. Aside from special cases such as the Theban Sacred Band, the Greek *poleis* were rarely able to support the continuous military training and lengthy campaigns to which Iphicrates had grown accustomed. He surely enjoyed spending time with what amounted to his own personal army, full of soldiers who respected and had affection for their commander. Thus, while Thrace offered the perfect forum for honing his military ideas, it also gave Iphicrates access to a world of hardened warriors fond of battle, plunder and drink.

For many Greeks, the ideal existence was epitomized in sitting by a fire in the cold, drinking with one's companions.<sup>123</sup> The poet Alcaeus speaks of cold rain and frozen rivers in the dead of winter, but life is good because there is wine and a warm blaze (F 338 Lobel and Page). One can imagine Iphicrates with his Thracian troops, rugged soldiers from a frozen country, jovially passing the time in such a way, warmed by the fires of their military camp. Such cultural factors, in addition to the ample material and political benefits, possibly lay in part behind the attraction Iphicrates felt for Thrace.

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<sup>123</sup> As shown by Olson 2002:116-117.

## CHAPTER 6

### WHY THRACE? CONTROL CASES

#### *Introduction*

The preceding chapters have outlined the sorts of personal connections which lay behind the relationship between Athens and Thrace. From the mid sixth to the mid fourth century, many prominent Athenian individuals and families found Thrace to be a useful alternative to Athens, a source of advancement both materially and politically. Throughout, the material, cultural and social factors which were at play have been highlighted, including the resources available in the north, the influence that could be attained abroad and at Athens, and the particular appeal of life on the rugged margins of the Greek world. This all beckons the question: How was Thrace unique in the eyes of Athenians? Athenians had ties in many places abroad, even outside of the Greek world. Throughout the ancient world foreign relationships were cultivated and exploited, by states and individuals alike, in order to achieve political and material advantage. The same can be said for all historical epochs, across every society. Thrace, however, offered distinct advantages and had a cultural and social appeal few other places could match. To highlight this, this chapter will examine the experiences of several prominent Athenians who spent much of their careers abroad in places other than Thrace.

In the end, Thrace proved to be one of the very few places within reach of the Athenians that promised at once unmatched resources and relatively weak local governance. Whereas Persia and Egypt could offer wealth and prestige, they could not

guarantee the level of autonomy a clever Athenian could enjoy in the north Aegean among scattered Thracian tribes and often feuding Thracian dynasts. To account for why every Athenian eager for power or refuge did not turn to Thrace, we ought to consider a combination of factors: the geo-political realities in the Aegean at particular periods; rivalries among the elite for influence in Thrace; and perhaps a level of personal prejudice. For example, the proximity of Thrace to Athens briefly ceased to ensure easy access to the north after the Battle of Aegospotami left the Spartans as masters of the Aegean. During Themistocles' exile in Persia, his rival Cimon was active in Thrace; and likewise, as Chabrias was in Egypt, his longtime rival Iphicrates was influential at the Odrysian court. Finally, Sparta offered a different sort of alternative to Athens which evidently had more appeal to a man such as Xenophon than did Thrace. Though, again, Xenophon may have been effectively prevented from carving out his own niche in Aegean Thrace by the strong Spartan presence in the region in 399.

For the Athenians, Thrace was a tantalizing frontier in a way that Sparta, Persia, and Egypt were not. Until Philip of Macedon fixed his gaze on the Aegean littoral in the late 350's and consolidated his power over the region by the end of the 340's, for over two centuries members of the Athenian elite had derived advantage from a vast and open territory lying on the fringe of the Greek world. The Thracian experience could hardly be duplicated elsewhere.

### *Hippias and Themistocles*

For the late Archaic and early Classical periods, no Athenian exiles stand out quite like Hippias and Themistocles. Respectively a tyrant and savior of the freshly minted democracy, both turned to Persia when their fortunes at Athens waned: Hippias in a calculated attempt at regaining mastery of Athens; Themistocles as an accused traitor seeking asylum and recognizing the court of the King as the ideal forum in which to put his considerable talents to good use. While both turned to Persia rather than Thrace at the end of their careers, they each had strong ties to Thrace stretching back a generation. Why, then, did they not become Thrace-haunters?

Hippias' father Pisistratus had amassed considerable wealth in Thrace, chiefly from the mines of Pangaeum. While in the north he seems to have enjoyed great influence.<sup>1</sup> A private band of Thracian mercenaries allowed him to seize power for the third and final time in Athens after disarming the populace ([Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 15.2). Pisistratus might have appreciated the strategic importance of the Chersonese and therefore have had a hand in the journey of the elder Miltiades to the region. Herodotus is explicit in that following Pisistratus' death, Hippias actively commissioned the younger Miltiades to take over affairs in the Chersonese (6.38.2). Wade-Gery has argued that Miltiades and Hippias eventually had a falling out, perhaps due to Miltiades divorcing a relative of Hippias in order to marry the Thracian princess Hegesipyle. It was at this point that Hippias married his daughter to Aeantides, the son of Hippocles tyrant of Lampsacus. As the Philaids were enemies of Lampsacus, a city lying on the Asiatic shore of the Hellespont, Wade-Gery sees this

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<sup>1</sup> See Baba (1990) for Pisistratus' activities and influence around Pangaeum and the Thermaic Gulf.

marriage alliance as the decisive break between Hippias and Miltiades.<sup>2</sup> Thucydides tells us that Hippias made the alliance with Lampsacus after the murder of Hipparchus. Fearing his position in Athens, Hippias looked to the tyrant Hippocles because of his strong ties to Darius, a potential guarantor of the Athenian tyranny (Thuc. 6.59). Following his expulsion from Athens, Hippias and his family found refuge at Sigeum, a city not far from Lampsacus, where Pisistratus had earlier established a friendly tyranny (Hdt. 5.94). It should be noted that Amyntas of Macedon offered Hippias Anthemus, located on the Thermaic gulf where Pisistratus had been involved, but Hippias chose rather to flee to Asia Minor.<sup>3</sup>

Hippias and the Pisistratids, then, had a longstanding connection with the Thraceward region and used Thrace to achieve and safeguard their power in Athens. Hippias, however, was in the main not interested in Thrace *qua* Thrace, but rather as a conduit to Persia and King Darius. In the late sixth and early fifth century, the Aegean coast of Asia Minor was littered with Persian client tyrannies. In the histories of Herodotus, one of these tyrants, Histiaeus of Miletus, is made to outline how he and others like him were dependent upon Persia. In order to dissuade his fellow Greek rulers from betraying the Persians during Darius' ill-fated campaign to subdue Scythia, Histiaeus stressed that the Greek tyrants enjoy their positions of authority at the pleasure of Darius. Should the Persians be defeated, all of the Greek subject-cities

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<sup>2</sup> Wade-Gery 1951: 215-216.

<sup>3</sup> See Thuc. 2.99 for the Macedonian annexation of this territory, which had been – and still might have been at the time of Hippias' expulsion – under the control of Edonian Thracians. For a commentary, see Hammond et al. 1972-1988: vol. 1, 435-440. See also Cole 1975: 42, n. 1.



would surely throw out the tyrants and opt instead for democracy (Hdt. 4.137).<sup>4</sup> The tyranny in Lampsacus, with which Hippias allied himself, was a client of the Persian king in this manner.<sup>5</sup> After he was expelled from Athens, Hippias fled to his friends at Sigeum, and then Lampsacus, and finally to the court of Darius himself (Thuc. 6.59). Desirous of regaining his position in Athens, Hippias decided the best course of action was to emulate the model of the Greek cities in Asia, that is, to turn to the Persian king as his benefactor and rule a Persian-controlled Athens as Darius' client.

It was with this in mind that he acted as a guide for the Persian forces at Marathon. Herodotus claims that the Persians landed in the deme of Marathon in 490 because it was the part of Attica nearest to Eretria, where they had been engaged previously, and because it offered the best ground for cavalry (6.102-103). On the first count, Herodotus is simply wrong as other parts of Attica in fact lie closer to Eretria; and regarding the second we must ask why the Persians did not opt for a battle in the Thriasian Plain in southwestern Attica, which boasted ground much more suitable to the Persians' cavalry. In any case, the cavalry seems not to have been used at Marathon, and its intended role is debated by modern scholars.<sup>6</sup> Lazenby argues that Marathon was chosen by Hippias because of his family's connection to the deme. Pisistratus had landed there and gathered supporters when he took power decades earlier (Hdt. 1.62). As Lazenby contends, Hippias could have hoped to gain Athenian supporters in the same way. The anti-Persian propaganda following this battle and the

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<sup>4</sup> For the historical veracity of this episode, see How and Wells 1912: vol.1, 343-344. Interestingly enough, Herodotus presents the younger Miltiades as the chief advocate of betraying the Persians. The Philaids had dominion over the Chersonese independent of the Persians.

<sup>5</sup> See Frost 1998: 199.

<sup>6</sup> For an overview, see Shrimpton 1980.

Xerxes' invasion of 480-479 has obscured the reality that many Athenians, if not overtly treacherous, were at least in favor of appeasement with the Persians when faced with their impressive invasion force in 490.<sup>7</sup>

Hippias was useful to the Persians as a means of taking the city, perhaps without the need for a battle, as the Persians were central to Hippias' goal of becoming tyrant once again. If his friends in Asia enjoyed enviable power at the behest of the Great King, why could the same model not apply to Athens? The Athenian victory at Marathon and the total defeat of the Persians a decade later – not to mention the resultant stigma forever attached to Medism – all but removed this “Persian option” for ambitious Athenians attempting to gain power in their own city. As tyrant before the advent of broadly based democracy, Hippias had enjoyed immense personal power and was able to exercise all the prerogatives of the aristocracy, such as cementing marriage alliances with fellow aristocrats throughout the Aegean world. As argued throughout this study, it was the constraints imposed upon the elite by the democracy that forced aristocrats and generally power-hungry individuals to turn elsewhere, chiefly Thrace. Before democracy, the Philaids ventured to Thrace because the Pisistratids were in power in Athens and afforded little room for rival families. After his expulsion, Hippias did not seek an outlet for his ambitions in Thrace because he believed the Persians would be able to restore him to power in Athens, where he could return to fulfilling his ambitions as he saw fit. No sixth century Thracian ruler or tribe could plausibly offer Hippias a similar reward.

Like Hippias, Themistocles might have had family connections to Thrace. It

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<sup>7</sup> Lazenby 1993: 48.

was widely disseminated in antiquity that Themistocles' mother was not Athenian. Plutarch quotes various sources which claim she was either Thracian or Carian, perhaps from Halicarnassus (*Them.* 1.1-2). Nepos says she was from Acarnania (*Them.* 1.1). Bicknell argues, quite plausibly, that the specific origins of Themistocles' mother can in fact be discerned through a critical examination of these passages and the sources upon which they were derived. "Karia" as her supposed place of origin is no more than a corruption of "Kardia," a city on the Thracian Chersonese. This evidence is coupled with other indicators such as an ostrakon meant for Themistocles bearing the name "Xanthias" – an epithet meant to convey the stereotype of the red-haired Thracian slave – to suggest that Themistocles was part Thracian through his mother. Bicknell posits that Themistocles' father, Neocles, had accompanied the elder Miltiades on his expedition to the Chersonese and there met Themistocles' mother.<sup>8</sup> Lewis adds a postscript to Bicknell's article, conjecturing that Plutarch in remarking that Themistocles' mother was married ἐξ ἁγορᾶς (*Mor.* 753d), was actually transmitting a corruption of ἐξ Ἀγορᾶς, implying that she was a Thracian from Agora, another city in the Chersonese.<sup>9</sup> While it is attractive that Themistocles had Thracian roots, the fragmentary state of our sources dictates that such ideas must remain but scholarly speculation.

As is well known, Themistocles was eventually ostracized from Athens in spite of his leading role in defeating the Persians in 480-479. When the Spartan regent Pausanias was found to be a pro-Persian traitor, the Spartans presented evidence that

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<sup>8</sup> Bicknell 1982.

<sup>9</sup> Lewis 1983.

Themistocles too had turned to the Persians, working in conjunction with Pausanias. Themistocles' circuitous flight from the Peloponnese following his branding as a traitor demonstrates that few places within the reach of the Athenians and their navy could offer him refuge. He fled first to Corcyra, a state indebted to him for some prior service, but the Corcyreans were afraid of incurring the displeasure of Athens and Sparta and therefore sent him to the mainland. Themistocles then went as a suppliant to Admetus, king of the Molossians, who offered him protection for a time. Admetus was also beset by Themistocles' pursuers, so Themistocles fled by sea. After narrowly avoiding capture by the Athenians at Naxos, he arrived in Ephesus where, aided by his contacts, he made his way deep into Persia and eventually to the court of Artaxerxes.<sup>10</sup> If his initial intention once accused of treachery had been flight to Persia, the journey to Corcyra and other western regions would be difficult to explain. Clearly Persia, a great power centered far from Athens' ships, became the only viable option for Themistocles after several harrowing escapes from Athenian and Spartan agents in the Adriatic and Aegean seas.

Themistocles probably arrived in Asia around 465, and after over a year spent mastering Persian languages and customs, he took his place at the Persian court in 463.<sup>11</sup> At this same time, Cimon was active in restoring Athenian rule over the Thracian Chersonese, a territory formerly ruled by his family. In 466 Cimon had led the Greeks to victory over the Persians at the Battle of Eurymedon, which effectively eliminated Persian power in the Aegean. After regaining the Chersonese, Cimon put

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<sup>10</sup> For the various ancient accounts of Themistocles' flight, see Thuc. 135-138; Diod. 11.54-58; Plut. *Them.* 24-29; Nep. *Them.* 8-10. The evidence for Themistocles' exile and flight is usefully collected and interpreted by Keaveney 2003.

<sup>11</sup> For this chronology, see Keaveney 2003: 104.

down a revolt on Thasos and secured for Athens the lucrative mines on the mainland. A decade earlier, in 476, he had led an expedition to expel the Persians from Eion on the Strymon River, after which he subdued the local Thracians who had supported the Persians. Cimon then encouraged the Athenians to settle the area, a precursor the important Athenian colony of Amphipolis.<sup>12</sup> Through Cimon's campaigns, the Athenians became masters of the Aegean, including much of coastal Thrace, from Thasos and the Strymon to the Chersonese. This was all achieved at the expense of Persia.

There is considerable evidence that Cimon was a personal enemy of Themistocles. Plutarch says that the Spartans advocated Cimon's advancement in Athens as a pro-Spartan political counterweight to Themistocles (*Them.* 20.4; *Cim.* 10.7, 16.2).<sup>13</sup> The Philaid family may have been at odds with Themistocles for some time. Gruen argues that while most scholars suggest Miltiades and Themistocles were allies because of their supposedly complementary anti-Persian policies, the two were rivals. A fragment of Stesimbrotus, preserved by Plutarch (*Them.* 4.3), says that Miltiades publically opposed Themistocles' famous naval policy whereby the latter turned Athens into a naval power at the expense of the hoplite arm of the military. In 493/2, the very year in which Themistocles was archon and began turning his attention to fortifying the Piraeus, Miltiades returned from the Chersonese. It was then that the two men clashed in the political arena.<sup>14</sup> Scholars are mistaken in asserting that the

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<sup>12</sup> For Cimon's activities in Thrace, see Meiggs 1972: 79-82; Isaac 1986: 19-21, 177. See also above, ch. 2.

<sup>13</sup> See Podlecki 1975: 34-35.

<sup>14</sup> It should be noted that if Bicknell's suggestion (1982: 168-171) that Themistocles' father Neocles accompanied the elder Miltiades to the Chersonese is correct, we would have to understand some sort of

role these men had in fighting the Persians signaled a strong alliance. As Gruen correctly states, in the years following the expulsion of the Pisistratids, politics was played out in the sphere of individual and family rivalries rather than between any coherent factions or ideological groups.<sup>15</sup> It would seem that the Philaid family saw Themistocles as a threat to their own power, and vice versa. What began with Miltiades continued under Cimon. In addition to the Athenians' naval reach, the strong influence of Cimon in the Thraceward region would have been a formidable barrier to Themistocles becoming a player in Thrace, despite any family connection of his own he might have had.

The final years of Themistocles' career are paradigmatic of what power Greeks could achieve within the Persian Empire. Once he had arrived in Asia, he sent a letter to the king in advance outlining his prior services to the Persians, namely the secret messages he conveyed to Xerxes before and after the Battle of Salamis. In this way, he hoped to gain admittance to the Persian court.<sup>16</sup> Ever the shrewd manipulator, Themistocles had hedged his bets at Salamis by offering the Persians advice which in the advent of a Persian victory could have ingratiated him with Xerxes. As it turned out, these messages were seen as part of a cunning stratagem that ensured the Greeks' triumph. In Asia Themistocles presented himself as having been a friend to Persia all along.<sup>17</sup> Before taking his place at the Persian court, Themistocles spent a year

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falling out between the family of Themistocles and the Philaids before the late 490's. Such a change in political alliance among men competing for a leading position in post-Pisistratid Athens is entirely plausible.

<sup>15</sup> Gruen 1970.

<sup>16</sup> For Themistocles' flight, see the slightly varying accounts in Thuc. 1.135-138; Plut. *Them.* 23-26; Diod. 11.56; Nep. *Them.* 8.

<sup>17</sup> See Strauss (2004: 112-117) for a discussion of these messages and the notion that Themistocles had seriously contemplated joining the Persians should the affair at Salamis have gone poorly.

learning all he could about Persian customs and language in order to adopt them himself. He then attained a position at the court greater than any Greek had before him, partly because of his reputation, and also because of a zeal for conquering Greece for the Persian king Artaxerxes. As a reward for his services, Artaxerxes granted Themistocles power over Magnesia near the Meander, Lampsacus, and Myus, all materially valuable in their own ways (Thuc. 1.135-138). Though he had attained rich territory over which to rule, he would have done so only at the pleasure of the Persian king, always remaining a vassal as Histiaeus had been in Miletus and Hippias would have been in Athens. The autonomy ambitious Athenians could attain in Thrace was largely out of Themistocles' grasp.

Themistocles, however, did manage to have cult honors paid to his descendents in Lampsacus similar to those given the elder Miltiades in the Chersonese.<sup>18</sup> Lampsacus is an interesting case in that it may have already been part of the Delian League when Themistocles received it from Artaxerxes. As Frost argues, a tyrannical government did not necessarily preclude a state from membership in the league.<sup>19</sup> Yet, it is difficult to conceive of a tyranny of Themistocles over a member state of the league lying near the Hellespont and Athenian-controlled Thrace. In the end, we do not know to what extent Themistocles actively governed the city. Perhaps he merely derived revenue from it, or perhaps Artaxerxes offered the city merely as a token gift, as Gomme has argued.<sup>20</sup> As the festival held at Lampsacus in honor of Themistocles' descendants would imply, maybe Themistocles had more

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<sup>18</sup> For these cult practices as part of a Thracian, as opposed to Greek, νόμος, see above, ch. 2.

<sup>19</sup> Frost 1998: 196-199.

<sup>20</sup> Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 1, 292. Meiggs (1972: 53-54) shows that the connection between Themistocles and Lampsacus is supported by strong evidence and should not be denied.

influence in the Thraceward than is readily apparent. Whatever the case may be, during the final years of his checkered career, Themistocles found the Persian court, not Thrace, to provide the greatest avenue for advancement, though he only turned to Persia as a last resort.

### ***Xenophon***

With the notable exception of Thucydides, Xenophon is unique in that he was both a player in Thrace and one of our chief sources for the region, especially for life at the court of a Thracian ruler. Though Thucydides had property and family connections in the north, he tells us little about them. Xenophon, on the other hand, in his *Anabasis* gives us a detailed firsthand narrative of the campaigns in the areas of Thrace to the south of the Black Sea and in the vicinity of Byzantium in which he took part. He also provides an invaluable glimpse into the social life of the Thracian nobility by detailing his relationship with Seuthes II, including a vivid account of a banquet attended by the most important figures in the area. Why, then, is Xenophon included in this chapter on so-called control cases? Though he was offered valuable estates, a royal marriage, and other privileges by Seuthes in 399, he chose rather to enter the service of the Spartans. After fighting with the Spartans in Asia Minor for several years, Xenophon eventually returned to mainland Greece with Agesilaus in 394 where by every indication he remained. Xenophon fits the profile of the other figures covered in this study. He was an aristocrat alienated by the Athenian political system, most keenly in the climate following the overthrow of the Thirty in 403. A military man, he was no stranger to thrilling and dangerous adventure, and his talent



for tactical innovation was not inconsiderable. He was exiled from Athens, most likely because of friendship with Sparta on whose side he may have fought against Athens at the Battle of Coronea in 394. Thus, while Xenophon had plenty of motive and opportunity, so to speak, in the end he chose to spurn Seuthes and all that Thrace had to offer.

Once he arrived in Thrace along with the Ten Thousand, Xenophon had aspirations to be an oikist, much like the Philaids and Hagnon before him. He enumerates the many fine qualities of Calpe Harbor, located in “the part of Thrace in Asia,” that is, on the southern shore of the Black Sea (*An.* 5.6.15-16; 6.4.1-8).<sup>21</sup> In Xenophon’s view the foundation of a city in this place would have been advantageous, especially because of the large numbers of battle-hardened hoplites, peltasts, archers, slingers, and horsemen he had at his disposal, and because of the multitude of those peoples living in the vicinity, predominantly non-Greeks. He was careful to state that this foundation would add territory and power to Greece as a whole. The majority of the troops were against such a foundation, and because Xenophon performed sacrifices on his own initiative – without first consulting the others – to inquire whether such a foundation should be undertaken, many thought he was conspiring to found a city for his own prestige and glory.<sup>22</sup> Even through Xenophon’s biased account it is clear that there were a substantial number of troops among the Ten Thousand who mistrusted Xenophon’s motives. Raw personal ambition may have been a significant factor in his desire to found a colony.

A major criticism leveled against Xenophon was that the site of Calpe was

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<sup>21</sup> For the situation of Calpe, see Stronk 1995: 62-64.

<sup>22</sup> For the impropriety of such a unilateral sacrifice, see Parker 2004: 152.

located in the midst of barbarians (5.6.25). Xenophon himself says that there were no Greek settlements in the immediate area, but only large numbers of Bithynians who terribly mistreated (δεινὰ ὑβρίζειν) any Greeks unfortunate enough to wind up on their shores (6.4.2). Yet, it seems as though Xenophon wanted to dominate the local population inhabiting the nearby villages (κῶμαι . . . πολλὰ καὶ οἰκούμεναι) by means of the forces he would have settled at Calpe (6.4.6). Further indication of his desire to settle amongst and have influence over barbarians is given by the envoys repeatedly sent by the neighboring hostile peoples, inquiring how they might become friends of Xenophon since they thought he was founding a city (6.6.4). Clearly for Xenophon the prospect of living among warlike non-Greeks was no deterrent.

Xenophon describes in detail how he came to the rescue of the Arcadian contingent which had suffered greatly while trying to plunder the villages in the vicinity of Calpe. The lightly armed Bithynians, in defense of their homes, slaughtered great numbers of Arcadian hoplites who were unable to defend themselves because of their unwieldy armament. As the Arcadians huddled together on a hilltop to spend the night, the Bithynians called out to each other in the dark and skillfully mustered greater forces. The next day many Greeks were again cut down. As Xenophon heard of the plight of the Arcadians, he marched his own contingent to their position by night, shrewdly placing his light troops on the flanks and upon the heights to provide cover, while setting much of the area ablaze to give the impression of a huge army. The plan worked as by daybreak the Bithynians had all fled (*An.* 6.3). Where the Arcadian hoplites failed, Xenophon and his competent use of a combined-arms force succeeded. Implicitly, Xenophon tells us that he was not only willing to

found a settlement in barbarian lands, but was also the perfect leader for the job.<sup>23</sup>

Denied the honor of founding a city, Xenophon also never came to possess the Thracian estates offered by Seuthes – namely Bisanthe, Ganos, and Neonteichos (*An.* 7.2.38; 7.5.8), all located on the northern shore of the Propontis and two of which were previously held by Alcibiades. Various reasons are given for this, especially the advice of Xenophon's chief rival in Thrace, Heraclides of Maronea, to Seuthes that such valuable territory should not be given to a man with an army (*An.* 7.5.8). At one point Xenophon indicates that he had hoped to secure from Seuthes a fair place of refuge (ἀποστροφή) for himself and his children, should he ever have any (*An.* 7.6.34). At the same time, he continued to insist that he wished to sail home to Athens (*An.* 7.1.4; 7.1.38-40; 7.7.57). Later on, Seuthes offered these estates once again, but Xenophon declined, saying that the god told him to leave with the army and that it would not be possible for him to stay in Thrace (*An.* 7.6.43; 7.7.51-52).

The final two books of the *Anabasis* show that the Spartans were the undisputed masters of Greece in 399, firmly in control of the Hellespont and the neighborhood of Byzantium. Rather than sailing straight for home after his service in Thrace, Xenophon continued with the remnants of the Ten Thousand in order to hand them over to the Spartan Thibron in Asia (*An.* 7.7.57). In effect, then, he had already entered Spartan service in 399, where he continued for the next several years.

Alcibiades was forced off his Thracian estates once the Spartans had gained mastery

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<sup>23</sup> Prior to the march of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon was familiar with Thracian tactics. He probably fought on the side of the Thirty against Thrasybulus and his Thracian supporters in 404-403 (Anderson 1974: 47-48); he also seems to have taken part in Thrasyllus' expedition to Asia in 409 (Stronk 1995: 4), which included a sizeable contingent of peltasts. Thrasyllus eventually joined his force to that of Alcibiades in the Hellespont, where the two proceeded to attack Persia's interests in the region.

of the Aegean following Aegospotami. The new rulers of Greece would not have tolerated such a man having his own little niche in what they considered to be their sphere of influence. The Spartan Anaxibius' mistrust of the Ten Thousand in the territory of Byzantium and desire to disperse them makes this abundantly clear.<sup>24</sup> Xenophon would have risked incurring Spartan displeasure if he had tried to forge an autonomous existence in Thrace.

It has recently been suggested that the entirety of *Anabasis* 7 is an attempt by Xenophon to exonerate himself from the suspicion that he was motivated by bribes from Seuthes.<sup>25</sup> Xenophon was already mistrusted by many of his troops because of hints that he wanted them to settle Calpe. Several speeches are given to combat such notions, and Xenophon speaks to the troops many more times once in Seuthes' service to address allegations that he was pursuing his own advancement ahead of the needs of the men. Xenophon is at pains to represent himself as motivated by the ideals of reciprocity and guest-friendship, rather than material gain.<sup>26</sup> Here we can see some of the potential pitfalls of aristocratic connections to Thracian rulers. Xenophon was indeed offered many good things from Seuthes, including territory, a royal marriage, and even to become a brother to Seuthes, a table companion, and an equal partner in all things acquired.<sup>27</sup> Yet this threatened to arouse the jealousy of the other Greeks and put Xenophon's safety among the men in jeopardy. The appeal of Thrace for the Athenian elite was that it offered room to exercise one's ambitions without the checks

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<sup>24</sup> For the danger the Ten Thousand posed to Spartan interests at Byzantium, see Stronk 1995: 146.

<sup>25</sup> Azoulay 2004.

<sup>26</sup> Azoulay 2004: 300.

<sup>27</sup> *An.* 7.2.38: "ἀδελφούς . . . καὶ ἐνδιφρίους καὶ κοινωνοὺς ἀπάντων ὧν ἂν δυνάμεθα κτᾶσθαι."

inherent in the *polis*. Xenophon, however, was leading a large group of Greek soldiers, complete with rivals for the overall command. Throughout the long retreat from Cunaxa, the army functioned largely as a true community of citizens, with participatory government being the norm.<sup>28</sup> Xenophon was, after all, elected to his position by popular vote, and many of the decisions he made as to what the army should do next were put to a vote of the soldiers. He had to proceed very cautiously in accepting anything from Seuthes while this Greek army was still in the area.

Xenophon is careful to contrast his own uprightness and honesty with the unreliability and treachery of Seuthes and the Thracians.<sup>29</sup> His damning portrayal of the scheming Heraclides of Maronea establishes a paradigm of the disloyal Greek eager to secure his position at a barbarian court. Mitchell claims that Xenophon ran into trouble because he misunderstood the Thracian custom of gift-exchange, expecting the sort of reciprocity that would have been the norm among the Greeks.<sup>30</sup> Some scholars go further, arguing that Thracian gift-exchange, whereby the more powerful receives gifts from his subjects, is the inverse of the practice as it normally exists among other cultures.<sup>31</sup> In Xenophon's account, however, Seuthes did in fact offer rewards to Xenophon and the other Greeks in exchange for their services, implying reciprocity. It was the failure to follow through with these promises that Xenophon denounces.<sup>32</sup> In many passages, most notably throughout his *Agesilaus*,

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<sup>28</sup> See Nussbaum 1967 for the Ten Thousand as a *polis*.

<sup>29</sup> See especially Xenophon's long speech covering much of *An.* 7.7.

<sup>30</sup> Mitchell 1997: 141.

<sup>31</sup> See, for example, Testard and Brunaux 2004.

<sup>32</sup> Hirsch (1985: 33-38), in an attempt to show that Xenophon had favorable attitudes toward the barbarians, argues that the Greeks are shown throughout to be even more treacherous than non-Greeks, and that *pistis* was a much stronger value for the Persians and others than for the Greeks. His

Xenophon praises the patriotic and selfless loyalty of his friend Agesilaus. It was this Spartan King, rather than Seuthes, who embodied the ideals which Xenophon held dear.

Xenophon seems to have been put off by how savage and cruel the Thracians could be. Seuthes himself was ruthless in subduing the peoples living in his territory. While he was working in conjunction with the Ten Thousand, Seuthes burned the local villages completely (παντελῶς), leaving not a single house intact. He did this in order to inspire fear in everyone of the sort of ruin they would suffer if they did not yield to his authority (*An.* 7.4.1). He also demanded that the mountain-dwelling Thynians, whom Xenophon calls the most warlike of all peoples (πάντων . . . πολεμικώτατοι, *An.* 7.2.22), descend from the heights and yield to him while inhabiting the plains. If they failed to do so, he threatened to burn their villages and destroy their crops so that they would starve. When the men refused to descend, Seuthes attacked and cut down unsparingly (ἀφειδῶς) all he managed to capture (*An.* 7.4.5-6). Lane Fox argues that such indiscriminate devastation of villages whose only crime was to be prosperous exceeded much of the strategy of even Alexander as he campaigned to subdue central Asia.<sup>33</sup> Seuthes so terrified the population that droves of people came down to join his army of their own accord, while all others urgently entreated him for peace. Once in control of increasingly massive resources, Seuthes told Xenophon that he would be willing to forgo peace if the latter wished to punish the Thracians who had lately bested the Greeks in a night attack. Xenophon highlights

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arguments are not entirely convincing. Xenophon chose to spend the bulk of his career among the Spartans, often against the Persians as in the case of Agesilaos' Asian campaigns.

<sup>33</sup> Lane Fox 2004: 22.

his own magnanimity by saying that he felt subjection to Seuthes would be punishment enough and there was no need for further military action (*An.* 7.4.24). The careers of Diitrephes and others demonstrate that an Athenian had to be sufficiently free of scruples in order to fight alongside Thracians. Xenophon had a healthy respect for the utility of light armed Thracian-style troops as a complement to heavy infantry, and he had no problem commanding such units within the army. Perhaps, though, the savagery of Seuthes was more than he could countenance.

The pomp of the Thracian court was very attractive to men such as Alcibiades and Iphicrates. Xenophon, however, is careful to present himself as above such things, concerned with upright character, personal loyalty, and virtuous exercise of command instead. His hero Agesilaus is praised for similarly spurning the conspicuous consumption of the elite. Victories in the four-horse chariot race, so crucial to the image of the Philaids, were mocked by Agesilaus as resulting from wealth rather than any innate character. In demonstration of his point, he entered his sister in the chariot race at Olympia, where she won (*Xen. Ages.* 9.6). We should always take Xenophon's evidence with a grain of salt. For example, there might have been at least a kernel of truth behind the allegations that Xenophon wished to found a colony at Calpe for his own glory. Otherwise, he probably would not have spilled so much ink to dispel such charges. But in the end Xenophon condemns the behavior of Seuthes and those Greeks such as Heraclides who pandered to barbarians.

Above all Xenophon was eager to gratify the Spartans. It was the Spartans who would end up providing Xenophon with substantial rewards and honors, including an estate at Scillus in the Peloponnese. As Azoulay argues, the Spartans in

the final chapters of the *Anabasis* honored Xenophon at an exceptional level precisely because he spurned mercenary pay and other base rewards such as those offered by Seuthes.<sup>34</sup> The *Anabasis* ends in Asia Minor with the Laconians and the troops under them offering Xenophon the pick of the booty acquired during a raid. This reward allowed Xenophon even to lavish gifts on others (*An.* 7.8.23). Xenophon remained in the Spartans' service in Asia, eventually befriending Agesilaus and returning to Greece with him. After the Battle of Coroneia, at which Xenophon was present and may have even fought on the Spartan side, he was granted *proxenia* at Sparta and later given the estate at Scillus, probably in the late 390's or early 380's.<sup>35</sup> Diogenes Laertius says that his sons, Gryllus and Diodorus, were educated and received military training at Sparta (2.54). It was most likely this friendship with the Spartans, instead of ties to the barbarians Cyrus and Seuthes, which caused Xenophon to be exiled from Athens.<sup>36</sup>

A combination of circumstances and a fair degree of prejudice precluded Xenophon from taking up residence in Thrace. The limitations for a commander leading a group of independently minded Greeks were made apparent when Xenophon conceived of founding a settlement at Calpe Harbor. In Xenophon's vision, this settlement would have been populated by Greek soldiers more than capable of bringing the surrounding Thracians under their suzerainty, and would have offered

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<sup>34</sup> Azoulay 2004: 303.

<sup>35</sup> For these details of Xenophon's life, see above, n. 2. Plutarch (*Ages.* 18.1) says that Xenophon fought on the side of the Spartans at Coroneia, while Xenophon himself implies that he was merely present out of loyalty to Agesilaos (*An.* 5.3.6).

<sup>36</sup> The date and cause of the exile is one of the most contentious issues in the life of Xenophon, with even our ancient sources varying in explanation from participation with the Cyreans to philo-Laconism. See previous note for modern scholarship. To my mind, Rahn 1981 offers the most convincing arguments, proposing that Xenophon was exiled in 394 after anti-Spartan sentiment became more openly expressed in Athens.



Greeks in the area and those travelling by sea a place of refuge and commerce. The remnants of the Ten Thousand did not share his enthusiasm. Seuthes, though offering Xenophon tempting rewards, was not to be trusted. Nor was the luxury of the Thracian nobility to be emulated. Greek soldiers would not have stood by without sufficient pay while their commander was made a Thracian prince. The Spartans controlled much of the region on the fringes of Seuthes' domain, and they would not have smiled upon an independent Greek controlling several fortified settlements. Finally, Xenophon was keen to please the Spartans and his later service in Asia under the Spartans and eventually Agesilaus demonstrates that he trusted in Sparta to provide him with suitable rewards and advancement. Friendship with Agesilaus, *proxenia* at Sparta and later an estate at Scillus, and privileges such as having his sons trained at Sparta were plenty to satisfy Xenophon's ambitions. Sparta was his preferred alternative to Athens.

### ***Conon and Timotheus***

Conon, the most famous Athenian general in the first years of the fourth century, served as a model for the type of military leadership exercised by the likes of Iphicrates, rooted in force of personality and fuelled by ambition that would not always be subordinated to the service of Athens. Indeed, Iphicrates had been a protégé of Conon and the evidence suggests he had served under Conon's command.<sup>37</sup> While Conon would have a decisive influence on Iphicrates and other renegade fourth century generals who were tied to Thrace, he found his outlet and refuge not in

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<sup>37</sup> For Conon's career, see Seager 1967; Hamilton 1979; Strauss 1984 and 1987, esp. 126-129; Harding 1985: no. 12; March 1997.

Thrace, but in Cyprus at the court of Evagoras of Salamis, and in the service of the Persians. With nine ships Conon fled the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 when it became apparent that the Athenian fleet would be destroyed by Lysander and the Spartans. Rather than face prosecution at Athens due to his role in the defeat, he remained abroad. Whereas Alcibiades and later Iphicrates turned to Thrace and the courts of Thracian rulers to avoid the irate Athenian people, the reality of a Spartan-controlled Aegean limited Conon's options.

Beginning around 398 Conon and Evagoras worked together to arrange Conon's appointment as commander of a new Persian fleet built to combat the Spartans. We have accounts of many letters to this effect sent back and forth between Conon, Evagoras, the Persian king Artaxerxes, and his officer Ctesias. The satrap Pharnabazus, to whom Evagoras introduced the Athenian general, also played a role in securing Conon's command.<sup>38</sup> There has been a lot of scholarly speculation as to what all the parties in this arrangement hoped to gain. Clearly the Persians wished to curtail the growing power of the Spartans in the Aegean, and perhaps Conon and even Evagoras hoped to benefit Athens.<sup>39</sup> Diodorus gives us one motivation on the part of Conon that fits well with the general's character. Namely, he wanted to win great personal fame by being solely responsible for humbling Sparta and regaining the hegemony of Greece for Athens (14.39.3). And win fame he did. Conon, along with Pharnabazus, led the Persian fleet to a decisive victory over the Spartans at Cnidus in

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<sup>38</sup> Isocrates 9.54-56; Ctesias *Pers. Eclog.* 63; Diodoros 14.38-39; Justin 6.1.7-9; Orosius 3.1.7. For these dealings, see Costa 1974: 48.

<sup>39</sup> For a summary of the scholarship, see Costa 1974: 48. See also Seager 1967, esp. 99-103.

394, a battle in which Iphicrates likely participated.<sup>40</sup> This battle was followed up by the removal of Spartan *harmosts* from the coast of Asia. The Spartans duly rebuked, Conon felt it safe to return to Athens, and he was welcomed back as a hero. With an infusion of Persian money Conon rebuilt the long walls of Athens to much fanfare (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10). As Strauss points out, this act was of great strategic and emotional significance to the Athenians. As Themistocles had built the original long walls, Conon could be seen as a second Themistocles and a re-founder of the Athenian Empire. The span of the brilliant career of Themistocles, which included both invaluable service to Athens and influence in the Persian court, could be seen at a single moment in Conon.<sup>41</sup>

Even following the defeat of the Spartans and the rebuilding of the Long Walls, an awkward tension lingered concerning the role of the Persians in the restoration of Athenian fortunes. Lewis and Stroud, in their publication of an Athenian inscription dating from around 392-391 honoring Evagoras, point out that the Cypriot king is explicitly praised as a Hellene, indicating that his ethnic identity was in question. The emphasis on the role of Evagoras, carefully presented as a Greek, in helping Conon to defeat the Spartans is probably an attempt to minimize Persia's role. Pharnabazus, after all, was never honored in Athens, though he was Conon's associate and likely superior.<sup>42</sup> Isocrates later claimed, seemingly in the same vein, that Evagoras provided the bulk of the forces commanded by Conon (Isoc. 9.56). Seager stresses that the victory at Cnidus and subsequent expulsion of Spartan

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<sup>40</sup> See above, ch. 5.

<sup>41</sup> Strauss 1987: 127-128.

<sup>42</sup> Lewis and Stroud 1979: 190-191.

garrisons won the Greek cities of Asia and the Aegean over to Persian control, and Conon was throughout the period of 397-392 an admiral in the Persian service, subordinate to Persian officials, and working for Persian interests.<sup>43</sup> Whether or not Conon's ultimate aim was to restore Athenian hegemony in the Aegean, he worked hand in hand with the greatest bogeyman of Athenian history.<sup>44</sup>

Ironically, the Persian role in Conon's campaigns hindered his goals in Thrace. Following Cnidus, Conon and Pharnabazus sailed around the Aegean, driving the Spartans out of various cities and laying waste to Spartan territory. This was generally welcomed by the people in the respective cities, but at Sestus and Abydos the Spartan harmost Dercylidas rallied the people behind the cause of preventing Persia from gaining mastery of the sea. As such, Conon and Pharnabazus were unable to take these two cities which remained loyal to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1-6). They were, however, able to recruit many mercenaries from the Thraceward region who would later play such a decisive role under the command of Iphicrates.

While Conon's fame and influence at Athens were without peer following his return to the city around 393, his energetic activities would soon bring him down. The Spartan Antalcidas complained to the Persian satrap Tiribazus, saying that Conon was bent on building up Athenian power at the expense of Persia. His arguments must have been convincing as Tiribazus arrested Conon at Sardis (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12-16).

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<sup>43</sup> Seager 1967: 101.

<sup>44</sup> Scholars have long argued that Conon, and also Evagoras, from the very beginning had a far-sighted plan first to ruin the Spartans and then to turn against Persian interests. Costa (1974) convincingly shows that such arguments are mere extrapolations from later events, particularly Evagoras' revolt from Persia in 391. Likewise, Seager (1967: 103) argues that while Conon may have desired to increase Athenian power to a certain extent, activities such as rebuilding the walls of Athens, for which he would later be arrested by the Persians, were more an opportunistic exploitation of popular imperialism than a reflection of Conon's own policies. Again, it seems that personal advancement was the foremost consideration.

Hamilton discusses Conon's extraordinary honors in detail and compares them to those received by Lysander. Such excessive honors, according to Hamilton, eventually led to jealousy and the downfall of both men, including Conon's arrest by the Persians.<sup>45</sup> Though Conon would escape the Persians and again find refuge with Evagoras (Lys. 19.39-41), he fell into political obscurity. After his death, many influential Athenians tried to downplay or outright deny Conon's role in Athens' recent successes.<sup>46</sup>

The volatile fortunes of Conon reflect the careers of many Athenian Thracian-haunters. Conon was at one point a traitor and fugitive, later to become a savior of the city, only then to fall precipitously from grace. A commander at Aegospotami, the most crushing defeat in Athenian memory, he abandoned his countrymen and fled with Athenian ships. He evaded certain prosecution and perhaps death at Athens by staying abroad, entering the service of the very Persians who had made the Spartan victory at Aegospotami possible. Yet with his military skill and prodigious political sense, he managed within a decade to be embraced by Athens and achieve a status enjoyed by no one else. All of this was accomplished *because of* his service for foreign powers, stemming from a desertion and flight that were tantamount to treason. The example of Alcibiades' return to Athens with the promise of securing Persian support taught Conon that brilliant service abroad, ostensibly for the benefit of Athens, could cover a multitude of sins. It was merely the vagaries of the balance of power in

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<sup>45</sup> Hamilton 1979.

<sup>46</sup> The Lysianic funeral oration, for example, discredits ties to Persia, and even attributes the rebuilding of the Long Walls to the men of Phyle, rather than Conon (2.56-60, 63); see Seager 1967: 100, 108. Both Seager and Strauss (1984) remark upon the bitter political rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus. While Conon was ascendant, Thrasybulus was largely out of the political picture, only to return to prominence following Conon's arrest and disgrace.

the Greek world that prevented Conon from turning to Thrace instead of Cyprus and Persia. Conon was in the end a Persian admiral, under the authority of the Persian king and his satraps. When he overstepped the limits of his Persian commission, he came to ruin.

Conon's son Timotheus was also a prominent Athenian general who had a checkered career.<sup>47</sup> Like his father, he was a shrewd cultivator of foreign connections. At his trial in 373, brought about by the machinations of Iphicrates and others who insisted that Timotheus had delayed an expedition too long while trying to raise support, he was defended in person by both Alcetas king of the Molossi in Epirus and no less a figure than Jason of Pherae, then the leading man in Greece ([Dem.] 49.9-10). Timotheus was acquitted, barely, but was deposed from command in favor of Iphicrates. He decided then to take up service as a mercenary for the Persians in Egypt, where he remained for several years ([Dem.] 49.25).<sup>48</sup> He probably grew very rich as a result of this campaign.<sup>49</sup> Once back in favor at Athens, he was sent out in 366 with thirty triremes and 8000 peltasts to aid the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes in his revolt from the king (Isoc. 15.111).<sup>50</sup>

Timotheus was the leading proponent of the fourth century maritime league dubbed by modern scholars the Second Athenian Confederacy.<sup>51</sup> In his capacity as general, he brought many states into league membership and won a great deal of non-

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<sup>47</sup> Burich (1994) gives the fullest account of Timotheus' life and career as an Athenian general and statesman.

<sup>48</sup> For this service abroad, see Burich 1994: 118.

<sup>49</sup> As pointed out by E. Harris 1988: 51, and n. 21

<sup>50</sup> See Burich 1994: 131.

<sup>51</sup> For this league, see Cargill 1981; for Timotheus' role in it, see Burich 1994: 80-177.

league territory for Athens.<sup>52</sup> Many of the states listed on the so-called Decree of Aristoteles, the league's foremost epigraphical source, were brought into the alliance by Timotheus during his activities in 375 and 373.<sup>53</sup> Nepos says that during his service for Ariobarzanes in 366, Timotheus received Sestus and Crithote for Athens (*Tim.* 1). After he replaced Iphicrates at Amphipolis in 364, he apparently brought twenty cities over to his side (*Din.* 1.14 = 3.17; *Isoc.* 15. 113ff). Though he failed to take Amphipolis, he carried on a war against Cotys around the Thermaic Gulf and the Chalcidice for several years, achieving much success (*Diod.* 15.81.6).<sup>54</sup>

Timotheus was active against Cotys at the very time Iphicrates was at Cotys' court, working on his behalf. It might have been against some of Timotheus' forces that Iphicrates fought a naval engagement.<sup>55</sup> The two generals were fierce rivals for power in Athens, bringing each other to trial on different occasions, and replacing one another in military commands once one had fallen out of favor. While the two were eventually reconciled by the marriage of Timotheus' daughter to Iphicrates' son, their longstanding rivalry encapsulates the volatility of Athenian democratic politics and the competition for military honors among members of the elite.<sup>56</sup>

Timotheus, though, was no Iphicrates. A student of Isocrates and thus a committed Panhellenist, Timotheus strove long and hard to maintain the Second Athenian Confederacy, with the acquisition of allies and a unification of purpose

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<sup>52</sup> As noted by Cargill 1981: 182-183, n. 42.

<sup>53</sup> For the text of the decree, see Cargill 1981: 14-27; for Timotheus' role in enlisting various states, and the relevant chronology, see Cargill 1981: 61-65.

<sup>54</sup> See Burich 1994: 142.

<sup>55</sup> For the date of this action, see E. Harris 1989: 266, n. 11.

<sup>56</sup> For more on the conflict between Timotheus and Iphicrates, see above, ch. 5.

among the Greeks his overriding goal.<sup>57</sup> While he did take up mercenary service for a period, it was in no way opposed to Athenian interests, and he was forced into the position because Iphicrates had had him removed from command. Service abroad, far from a hostile *demos*, proved necessary time and again for many prominent Athenians. Theopompus says that Timotheus left Athens and withdrew to Lesbos, though it is unclear when and for how long this occurred (FGrHist 115 F 105). Whereas Iphicrates worked against the Athenian cause in Thrace on more than one occasion, Timotheus' contact with Thrace and the Greek cities on the Thracian littoral was geared to winning allies for Athens and checking Cotys' hostile actions.

Timotheus was generally regarded as an upright figure. Nepos, for one, remarks on his temperance and decency, insisting that despite his many powerful foreign connections he considered loyalty to his homeland greater than any principle of hospitality (*Tim.* 4). His scruples may have been his undoing. While Iphicrates and Menestheus were acquitted in the trial of 356 following the defeat at Embata in the Social War, Timotheus was found guilty and fined 100 talents. He withdrew to Chalcis in disgrace and died soon afterwards.<sup>58</sup> While Iphicrates might have secured his own acquittal by intimidating the court with a band of his own retainers (Polyaen. 3.9.15, 29; Sen. Rhet. *Cont.* 6.5), Timotheus resorted to no such measures. Isocrates attributed his legal condemnation and disgrace to a lack of courting the Athenian populace. For Isocrates, Timotheus was as inept at securing public favor as he was

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<sup>57</sup> For Timotheus as an Isocratean Panhellenist, see Burich 1994: 178-193. See also Ober (1998: 248-286, esp. 268-277) for a discussion of Isocrates' political philosophy as appears in his speeches *Antidosis* and *Areopagiticus*, and its relation to students such as Timotheus.

<sup>58</sup> For the trial, see: Diod. 16.21.4; Isok 15.129; Dein 1.14; Nep. *Iph.* 3.3, *Tim.* 3; Polyaen. 3.9.29; Plut. *Mor.* 801-802.



skilled at handling affairs (15.131). While he was not totally above the use of clever instruments to overcome his opponents – he did threaten to bring Iphicrates up on a charge of *xenia* ([Dem.] 49.66) – Timotheus in the main looked out for the interests of Athens and the league rather than elevating himself at the expense of the *polis*. It is unlikely that a student of Isocrates, the leading advocate for uniting the Greeks against a barbarian foe, would have spent too much time at the court of a barbarous Thracian. And besides, it was his arch rival Iphicrates who was influential with Cotys.

### ***Chabrias***

Chabrias was the general who inspired Theopompus' list of Athenians opting to live abroad (FGrHist 155 F 105). An able commander, he was from a family of means and prominence and had a penchant for luxury. His profligacy, extravagance, and great wealth are attested in many sources outside of Theopompus, many of which are usefully enumerated by Davies.<sup>59</sup> His military victories were numerous, the most famous being the naval defeat of the Spartans at Naxos in 376. This was widely hailed as the first true Athenian naval victory since the Peloponnesian War, overshadowing Conon's achievement with a Persian fleet at Cnidus (Diod. 15.35). Like Conon and Iphicrates, Chabrias received great personal rewards at Athens for this and other victories, including a bronze statue modeled to reflect his storied tactical ingenuity against Agesilaus in Boeotia.<sup>60</sup> But, like many other talented generals, Chabrias at

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<sup>59</sup> Davies 1971: 560-561.

<sup>60</sup> For the honors after Naxos, see esp. Dem. 20.75, 84-85, 146. Chabrias' statue was designed to mirror the stance he urged his troops to adopt to receive a charge of Agesilaus' hoplites in 378/7. Most of the evidence indicates that he had his soldiers stand at ease, with their shields resting upon their knees, in order to display their contempt of the Spartan forces who in turn called off their advance. See Anderson

times could not bear the Athenians, their fickle support and their disapproval of his more eccentric traits. So, as Theopompus tells us, he chose to leave Athens for Egypt, where he acted as a mercenary general for at least two different rulers.

Like Iphicrates, Chabrias has been equated to a *condottiere*. And, as in the case of Iphicrates, Pritchett objects to this characterization of Chabrias, claiming that aside from two brief sojourns in Egypt Chabrias remained loyal in his service to Athens and always acted at the behest of the Athenians.<sup>61</sup> Our sources are explicit, however, in their description of Chabrias' involvement in Egypt as being a private enterprise lacking any formal Athenian directive or sanction. Nepos says that Chabrias went to Egypt *sua sponte* on two separate occasions, which is in direct contrast to the service he rendered to Evagoras of Salamis at the head of an official Athenian expedition. In the case of his second journey to Egypt, self-interested motives are attributed to him, namely a desire to reap material rewards equivalent to those given to Agesilaus who had agreed to serve Tachus as a general (Nep. *Chab.* 2). Likewise, Diodorus says that Chabrias went to aid the Egyptian king Acoris without first securing the approval of the *demos* (ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ δήμου γνώμης προσδεξάμενος, 15.29.2), and in the case of Tachus, Chabrias was persuaded to serve privately (ἰδίᾳ) instead of being sent publically by Athens (δημοσίᾳ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος, 15.92.3).

Prior to the King's Peace, Chabrias had been sent by the Athenians to aid

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1963; Buckler 1972. The interpretation of Burnett and Edmonson (1961), that the statue depicted a kneeling hoplite, is based on a confused passage of Nepos (*Chab.* 1.3), but the description in Diodorus (15.33.4) should be preferred.

<sup>61</sup> Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 72-77.

Evagoras in his revolt from Persia and helped him consolidate power over all of Cyprus. Xenophon says the Athenians sent Chabrias out with some 800 peltasts and a large number of hoplites under the control of Demaenetus, probably the same man who had earlier brought supplies to Conon while he was working with Evagoras (*Hell.* 5.1.10). This expedition set sail in late 388 or early 387. A year later, Athens was forced to acquiesce to the terms outlined by the King's Peace.<sup>62</sup> This would have ended the official Athenian help to Evagoras. Chabrias, though, appears to have remained in Cyprus a while longer before going to Egypt and entering the service of Acoris sometime in 386.<sup>63</sup> Pritchett disapprovingly quotes both Grote and Parke, who argue that after the ratification of the King's Peace Chabrias refused to return to Athens and maintained control of his forces abroad, just as Iphicrates did in Thrace.<sup>64</sup> It is unclear whether Chabrias maintained a private force which he brought to Egypt, but he did indeed enter the service of the Egyptian king after most likely serving Evagoras privately for a time. His position in Egypt was much the same as Iphicrates' in Thrace during the same period. Both generals had been abroad leading Athenian forces and both opted not to return to Athens once overseas state ventures were rendered impossible by the terms of the peace.

The similarity between the careers of the two men is remarkable. Aside from enjoying a reputation as great tacticians, both rendered important financial and governmental advice to their foreign patrons. While in the employ of Tachus,

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<sup>62</sup> For the chronology, see Stylianou 1988: 466-469.

<sup>63</sup> The chronology of Chabrias' activities in Egypt has troubled scholars for some time, given that Diodorus (15.29.1-4) relates these events under the year 377/6. Stylianou (1998: 100-101) gives the most plausible solution, suggesting that Diodorus' source, Ephorus, had at this point in his narrative provided a summary of all events in Egypt from 386 until the dispatch of Iphicrates in 380/79.

<sup>64</sup> Grote 1851-1856: vol. 9, 322; Parke 1933: 59; quoted in Pritchett 1974-1991: vol. 2, 77.

Chabrias set up an essentially Athenian-style financial system in Egypt, in spite of the near total lack of a money-driven economy.<sup>65</sup> Pseudo-Aristotle describes Chabrias' financial savvy in relation to that of Iphicrates in Thrace (*Econ.* 2.1350b33-1351a32). As Iphicrates was granted estates in Thrace, Chabrias also seems to have been awarded land in Egypt. Strabo mentions the palisaded camp (χάραξ) and the village (κώμη) of Chabrias in Egypt (16.2.33; 17.1.22). While the former may denote a temporary military encampment, the latter was probably a more permanent settlement. The Elder Pliny also refers to an encampment (*castra*) of Chabrias (*Nat. Hist.* 5.25). In the same way that Iphicrates faced legal troubles at Athens, Chabrias was taken to trial in 366 due to the loss of Oropus to the Boeotians (*Dem.* 21.64). And finally, Chabrias' activities abroad may have incurred the scorn of many Athenians, as a remark of Demosthenes concerning one of Chabrias' Athenian mercenaries in Egypt indicates (19.287). Because of his foreign activities, Iphicrates was himself brought up on a charge of *xenia* by Timotheus.

While their careers were similar, Chabrias and Iphicrates may have been rivals.<sup>66</sup> Chabrias often led mercenary troops, including peltasts (*Xen. Hell.* 5.1.10; 4.14), and he was sent by the Athenians as Iphicrates' replacement in command of the mercenary corps at Corinth (*Diod.* 14.92.2; Harpocration, s.v. ξενικὸν ἐν Κορίνθῳ). When the Persians complained to the Athenians about Chabrias' involvement on the side of the Egyptians in the 380's, the Athenians summoned Chabrias back to Athens and sent out Iphicrates to serve as a general for the Persians (*Diod.* 15.29-1-4). The

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<sup>65</sup> For his financial services to Tachus, see Will (1960) who argues that Chabrias largely anticipated the financial reforms of the Ptolemies.

<sup>66</sup> As suggested by Strauss 1987: 156.

rivalry may have gone as far back as the 390's when Chabrias served in the diplomatically successful expedition of Thrasybulus to Thrace in 390/89 (IG ii<sup>2</sup> 21; 22). Thrasybulus had been a longtime rival of Conon, Iphicrates' mentor, and it was Iphicrates that was sent by the Athenians to replace Thrasybulus' mission in the north once the latter had died (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.33-35). Chabrias took up service in Egypt for Acoris and Tachus during the late 380's and the late 360's respectively, precisely the two time periods in which Iphicrates was influential at the court of Cotys in Thrace. Though at times Chabrias had been involved in Thrace – with Thrasybulus in 390/89, and in the 370's when he saved Abdera from the marauding Triballians (Diod. 15.36.4) and won many Thracian cities over to the Second Athenian Confederacy – great influence among the Odrysians was wielded by his rival Iphicrates.<sup>67</sup> This might have effectively shut Chabrias out of the north Aegean and curtailed any influence he could have had in Thrace.

As Theompomus attests, Egypt was an outlet for Chabrias, much as Thrace was for Iphicrates and others. How, then, was Egypt different from Thrace in terms of the advantages and opportunities afforded ambitious Athenians? First of all, aside from the sixty-year span between 404-343, Egypt was under the control of the Persians for roughly the entire period covered by this study. Essentially, then, I regard Egypt as a Persian context. The experiences of Conon and Alcibiades reveal the pitfalls of turning to Persia for advancement and an alternative to Athenian democracy. Suffice it to say that the levels of autonomy attainable for a Greek in Thrace could not be matched under the King and his satraps. Even under Egyptian

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<sup>67</sup> For Chabrias' acquisitions in Thrace on behalf of Athens, see Burnett and Edmonson 1961: 82-84; Woodhead 1962: 259.

rulers, haughty Greek commanders could be disappointed by the limitations imposed on them. Agesilaus, for instance, was vexed at being given a subordinate military position to Tachos when he ventured to Egypt as a mercenary (Plut. *Ages.* 37.1-2). At any rate, the volatile nature of Egypt during the period of 404-343, when there were several conflicts with Persia and multiple dynastic quarrels, did offer many opportunities for mercenary service and the acquisition of riches which Greeks like Chabrias exploited. But, unlike Thrace, Egypt was a venerable and ancient society, civilized centuries before even the emergence of the Greek *polis*, with entrenched institutions like the priesthood and a rigorous code of laws. Wealth and influence aside, perhaps Egypt simply did not offer the same cultural attractions as Thrace. The *exousia* up for grabs in the lawless regions north of the Aegean might have been missing in Egypt, not to mention the chariot-racing, heroic feasting, and other ancillary benefits which were attractive to elite Athenians. Egypt was not a rough-and-tumble frontier for the Athenians in the same way as Thrace. Finally, Egypt did not have the same geographic proximity nor quite so long and rich a history of diplomatic and military connections with Athens.<sup>68</sup> Aside from Chabrias, there were very few Athenians whom we could legitimately call Egypt-haunters.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Egypt is roughly 600 miles from Athens, with Crete lying in between at about a third of the distance, just under 200 miles. By contrast, the Thracian Chersonese is only 200 miles from Athens, with many friendly islands such as Imbros, Lemnos and Scyros lying in between.

<sup>69</sup> In the late 460's the Athenians launched an expedition to Egypt to aid the Libyan king Inarus in his revolt from Persian control. The expedition, which Thucydides says involved over 200 ships, came to ruin after six years (Thuc. 1.104, 109-110; Diod. 11.71.3-6, 74.1-4, 75, 77.1-5). Thucydides' brief account portrays this venture as one of the Athenian state, in line with campaigns in Cyprus and elsewhere. We are largely in the dark about internal Athenian politics in this period, and we do not know who advocated the mission to Egypt, whether Cimon, who may have already been ostracized, Pericles, or someone else. See Gomme et al. 1945-1981: vol. 1, 306-307. As such, we cannot evaluate whether this mission was in any way driven by a person somehow tied to Egypt, like those spearheaded by Cimon to the Chersonese and Thasos.

### ***Thrace versus Persia: The Case of Alcibiades***

With the figure of Alcibiades we are uniquely positioned to evaluate some of the differences between Thrace and Persia as foci of interest for elite Athenians. The most pronounced distinction between the two societies, from an Athenian perspective, was the level of autonomy an ambitious Greek could hope to achieve. To be sure, many Greeks were able to exercise remarkable power and influence within the Persian Empire. For instance, Persia had on many occasions supported Greek tyrants in Ionia such as Histiaeus of Milteus. But, when Histiaeus and his nephew Aristagoras tried to establish their own niche in Thrace centered around a fortified settlement at Myrcinus on the Strymon, and started to accumulate their own private resources in terms of men and materiel, they began to pose a threat to Darius. Accordingly, on the advice of Megabazus who warned against such men being given power in advantageous territory, Histiaeus was recalled to Susa (Hdt. 5.23). Aristagoras probably would have been too, had he not been killed by local Thracians during an attempt at expanding his territory (Hdt. 5.124-126).<sup>70</sup>

Alcibiades had extensive dealings with the Persians. After he fled the Spartans who had grown to distrust him, he became an advisor to Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap in Sardis. Alcibiades, a haughty, talented, and urbane figure, thoroughly charmed Tissaphernes. The satrap was so enamored with the great Hellene, that he named the most luxurious park in his dominion “The Alcibiades” (Plut. *Alc.* 24.4.-5). Meiggs has argued that it was Tissaphernes’ own sophisticated attraction to

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<sup>70</sup> For more on Histiaeus and Aristagoras in Thrace, see Isaac 1986: 15-17.

Hellenism, in stark contrast to the boorishness of the uncultured Spartans, that ensured Alcibiades a privileged position in his court.<sup>71</sup> Perhaps Alcibiades was himself attracted to the lifestyle and power available among the Persians. Alcibiades advised his Persian host against hastily bringing defeat against either the Athenians or Spartans. Rather, it would be in the Persians' interest to prolong the war between the Greeks until all players were rendered weak. Accordingly, Tissaphernes decided to play both sides, promising, for example, to send money and ships to the Spartans, but delaying at every opportunity. While at the court of Tissaphernes, Alcibiades achieved so great a level of influence that he was able to conduct business personally in the satrap's name (αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγων ὑπὲρ τοῦ Τισσαφέρνης, Thuc. 8.45-46). Eventually, the double-dealing which Alcibiades had encouraged Tissaphernes to adopt backfired. The satrap was forced to arrest Alcibiades after the latter had been denounced by the Spartans to the Great King. Alcibiades eventually escaped this imprisonment (Plut. *Alc.* 27.5).

A few years later, in 409/8, Alcibiades managed to convince Pharnabazus, the energetic satrap of Phrygia, to swear a personal oath to him. The other Greek generals had sworn oaths to the Persians regarding their treatment of the city of Chalcedon. Though Alcibiades was absent at the time, Pharnabazus thought it appropriate that he also be made to give an oath. Alcibiades, however, refused to swear anything unless Pharnabazus in turn swore an oath to him personally. Thus, in addition to making pledges about Chalcedon, both leaders gave private assurances to each other (Xen.

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<sup>71</sup> Meiggs 1972: 354-355.



*Hell.* 1.3.11-12).<sup>72</sup>

Alcibiades time and again showed himself a master at entering into profitable relationships with the most powerful men in the Persian Empire. The ties he forged with Pharnabazus seemed on the cusp of bearing fruit once Alcibiades was forced to leave his possessions in Thrace following Aegospotami in 405. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades entered the Persian Empire at this time determined to make himself as useful to the Great King as Themistocles had been (*Alc.* 37.4). While in Phrygia, his ally Pharnabazus gave him the town of Grunium, from which he was able to derive fifty talents in revenue annually, a situation analogous to that of Themistocles under Artaxerxes (*Nep. Alc.* 9). Before he was able to gain a position at the court of the king, however, Alcibiades was killed at the request of Lysander by Pharnabazus' agents (*Plut. Alc.* 39).

Powerful as he was, Alcibiades was always subservient to the Persians while in their empire. In Thrace things were a different matter. Militarily active in the north Aegean, especially around the Hellespont, since at least 411, at some point he established settlements in the area. Xenophon only mentions unspecified fortified settlements (τείχη), while other sources name perhaps three places in the vicinity of Bisanthe and Pactye (*Xen. Hell.* 1.5.17; 2.1.15; *Lys.* 14.26-27; *Plut. Alc.* 36.3; *Nep. Alc.* 7).<sup>73</sup> It seems that he had secured these fortified places in case he needed a refuge from the Athenians, which in fact he did after the defeat at Notium in 407/6. His settlements were near the territory controlled by the Philaids in the late sixth and early

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<sup>72</sup> For the special relationship between these two, see Hatzfeld 1940: 286.

<sup>73</sup> For these settlements, see Isaac 1986: 211-212.

fifth century, and a conscious emulation of their hereditary dominion might have been intended.<sup>74</sup> After Notium, he remained in Thrace until the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami left the Spartans as masters of the Aegean. Remaining in coastal settlements, no matter how well fortified, was rendered imprudent in such a climate. Accordingly, Alcibiades fled across the Hellespont to the court of Pharnabazus.<sup>75</sup>

Alcibiades seemed to enjoy a great deal of autonomy while in Thrace, and was even able to raise sizeable armies of Thracians for his own use. In 409, while he was campaigning in the north more or less independently of the official directives of Athens, he seized the city of Selymbria with the forces of the Chersonese and a large number of Thracian troops (Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.10).<sup>76</sup> Plutarch says that the Thracians under his command at this time served Alcibiades zealously because of the goodwill and affection they had for him (*Alc.* 30.4-5). Nepos tells us that when he withdrew to his fortresses after Notium, he raised a force of locals and became the first Greek to penetrate into the interior parts of Thrace. By this action, his fame greatly increased and he was able to secure alliances with some of the kings of Thrace (*Alc.* 7). Plutarch clarifies that Alcibiades at this time withdrew from the Athenians, gathered a force of foreign fighters, and on his own initiative (ἰδίᾳ) attacked some kingless Thracians (ἄβασιλεύτοι), and also protected the Greeks living on the frontier from Thracian incursions (*Alc.* 36.3).

These actions appear to have been undertaken by Alcibiades on his own,

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<sup>74</sup> Hatzfeld 1940: 319-322.

<sup>75</sup> Hatzfeld 1940: 339.

<sup>76</sup> For the independent status of the Athenian generals in the Hellespont during this period, see Andrewes 1953.

without the direction of the Athenians or any local Thracian ruler. He did manage to ally himself with Thracian leaders, notably Medocus and Seuthes II. Nepos implies that these alliances were made because of the military success he enjoyed in Thrace. Scholars have surmised that Alcibiades at some point gave aid to these rulers against rebel Thracians. The kingless Thracians mentioned by Plutarch might have been rebelling against the authority of Seuthes. That Alcibiades was able to offer the support of both Medocus and Seuthes to the Athenians at Aigospotamoi suggests that he had rendered both kings valuable services (Diod. 13.105.3). This is especially interesting given that Medocus and Seuthes were often fierce rivals for power, as both claimed legitimate descent from the Odrysian king Seuthes I.<sup>77</sup> Alcibiades was a master at playing both sides, and he appears to have done so in Thrace to his own advantage. He also seems to have had his own force of peltasts and horsemen at Aegospotami (Plut. *Alc.* 37.2).

There is no indication that he was under the authority of any Thracian ruler. Two of the territories offered to Xenophon by Seuthes had been controlled by Alcibiades. Heraclides of Maronea persuaded Seuthes that it was dangerous to give these fortified places to Xenophon, a man with an army (*An.* 7.5.8). This was most likely a thinly veiled reference to Alcibiades' own fortresses.<sup>78</sup> Heraclides' remark implies that Alcibiades had been a threatening presence in Thrace, as he had owned several fortresses and commanded private armies independent of a Thracian authority. Because of their fortified position at Myrcinus, Histiaeus and Aristagoras had threatened to acquire more power than the Persians could tolerate. Seuthes heeded the

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<sup>77</sup> Hatzfeld 1940: 319-320; Archibald 1998: 122-123.

<sup>78</sup> Archibald 1998: 123.

advice of Heraclides and ceased mentioning the territories to Xenophon, fearful that with these fortresses the Athenian general would be too powerful and autonomous a force in the area. A few decades later, Cotys granted Iphicrates territory of his own on which to settle in Thrace. Even after he fell out with Cotys and began to fear for his life, Iphicrates was able to remain on his holdings in Thrace. This suggests that, because of his control of fortified settlements, he too enjoyed a high degree of autonomy independent of the local ruler.<sup>79</sup>

Few places could rival Thrace for sheer opportunity. Alcibiades, like the Philaids before him, was able to sow the seeds of his own statelet near the Hellespont, where he commanded great material resources and his own private armies. While he at times worked on behalf of the Thracian kings in the area, he did so to increase his own power and influence, not because of any compulsion from a higher authority. He had enjoyed tremendous, albeit fleeting, influence among the Persians. Yet, he was never able to take charge of his own private forces to do with as he pleased. He could influence and manipulate powerful men like Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, but he was always under their direct authority and ultimately under the power of the Great King. Estates in the Persian Empire, such as Grunium in Phrygia, were a source of vast revenue for Alcibiades, but they were not his to do with as he wished as his fortresses in Thrace seem to have been.

Conon had achieved perhaps the greatest level of military authority of any Greek among the Persians. While he was given a startling amount of power, it was always at the behest of the Persians. When he tried to use this money and influence to

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<sup>79</sup> See above, ch. 5.

reestablish Athenian power in the Aegean, decidedly against Persia's interest, he was arrested by the satrap Tiribazus, effectively ending his career (Xen. 4.8.12-16). Other Athenians, like Conon, were able to rise to positions of prominence at the courts of foreign kingdoms, from Persia to Egypt. As the career of elder Miltiades and his successors, as well as the attempts of men such as Histiaeus, have demonstrated, the territories of Aegean Thrace were best placed to offer ambitious Greeks their own autonomous niche. Were it not for the destruction of Athenian naval power in 405, Alcibiades might have been able to achieve lasting power on the Hellespont.

As in the famous formulation of Herodotus (5.3), the Thracians were numerous and potentially very powerful, yet they were never able to unite under a single authority or behind a common purpose. Accordingly, they remained fragmented and weak. For brief periods, the Odrysian kingdom under leaders such as Sitalces approached the sort of unity and central authority that positioned it as a potentially significant Mediterranean power. But, more often than not, internal divisions and dynastic squabbles within the kingdom threatened to tear it apart.<sup>80</sup> Alcibiades was able to exploit this situation to his own benefit by rendering influential Thracian rulers military aid against their rivals. Xenophon was offered territory and other benefits in return for aiding Seuthes II against rival Thracians. One of Thrasybulus' most pronounced diplomatic successes was engineering a rapprochement between competing Thracian kings. Thrace presented a tantalizing power vacuum for ambitious Athenians. Its natural resources and hordes of fierce warriors, eager to serve the highest bidder, were there for the taking.

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<sup>80</sup> See Archibald (1998: 122-123) for an example of the rival powers within the Odrysian kingdom during this period.

## ***Conclusions***

There were many places in which an Athenian could seek personal power as well as refuge from his native city. Thrace, though, was different. No other locale held the interest of so many great Athenians and great Athenian families. Sparta may be the sole exception to this, attracting men such as Cimon and Xenophon, but certainly such a claim can be made for no other non-Greek power, including Persia. This study has examined in detail several distinct cases of Athenians turning to Thrace, and usually ties were established between Thrace and several generations of a particular family rather than one individual. Diitrephes probably inherited his interest in Thrace from his older relatives, and the Philaids were active in the Chersonese for at least three generations. Other great families, only briefly touched upon in this study, had connections in the north, such as Hagnon and his son Theramenes. The list goes on and on. The same cannot be said for Persia, Egypt, or even Sparta.

Many things led to Athenian interest in the north, from metal and timber, to mercenary soldiers and military alliances, to vitally important shipping lanes. Thrace was also in close proximity to the Greek mainland in a way places such as Egypt were not. Unlike other locales, the vast resources of Thrace, lying within easy reach for the Greeks, were largely up for grabs. Though from time to time powerful kings did rule over large parts of the region, there were always internal divisions that could be exploited by a savvy leader. Where Alcibiades wielded his own private army in the service of rival kings, Conon led Persian forces and was subordinate to the Persian

satrap, a hierarchy he would ignore at his own peril. Hippias attempted to use the Persians as a means of regaining power in Athens in the model of the Greek tyrants of Asia. For a Pisistratid in the period before the Persian Wars this was a reasonable goal; but, after the Greek victories in 490 and 480-479, Hippias' attempt could never reasonably be emulated. In the north, however, a place of refuge complete with fortified settlements and private armies of local warriors was still available to exiled and dissatisfied Athenians.

Thrace also had certain cultural draws that appealed to men of a particular stripe. Where Iphicrates was attracted to life among foreign mercenaries and the horse-racing Philaids sought the prestige commensurate with their rank, Xenophon turned up his nose at the decadence of Seuthes' court, looking instead to the Spartans as military and moral exemplars. Though Themistocles found refuge in Persia, it was in Lampsacus, a city lying opposite the Thracian Chersonese, that he received cult honors. Chabrias, perhaps shut out of Thrace by his rival Iphicrates, found an outlet in Egypt, though few others did likewise. Egypt was often under Persian domination and did not offer the same sort of frontier existence as Thrace. As by turns a source of wealth, a place of refuge, and fount of great political and military power, Thrace provided the Athenians with a unique and oft-exploited alternative to their home city.

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS

The relationship between Athens and Thrace was complex, as were the motives and experiences of the various figures examined in this study. Nonetheless, some clear and important trends can be discerned throughout the two centuries in which Athens and Thrace were connected. As in the introductory chapter, the following concluding remarks have been grouped into three broad categories: Political, Military, and Cultural.

#### *Political*

So far as we know, Pisistratus was the first Athenian who found in Thrace the resources that could tip the balance of power in Athens. For Pisistratus in the mid sixth century, these resources were large sums of money and mercenary soldiers. He had tried to secure autocratic power in Athens on two occasions prior to turning to Thrace, and both times he was eventually overcome by his aristocratic rivals. After his second expulsion from the city, he turned to the Thermaic gulf where he established a settlement and evidently made connections with the local ruling elite. He also went to the region surrounding Mt. Pangaeum, recruiting soldiers and growing wealthy from the area's mines. Only then did he move south and amass his Greek allies from various states to help overwhelm his rivals at Pallene. Once back in power, Herodotus says he maintained his position by means of revenue from Thrace and by retaining a force of mercenaries, presumably those he recruited from Thrace (1.64).



Pisistratus' enemies at Athens were utterly bested, unable to challenge the tyrant's authority again. A new element had been introduced into Athenian politics that would be of central importance for the next two hundred years.

In his stimulating reassessment of the Athenian grain supply, Moreno concludes that the entire system of overseas clerouchies in the fifth century and trade in the fourth century with the Bosporan kingdom in the Black Sea was guided and driven by elites in order to cement their control of the Athenian grain trade. Control of the grain trade translated into entrenched control over politics.<sup>1</sup> Thus, we can observe a phenomenon in democratic Athens similar to that which occurred under Pisistratus, namely, that the securing of resources abroad led to political dominance at home. Moreno himself contends that it was the adventurism of Pisistratus, the Philaids, and others that established the trend of Athenian overseas acquisitions which led to this particular mechanism of elite control of the *polis*.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond grain supply, many examples of Thrace-haunter control over foreign resources in general can be brought to bear to enhance Moreno's premise. Diitrephes and Thrasybulus, for instance, made use of their foreign connections and access to the resource of foreign soldiers to bolster their own positions at Athens. Under the democracy, Diitrephes was appointed to what appears to have been a special command over a group of mercenaries in 413. Two years later, under an oligarchic government, he was made commander of the entire Thraceward region because of his preexisting ties to the area. In 404-403, Thrasybulus probably used Thracian mercenaries, and almost certainly Thracian metics at Athens, to defeat the Thirty

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<sup>1</sup> Moreno 2007, esp. 322-323.

<sup>2</sup> Moreno 2007: 140-141.

Tyrants and restore democracy to the city. As the hero of the democracy, Thrasybulus would enjoy lasting fame and no shortage of political prominence. Though he was eclipsed for a time by Conon, he eventually regained his position and won further renown by negotiating an alliance with two Thracian kings in 389. Likewise, Iphicrates achieved his greatest successes and was appointed to many of his commands because of his ties to foreign mercenary troops, many of whom were Thracian. Though a foreigner himself, Charidemus was elected to generalships and otherwise honored by Athens because of his ties to Thracian rulers and the influence he could wield for or against Athenian interests.

This was not a phenomenon unique to Thracian connections. Mitchell usefully gathers the examples of appointments made on the basis of personal foreign connections from the time of the Peloponnesian War through the fourth century, and at Athens it is apparent that leaders were selected based on ties to many foreign powers.<sup>3</sup> But the importance of Thrace in terms of strategic location and abundance of resources, coupled with the sheer number of leading Athenians that had connections in the region, meant that Thrace did play a larger role in this aspect of Athenian politics than did other locales.

Advancement at home, however, is not the whole story. Despite Moreno's insistence that the Athenian democracy was vulnerable to elite capture, several Athenian elites could not achieve the desired level of power and influence, either because they were outdone by their rivals, or because the democracy was too

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<sup>3</sup> Mitchell 1997. See 90-110 for Athenian appointments to various offices, including the generalship, based on foreign ties. Of the twenty-three Athenian generals listed (105), six were connected to Thrace. So, for the period covered by her study (435-323), over a quarter of the generals selected directly because of their foreign connections were tied to Thrace.

constraining. In such cases, Thrace provided a refuge and a power base where an ambitious Athenian could grow rich, acquire substantial tracts of territory, command private armies, and rule over subject populations. This exploitation of Thrace as an outlet from or an alternative to Athens was first ventured directly following Pisistratus' third and final seizure of power in Athens. Pisistratus' position was so unassailable that Miltiades the Elder jumped at the chance to leave Athens for the Thracian Chersonese, where he was made a tyrant in his own right and came to possess an area of vital strategic and economic importance. Though Moreno contends that such overseas ventures were always made with power at Athens being the primary goal, Miltiades made no attempt to emulate Pisistratus' triumphant return at the head of Greek allies and Thracian retainers.<sup>4</sup> Instead, he remained in the Chersonese and passed on his rule to two successors from the Philaid family, his nephews Stesagoras and Miltiades the Younger.

Alcibiades had made himself sufficiently valuable to the Athenians to be recalled from exile and reestablished as a leading general despite the affair of the herms and his defection to Sparta; his failure at Notium in 406, though, was the last straw for this would-be tyrant. He had also burned his bridges at Sparta and had faced arrest in the Persian Empire. But he had established ties in Thrace, where he turned as his last option. For Alcibiades, Thrace was much more than a refuge from the angry Athenians and the other peoples he had alienated. He came to possess valuable estates and led his own forces of Thracian soldiers, providing services for several Thracian rulers and even offering to supplement the Athenian force at Aegospotami. Once

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<sup>4</sup> Moreno 2007: 141.

power in Athens was no longer an option, Alcibiades found substantial power abroad in Thrace. Iphicrates too, though he had been responsible for important Athenian victories in the past, lost the control of the Hellespont in the 380's, and failed to retake Amphipolis in the 360's. On both occasions he likely faced prosecution at home or at the very least a loss of status and deprivation of command. Furthermore, Iphicrates had little time for the political arena, and with the imposition of the King's Peace the prospect of lucrative and prestigious military expeditions at the behest of Athens was greatly diminished. Thrace and the court of the Odrysian kings provided Iphicrates with a forum for military service, as well as an avenue to influence and wealth.

Many leading Athenians saw in Thrace a refuge that could spare them from the vicissitudes of Athenian public life. Lysias accused Thrasybulus of pondering to abandon Athens in favor of a freelance career in Thracian lands (28.5-6). There is no hard evidence that Lysias' charges were true, but members of the audience were probably inclined to believe them based on the precedent set by other generals, notably Thrasybulus' associate Alcibiades. Athenian politics were volatile and the *demos* was notoriously fickle. Despite his prestige and prior service for the *polis*, Thrasybulus did experience varying political fortunes at Athens. While Pisistratus was able for a time to end the cycle of aristocrats forcing one another out of power and even out of Athens itself, few other elites managed to do the same. The younger Miltiades returned to Athens from the Chersonese in 493 and enjoyed a position of considerable influence in the city, but not without facing a charge of tyranny at the hands of his rivals. Even though he was credited with the victory at Marathon, shortly afterwards he fell into disgrace after an unsuccessful expedition to Paros. His son

Cimon recouped his family's political and monetary fortunes through campaigns abroad, largely in Thrace, but Cimon too was eventually ousted by his rivals. The same pattern is true for countless other elite Athenians and their families. Ties abroad were often an avenue to power in Athens, but they were also utilized as insurance against a loss of power. This aspect of foreign connections is not fully addressed in Moreno's study.

Chapter 6 provides several control cases involving Athenians such as Conon and Chabrias who served abroad and had ties to places other than Thrace. Though it is beyond the scope of this study, perhaps another appropriate set of controls would be those Athenians who did not need to rely on foreign connections to achieve positions of power in Athens, especially those who enjoyed lasting power without the specter of political eclipse or worse. Pericles provides a stark exception to the normal patterns of Athenian public life. Though he spearheaded many expeditions abroad, he did not rely on foreign ties to solidify his place at Athens. Once in power, he remained there as a virtual autocrat until his death, though we can never know what would have become of his political career had he survived to see the war take a turn for the worse. For those unable to achieve what Pericles did, Thrace promised an alternative venue for power, wealth, and prestige removed from the rivalries and constraints of democratic politics. Because Thrace was materially rich and strategically situated while being weakly governed, and because it was located just across the Aegean within easy reach of Athens, it beckoned ambitious Athenians in ways other locales could not. As an outlet for the power-hungry, Thrace saved Athens from a great deal of political strife.

## ***Military***

Thracian soldiers, especially light-armed peltasts, had a great impact on the development of Greek tactics, a point which has been made by many scholars and refined substantially by Best. As Best has shown, peltasts became a regular presence in Greek infantries from the last quarter of the fifth century on, though they never replaced the hoplite phalanx as the primary military arm of virtually every Greek state. Greeks themselves were often prized as mercenaries in the fourth century precisely because they were heavy infantrymen, a type of soldier underrepresented in the armies of the Persians and other non-Greek powers.<sup>5</sup> Several factors prevented the Greeks from realizing a lasting combined-arms force. Greek *poleis* could not maintain professional armies for extended periods, which was essential for the intensive training and expertise required for an effective variegated force. On those occasions when Greek soldiers did take the field for years at a time, such as the March of the Ten Thousand, effective ways of integrating heavy and light infantry were developed and utilized, often to great effect. The Greeks were also constrained by their own military conventions, the predominance of the hoplite ethos in particular. As the Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria displayed contempt for the missile troops that forced them to surrender, good Athenian hoplites disdained the “naval mob” that had been empowered by their role as rowers in the fleet (Thuc. 8.72.2).<sup>6</sup> The level of prejudice was often so great that commanders strove to fight *de facto* hoplite battles even at sea,

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<sup>5</sup> See Best 1969: 110-119.

<sup>6</sup> These sentiments are also expressed in the so-called Old Oligarch’s essay on Athenian government. For a synopsis of this text, including its treatment of the naval mob, see Cartledge 2009: 140-142.

privileging the hoplite soldier over the lowly rower.<sup>7</sup>

But Greek tactics did evolve nonetheless, however delayed by the dogged persistence of the hoplite phalanx. Contacts with Thrace played no small part in this, starting well before the career of Iphicrates. Beyond the incorporation of the peltast, the evidence indicates that Thracians had a broader military influence than scholars have recognized. In the Chersonese, the Philaids had to come to terms with a different type of enemy, one making use of non-phalanx tactics and also one prone to raiding and the avoidance of pitched battle. Miltiades the Elder put a stop to enemy attacks on his territory by building a wall across the entire peninsula and leading raiding parties of his own which probably included both Greeks and Thracian Dolonci. The strategy of the barrier wall was repeated many times throughout antiquity, and its effectiveness in the Chersonese is demonstrated by the several occasions on which Miltiades' wall was rebuilt and strengthened. On a vase from the late sixth century the younger Miltiades is praised as "*kalos*" to accompany an image of a mounted archer dressed in barbarian fashion. Perhaps the horse-loving Philaids and their fellow Greek settlers in the north worked alongside native mounted troops or even adopted such tactics themselves. Back in mainland Greece, Miltiades might have applied the lessons learned from experience in Thrace. At Marathon, a battle led by Miltiades only three years after his return from the Chersonese, Greek hoplites charged at a run and slaves fought along with their masters, both for the first time. The famous charge might

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<sup>7</sup> Strauss (2000) argues that at the Battle of Eurymedon, Cimon modified his triremes to hold more hoplites for the political purpose of undercutting the importance of the thetic rowers. Fornara (1966) plausibly argued that the hoplite victory on the small island of Psyttaleia during the Battle of Salamis was exaggerated by Herodotus' sources in order to highlight the hoplite achievement at the expense of the navy.

reflect Miltiades' experience with enemy archers, and the slaves might have acted as light troops on the flanks, a tactic often employed by Thracian troops. A prejudice against slaves and the elevation of Marathon as the quintessential hoplite moment explain our sources' reluctance to expound upon the role of the slaves and other novel tactics employed in the battle.

In the fifth century several Athenian military leaders continued the Thracian connection. Hagnon successfully founded a colony in the midst of Thracian tribes and led the Thracian infantry of the Odrysian king Sitalces. Hagnon appears to have alerted his fellow Athenian generals to the usefulness of Thracian troops, and also how best to employ them. He had led the fearsome Dioi in 429/8, a group slated to serve with Demosthenes in Sicily in 413. Demosthenes himself was a pioneer in light-armed tactics, and had used Thracians and other mercenaries at Pylos in 425 to defeat the Spartans. At Pylos, Demosthenes worked in conjunction with Cleon, a man with some Thracian ties of his own. It was Cleon that had arranged for the contingent of light troops to be sent to Pylos. While Cleon tried to make use of Thracian mercenaries in the struggle to retake Amphipolis a few years later, he was defeated by Brasidas before his Thracian help arrived. In 413 the Dioi had arrived too late to serve with Demosthenes. Instead, the Athenians sent them back to Thrace under the command of Diitrephes, another figure with an awareness of how these Thracian soldiers could be effectively utilized. Diitrephes and the Dioi ravaged the territory of Tanagra and then carried out a surprise attack on Mycalessus after ascending to a mountain pass in the dark.

After the defeat in Sicily, the main theatre of the Peloponnesian War was the



Aegean, especially along the coast of Ionia and the Thraceward region to the north. Two leading players in this phase of the war were Alcibiades and Thrasybulus, and both conducted numerous campaigns in Thrace and led Thracian soldiers. Alcibiades had Thracian horsemen and peltasts at his beck and call, which he offered to the Athenians at Aegospotami. Thrasybulus used Thracians in the struggle against the Thirty Tyrants at Athens, and the evidence indicates that he well understood the proper tactical use of Thracian troops. He attacked the forces of the Thirty at dawn after descending from the lofty mountain fort of Phyle by night, and his troops cut down hundreds of their enemies with missile weapons. In the Piraeus, Thrasybulus arranged his Thracian and other light-armed soldiers on the high ground behind his own phalanx from where they could rain down missiles on the Thirty's hoplites. These and other ingenious deployments of Thracian and Thracian-style soldiers occurred well before Iphicrates' destruction of the Spartan *mora* at Corinth and before his famous infantry reforms.

Iphicrates himself learned much from his experiences with Thracians. He was indeed a skilled captain of peltasts, but he seems also to have taken steps to create the ideally versatile infantry soldier. During his campaign in Egypt, he was unable to marshal complementary contingents of hoplites and peltasts, so he improvised by equipping his troops such that they could fight in close order or dash out to harass and pursue the enemy as the situation demanded. Best rightly asserts that Nepos and Diodorus erred in ascribing to Iphicrates the introduction or regularization of peltasts through these novel measures. But Iphicrates did show an ability to innovate based on his experiences with Thracian troops. It seems more likely that his new type of

versatile soldier did not become a regular feature of fourth century Greek armies because of the constraints placed on Greek militaries – especially a lack of continuous training – rather than because he made no such innovations.

The prominent Athenians with connections to Thrace were likely instrumental in bringing Thracian troops into Athenian service. A man like Hagnon, politically and militarily eminent in Athens prior to and during the Peloponnesian War, would have told figures such as Demosthenes and Cleon how valuable Thracian fighters could be, and he would have drawn upon his ties to Sitalces and other leading Thracians to procure the services of the Dioi and those like them. As the Greek *poleis* lining the northern Aegean coast developed Thracian tactics due to their proximity to and experience with Thracian tribes, so too would Athens, with many of its renowned citizens intimately tied to Thrace, have appreciated the utility of Thracian tactics from sheer exposure to them. Simply put, Athens played a leading role in the incorporation of Thracian elements into Greek warfare because many Athenian military leaders spent time in Thrace and were connected to the Thracians. Those who study Greek military developments, including Best, have not taken this relationship into account.

The tacticians who introduced new methods of warfare had to be open to experimentation outside the bounds of traditional military practice. Vidal-Naquet has plausibly argued that the Athenian navy was able to experiment with novel ways of fighting because it was a relatively new arm of the military and was manned by lower classes of Athenians. The ideology of the hoplite phalanx could thus be circumvented. In the fourth century, Plato disparaged naval victories as due to *techne* rather than any innate virtue on the part of the combatants. By implication, the ritualized nature of

phalanx battle ensured that battles were won by the moral qualities of the victors instead of clever trickery or cunning maneuver.<sup>8</sup> What led Athenian commanders to embrace new ways of fighting that were so often disdained by the hoplite classes and the cultural elite alike?

Iphicrates and other influential leaders of peltasts cared little whether their soldiers were seen as legitimate according to the prevailing ethos. Throughout their careers, Thrace-haunters demonstrated that they were not tied down by civic ideology or obeisance before the ethics embraced by the *demos*. They turned to Thrace in the first place largely because they were out of step with Athenian ideals and constraints. They did not strive for a reputation as model citizens in the eyes of their fellow Athenians, but rather they sought the aggrandizement of power, wealth, and prestige. In the same way, they saw that unconventional tactics could be very effective in achieving their military ends. It was to Iphicrates' advantage that the Spartans at Lechaeum stuck to more or less regular hoplite tactics and made themselves vulnerable when they attempted to modify these tactics by breaking formation to pursue the peltasts. The Spartans might have disdained the ranged troops arrayed against them at Sphacteria, but there too unconventional tactics, noble or otherwise, carried the day. Leading barbarian troops, marrying barbarian princess, and courting the favor of barbarian kings were activities often reviled at Athens, and more than once led to prosecution in the courts. But such methods could achieve the desired outcomes for those who practiced them. In Thrace-haunters, experience with the

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<sup>8</sup> Vidal-Naquet 1999 [1968]: 228-234. See especially Plat. *Laws* 706b-c, where naval crews are compared unfavorably to hoplites. Whereas hoplites courageously stand their ground, naval tactics often dictate tactical retreats.

Thracians and an awareness of the military value of Thracian troops was coupled with a willingness to employ new and “ungentlemanly” tactics regardless of social and cultural stigma.

The figures examined in this study were ready to take unprecedented military measures well beyond battlefield tactics. Miltiades the Younger freed large numbers of slaves to fight at Marathon, and those slaves that fell in the battle were buried on the plain itself, just as the Athenian citizens were. This remarkable emancipation and enfranchisement was not repeated until after the Battle of Arginusae eight and a half decades later. Thrasybulus tried to reward his supporters, which included Greek and non-Greek metics resident at Athens and probably also Thracian mercenaries, with full citizenship rights. These non-Athenians played a crucial part in restoring the Athenian democracy, but Thrasybulus’ attempts at honoring them were quashed in the face of opposition, and he himself was brought up on a charge of introducing an unlawful motion.<sup>9</sup> Freeing slaves and enfranchising foreigners were sometimes useful and even necessary measures, but they were few and far between. Athenian attitudes persisted towards slaves and foreigners, and also towards non-hoplite troops in general.

In the fourth century the most important land battles were fought between opposing phalanxes, which is perhaps the greatest testimony to Greek reluctance to adopt the new tactics and embrace the measures pioneered in large part by Thracians. In Herodotus, the Persian general Mardonius mocks the Greek style of battle, namely finding a level plain and fighting it out on even terms without either side attempting to employ strategic devices or make use of advantageous terrain

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<sup>9</sup> Hunt (2001) argues that part of the reason the generals of Arginusae were brought up on trial was that they advocated a policy of freeing and enfranchising the slaves who rowed in the fleet.

(7.9b). This is an exaggeration to be sure, but, so far as we can tell, even at Chaeronea in 338 the Greek forces consisted overwhelmingly of traditional citizen hoplites. They were crushed by Philip's variegated and professionally trained army.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Cultural***

When it comes to the cultural attractions Thrace held for certain Athenians, we can engage only in plausible speculation. Did the horse-loving Philaids feel at home among the people of the Chersonese, who were themselves fond of horse-racing and skilled at mounted warfare? Did the vain and pompous Alcibiades fit in well with the Thracians who expected their leaders to be ostentatious; and did Iphicrates appreciate the feasts to which he was treated by the Odrysians, especially in contrast to the apparent sparseness of dinners at Athens? In short, did Athenian leaders who were prone to what the Athenians might have viewed as personal excess find a cultural outlet in Thrace? I think the answer is yes, though it is impossible to say to what extent such cultural factors were involved in attracting these Athenians to Thrace.

Many Athenians, especially members of the *hippeis*, found Thracian attributes to be an appropriate expression of their social status. From black and red-figure vase-painting to the sculptural reliefs on the Parthenon, Athenian horsemen were regularly portrayed with Thracian clothing and equipment. To be sure, the peltast was often

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<sup>10</sup> This battle has been notoriously difficult to reconstruct. Our principal source is Diod. 16.85-86, supplemented with Polyæn. 4.2.2, 7. For a good reconstruction, see Hammond et al. 1972-1988: vol.2, 596-603. Diodorus says that Philip had in addition to his infantry no less than 2000 cavalry. The role of the cavalry in the battle is disputed. See, for example, Gaebel (2002: 154-157) who argues that, despite most scholarly reconstructions of the battle, the Macedonian cavalry could not have broken the densely packed phalanx of the Theban Sacred Band. In any case, Philip's own phalanx was expertly trained and had the advantage in technology with the longer *sarissa* that replaced the conventional hoplite spear. As the mainland Greeks developed no arm that could contend with heavy cavalry, so too did they fail to adapt to the threat posed by the Macedonian phalanx.

depicted as the antithesis of the heroic hoplite, and Thracians were associated with emblems of the barbarian other and foreign excess. But there is no mistaking that the Athenians had a fascination for the Thracians, one which seems to have been exploited by some members of the upper classes.

Maybe some truly did find Thracian culture to be a better expression of their aristocratic ideals, ideals that were out of fashion within the Athenian democracy. Also, many aspects of traditional elite training and education were out of step with the assembly-driven *polis*. Horsemanship, athletic prowess, and even martial skill and courage did not guarantee that political power would be granted by the *demos*. Alcibiades felt entitled to rule partly because he had won resplendent victories at Olympia. Other aristocrats probably felt the same. To Athenian eyes at least, the Thracians continued to revere brave warriors, whom they sometimes buried with their beloved horses. The Thracian ruler derived legitimacy from his martial prowess, his wealth, and his ability to reward his friends. He could also expect to be honored by his subjects with lavish gifts reminiscent of the symbols of *geras* so coveted by Homer's *basileis*.

In the end, Thrace made many Athenians rich and powerful. Part of this power certainly derived from their ability to appropriate Thracian cultural practices. Among Thracian dynasts the custom was to feast and exchange valuable gifts. Iphicrates, therefore, would have happily accepted the gifts given to him by his father-in-law along with lavish feasts and the other trappings of Thracian power. The Philaids would hardly have discouraged the honoring of the elder Miltiades with a cult, as this cult would only have enhanced their own claims to power. And so forth. Sensible

political actors are able to work within the prevailing ethos, regardless of their own beliefs.

The question of the divinity of Alexander the Great may provide a useful parallel. Throughout the course of his conquest of Asia, Alexander appropriated elements of the god-king model typical of the Persian rulers that preceded him. For example, he encouraged his Iranian subjects to honor him by *proskynesis*, the kneeling homage traditionally paid to the Persian king (Arr. *An.* 4.10; Curt. 8.5). As his reign progressed, he promoted the idea of his divinity ever more explicitly, establishing the model for the cults of Hellenistic monarchs.<sup>11</sup> Was his assumption of divine honors simply a means to win over his new subjects? Or did he actually believe he was divine? Both were probably true to a certain extent. Alexander could have been an insightful political and cultural manipulator while at the same time gratifying his own predispositions.<sup>12</sup> The analogy can be stretched further if we consider that while these activities might have appealed to Alexander's Iranian subjects, they incensed the Macedonians. In the same way, Thrace-haunters were routinely subjected to censure and even prosecution at home because of their affinity for barbarians.

With the Thrace-haunters, careful political calculation need not have been divorced from an attraction to Thracian cultural practices. Demosthenes' suggestion that a desire for *exousia* was a prime motivation in turning to Thrace rings true

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<sup>11</sup> See Bosworth (2006 [1988]: 278-290) for a full treatment of Alexander's divinity.

<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Edmunds (1971) who argues that Alexander's religiosity went well beyond the requirements of his office or the purposes of propaganda. There is considerable debate concerning the extent to which Alexander pursued a deliberate policy of cultural and political fusion between Macedonians and Asians, of which his adoption of Persian customs might have been part. Long ago Berve (1938) suggested that Alexander followed a careful, predetermined policy, while more recently Bosworth (1980) has argued that Alexander reacted as necessary to the various challenges of governing an empire filled with disparate peoples, making up policy decisions such as integration of Iranian troops and adoption of foreign customs as he went along.

(23.57). At the same time, we should not dismiss out of hand Theopompus' charge that Chabrias and other generals were too profligate and ostentatious for Athenian society (FGrHist 115 F 105). Such sentiment had indeed become a well-worn topos in the fourth century, but many of those Athenians that turned to Thrace seemed genuinely dissatisfied with the restraints of Athenian society. In Thrace power and wealth could be coupled with a pseudo-heroic lifestyle. This might have added to the appeal.

The exact relationship between what Athens as a *polis* tried to accomplish overseas in Thrace and what were the personal ventures of individual Athenians is often unclear. What is clear, however, is that for two centuries Athens and Thrace were intimately linked. These ties were forged and maintained by a set of individuals and families that Aristophanes aptly described as Thrace-haunters. Many of these Thrace-haunters were the most distinguished figures in the *polis* and were often those who shaped and effected Athenian policy at home and abroad. At the same time, they were frequently denied the power they sought at Athens and were forced to look elsewhere. From Pisistratus' seizure of power with the help of Thracian mercenaries and Pangaeum gold, to Athens' preoccupation with Amphipolis, the colony founded by Hagnon; and from the light-armed troops arrayed against the Spartans at Pylos, to the extreme measures aimed at safeguarding the Chersonese in the face of Philip's expanding empire, Thrace and the Thrace-haunters had a profound influence on the course of Athenian history.



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